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STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 803 

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE 
ON THE JUDICIARY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER SUFFICIENT 
GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO 
EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO IMPEACH 
RICHARD M. NIXON 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 


Book IV — Part 1 

EVENTS FOLLOWING 
THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN 

March 22, 1973— April 30, 1973 



MAY-JUNE 1974 


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
35 - 904 O WASHINGTON : 1974 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price: $15.15 in sets of 3 parts. 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PETER W, RODINO, Jr., New Jersey, Chairman 


HAROLD D. DONOHUE, Massachusetts 
JACK BROOKS, Texas 
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin 
DON EDWARDS, California 
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, Missouri 
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan 
JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania 
JEROME R. WALDIE, California 
WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama 
JAMES R. MANN, South Carolina 
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland 
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio 
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California 
ROBERT F. DRINAN, Massachusetts 
CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York 
BARBARA JORDAN, Texas 
RAY THORNTON, Arkansas 
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, New York 
WAYNE OWENS, Utah 
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, Iowa 


EDWARD HUTCHINSON, Michigan 
ROBERT McCLORY; Illinois 
HENRY P. SMITH III, New York 
CHARLES W. SANDMAN, Jr., New Jersey 
TOM RAILSBACK, Illinois 
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, California 
DAVID W. DENNIS, Indiana 
HAMILTON FISH, Jr., New York 
WILEY MAYNE, Iowa 
LAWRENCE J. HOGAN, Maryland 
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, Virginia 
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine 
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Wisconsin 
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California 
JOSEPH J. MARAZITI, New Jersey 
DELBERT L. LATTA, Ohio 


John Doar, Special Counsel 
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Special Counsel to the Minority 
Joseph A. Woods, Jr., Senior Associate Special Counsel 
Richard Cates, Senior Associate Special Counsel 
Bernard W. Nussbaum, Senior Associate Special Counsel 
Robert D. Sack, Senior Associate Special counsel 
Robert A. Shelton, Associate Special Counsel 
Samuel Garrison III, Deputy Minority Counsel 


Fred H. Altshuler, Counsel 
Thomas Bell, Counsel 
W, Paul Bishop, Counsel 
Robert L. Brown, Counsel 
Michael M. Conway, Counsel 
Rufus Cormier, Special Assistant 
E. Lee Dale, Counsel 
John B. Davidson, Counsel 
Evan A. Davis, Counsel 
Constantine J. Gekas, Counsel 
Richard H. Gill, Counsel 
Dagmar Hamilton, Counsel 
David Hanes, Special Assistant 
John E. Kennahan, Counsel 
Terry R. Kirkpatrick, Counsel 
John R. Labovitz, Counsel 
Laurance Lucchino, Counsel 
R. L. Smith McKeithen, Counsel 


Alan Marer, Counsel 
Robert P. Murphy, Counsel 
James B. F. Oliphant, Counsel 
Richard H. Porter, Counsel 
George Rayborn, Counsel 
James Reum, Counsel 
Hillary D. Rodham, Counsel 
Stephen A. Sharp, Counsel 
Jared Stamell, Counsel 
Roscoe B. Starek III, Counsel 
Gary W. Sutton, Counsel 
Edward S. Szukelewicz, Counsel 
Robert J. TRainor, Counsel 
J. Stephen Walker, Counsel 
Ben A. Wallis, Jr., Counsel 
William Weld, Counsel 
William A. White, Counsel 


(II) 



FOREWORD 


By Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary 


On February 6, 1974 , the House of Representatives adopted by a 

vote of 410-4 the following House Resolution 803: 

RESOLVED, That the Committee on the Judiciary acting as 
a whole or by any subcommittee thereof appointed by the 
Chairman for the purposes hereof and in accordance with 
the Rules of the Committee, is authorized and directed 
to investigate fully and completely whether sufficient 
grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exer- 
cise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. 

Nixon, President of the United States of America. The 
committee shall report to the House of Representatives 
such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or other 
recommendations as it deems proper. 

Beginning in November 1973, acting under resolutions referred to 
the Committee by the Speaker of the House and with a special appropria- 
tion, I had begun to organize a special staff to investigate serious 
charges against the President of the United States. 

On May 9, 1974, as Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

I convened the Committee for hearings to review the results of the 
Impeachment Inquiry staff's investigation. The staff began its initial 
presentation the same day, in executive session, pursuant to the Com- 
mittee's Impeachment Inquiry Procedures adopted on May 2, 1974. 

By June 21, the Inquiry staff had concluded its initial presen- 
tation. 


On June 25, the Committee voted to make public the initial pre- 
sentation including substantially all of the supporting material 


(Hi) 



- 2 - 


presented at the hearings. The Committee also voted to make public the 
President’s response, which was presented to the Committee on June 27 
and June 28 in the same form and manner as the Inquiry staff's initial 
presentation. 

Statements of information and supporting evidentiary material 
were compiled by the Inquiry staff in 36 notebooks and furnished in 
this form to each Member of the Committee. The notebooks presented 
material on several subjects of the Inquiry: the Watergate break-in 

and its aftermath, ITT, dairy price supports, domestic surveillance, 
abuse of the IRS, and the activities of the Special Prosecutors. 

The staff also presented to the Committee written reports on 
President Nixon's income taxes. Presidential impoundment of funds 
appropriated by Congress, and the bombing of Cambodia. 

Fifteen notebooks were furnished to the Members of the Committee 
relating to the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972 and to events fol- 
lowing the break-in, through April 30, 1973. In each notebook a state- 
ment of information relating to a particular phase of the investigation 
was immediately followed by supporting evidentiary material, which in- 
cluded copies of documents and testimony (much already on public record) , 
transcripts of Presidential conversations and affidavits. 

The fifteen volumes related to the Watergate phase of the 
Inquiry were divided into four books, as follows: 

Book I - Events Prior to the Watergate Break-In 
12/2/71 - 6/17/72 

Book II - Events Following the Watergate Break-In 
6/17/72 - 2/9/73 


(iv) 



-3- 


Book III - Events Following the Watergate Break-In 
6/20/72 - 3/22/73 

Book IV - Events Following the Watergate Break-In 
3/22/73 - A/30/73 

Book I dealt with events prior to the Watergate break- in . Book 
II dealt with allegations involving Presidential interference with the 
official Department of Justice investigation. Book III dealt with alle- 
gations concerning payments of "hush" money to Watergate defendants to 
insure their silence, offers of leniency and executive clemency, and 
the instigating or making of false statements to persons connected 
with an official investigation of Watergate; Book III also included 
a chronology of events between February 9 and March 22, 1973. Book 
IV dealt with events relating to the President's investigation of the 
Watergate break-in and alleged cover-up between March 22 and April 30, 
1973. 

Every effort was made to preclude inferences in the presentation 
of this material. A deliberate and scrupulous abstention from conclu- 
sions, even by implication, was observed. 

With respect to the Presidential recorded conversations, the 
Committee determined to hear the recorded conversations in their 
entirety. The Presidential recorded conversations were neither para- 
phrased nor summarized by the Inquiry staff. Thus, no inferences, or 
conclusions were drawn for the Committee. During the course of the 
hearings. Members of the Committee heard each recording and simultane- 
ously followed transcripts prepared by the Inquiry staff. Each of 


(v) 



-4- 


these transcripts is reprinted under the appropriate Statement of 
Information. 

During the course of the hearings, the Committee found it neces- 
sary to issue four subpoenas to President Richard Nixon requiring tape 
recordings of 98 Presidential conversations as well as all papers and 
things prepared by, sent to, received by, or at any time contained in 
the files of H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson, John 
Dean, III, and Gordon Strachan to the extent that such papers or things 
related or referred directly or indirectly to the break— in and electronic 
surveillance of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the 
Watergate office building during Hay and June of 1972 or the investiga- 
tions of that break-in by the Department of Justice, the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, or any other legislative, 
judicial, executive or administrative body, including members of the 
White House staff. 

The Committee also subpoenaed the President’s daily diaries (logs 
of Presidential meetings, telephone calls, and other activities) for the 
periods April through July 1972, February through April 1973, July 12 
through July 31,' 1973 and October 1973. 

In response to these subpoenas, the President furnished only 
edited White House transcripts of 31 of the subpoenaed conversations 
between March 17 and April 18, 1973. These edited transcripts were 
summarized by the Inquiry staff and made a part of the evidentiary 
material presented to the Committee. To the extent that the President 
declined to comply with the Committee’s subpoenas and produce the 


(VI) 



-5- 


required material, the record of the Committee now made public in these 
volumes is incomplete. 

In a few instances. Ranking Minority Member Mr. Hutchinson and 
I determined, pursuant to authority granted us by the Committee, to 
defer the release of evidentiary material or to delete it for one of 
the following reasons: 

1) Because the public interest in making the material public was 
outweighed by the potential prejudice to the rights of defendants under 
indictment and awaiting trial. 

2) Because the information was classified or otherwise required 
confidential treatment , 

3) Because the material was only marginally pertinent and was 
considered to be defamatory, degrading or embarrassing, or, 

4) Because the material was not pertinent to Presidential 
responsibility within the outer limits of an impeachable offense within 
the meaning of the Constitution. 

The Committee on the Judiciary is working to follow faithfully 
its mandate "to investigate fully and completely" whether or not suf- 
ficient grounds exist to recommend that the House exercise its constitu- 
tional power of impeachment. 

I believe that the readers of these volumes will see that the 
Committee's primary effort in carrying out its mandate has been to ob- 
tain an objective, impartial presentation which will enable each Member 
of the Committee to make an informed judgment in fulfilling his or her 
constitutional responsibility. 


(VII) 



- 6 - 


I also believe that the publication of the record of these hear- 
ings will provide readers with a clear idea of the particulars of the 
investigation and that the proximity of the evidence will assure them 
that no statement of Information is offered without supporting eviden- 
tiary material. 



July 1974 



CONTENTS 


Page 


Foreword iii 

Introductory Note xi 

Statement of Information 1 

Statement of Information and 

Supporting Evidentiary Material - Part 1 105 


NOTE: Book IV is published in three parts. Part 1 contains the entire 

statement of information and supporting evidentiary material for 
paragraphs 1-33. Part 2 contains copies of paragraphs 34-57 and 
the supporting evidentiary material for those paragraphs. Part 3 
contains copies of paragraphs 58-90 and the supporting evidentiary 
material for those paragraphs. 




INTRODUCTORY NOTE 


The material contained in this volume is presented in two sec- 
tions. Section 1 contains a statement of information footnoted with 
citations to evidentiary material. Section 2 contains the same state- 
ment of information followed by the supporting material. 

Supporting material consists of information obtained at hearings 
before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities; 
information developed in executive session by other Congressional com- 
mittees; information furnished to the Committee by the Grand Jury of 
the District of Columbia and by other grand juries; information fur- 
nished to the Committee by government agencies; transcripts of tape 
recordings of conversations among President Nixon and his key associates 
prepared by the Committee staff; information furnished to the Committee 
by the President, the Executive Departments of the Government, the 
Special Prosecutor, and other information obtained by the Committee, 
much of which was already on the public record. 

Each page of supporting evidence is labeled with the footnote 
number and a description of the document or the name of the witness 
testifying. Copies of entire pages of documents and testimony are 
included, with brackets around the portions pertaining to the state- 
ment of information. Markings on the documents include item numbers 
and receipt stamps of the House Judiciary Committee and other agencies 
from which the Committee received material. 


(xi) 



- 2 - 


In a few instances, names of persons in sensitive positions 
have been deleted from documents at the request of the CIA, FBI and 
other investigative agencies. Some documents contained deletions when 
the Committee received them. 

In the citation of sources, the following abbreviations are 
used: "SSC" for Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 

Activities; "SJC" for Senate Judiciary Committee; and "HJC" for House 
Judiciary Committee. 


(XII) 



STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 


EVENTS FOLLOWING 
THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN 
March 22, 1973 - April 30, 1973 


Part 1 


(l) 






1. On March 22, 1973 from 1:57 to 3:43 p.m. there was a meeting 

among the President, John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean. The following is an index to certain of the subjects 


discussed in the course of that meeting: 



TRANSCRIPT PAGE 

Nature and purpose of a written report on 
Watergate-related matters to be drafted 

22-33, 52-53, 

by John Dean. 

57, 74-75 

White House - contacts with the Senate 
Select Committee, and discussion of the 

7-19, 27-32, 35, 

activities of that Committee. 

46-51, 58-61, 64-68 

White House position on doctrine of 
executive privilege, and possible 

14, 19-21, 32-44, 

changes in that position. 

62, 64, 67-69, 76 

White House relationship to future Grand 
Jury investigations. 

56-58 

Reference to White House approach to 
disclosure as ''modified limited hang out" 
and other discussion relating to disclosure. 

70-74, 81-82, 86 


Page 

1.1 Tape recording of meeting among the President, 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean, March 22, 1973, 1:57 - 3:43 p.m., 
and House Judiciary Committee transcript there- 


of 108 

1.2 H. R * Haldeman notes, March 22, 1973 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 212 


( 3 ) 




2. On March 22, 1973, during the meeting specified in the preceding 

paragraph, the President telephoned Attorney General Kleindienst and 
spoke to him from 2:19 to 2:26 p.m. According to the White House log 
of meetings and conversations between the President and the Attorney 
General, except for the President's cabinet meeting on March 9, the 
last previous meeting or conversation between the President and Attorney 
General Kleindienst occurred on March 1, 1973. The President directed 
Kleindienst to be the Administration's contact with Senator Howard 
Baker in connection with the hearings to be conducted by the Senate 
Select Committee. He asked Kleindienst to give Senator Baker "guidance," 
to be "our Baker handholder," to "babysit him, starting in like, like 
ten minutes." 


Page 


2.1 Tape recording of meeting among the President, 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrllchman 
and John Dean, March 22, 1973, 1:57 - 3:43 p.m., 
and House Judiciary Committee transcript there- 
of 214 

2.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and Richard Kleindienst, March 22, 1973 (received 

from White House) 215 


( 4 ) 



3. On the morning of March 23, 1973 Judge John Sirica read in open 

court a letter that James McCord had written on March 19, 1973. The 
letter alleged in part that political pressure to plead guilty and 
remain silent had been applied to the defendants in the Watergate trial; 
that perjury had occurred during the trial; and that others involved in 
the Watergate operation were not identified when they could have been 
by those testifying. At this time. Judge Sirica deferred final sentenc- 
ing of all defendants except Gordon Liddy. Judge Sirica stated that in 
imposing sentence he would weigh as a factor the defendants ' cooperation 
with the ongoing Watergate investigations. 


Page 


3.1 Pnited States v. Liddy docket, March 23, 1973, 

28-29 218 

3.2 Pnited States v. Liddy transcript of proceedings, 

March 23, 1973, 2-6, 33-40 .... 220 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1 - 2 


( 5 ) 



4. On the morning of March 23, 1973 members of the press attempted 

to question John Dean regarding Patrick Gray's testimony at his confirma- 
tion hearings on the previous day that Dean "probably lied" when he told 
FBI agents on June 22, 1972 that he did not know whether Howard Hunt had 
a White House office. Later in the morning of March 23 Dean was informed 
by Paul O'Brien, an attorney for CRP, that a letter from James McCord to 
Judge Sirica had been read in open court. Dean has testified that he 
then telephoned Ehrlichman to inform him of McCord's letter and that 
Ehrlichman stated he had already received a copy. In the early after- 
noon of March 23 the President telephoned Dean from Key Biscayne. Dean 
has testified that the President told him, "Well, John, you were right 
in your prediction." Dean has testified that the President suggested 
that Dean and his wife go to Camp David and get some relaxation, and 
that Dean analyze the situation and report back to him. 


Page 

4.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1002-03 236 

4.2 L. Patrick Gray testimony, SJC, Gray Nomination 

Hearings, March 22, 1973, 671 238 

4.3 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 23, 1973 (received from 

White House) 239 


( 6 ) 



5. On March 23, 1973 the President telephoned Patrick Gray at 

1:11 p.m. According to the President's logs the last time the President 
had spoken to Gray was on February 16, 1973. Gray has testified that 
he cannot remember the President's precise words, but that the call was 
a "buck up call" -in which the President told Gray that he knew the 
beating Gray had taken at his confirmation hearing; that it was very 
unfair; and that there would be another day to get back at their 
enemies. Gray has testified that he remembered distinctly that the 
President said to him, "You will remember , Pat, I told you to conduct 
a thorough and aggressive investigation." Gray also has testified 
that from March 21 on he received no order from the President or anyone 
implementing a Presidential directive to get all the facts with respect 
to the Watergate matter and report them directly to the President. 


Page 

5.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 


and L. Patrick Gray, March 23, 1973 (received 

from White House) 242 

5.2 L. Patrick Gray log, March 23, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 243 

5.3 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3489-91, 

3506-07 244 


( 7 ) 


6. On March 23, 1973 the President met with H. R. Haldeman in Key 

Biscayne, Florida from 1:25 to 1:45 p.m. and from 2:00 to 6:30 p.m. 
Halde man has testified that on March 23 the President told him that he 
had been informed about the McCord letter and its contents, and that 
the President asked Haldeman to call Charles Colson to ask if Colson 
had ever offered Howard Hunt clemency or had any conversation with 
Hunt about clemency. Haldeman telephoned Colson some time before 
2:15 p.m. on March 23 and asked what commitment Colson had made to 
Howard Hunt with respect to the commutation of his sentence. Colson 
reported to Haldeman on this matter. Immediately after this conver- 
sation Colson dictated a memorandum of the conversation for the file. 
Colson's memorandum states, in part, that he told Haldeman that he 
made no representations nor used any one else's name in the conversation; 
that he had only told Hunt's lawyer that as long as he was around he 
would do anything he could to help Hunt. Colson's memorandum states 
that Haldeman asked what would happen if Hunt "blew" and that Colson 
replied that "it would be very bad" and that Hunt "would say things 
that would be very damaging." Colson's memorandum states that Haldeman 
replied, "then we can't let that happen." 


Page 


6.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and H. R. Haldeman, March 23, 1973 (received from 
White House) 250 

6.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3075-76 251 

6.3 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for 

delivery to the SSC, September 1973, 1, 41-43 253 

6.4 Memorandum for the file from Charles Colson, March 

23, 1973 (received from SSC) 257 


( 8 ) 


7. According to Colson's memorandum to the file regarding the 

telephone conversation between Colson and Haldeman described in the 
preceding paragraph, Haldeman also questioned Colson about a telephone 
conversation Colson had had with Magruder. Colson reported to Haldeman 
that one night in January or February 1972 Hunt and Liddy had come to 
Colson's office, and Hunt had stated that Liddy had some excellent plans 
and ideas for intelligence and counterintelligence which he had not 
been able to have approved at CRP. Colson told Haldeman that without 
learning of the details of the plan or endorsing the plan, Colson had 
telephoned Magruder, had asked Magruder to advise Liddy whether he 
was going to be used in the campaign, and had told Magruder that Hunt 
was a good man and that his ideas should be considered. Colson told 
Haldeman that Magruder had assured Colson that the plan would be con- 
sidered. Haldeman told Colson that Magruder might not remember the 
conversation the same way and that Magruder thought Colson had told 
him to start Liddy 's operation. Haldeman also told Colson that the 
reason for Haldeman 's call was to help decide whether all White House 
aides should volunteer immediately to go before the Grand Jury waiving 
all privilege. Haldeman said he was concerned that the President not 
appear to be covering up . 


Page 

7.1 Memorandum for the file from Charles Colson, 

March 23, 1973 (received from SSC) 262 

See Book I, Tab 6 for additional evidence regarding 
Colson's 1972 telephone conversation with Magruder. 


( 9 ) 




8. On the afternoon of March 23, 1973 Dean and his wife went to 

Camp David, Maryland. The White House compilation of meetings and 
conversations between the President and John Dean indicate that the 
President spoke by telephone with Dean at Camp David from 3:28 to 3:44 
p.m. Dean has testified that after the operator said that the President 
was calling Haldeman came on the line and said that while Dean was at 
Camp David he should spend some time writing a report on everything he 
knew about Watergate. Dean has testified that when he asked whether 
the report was for internal or public use Haldeman said that would be 
decided later. Haldeman has testified that Dean had been told to write 
a report prior to the time he left for Camp David. 


Page 


8.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1002-03 266 

8.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901 268 

8.3 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John Dean, March 23, 1973 (received from White 
House) 269 



9. Between March 23 and March 28, 1973 John Dean stayed at Camp 

David and attempted to prepare a report on matters relating to the 
break-in at the DNC headquarters and the investigation of the break-in, 
A draft of portions of a report was prepared by Dean* and partially 
typed. It related certain events before and after the Watergate 
break-in. The draft report made no reference to Dean f s meetings with 
the President or to any statements or actions by the President, Dean 
has testified that during his stay at Camp David he decided that he 
would have to think of some way for the President to get out in front 
of the matter and that, during a telephone conversation with Haldeman, 
he discussed the creation of an independent Warren^type commission. On 
March 28, 1973 Haldeman called Dean and requested that he return to 
Washington to meet with Mitchell and Magruder, 


Page 


9.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1003-06 272 

9.2 John Dean testimony, SSC Executive Session, June 

16, 1973, 132-35 276 

9.3 John Dean Camp David report, SSC Exhibit No. 

34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93 280 


( 11 ) 



10. On March 26, 1973 the Los Angeles Times reported that James 
McCord had told investigators for the Senate Select Committee that both 
John Dean and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the break-in at the 
DNC headquarters. On this same morning, H. R. Haldeman, who was with 
the President in Key Biscayne, Florida called Dean at Camp David. They 
discussed Dean's recollection of facts relating to the authorization 
of the Liddy Plan. Haldeman has testified that he asked Dean if he 
would have any problems if the President announced that day that he was 
requesting that Dean go to the grand jury without immunity; Dean replied 
that he would have no problem with appearing before the grand jury, but 
that his testimony concerning the number and purpose of the meetings 
among Dean, John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy and Magruder would conflict 
with the testimony previously given by Magruder; Dean stated that there 
were other areas of concern, such as payments to the defendants by 
Kalmbach, the $350,000, the Hunt threat, and Colson's talk about helping 
Hunt. Following his telephone call with Dean, Haldeman met with the 
President. Haldeman has testified that the President decided to drop 
his plan to announce that Dean would be requesting an appearance immedi- 
ately before the grand jury. Haldeman has testified that the problem was 
that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that point and it was 
not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury. 


( 12 ) 


Page 


10.1 Los Angeles Times , March 26, 1973, 1, 12 313 

10.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and H. R. Haldeman, March 26, 1973 (received from 

White House) 315 

10.3 H. R. Haldeman calendar, March 26, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 316 

10.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901-2902 317 


( 13 ) 



11. On March 26, 1973 the President, in the presence of H. R. 
Haldeman, instructed Ronald Ziegler, his press secretary, to express 
the President's confidence in John Dean. Ziegler announced publicly 
on that day that the President had "absolute and total" confidence in 
Dean. 


Page 


11.1 Ronald Ziegler testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 12, 1974, 62-65 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 320 

11.2 Los Angeles Times , March 27, 1973, 1* 11 324 


11.3 AP and UPI wire clips, March 26, 

1973 (received from Watergate Grand -Jury) 325 


( 14 ) 




12. March 26, 1973 John Dean telephoned Jeb Magruder and Dean made 
a recording of the conversation. Dean has testified that at Haldeman's 
suggestion he telephoned Magruder and taped this conversation. Magruder 
acknowledged that the Los Angeles Times story stating that Dean had 
prior knowledge of the break-in was a "bum rap" for Dean. There was 
also discussion about the number and purpose of meetings among John 
Mitchell, Gordon Liddy, Magruder and Dean. Magruder told Dean that 
Magruder had testified that there had been "one meeting, not two," and 
that the purpose of the meeting was to go over the general framework 
of the job of CRP general counsel. 


Page 


12.1 John Dean testimony , 3 SSC 1004 332 

12.2 Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder, 

March 26, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 34-40, 3 SSC 

1258-59 333 


( 15 ) 



13. On March 26, 1973 the District of Columbia United States 
Attorney's office filed in open court a motion for an order compelling 
Gordon Liddy to testify under a grant of immunity before the grand jury 
investigating the Watergate break-in. As of March 27, 1973 Judge Sirica 
granted leave to proceed forthwith with grand jury interrogation of 
Howard Hunt and other of the convicted Watergate defendants. From 
March 28, 1973 through April 5, 1973 hearings were held in open court 
and orders were entered compelling Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy and the 
remaining Watergate defendants to testify before the grand jury under 
grant of immunity. 


13.1 In re Grand Jury, Misc. A7-73, docket, March 26 
1973, March 28 - April 5, 1973... 


Page 

336 


( 16 ) 


14. On March 27, 1973 Jeb Magruder met with John Mitchell in New 
York City and discussed the potential of Magruder' s being brought before 
the grand jury on a perjury count. Magruder has testified that he 
received from Mitchell assurances respecting continued salary and that 
they discussed executive clemency. Mitchell has testified that with 
respect to support, he told Magruder that he "was a very outstanding 
young man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I 
could help him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so." 
Mitchell has testified that he did not make any promises of executive 
clemency. During the conversation, Magruder asked for a meeting with 
Haldeman. 


14.1 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 806-07 

14.2 Jeb Magruder testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

June 12, 1973, 111-12 

14.3 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1633-34 


Page 

340 

342 

344 


( 17 ) 



15. On March 27, 1973 the President net from 11:10 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. 
with John Ehrlichman and from 11:35 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. with H. R. Hal deman. 
Ehrlichman has testified that at this meeting the President directed him 
to contact Attorney General Kleindienst. The President has stated that 
on March 27, 1973 he directed that Kleindienst be told to report directly 
to the President anything he found in the Watergate area. The President 
has produced an edited transcript of this conversation and a summary of 
that transcript has been prepared. 


Page 


15.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and H. R. Haldeman, March 27, 1973 348 

15.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John fihrlichman, March 27, 1973 349 

15.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-48 350 

15.4 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 352 

15.5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of conversation among the 
President, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, March 

27, 1973, 11:10 a.m. - 1:30 p.m 354 


( 18 ) 



16. On March 28, 1973 Mitchell and Haldeman met with Magruder in 
Haldeman's office. They discussed Magruder' s false testimony regarding 
the approval of the Llddy Plan. Haldeman telephoned Dean and requested 
that he return from Camp David to meet with Mitchell and Magruder. Dean 
has testified that on his return he went directly to Haldeman's office; 
that Haldeman told him that Mitchell and Magruder were waiting in another 
office to discuss with Dean his knowledge of the January and February 
1972 meetings in Mitchell's office; that Dean said he would not lie 
about those meetings; and that Haldeman said he did not want to get 
Into it but Dean should work it out with Mitchell and Magruder. Dean 
met with Mitchell and Magruder. Following the meeting, both Mitchell 
and Dean reported to Haldeman that there was a problem as to what the 
facts were regarding the 1972 meetings. 


Page 

16.1 H. R. Haldeman deposition. Democratic National 


Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 213-18, 

222-23, 229 374 

16.2 John Dean testimony $ 3 SSC 1005-07 383 

16.3 John Dean testimony, 4 SSC 1379, 1425 386 

16.4 H. R. Haldeman telephone log, March 28, 1973 

(received from SSC) 388 

16.5 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1634-35 389 

16.6 John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1914 391 

16.7 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 807-08 392 

16.8 Jeb Magruder testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

June 12, 1973, 111-14 394 


( 19 ) 


17. On March 28, 1973 John Ehrllchman telephoned Attorney General 
Klelndienst on the President's Instructions and asked Klelndienst a 
series of questions which the President had dictated and which Ehrlich- 
man had hand written on a piece of paper. Ehrllchman, during the con- 
versation, told Klelndienst that the President directed him to tell the 
Attorney General that the best information he had or has is that neither 
Dean, Haldeman, Colson nor Ehrllchman nor anybody In the White House 
had any prior knowledge of the Watergate burglary and that the President 
was counting on the Attorney General to provide him with any informa- 
tion to the contrary and to contact him direct. Ehrllchman also told 
the Attorney General that serious questions were being raised with 
regard to John Mitchell and the President wanted the Attorney General 
to communicate to him any evidence or Inferences on that subject. 


Page 


17.1 

John Ehrllchman log, March 28, 1973 (received 

f rnm 

. . 400 

17.2 

John Ehrllchman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-50 

.. 401 

17.3 

Richard Klelndienst testimony, 9 SSC 3569 

.. 405 

17.4 

Transcript of recorded telephone conversation 
between Ehrllchman and Klelndienst, March 28, 

1973, SSC Exhibit No. 99, 7 SSC 2944-46 

, . . 406 


17.5 Dictabelt recording of a telephone conversation 
between Ehrllchman and Klelndienst on or about 
March 28, 1973 and House Judiciary Committee trans- 
script thereof 


17.6 President Nixon statement, August 15, 1973, 9 Presi- 
dential Documents 991, 993 

17.7 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 


( 20 ) 


18. 


On August 22, 1973 the President publicly stated that on the 


29th of March he directed Ehrlichman to continue the investigation that 
Dean was unable to conclude. 


18.1 President Mixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 
9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 


Page 

428 


35-9C4 O - 74 - pt. 1-3 


( 21 ) 



19. 


On March 29, 1973 a report of James McCord’s testimony at an 


executive session in the Senate Select Committee on March 28, 1973 
appeared in the national press. The report said, among other things, 
that McCord testified that he had been told that John Mitchell, Charles 
Colson, John Dean and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the Water- 
gate bugging operation. 


Page 

19.1 Washington Post , March 29, 1973, Al, A18 432 

19.2 James McCord testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

March 28, 1973, 10-17, 31-32 434 


( 22 ) 


20. On August 15, 1973 the President stated that when he learned on 
March 30, 1973 that Dean had been unable to complete his report he 
instructed Ehrlichman to conduct an independent inquiry and to bring 
all the facts to him. On March 30 the President met with John Ehrlichman 
and Ronald Ziegler from 12:02 to 12:18 p.m. According to the White House 
edited transcript of this meeting, the only subject discussed was a draft 
statement to be issued by Ziegler at a press briefing. Ehrlichman has 
testified that at the noon meeting the President directed him to conduct 
an inquiry into the Watergate matter. Ehrlichman has testified that 
the President said he was satisfied John Dean was in this Watergate 
activity so deeply that he simply could not any longer have anything to 
do with it; that the President needed to know about executive privilege 
and the attorney-client privilege; that the President needed someone 
to set strategy with regard to testifying at the Committee and the grand 
jury and other places; and that the President needed the truth about the 
Watergate matter. 


Page 


20.1 President Nixon statement, August 15, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 991, 993 447 

20.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Ehrlichman, March 30, 1973 (received 

from White House) 449 

20.3 John Ehrlichman log, March 30, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 451 

20.4 White House edited transcript of meeting 

among the President, John Ehrlichman and Ronald 
Ziegler, March 30, 1973, 12:02 to 12:18 p.m 452 


( 23 ) 




20.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-50 464 

20.6 John Ehrlichman deposition. Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 64, 155-56 468 


( 24 ) 



21. On March 30, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. Ehrlichman met with Fielding, 
Dean's assistant. Ehrlichman has testified that he had directed Fielding 
to deliver Dean's personnel records to Ehrlichman and to brief Ehrlich- 
man about allegations that Dean had been dismissed by a law firm because 
of unethical conduct. At 3:00 p.m. on March 30, 1973 Ehrlichman and 
the President flew to San Clemente, where Haldeman joined them on April 
1, 1973. They remained in San Clemente until April 8, 1973. While 
they were at San Clemente, Ehrlichman had a long distance telephone 
conversation with Dean in which they discussed the allegations that 
Dean had been involved in unethical conduct. 


Page 

21.1 John Ehrlichman log , March 30 and April 8, 


1973 (received from SSC) 472 

21.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2753 474 

21.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903 475 


( 25 ) 


22. On March 30, 1973 Ronald Ziegler stated in a press briefing 
that no one in the White House had any involvement in the Watergate 
matter. Ziegler also announced that the President reiterated his 
Instructions that any member of the White House staff would appear 
before the grand jury if called to answer questions regarding that 
individual's alleged knowledge or possible involvement in the Water- 
gate matter. 


Page 


22.1 Transcript of White House press briefing, 

March 30, 1973, No. 1704, 708 (received from 
Watergate Grand Jury) 47 g 

22.2 Ronald Ziegler press briefing, March 30, 1973, 

White House edited transcripts. Appendix 12 479 

22.3 Ronald Ziegler testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 12, 1974, 71-72 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 480 


( 26 ) 




23. On March 30, 1973 John Dean, after consultation with his 
attorney, Thomas Hogan, retained Charles Shaffer, an attorney in the 
criminal law field. That day Dean met with Hogan and Shaffer and dis- 
cussed the break-in at the DNC headquarters and the events that followed. 
Haldeman has testified that Dean had indicated earlier that he might 
retain a private attorney so that Dean - — and, through him, the President 
— could consult an attorney familiar with criminal law on the impli- 
cations of some of Dean's concerns. On the afternoon of April 2, 1973 
Dean's lawyers began a series of meetings with the Watergate prosecutors. 


Page 


23.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1009 484 

23.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903 485 


( 27 ) 



24. On March 30, 1973 newspaper reports stated that Robert Relsner, 
former Administrative Assistant to Jeb Magruder at CRP, was to be sub- 
poenaed by the staff of the SSC. Magruder has testified that he realized 
that his story about his 1972 meetings with Mitchell, Dean and Liddy 
would not hold up. Magruder realized, among other things, that 
the SSC had begun an Investigation and Relsner, who knew about the 
meetings and who had previously been missed by the prosecutors, would 
be gotten to. On March 31, 1973 Magruder, who previously had been 
represented by the attorneys for CRP, retained James Blerbower as his 
personal attorney. 


Page 


24.1 Washington Post , March 30, 1973, Al, A6 488 

24.2 Robert Relsner testimony, 2 SSC 489, 508-10... 490 

24.3 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 805-06, 808 494 


( 28 ) 


25. On April 2, 1973 Ronald Ziegler issued a public statement 
criticizing the Senate Select Committee as being plagued by irresponsible 
leaks of tidal wave proportions. Ziegler stated that the White House 
intended to cooperate with the Committee but called on Senator Ervin to 
get his own disorganized house in order so that the investigation could 
go forward in a proper atmosphere of traditional fairness and due process. 


Page 


25.1 Washington Post: , April 3, 1973, Al, A4 


498 



26. On April 4, 1973 Dean told Haldeman that his lawyers had met 
privately with the prosecutors. 

Page 

26.1 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903... 502 


( 30 ) 




27. On April 5, 1973 L. Patrick Gray called the President and 
requested that his nomination as permanent Director of the FBI be with- 
drawn. According to Gray, the President told him that this was a 
bitter thing to have happened to Gray and there would be a place for 
Gray in the Nixon administration. The President informed Gray that 
he wanted him to serve as Acting FBI Director until a successor was 
confirmed. In a public statement issued by the President on April 5, 
1973 announcing the withdrawal of Gray's name, the President praised 
Gray and stated that his compliance with Dean's completely proper 
and necessary request for FBI reports exposed Gray to totally unfair 
innuendo and suspicion. 


Page 


27.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3545-46 504 

27.2 President Nixon statement, April 5, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 335 506 


( 31 ) 



28. On April 5, 1973 John Ehrlichman met in San Clemente, California 
with Paul O'Brien. According to Ehrlichman, O'Brien had asked to meet 
with H. R. Haldeman to transmit some information to the President. 
According to Ehrlichman' s testimony and notes, O'Brien told him that 
he had obtained information from Jeb Magruder and others concerning, 
among other things, Magruder' s and Mitchell's involvement in meetings 

l 

in which the Liddy Plan for electronic surveillance with a budget of 
$100,000 to $250,000 was outlined; Magruder 's testimony concerning the 
number of meetings among John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy, John Dean and 
Magruder; Magruder 's claim that Charles Colson called him urging that 
the program go forward; Magruder' s claim that Gordon Strachan came to 
him and said the President wants this project to go on; payments that 
had been made to the defendants and their attorneys; and possible 
offers or commitments regarding executive clemency to Liddy, Howard 
Hunt and James McCord. O'Brien told Ehrlichman that neither Magruder 
nor Mitchell were inevitably hung and that Dean was the key problem. 
Ehrlichman 's notes also state "must close ranks," "JNM will tough it 
out," "H must bring Jeb up short" and, written below "Jeb," "shut up" 
and "stop seeing people." After this meeting Ehrlichman met with the 
President. Ehrlichman has testified that he reported to the President 
after he had talked to O'Brien. 


( 32 ) 



Page 


28.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 5, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 509 

28.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2729-36, 2751. 510 

28.3 John Ehrlichman notes of April 5, 1973 meeting 
with Paul O'Brien, SSC Exhibit No. 98, 7 SSC 

2922-31 519 

28.4 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John Ehrlichman, April 5, 1973 (received from 

White House) 529 


( 33 ) 



29. On April 6 , 1973 Ehrlichman met with Kalmbach in the Bank of 
America parking lot in San Clemente, California. Ehrlichman 's notes 
dictated after the meeting reflect a discussion of Kalmbach* s activities 
in raising and disbursing money for the Watergate defendants. Kalmbach 
told Ehrlichman that he had retained the services of an attorney, Paul 
O'Connor. 


Page 

29.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 6 , 1973 (received 

from SSC) 532 

29.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2752, 2768, 2773... 533 

29.3 John Ehrlichman notes of April 6 , 1973 meeting 
with Herbert Kalmbach, SSC Exhibit No. 100, 7 SSC 

2947 536 


( 34 ) 




30. On April 8, 1973 Dean started to meet with the prosecutors. 
While meeting with the prosecutors, Dean received a call from Air Force 
One from Haldeman's assistant Lawrence Higby, who asked Dean to be in 
Ehrlichman' s office that afternoon for a meeting. Ehrlichman and 
Haldeman met with Dean from 5:00 until 7:00 p.m. There was a discus- 
sion of the possibility of a grand jury appearance by Dean. Ehrlich- 
man has testified that they discussed, among other things, what this 
"hang up" was between Mitchell and Dean and Dean's feeling that 
Mitchell did not want Dean to talk to the prosecutors or appear before 
the grand jury. Ehrlichman has also testified that the President 
decided on the flight that he wanted Dean to go to the grand jury, and 
that Ehrlichman and Haldeman conveyed that to Dean at the meeting. 


Page 


30.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1010-11 538 

30.2 Joh* Ehrlichman log, April 8, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 540 

30.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2753-54 541 


( 35 ) 



31. On April 8, 1973, from 7:33 to 7:37 p.m., the President and 
John Ehrlichman spoke by telephone. The President has produced an 
edited transcript of that conversation. A summary has been prepared 


of that transcript. 


31.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John Ehrlichman, April 8, 1973 (received 
from White House) 

31.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 

House edited transcript of conversation between 
the President and John Ehrlichman, April 8, 1973, 
7:33 - 7:37 p.m 


Page 


544 


545 


( 36 ) 




32. On April 11, 1973 Attorney General Kleindienst had a conversation 
with Assistant Attorney General Petersen. Kleindienst told Petersen 
that Ehrlichman had just called to tell Kleindienst that he did not feel 
that any White House aides should be granted immunity. 

’ Page 

32.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3629 548 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-4 


( 37 ) 


33. On or about April 12, 1973 Ehrlichman met with Haldeman's 
assistant Gordon Strachan. Ehrlichman has testified that Strachan said 
that he had just returned from the grand jury and that upon leaving the 
grand jury room he had realized that the testimony he had given was 
mistaken with respect to the amount of money he had delivered to Fred 
LaRue. Ehrlichman has testified that he advised Strachan to get an 
attorney and, subject to the attorney's advice, to tell the prosecutor 
that he had made a mistake in his testimony. 


33.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 12, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 

33.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2767 


Page 


550 

551 


( 38 ) 




34, On April 12, 1973 the President telephoned Charles Colson at 
7:31 p.m. and asked Colson to prepare a specific set of recommendations 
with respect to the Watergate matter* The following day Colson met with 
Ehrlichman twice. At the second meeting Colson was accompanied by his 
lawyer. Ehrlichman has testified that at the second meeting Colson said 
that he understood that Howard Hunt would testify before the grand jury 
that the second break-in at the Watergate was opposed by Hunt but that 
Liddy said to Hunt that they couldn't call it off because they were doing 
it on Mitchell's order; that Hunt would testify about the transmittal 
of funds to the Watergate defendants; and that McCord was making alle- 
gations about a trip to Las Vegas by Hunt, McCord and possibly Liddy to 
break into the safe of Hank Greenspun in a project masterminded by Colson. 
Colson has stated that he recommended to Ehrlichman, among other things, 
that the President take steps to expose those involved in the planning, 
approving or authorizing of the Watergate break-in. 


Page 


34.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 12, 1973, 

Exhibit 17, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 589 


34.2 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for delivery 

to SSC, September 1973, 1, 46-48 591 

34.3 John Ehrlichman log, April 13, 1973 (received from 

SSC) 595 

34.4 John Ehrlichman deposition. Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 126-27 596 


34.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2729-30, 2800-02 598 


( 39 ) 


34.6 John Ehrlichman notes of April 13, 1973 meeting 

with Charles Colson and David Shapiro, SSC Exhibit 


No. 98, 7 SSC 2933-36 603 

34.7 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1012-13 607 


( 40 ) 



35. On April 13, 1973, the day Magruder began meeting with the 
prosecutors, Lawrence Higby, staff assistant to Haldeman, had two 
telephone conversations with Magruder which were taped without Magruder' s 
knowledge. Higby asked Magruder whether his testimony was going to 
be damaging to Strachan and Haldeman. Magruder said it would damage 
Strachan but he had not talked to Haldeman about the Watergate until long 
after. Higby told Magruder that it wasn't in his long or short term 
interest to blame the White House. On April 14, 1973 Ehrlichman and 
Haldeman reported these conversations to the President. Ehrlichman told 
the President that Higby had handled Magruder so well that Magruder had 
closed all his doors now with this tape; that the tape would beat the 
socks off Magruder if he ever got off the reservation. 


Page 

35.1 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 808, 851 610 

35.2 Tape recording of telephone conversation between 

Jeb Magruder and Lawrence Higby, April 13, 1973 
(received from SSC), and House Judiciary Committee 
transcript thereof, 9-10, 12-13, 14-16, 21 612 

35.3 White House edited transcript of meeting among 

the President, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, 

April 14, 1973, 8:55-11:31 a.m., 1, 7-9.... 656 


( 41 ) 




36. On April 14, 1973 the President met with Ehrlichman from 
8:55 to 11:31 a.m. and with Haldeman from 9:00 to 11:30 a.m. At this 
meeting the President instructed Ehrlichman to meet with Mitchell. The 
President was advised that the grand jury was focusing on the Watergate 
aftermath. There was a discussion of payments to the Watergate defen- 
dants and of the transfer of $350,000 from Strachan to LaRue to be used 
for payments to the defendants. 

In response to the Judiciary Committee's subpoena for the tape 
recording and other evidence of this conversation, the President has 
produced an edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that 
transcript has been prepared. 


Page 


36.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 662 


36.2 House Judiciary Commitee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, H. R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman, April 14, 1973, 8:55 - 11:31 n.m 665 


( 42 ) 



37. On the afternoon of April 14, 1973 Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
met in Ehrlichman’s office. Dean has testified that there was a dis- 
cussion of whether Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mitchell, Colson and 
others would be indicted. 


Page 


37.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 14, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 698 

37.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1013-14 699 

37.3 John Dean list of names, SSC Exhibit No. 34-37, 

3 SSC 1312 701 

37.4 John Dean testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

June 16, 1973, 146 702 

37.5 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1960, 1988-90 703 


( 43 ) 


38. On April 14, 1973, at 1:30 p.m., Haldeman had a telephone 
conversation with Magruder and taped the conversation. Magruder told 
Haldeman that he had committed perjury many times; that he had now 
decided to follow his lawyer's advice and make a full disclosure to 
the grand jury; that his testimony would put Gordon in a spot; and that 
he intended to plead guilty. 


Page 


38.1 H. R. Haldeman log, April 14, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 708 

38.2 Recording of a telephone conversation between. 

H. R. Haldeman and Jeb Magruder, April 14, 

1973, and House Judiciary Committee transcript 

thereof 709 


( 44 ) 




39 


On April 14, 1973, at the President's request, Ehrlichman met 
with Mitchell from 1:40 to 2:10 p.m. Ehrlichman told Mitchell that 
the President had instructed him to talk to Mitchell and say not to hold 
back on account of the Presidency. Mitchell said that he was going to 
stay where he was because he was too far out. Mitchell said that he 
got euchred into it by not paying attention and that the whole genesis 
of this thing was at the White House. Mitchell told Ehrlichman that 
Dean had been caught in the middle like so many others who were trying 
to keep the lid on until after the election and trying to keep the lid 
on all the other things that had gone on at the White House. Magruder's 
pending disclosures to the prosecutors were also discussed. Mitchell 
told Ehrlichman that some of the White House fund had been used to make 
payments to the defendants, with Haldeman's approval, prior to the return 
of the money to Fred LaRue. 


Page 


39.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 14, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 718 

39.2 John Ehrlichman deposition, Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 171-73 719 


39.3 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1651-52 722 

39.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2756.. 724 

39.5 Tape recording of a conversation between John 
Ehrlichman and John Mitchell, April 14, 1973, 
and House Judiciary Committee transcript thereof, 

1-3, 5, 16, 40-43 725 


( 45 ) 




40. On April 14, 1973 the President met with Haldeman from 1:55 to 
2:13 p.m. Haldeman reported to the President on his telephone conver- 
sation with Magruder. These was a discussion of what Haldeman and Strachan 
would say if Magruder testified that he had sent Gemstone materials to 
Strachan. 

In response to the Committee' subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of this conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript 
has been prepared. 


Page 


40.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury , Misq. 47-73 770 


40.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and H. R. Haldeman, April 
14, 1973, 1:55 - 2:13 p.m 773 


( 46 ) 


41. On April 14, 1973 the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
from 2:24 to 3:55 p.m. At this meeting Ehrlichman reported on his meeting 
with Mitchell. There was a discussion of the motive for the payments to 
the defendants and the transfer of the $350,000 from the White House to 
the Committee for the Re-election of the President. The President instructed 
Ehrlichman to meet with Magruder . There was a discussion whether it 
would reduce the likelihood of Department of Justice follow-up if Ehrlich- 
man gave a report to Kleindienst rather than Silbert. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of this conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


41.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury. Misc. 47-73 778 


41.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a meeting among the 
President, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, 

April 14, 1973, 2:24-3:55 p.m 781 


( 47 ) 


42. On April 14, 1973 John Ehrlichman met with Jeb Magruder and 
his attorneys. Ehrlichman informed Magruder and his attorneys that 
he was conducting an investigation for the President. Magruder and 
his attorneys discussed with Ehrlichman the information which Magruder 
had disclosed to the prosecutors earlier that day to the effect that 
at a meeting in Key Biscayne Mitchell, LaRue and Magruder had partici- 
pated in an express and specific approval of the plan to break into and 
bug the DNC headquarters and to bug McGovern headquarters and the 
Fontainebleau headquarters of the Democratic Convention. 


Page 


42.1 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 808 800 

42.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2765-66 801 

42.3 John Ehrlichman notes of a meeting with 

Jeb Magruder, April 14, 1973, SSC Exhibit 803 

No. 98, 7 SSC 2937-43 803 


( 48 ) 




43. On April 14, 1973 the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
from 5:15 to 6:45 p.m. Ehrlichman reported to the President on his 
meeting with Magruder and his attorneys. The President instructed 
Haldeman to give Strachan a report of Magruder' s testimony. There was 
a discussion of the motive for the payments to the defendants. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of this conversation, the President has produced 
an edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript 
has been prepared. 


Page 

43.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2757-58 812 

43.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 ®14 

43.3 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 

White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, H. R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman, April 14, 1973, 5:15-6:45 p.m 817 


( 49 ) 




44. On April 14, 1973, at approximately 6:00 p.m. and during the 
meeting specified in the preceding paragraph, Ehrlichman telephoned 
Kleindienst. Ehrlichman told Kleindienst that he had been conducting 
an investigation for the President. There was a discussion of what 
Ehrlichman should do with the information he had uncovered. Kleindienst 
has testified that Ehrlichman told him that the testimony that Magruder 
had given to the U. S. Attorneys would implicate people high and low in 
the White House and in the campaign committee. The President has produced 
an edited transcript of this conversation. According to this transcript 
Ehrlichman stated that the information provided by Magruder implicated 
people up and down in the Committee to Re-elect; and, when Kleindienst 
asked who Magruder implicated besides himself and Mitchell, Ehrlichman 
answered Dean, LaRue, Mardian and Porter. 


Page 


44.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2757-58 830 

44.2 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3577-78 832 


44.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury* 

September 13, 1973, 138-40 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 834 

44.4 Richard Kleindienst testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

August 9, 1973, 67-69 (received from Watergate Grand 

Jury) 837 

44 # 5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of Wnite uouse 
edited transcript of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Richard Kleindienst, April 14, 1973, 
at approximately 6:00 p.m.... 840 


( 50 ) 




45. On April 14, 1973 the President had a telephone conversation with 

Haldeman from 11:02 to 11:16 p.m. There was a discussion of what would be 
said to Strachan about the information Magruder was giving to the prosecu- 
tors. There was also a discussion about the motive for making payments to 
the defendants. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of this conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


45.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury, Misc. 47-73 844 


45.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a telephone 
conversation between the President and H. R. 

Haldeman, April 14, 1973, 11:02-11:16 p.m 847 


( 51 ) 




46. On April 14, 1973, from 11:22 to 11:53 p.m., the President had 
a telephone conversation with John Ehrlichman. There was a discussion 
of what Ehrlichman would say to Colson and Strachan about his conver- 
sation with Magruder, and what Ehrlichman would say to Dean about a plan 
to deal with obstruction of justice allegations. There was also a dis- 
cussion of whether Haldeman should be dismissed. 

In response to the Committee T s subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of this conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


46.1 N President Nixon daily diary, April 14, 1973, 

Exhibit 19, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 852 


46.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a telephone 

conversation between the President and John 

Erlichman, April 14, 1973, 11:22-11:53 p.m 855 


( 52 ) 




47. 


During the evening of April 14, 1973 Petersen was briefed by 


the prosecutors on the information furnished by Dean and Magruder. 

Petersen telephoned Kleindienst and arranged to report to him immediately. 
On April 15, 1973 Kleindienst met at his home with Petersen, United States 
Attorney Titus, and chief prosecutor Silbert from approximately 1:00 a.m. 
to 5:00 a.m. Kleindienst was briefed on evidence implicating high 
White House and CRP officials in the Watergate break-in and the obstruc- 
tion of the government's investigation. Kleindienst decided to arrange 
a meeting with the President that morning. 


47.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3627-28 

47.2 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3572-73, 

3578-79, 3585-86 


Page 

864 

866 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-5 


( 53 ) 




48. On April 15, 1973 at 8:41 a.m. Kleindienst attempted to reach 
the President by telephone to request an immediate meeting. The President 
returned Kleindienst* s call at 10:13 a.m. and agreed to meet Kleindienst 
that afternoon. 


Page 

48.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 874 

48.2 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3572-73, 

3602 877 


( 54 ) 




49. On April 15, 1973 John Ehrlichman met with Gordon Strachan from 
approximately 10:00 a.m. to 10:35 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. to noon. They 
discussed Strachan' s recollection of his contacts with Magruder and 
Haldeman relating to Watergate. Ehrlichman has testified that he con- 
fronted Strachan with Magruder' s allegation about sending Strachan a 
budget which included specific reference to bugging, and that Strachan 
said that he was sure he had never seen anything like that . Ehrlichman ' s 
notes of his meeting with Strachan reflect a reference to a memorandum 
from Strachan to Haldeman stating a sophisticated intelligence operation 
is going with a 300 budget. 


Page 


49.1 John Ehrlichman deposition. Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord, May 22, 1973, 46-54 882 


49.2 John Ehrlichman notes of a meeting with Gordon 
Strachan, April 15, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 98, 

7 SSC 2918-21 891 

49.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2767-69 895 

49.4 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47- 898 


49.5 Memorandum from Tom Hart to Jack Nesbitt, 

July 24, 1973, Exhibit 29, In re Grand Jury' , 

Misc. 47-73 901 


( 55 ) 



50. 


On April 15, 1973 the President met with John Ehrlichman from 


10:35 to 11:15 a.m. Ehrlichman reported that he was meeting with Strachan. 
There was a discussion of the motive for payments to the defendants and 
of what Dean’s defense might be to obstruction of justice charges. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has been 
prepared. 


Page 

50.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 


Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73 906 

50.2 Memorandum from Tom Hart to Jack Nesbitt, 

July 24, 1973, Exhibit 29, In re Grand Jury. 

Misc. 47-73 909 


50.3 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and John Ehrlichman 

from 10:35 to 11:15 a.m., April 15, 1973 912 


( 56 ) 


51. On April 15, 1973 the President met with Attorney General Klein- 
dienst from 1:12 to 2:22 p.m. in the President's EOB office. Kleindienst 
reported to the President on the evidence against Mitchell, Dean, Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, Magruder, Colson and the others. Kleindienst has testified 
that the President appeared dumbfounded and upset when Kleindienst told 
him about the Matergate involvement of Administration officials, and that 
the President did not state that he had previously been given this infor- 
mation by John Dean. The President asked about the evidence against 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman and made notes on Kleindienst' s response. There 
was a discussion of the payments to the defendants and what motive had 
to be proved to establish criminal liability. There was discussion of 
the transfer of $350,000 from the White House to LaRue. The President 
made a note: "What will LaRue say he got the 350 for?" 

The Committee has subpoenaed the tape recording and other evidence 
of this conversation. The President has stated that the tape on the 
recorder for his EOB office ran out during his afternoon meeting with 
Kleindienst. The President has produced an edited transcript of a 
recording of a portion of the conversation. A summary of that transcript 
has been prepared. 


( 57 ) 




Page 


51.1 Richard Kleindlenst testimony, 9 SSC 3573, 

3579-80, 3592 925 

51.2 President Nixon notes, April 15, 1973, 3 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 929 

51.3 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury. Misc. 47-73 930 


51.4 Memorandum form Tom Hart to Jack Nesbitt, July 

24, 1973, Exhibit 29, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73... 933 

51.5 President Nixon statement, November 12, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1329-30 936 

51.6 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a meeting between 
the President and Richard Kleindlenst, April 15, 

1973, 1:12 - 2:22 p,m 938 


( 58 ) 



52. On April 15, 1973 from 2:24 to 3:30 p.m. the President met with 
Ehrlichman in the President's EOB office. From 3:27 to 3:44 p.m. the 
President spoke to Haldeman by telephone and discussed conflicts between 
the recollections of Mag ruder and Strachan concerning conversations 
about Watergate. At 3:48 p.m. the President returned a telephone call 
from Kleindienst and agreed to have Petersen join their upcoming meeting. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of the President's meeting with Ehrlichman, his 
telephone conversation with Haldeman, and his telephone conversation 
with Kleindienst, the President has produced edited transcripts of the 
recordings of the Haldeman and Kleindienst telephone calls. Summaries 
of those transcripts have been prepared. The President has stated that 
the tape on the recorder for his EOB office had run out during his 
afternoon meeting of April 15, 1973 with Kleindienst and that no further 
conversations in that office were recorded. 


Page 


52.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 
Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73... 

52.2 Memorandum from Tom Hart to Jack Nesbitt, 

July 24, 1973, Exhibit 29, In re Grand Jury , 
Misc. 47-73 


52.3 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 

House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and H.R. Haldeman, April 15, 
1973, 3:27 - 3:44 p.m 

52.4 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and Richard Kleindienst, 

April 15, 1973, 3:48 - 3:49 p.m 


( 59 ) 


53. On April 15, 1973 Petersen and Kleindienst met with the President 
from 4:00 to 5:15 p.m. in the President's EOB office. Petersen has testi- 
fied that he reported on the information that the prosecutors had received 
from Dean and Magruder and that his report included the following : that 

Mitchell had approved the $300,000 budget for the Liddy "gemstone" oper- 
ation; that budget information for "gemstone" and summaries of intercepted 
conversations were given to Strachan and that information given to Strachan 
was for delivery to Haldeman; that if the prosecutors could develop 
Strachan as a witness, "school was going to be out as far as Haldeman 
was concerned”; that Ehrlichman through Dean informed Liddy that Hunt 
should leave the country; and that Ehrlichman had told Dean to "deep six" 
certain information recovered by Dean from Hunt's office. Petersen has 
also testified that he recommended that Haldeman and Ehrlichman be dis- 
missed, but Dean be retained while cooperating with the prosecutors. 
Petersen has testified that the President: exhibited a lack of shock 

and emotion; spoke well of Haldeman and Ehrlichman; suggested that Dean 
and Magruder were trying -to exculpate themselves; suggested a cautionary 
approach to the granting of immunity; stated that he had first learned 
that there were more significant problems than he had anticipated on March 
21, 1973, although he did not tell Petersen what Dean had told him on that 
date; stated that he had told Dean to write a report but that Dean had 
been unable to write a report; stated that he told Ehrlichman to conduct 
an investigation after Dean failed to deliver his report; stated that 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman had denied the charges against them; and requested 


( 60 ) 



that Petersen reduce to writing what he had said to the President about 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 

The Committee has subpoenaed the tape recording and other 
evidence regarding this conversation. The President has stated that 
the tape on the recorder for his EOB office ran out during his afternoon 
meeting with Kleindienst. 


Page 

53.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 975 

53.2 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 5, 1974, 2-12 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 978 

53.3 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3627-29, 3632-35... 989 

53.4 Henry Petersen testimony. In re Grand Jury , 

Misc. 47-73, November 12, 1973, 1192-94 996 

53.5 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3573, 3592.... 999 

53.6 Henry Petersen notes, SSC Exhibit No. 147, 9 SSC 

3875-76 1001 

53.7 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903-04 1003 

53.8 President Nixon notes, April 15, 1973, 4 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1005 

53.9 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

August 23, 1973, 68-72 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1006 

53.10 President Nixon remarks, April 17, 1973, 9 Presi- 
dential Documents 387 1011 


( 61 ) 




54. On April 15, 1973 the Watergate prosecutors Interviewed John 
Dean. The prosecutors were informed that Gordon Liddy and G. Howard 
Hunt had participated in the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's 
psychiatrist. Dean stated that not all the material from Hunt's safe 
had been turned over to FBI agents after the Watergate break-in, but 
that certain materials from the safe were personally handed by Dean to 
Gray. 


Page 


54.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3624-25 1014 

54.2 Memorandum from Earl Silbert to Henry Petersen, 

April 16, 1973, Exhibit 27, United States v. 

Russo 1016 

54.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1014 1017 

54.4 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 5, 1974, 24-25 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1018 


( 62 ) 




55. On April 15, 1973 at approximately 7:30 p.m. , Ehrlichman requested 
a meeting with Dean. Dean f s attorney discussed this request with Petersen 
who advised against such a meeting. Dean arranged to have the President 
told that Dean was acting out of loyalty to the President and that Dean 
felt the meeting requested by Ehrlichman was inappropriate at this time. 

The President telephoned Petersen and spoke with him from 8:14 to 8:18 p.m. 
and from 8:25 to 8:26 p.m. Petersen told the President about Ehrlichman’ s 
request to meet with Dean. The President asked if Petersen would have any 
objection to the President’s meeting with Dean. Petersen said he had no objec- 
tion. The President arranged to meet with Dean that evening. 

In response to the Committee’s subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of the President’s telephone conversations with 
Petersen, the President has produced edited transcripts of the recordings. 

A summary of these transcripts has been prepared. 


( 63 ) 


Page 


55.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1014-15 1023 

55.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 14, 1974, 20-22 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1025 

55.3 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3635, 3648 1028 

55.4 Message from John Dean to the President, received 
by Lawrence Hlgby, April 15, 1973, 8:15 p.m. , 

SSC Exhibit No. 34-48, 3 SSC 1313 1030 

55.5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between H.R. Haldeman and Lawrence Higby, 

April 15, 1973 1031 

55.6 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen, April 

15, 1973, 8:14 - 8:18 p.m 1032 

55.7 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen, April 

15, 1973, 8:25 - 8:26 p.m 1034 

55.8 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73 1035 


( 64 ) 



56. On April 15, 1973 from 9:17 to 10:12 p.m. , the President met 
with John Dean in the President's EOB office. Dean has testified that 
he reported to the President that he had been to the prosecutors; that 
the President asked him about Haldeman's knowledge of the Liddy plans; 
that the President stated he had been joking when he said it would be 
easy to raise $1 million to pay for maintaining the silence of the 
Watergate defendants; and that the President said in a nearly Inaudible 
tone that he had been foolish to discuss Hunt's clemency with Colson. 

Dean also has testified that he told the President he had not discussed 
with the prosecutors his conversations with the President and that the 
President told him that he could not tell the prosecutors about national 
security matters or about any of the conversations between the President 
and Dean. Dean has testified that the nature of the President's questions 
led him to think that the President was taping the conversation. The 
President's notes of this meeting indicate that the President asked 
Dean what he had told Kalmbach about the purpose of the money and that 
Dean said he had briefed Haldeman and Ehrllchman every inch. of the way. 
During this meeting the President telephoned Petersen from 9:39 to 9:41 
p.m. and instructed Petersen to contact Llddy's attorney and tell him 
that the President wanted Liddy to tell everything he knows. 

The President has stated that the tape on the recorder for his 
EOB office ran out on the afternoon of April 15, 1S73. In response to 
the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording and other evidence of his 


( 65 ) 



telephone conversation with Petersen, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript 
has been prepared. 


Page 

56.1 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 14, 1974, 22-24 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 1041 

56.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1015-17...., 1044 

56.3 President Nixon notes, April 15, 1973, 1-2 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1047 

56.4 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury , Mlsc. 47-73 1049 


56.5 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, April 15, 1973, 

with accompanying Fred Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhi- 
bit No. 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 1052 

56.6 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen, April 

15, 1973, 9:39 - 9:41 p.m 1055 

56.7 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3648 1056 

56.8 President Nixon statement, November 12, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1329, 1331 1057 


( 66 ) 




57. On April 15, 1973 from 10:16 to 11:15 p.m. the President met with 
H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman in the President's EOB office. During 
this meeting Ehrlichman at the President's request telephoned Patrick 
Gray and discussed the documents taken from Hunt's White House safe and 
given to Gray by Dean in June 1972. Shortly thereafter Ehrlichman tele- 
phoned Gray and had a second conversation regarding the contents of Hunt's 
safe. Ehrlichman told Gray that Dean had told the prosecutors that he 
had delivered two of Hunt's files to Gray. Gray told Ehrlichman that he 
had destroyed the documents. 


Page 

57.1 President Nixon dally diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury .. Misc. 47-73 1060 

57.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2615-16 1063 

57.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2675-76, 2678-79... 1065 

57.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

May 3, 1973, 177-79 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1069 

57.5 L. Patrick Gray testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

July 20, 1973, 113-18 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1072 

57.6 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3470. 1077 

57.7 H. R. Haldeman deposition. Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 254-55 1078 


( 67 ) 


58. On April 15, 1973, from 11:45 to 11:53 p.m. , the President had 
a telephone conversation with Henry Petersen. The President told Petersen 
that he had met with Dean. There was also a discussion of whether the 
Predident should ask Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman to resign. Petersen 
has testified that the President told him that Dean had given the 
President basically the same information which Dean had previously 
given to the prosecutors. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


58.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3648 .1124 

58.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 15, 1973, 

Exhibit 20, In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73 1125 


58.3 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a telephone 
conversatibn between the President and Henry 
Petersen, April 15, 1973, 11:45 - 11:53 p.m., 1128 


( 68 ) 




59. On April 16, 1973 from 8:18 to 8:22 a.m. the President had a 
telephone conversation with John Ehrllchman. Ehrllchman has testified 
that the President stated he was going to ask Dean to resign or take a 
leave of absence because Dean apparently continued to have access to 
White House files and because the President and Dean then had basically 
an adversary relationship. From 9:50 to 9:59 a.m. the President met 
with Haldeman and Ehrllchman. There was a discussion of what the Presi- 
dent would say to Dean and of what statement might be released to the 
press. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of the conversation between the President, Haldeman 
and Ehrllchman, the President has produced an edited transcript of the 
recording. A summary of that transcript has been prepared. 


Page 


59.1 John Ehrllchman testimony, 7 SSC 2807-08 1132 

59.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1134 


59.3 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, H.R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrllchman, April 16, 1973, 9:50 - 9:59 a.m 1137 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-6 


( 69 ) 



60 


On April 16, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 10:00 to 


10:40 a.m. The following is an index to certain of the 
in the course of that meeting: 


President's request that Dean submit a 
letter of resignation or a request for 
a leave of absence, and discussion of 
other resignations. 

March 21, 1973 conversation among the 
President, Dean and Haldeman, and what 
Dean should say about that conversation. 

Whether the President would waive 
executive privilege. 

How events after the break-in and after 
March 21 would be described. 

What induced Magruder to talk and the 
President '8 desire to take credit for 
Magruder' 8 cooperation. 

President's statements to Dean that 
Dean should tell the truth. 

Executive clemency. 

President's statement that Dean was 
still his counsel. 

What should be done about legal 
problems of White House aides. 


subjects discussed 

TRANSCRIPT PAGE 

1 , 8 , 11 , 12 , 
51-53 

17-21; 24-27 
22, 28 

22-28; 42-43 

31-34 

34- 35; 44 

35- 36; 46-48 

38 

38-42; 45-51 


( 70 ) 



Page 


60.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1143 


60.2 Drafts of two letters to the President dated 
April 16, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 34-49, 

3 SSC 1314-15 1146 

60. 3 Tape recording of a conversation between the 
President and John Dean, April 16, 1973, 10:00 - 
10:40 a.m. , and House Judiciary Committee 

transcript thereof 1148 


( 71 ) 



61. On April 16, 1973 from 10:50 to 11:04 a.m. the President, H. R. 
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman met. The President reported on his meeting 
with Dean. There was a discussion of a "scenario” of events after the 
President became aware that there were some discrepancies between what 
he had been told by Dean in the report that there was nobody in the 
White House involved. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared . 


Page 


61.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1204 


61.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, H.R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman, April 16, 1973, 10:50 - 11:04 a.m 1207 


( 72 ) 



62. On April 16, 1973 from 12:00 to 12:31 p.m. the President met 
with H. R. Haldeman. There was a discussion of what Haldeman might 
state publicly about his involvement in the transfer of cash from the 
White House to CRP. 

In response to the Committee’s subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


62.1 President Nixon dally diary, April 16, 1973, 


Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1214 


62.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and H.R. Haldeman, 

April 16, 1973, 12:00 - 12531 p.m 1217 


( 73 ) 




63. On April 16, 1973 from 1:39 to 3:25 p.m. the President met with 
Henry Petersen. Ronald Ziegler was also present from 2:25 to 2:52 p.m. 
During this meeting Petersen gave the President a report on the investi- 
gation and a written memorandum summarizing the prosecutors' evidence as 
of that time implicating Haldeman and Ehrllchman. There was discussion 
of whether the President should ask Haldeman and Ehrllchman to resign. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


63.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3634 1224 

63.2 Memorandum from Henry Petersen to the President, 

April 16, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 147, 9 SSC 3875-76.. 1225 

63.3 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 5, 1974, 21-22 (received from Watergate 


Grand Jury) 1227 

63.4 President Nixon dally diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73 1229 


63.5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and Henry Petersen, 

April 16, 1973, 1:39-3*25 p.m 1232 


( 74 ) 


64. On April 16, 1973 from 3:27 to 4:04 p.m. the President met with 
John Ehrlichman and Ronald Ziegler. There was a discussion of the infor- 
mation furnished by Henry Petersen. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


64.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, _ Jn re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73 1252 

64.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, John Ehrlichman and 

Ronald Ziegler, April 16, 1973, 3:27-4:04 p.m 1255 


( 75 ) 


65 


On April 16, 1973 from 4:07 to 4:35 p.m. the President met with 
John Dean. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed 
during that conversation: 

TRANSCRIPT PAGE 


Presidential statement in regard 
to Watergate. 

Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean's 
continued presence on the White 
House staff. 

Magruder's negotiations with the 
U. S. Attorneys. 

President's statement to Dean to 
tell the truth. 

Dean's proposed testimony before 
the grand jury in regard to the 
issue of Haldeman 's prior knowledge 
of the DNC break-in. 

Possible discovery of Hunt and Liddy's 
involvement in the Fielding break— in. 

Senate Select Committee and the 
failure of "containment" during 
the past nine months. 


1-3, 15, 18, 26 


3-7, 24-25 
8, 16-17 
10 


10-15 

20-21 


22-24 


( 76 ) 


Page 


65.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1267 

65.2 Letter from John Dean to the President, 

April 16, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 34-50, 3 SSC 1316 1270 

65.3 Tape recording of a conversation between the 
President and John Dean, April 16, 1973, 4:07 - 
4:35 p.m. , and House Judiciary Committee 

transcript thereof 1271 


( 77 ) 




66. On April 16, 1973 from 8:58 to 9:14 p.m. the President spoke 
by telephone with Henry Petersen. Petersen gave the President a report. 
The President said he would not pass the information on because he 
knew the rules of the Grand Jury. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


66.1 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 

House edited transcript of a telephone conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen, April 16, 


1973, 8:58 - 9:14 p.m 1298 

66.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 16, 1973, 

Exhibit 21, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1304 


( 78 ) 


67. On April 17, 1973 from 9:47 to 9:59 a.m. the President met with 
H. R. Haldeman. The President Instructed Haldeman to tell Kalnibach that 
LaRue was talking freely. There was discussion of the problem raised by 
Dean's efforts to get Immunity. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared . 


Page 


67.1 Rouse Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and H.R. Haldeman, 

April 17, 1973, 9:47 - 9:59 a.m 1308 

67.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 

Exhibit 48, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1312 


( 79 ) 


68. On or about April 17, 1973 John Ehrlichman had telephone conver- 
sations with Charles Colson, White House aide Ken Clawson, and former 
CRP campaign director Clark MacGregor. Ehrlichoan asked Colson and 
Clawson about their recollections regarding Dean's allegations that 
Ehrlichman had told Dean to destroy documents from Hunt's safe and to 
order Hunt to leave the country. During the course of their conver- 
sation, Colson and Ehrlichman discussed nailing Dean by seeing that 
he not get immunity. Each of these conversations was tape recorded 
by Ehrlichman. 


Page 


68.1 Transcript of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Clark MacGregor, SSC Exhibit 

No. 107, 7 SSC 3007-08 1318 

68.2 Tape recording of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Ken Clawson, April 17, 1973. 

(received from SSC) and House Judiciary Committee 
transcript thereof 1320 


68.3 Tape recording of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, April 17, 1973 
(received from SSC) and House Judiciary Committee 
transcript thereof 


( 80 ) 


69. On April 17, 1973 at 10:26 a.m. Gray met with Petersen in Gray's 
office. Gray has testified that he admitted to Petersen that he had 
received files from Dean in Ehrlichman's office andtold Petersen that 
he had burned the files without reading them. Petersen told Gray that 
the assistant D. S. attorneys would want him before the grand jury. 
During the afternoon of April 17 Petersen told the President that Gray 
had admitted destroying documents he received from Dean. 


Page 

69.1 L. Patrick Gray log, April 17, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 1332 

69.2 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3471 1334 

69.3 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3624-26 1335 

69.4 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 5, 1974, 26-27 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1338 

69.5 White House edited transcript of a conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen from 

2:46 to 3:49 p.m., April 17, 1973, 1, 38-40 1340 


( 81 ) 


70 


On April 17, 1973 from 12:35 to 2:20 p.m. the President met with 
H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. Ronald Ziegler joined the meeting 
from 2:10 to 2:17 p.m. There was a discussion about what to do about 
Dean and what Dean might say if he were fired; about the motive for 
making payments to the defendants; about what Strachan would say con- 
cerning intelligence material received from Magruder; and about whether 
Dean had reported to the President in the summer of 1972. There was 
also discussion of a press plan. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared . 


Page 


70.1 

President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 

Exhibit 48. In re Grand Jury, Misc. 47-73 

.. 1346 

70.2 

House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of a meeting among the 
President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and 
Ronald Ziegler, April 17, 1973, 12:35 - 2:20 p.m... 

.. 1350 


( 82 ) 


71. On April 17, 1973 from 2:39 to 2:40 p.m. the President had a 
telephone conversation with John Ehrlichman. There was a discussion 
of what the President would say to Petersen about immunity for top 
White House staff members. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


71.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 

Exhibit 48, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1388 


71.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a telephone 

conversation between the President and John 

Ehrlichman, April 17, 1973, 2:39 - 2:40 p.m 1392 


( 83 ) 


72. On April 17, 1973 from 2:46 to 3:49 p.m. the President met with 
Henry Petersen. There was a discussion about whether Petersen had 
passed grand jury information to Dean and about whether Dean would be 
granted immunity. The President read to Petersen a proposed press 
statement and Petersen stated the difficulties which would be posed 
by a statement that the President opposed granting immunity to high 
White House officials. Petersen told the President that Gray had 
admitted receiving from Ehrlichman and Dean documents unrelated to 
Watergate taken from Hunt ' s safe . Petersen said that Gray said he had 
burned these documents without reading them. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


72.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 


Exhibit 48, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1396 


72.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and Henry Petersen, 

April 17, 1973, 2:46 - 3:49 p.m 1400 


( 84 ) 




73. On April 17, 1973 from 3:50 to 4:35 p.m. the President met with 
H. R. Haldeman, Ronald Ziegler and John Ehrlichman. The President 
described his conversation with Petersen. There was a discussion of 
whether Haldeman and Ehrlichman should take leaves of absence. The 
President went over the text of the statement he was about to give. 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of that conversation, the President has produced an 
edited transcript of the recording. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. 


Page 


73.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 

Exhibit 48, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73...., 1412 

73.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, H.R. Haldeman, Ronald 
Ziegler and John Ehrlichman, April 17, 1973, 

3:50 - 4:35 p.m 1416 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-7 


( 85 ) 


74. On April 17, 1973 from 4:42 to 4:45 p.m. the President Issued a 
public statement containing two announcements. The President first 
announced that White House personnel would appear before the Senate 
Select Committee, but would reserve the right to assert executive 
privilege during the course of questioning . He then reported that on 
March 21 he had begun intensive new inquiries into the whole Watergate 
matter and that there had been major developments in the case. The 
President stated he had expressed to the appropriate authorities his 
view that there should be no immunity from prosecution for present 
or former high Administration officials. The President said that 
those still in government would be suspended if indicted and discharged 
if convicted. 


Page 


74.1 


President Nixon statement, April 17, 1973, 
9 Presidential Documents 387 


1420 



75 


On April 17, 1973 the President met in his EOB office with 


William Rogers from 5:20 to 6:19 p.m. and with H. R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman from 5:50 to 7:14 p.m. The President briefed Rogers on his 
investigation and his discussion with Petersen. There was a discussion of 
whether Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean should resign and of Dean's testimony 
against Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Haldeman and Ehrlichman reported on 
their conversation with John Wilson, a defense attorney in criminal cases 
who had been recommended by Rogers. There was a discussion of what 
Dean had told Kalmbach about the purpose of the money* he was asked to 
raise . 

In response to the Committee's subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of the President's conversations of April 17, 1973 
from 5:50 to 7:14 p.m., the President has produced an edited transcript 
of the recording of his conversations from 5:20 to 7:14 p.m. A summary 
of that transcript has been prepared. 


Page 


75.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 17, 1973, 

Exhibit 48, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73. 1422 

75.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, William Rogers, H. R. 

Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, April 17, 1973, 

5:20 - 7:14 p.m 1426 


( 87 > 




76. In April 1973 former and present White House aides and CRP 

officials were interviewed by the prosecutors or called before the 
Watergate Grand Jury. These included E. Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy, 
Jeb Magruder, Gordon Strachan, Richard Moore, Dwight Chapin, Herbert 
Kalmbach, James McCord, Fred LaRue, Herbert Porter, John Mitchell, 
Charles Colson and John Dean. 


Page 

76.1 Transcript of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Herbert Kalmbach, April 19, 

1973, SSC Exhibit No. 77, 5 SSC 2215-17.... 1444 

76.2 Transcript of a telephone conversation between 
John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, April 17, 

1973, SSC Exhibit No. 109, 7 SSC 3010-11 1447 

76.3 United States v. Chapin indictment, November 

29, 1973 1449 

76.4 United States v. Mitchell indictment, March 

1, 1974, 1, 20-21, 44-50 1450 

76.5 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 808 1460 

76.6 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1009 1461 

76.7 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 2059 1462 

76.8 Fred LaRue testimony, 6 SSC 2298 1463 

76.9 In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73, docket, 

March 28, 30, April 3, 5, 1973 1464 

76.10 Herbert Porter testimony, 2 SSC 637. 1466 


( 88 ) 



77. On April 18, 1973 the President had telephone conversations 

with Henry Petersen from 2:50 to 2:56 p.m. and from 6:28 to 6:37 p.m. 
Petersen has testified that the President told him that Dean said he 
had been granted immunity and the President had it oh tape, and that 
Petersen denied that Dean had been granted immunity. Petersen told 
the President that the prosecutors had received evidence that Gordon 
Liddy and E. Howard Hunt had burglarized the office of Dr. Fielding, 
Daniel Ellsberg f s psychiatrist. The President told Petersen that he 
knew of that event; it was a national security matter; Petersen’s 
mandate was Watergate; and Petersen should stay out of the Fielding 
break-in. The President told Petersen that the prosecutors should 
not question Hunt about national security matters. After this tele- 
phone call, Petersen relayed this directive to Silbert. 

In response to the Committee’s subpoena for the tape recording 
and other evidence of the telephone conversations between the Presi- 
dent and Petersen from 2:50 to 2:56 p.m. and from 6:28 to 6:37 p.m., 
the President has produced an edited transcript of the conversation 
from 2:50 to 2:56 p.m., during which the President and Petersen dis- 


( 89 ) 



cussed immunity for Dean and Magruder. A summary of that transcript has 
been prepared. The President has informed the Committee that the 
telephone call from 6:28 to 6:37 p.m. was placed from Camp David and 
was not recorded. 


Page 

77.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 18, 1973, 

Exhibit 49, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1469 


77.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 

White House edited transcript of a telephone 
conversation between the President and Henry 
Petersen, April 18, 1973, 2:50 - 2:56 p.m,. 1472 

77.3. Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand 

Jury, August 23, 1973, 73-75 (received from 
Watergate Grand Jury) 1474 

77.4 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 5, 1974, 12-14, 19-20 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1477 

77.5 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3630-31, 

3654-56. 1482 

77.6 President Nixon statement, August 15, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 991, 993 1487 

77.7 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 

1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1020 1489 

77.8 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1019-20 1491 


( 90 ) 


78. On April 19, 1973 John Dean issued a public statement declaring 

in part that he would not become a scapegoat in the Watergate case. He 
added that anyone who believed that did not know the true facts nor 
understand our system of justice. Following Dean's statement, Stephen 
Bull of the President's White House staff checked with the Secret Service 
agent in charge of the White House taping system to determine if Dean 
knew about the existence of the taping system. The agent replied that 
as far as the Secret Service knew Dean had no such knowledge. 


Page 

78.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1020 .1494 

78.2 New York Times , April 20, 1973, 1, 11 1495 

78.3 Stephen Bull testimony. In re Grand Jury , 

Misc. 47-73, January 18, 1974, 2544-46 ..1496 

78.4 Louis Sims testimony. In re Grand Jury, 

Misc. 47-73, January 17, 1974, 2447-48 ......1499 


( 91 ) 



79. On April 19, 1973 the President met with Richard Moore. They 

discussed the President’s public statement of April 17 and the fact that 
on March 20, 1973 Dean and Moore discussed Dean's telling the President 
about the Watergate matter. Moore has testified that the President 
said that he had told Dean that to raise money for the Watergate 
defendants was not only wrong but stupid. Moore told the President 
that Dean had shown him a list of individuals who might be indicted, and 
that Dean had said that Ehrlichman’s problem might be involved with the 
Ellsberg case. The President responded that the White House investigation 
of Ellsberg had to be done because J. Edgar Hoover could not be counted 
on as he was a close friend of Ellsberg' s father-in-law. 


Page 

79.1 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1961-62, 

1982-83 1502 

79.2 President Nixon daily diary, April 19, 1973, 

Exhibit 50, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1506 


( 92 ) 


80. 


On April 19, 1973 from 8:26 to 9:32 p.m. the President met with 


John Wilson and Frank Strickler, attorneys for H. R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman. There was a discussion of the case against Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman . 

The Committee has requested the tape recording and other 
evidence of this conversation. The President has provided an edited 
transcript of that recording. A summary of that transcript has been 
prepared. 


Page 


80.1 President Nixon daily diary, April 19, 1973, 


Exhibit 50, In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73 1512 


80.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, John Wilson and Frank 
Strickler, April 19, 1973, 8:26 - 9:32 p.m 1515 


(» 3 ) 



81. Between April 19 and April 26, 1973 the President had eleven 

conversations with Henry Petersen. Petersen has testified that during 
these conversations the President asked Petersen for a detailed written 
report on the Watergate matter; discussed the advisability of retaining 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman at the White House; and discussed the progress 
of the Grand Jury investigation. Petersen has testified that some time 
in the course of the April discussions the President made a flattering 
reference to Petersen as an adviser to the President and said he would 
have to serve as "White House counsel." The President also asked 
Petersen whether he would like to be FBI director, but stated he was 
not offering him the job. 


Page 


81.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and Henry Petersen, April 
19-26, 1973 (received from White 

House) 1532 

81.2 Henry Petersen testimony, Watergate Grand 
, Jury, February 5, 1974, 17-23, 29-33 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1535 


( 94 ) 




82. On April 20, 1973 Herbert Kalmbach was scheduled to testify 

before the Watergate Grand Jury. On the afternoon prior to his 
scheduled appearance, John Ehrlichman and Kalmbach had a telephone 
conversation, which was taped by Ehrlichman without Kalmbach' s know- 
ledge, during which they discussed Kalmbach' s payment of funds to 
the Watergate defendants. 


Page 

82.1 Transcript of a telephone conversa- 
tion between John Ehrlichman and 
Herbert Kalmbach at 4:50 p.m., 

April 19, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 77, 

5 SSC 2215-17 1548 

82.2 Herbert Kalmbach testimony, 5 SSC 2162-63 1551 


( 95 ) 




83. On April 22, 1973, Easter Sunday, the President telephoned 

John Dean from Key Biscayne, Florida. Dean has testified that the 
President called to wish him a happy holiday. 


Page 

83.1 Meetings and conversations between 
the President and John Dean, April 

22, 1973 (received from White House) 1554 

83.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1020 1555 


( 96 ) 




84. On April 25 and 26, 1973 Presidential aide Stephen Bull delivered 

a number of tape recordings of Presidential conversations to H. R. 

Haldeman. At the President's request Haldeman listened to the tape 
recording of the President's March 21, 1973 morning meeting with John 
Dean, made notes and reported to the President. 


Page 

84.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and H. R. Haldeman, April 25-26, 

1973 (received from White House) 1558 

84.2 Portion of log of access to tapes of 
Presidential conversations maintained by the 
Secret Service, Exhibit 7, In re Grand Jury , 

Misc. 47-73 1559 

84.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, November 8, 1973, 

In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73, 927, 937-38 1561 


84.4 Stephen Bull testimony, November 2, 1973, 

In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73, 344-45 1565 


84.5 President Nixon statement, November 12, 

1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1329 1567 

84.6 H. R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 30, 1974, 25-31 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1568 

84.7 H. R. Haldeman notes of listening to tape 

of March 21, 1973 meeting (received from Water- 
gate Grand Jury) 1575 

84.8 Raymond Zumwalt testimony, November 1, 1973, 

In re Grand Jury . Misc. 47-73, 96-97 1606 


84.9 H. R. Haldeman calendar, April 25 and 26, 

1973 (received from SSC) 1608 


( 97 ) 


85. On April 26, 1973 Senator Lowell Weicker, a member of the Senate 

Select Committee, released to the press information that Patrick Gray 
had burned politically sensitive files which had been given to him by 
John Dean from Howard Hunt's White House safe. Petersen has testified 
that on this date the President telephoned him to ask if Gray ought to 
resign as Acting FBI Director and that Petersen told the President that 
he thought Gray's position was untenable. At the President's instruc- 
tion, Petersen, Gray and Kleindienst met that evening and discussed 
Gray's possible resignation. Kleindienst telephoned the President and 
recommended that Gray step down, but added that Gray did not see it 
that way. The President told Kleindienst that he would not require 
Gray to resign immediately . Gray has testified that Kleindienst also 
stated after speaking to the President there must be no implication 
that in burning these files there was any attempt of a coverup at the 
White House. 


Page 

85.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3491-92, 


3495 1614 

85.2 New York Daily News , April 27, 1973, 2 1617 

85.3 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and Henry Petersen, April 26, 

1973 (received from White House) 1618 


85.4 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3625-26, 3654 

85 .5 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and Richard Kleindienst, April 

26, 1973 (received from White House) 

85.6 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3598-99. 


( 98 ) 


86. On April 26, 1973 Jeb Magruder resigned his post as Director 

of Policy Development for the Department of Commerce. 

i 

Page 

86.1 Washington Post , April 27, 1973, Al, A16 1626 


( 99 ) 




87. On the afternoon of April 27, 1973 Patrick Gray notified 

Lawrence Higby that he was resigning as Acting Director of the FBI. 

From 4:31 to 4:35 p.in. on April 27, the President had a telephone conver- 
sation with Petersen during which the President asked if Petersen had 
any information that would reflect on the President. Petersen said no. 

At the President's request, Petersen met with the President from 5:37 
to 5:43 p.m. and from 6:04 to 6:48 p.m. The President again asked if 
there was adverse information about the President. Petersen said he was 
sure that the prosecutors did not have that type of information. 

The Committee has requested the tape recordings and other 
evidence of various Presidential conversations on the afternoon and 
evening of April 27, 1973. The President has produced edited transcripts 
of the conversations between the President and Petersen from 5:37 to 5:43 
p.m. and among the President, Petersen and Ronald Ziegler from 6:04 
to 6:48 p.m. Summaries of the transcripts have been prepared. 


Page 

87.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3492-93 1629 

87.2 L. Patrick Gray log, April 27, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1631 

87.3 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and Henry Petersen, April 27, 

1973 (received from White House) 1633 

87.4 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3636 1634 


( 100 ) 


Page 


87.5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
between the President and Henry Petersen 

April 27, 1973, 5:37 - 5:43 p.m ... 1635 

87.6 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of 
White House edited transcript of a meeting 
among the President, Henry Petersen and 
Ronald Ziegler, April 27, 1973, 6:04 - 

6:48 p.m 1638 


( 101 ) 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-8 



88. On or about April 28, 1973 H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman 
determined that they should resign from their positions on the White 


House staff. Haldeman and Ehrlichman have testified that the President 
did not request their resignations. 


Page 

88.1 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3096 1648 

88.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2808-09 1649 


( 102 ) 



89 . On April 29 , 1973 the President met with Attorney General 

Richard Kleindienst at Camp David. They discussed Kleindienst 's 
resignation as Attorney General. The President asked Kleindienst 
if he could announce Kleindienst ' s resignation in his statement the 
next day and Kleindienst consented. Also on that date the President 
met with Elliot Richardson at Camp David and informed him of his 
intention to nominate Richardson to be Attorney General. The President 
told Richardson that he would commit to Richardson's determination 
whether a special prosecutor was needed. 


Page 


89.1 Elliot Richardson testimony, SJC, 

Richardson Confirmation Hearings, 

May 22, 1973, 228 1652 

89.2 Elliot Richardson press conference, 

October 23, 1973, 29 1653 

89.3 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 

9 SSC 3597-98 1654 


( 103 ) 




90. On April 30, 1973 the President made a nationwide televised 

address on the Watergate matter. He announced the resignations of H. R. 
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Kleindienst and John Dean and the 
appointment of Elliot Richardson as Attorney General of the United 
States. 


Page 


90.1 President Nixon address, April 30, 

1973, 9 Presidential Documents 433-34 


1658 




STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 


AND 

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 


EVENTS FOLLOWING 
THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN 
March 22, 1973 - April 30, 1973 


Part 1 


( 105 ) 






1. On March 22, 1973 from 1:57 to 3:43 p.m. there was a meeting 

among the President, John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean. The following Is an Index to certain of the subjects 


discussed in the course of that meeting: 



TRANSCRIPT PAGE 

Nature and purpose of a written report on 
Watergate-related matters to be drafted 
by John Dean. 

22-33, 52-53, 
57, 74-75 

White House . contacts with the Senate 
Select Committee, and discussion of the 
activities of that Committee. 

7-19, 27-32, 35, 
46-51, 58-61, 64-68 

White House position on doctrine of 
executive privilege, and possible 
changes in that position. 

14, 19-21, 32-44, 
62, 64, 67-69, 76 

White House relationship to future Grand 
Jury investigations. 

56-58 

Reference to White House approach to 
disclosure as "modified limited hang out" 
and other discussion relating to disclosure. 

70-74, 81-82, 86 


Page 


1.1 Tape recording of meeting among the President, 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean, March 22, 1973, 1:57 - 3:43 p.m., 
and House Judiciary Committee transcript there- 
of 108 

1.2 H. R. Haldeman notes, March 22, 1973 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 212 


( 107 ) 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF A 
RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, JOHN 
DEAN, JOHN EHRLICHMAN, H. R. HALDEMAN AND JOHN 
MITCHELL ON MARCH 22, 1973, FROM 1:57 TO 3:43 P.M. 


PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 


MITCHELL: 


Hello John, how are you? [Unintelligible] 

Mr. President [unintelligible] Nixon. Mr. President, 
I’m just great. How are you? 

You Wall Street lawyer — 

Yeah. I would hope that would be okay. 

I think so. Yeah. You have to admit it, have to 
admit you* re rich. 

Not in front of all these people that help to collect 
taxes. 


PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
MITCHELL : 


Well, we’ll spend them for what you want. [Unintelligible] 

But I, I can report 9 incidentally, that the firm is doing 
quite well. 

Are they? 

Can’t think of any reason why it shouldn't. 

I don’t either. 


( 108 ) 



EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 
I assigned the log [unintelligible] on Saturday. 

Tfes, we know. 

Eastland is going to postpone any further hearings on 
Gray for two weeks. Try and let things cool off a 
little bit. He thinks Gray is dead on the floor. 

[Unintelligible] 

Gray's the symbol of wisdom; today, he accused your 
counsel of being a liar. 

He may be dead 'cause I may shoot him. 

[Laughter] 

How's that? 

He said, "Yes"; he thinks John, he thinks John Dean did 
lie to the FBI when he said he wasn't sure whether Hunt, 
whether, uh, Howard Hunt had an office in the White 
House . 

I said I had to check it out. When, uh, when the agents 
asked me if they could see the office — was the way 
it occurred — right after an interview. And I said I 
would have to check that out. And now it's been inter- 
preted that I was lying to the FBI about the fact that 


- 2 - 


( 109 ) 



U1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 19? 3 MEETING 
he had an office or didn’t have an office here. 


HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 
HALDEMAN: 


Which wasn’t the question. 

Which wasn’t the question. 

[Unintelligible], But the headline for tonight will be 
’’Gray Says Dean Lied”, 

If Gray had been — Gray apparently didn’t know what 
the testimony was, is what, uh — 

He never really sought to find out the facts. 

The question [unintelligible} earlier he just took 
the question without checking on it. 

The leading question — Yeah, I think the question con- 
cerning the — 

Yeah, the, you know, the — 

Well, another factor, those agents may [unintelligible] 
That’s right. 

Gray said that [unintelligible] FBI interview with Dean 
[unintelligible] question, he said, "I’ll have to check 
it out" when asked if Hunt had a White House office. 


- 3 - 


( 110 ) 



PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN : 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN :: 

PRESIDENT : 
DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 197 S MEETING 

He wasn't asked that. He was asked if they could see, 
see the White House office. Said, "i'll have to check 
that out." 

Well, you, will — 

So then says, "Did Dean lie to the agents?" Byrd asked 
Gray. "Looking back I would have to conclude that 
you were — everything was correct in what you say." 

Yeah, but, uh — 

It's such an irrelevant point even, that's the funny 
thing . 

Well, as a matter of fact, uh [unintelligible] such a 
thing that — 

They're working on it right now. 

[Unintelligible] talk to Radford? 

I think so. 

Yeah, but [unintelligible] wasn't Gray responsible? Wasn't 
Gray responsible for that? 

Well, Bull has the matter right now. I just talked to him. 
He said he's quite frightened to sit down, frightened 
somebody is talking to you right now because, uh, uh, 


- 4 - 


(in) 



HALDEMAN: 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Byrd has indicated he'd like to have all the records 

of all the conversations we've had since the hearings 

started. How does he think you have called me, initiated 

the calls, to report on their hearings — wasn't a 

problem. 

Well, Hunt was on the [snap fingers] 

He's a very down man right now, I might say also. 

Did you check the specific FBI reports? 

Uh, they are trying to find it over there right now. 

They are trying to find just how the draft of the 
transcript originated. And, 

Yes. 

you know — ■ 

Here ? s the point, that some of the worst conclusions 
about, you know, I've tried to cut off the FBI is simply 
inaccurate. That's what isn't true. That's the fact 
that [unintelligible] 

In fact that's a good point for Ziegler to say, this sort 
of reminds me of too — 


- 5 - 


( 112 ) 



i .l TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


UNIDENTIFIED: 
MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

DEAN: 


UNIDENTIFIED : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


I know DeMarco * — 

He's plenty good. 

You, by the way, draw the combination, for instance 
[unintelligible] 

Well he may be feeling sorry for himself, you know, 
and [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] 

He's, he, he sounds down. He realized after our con- 
versation that, he sounded down. He said, uh, uh, 
and I said, "Well, I’ll talk to you later Pat" and, 
uh, you know, trying to show that he'd like to discuss 
[unintelligible] my voice [unintelligible], and he 
said, "Hold on just a minute." "All right, just 
keep the faith," [Laughs] 

Has he been coached by someone? 

I don't think so. Dick Moore is talking with him 
right now and, and [unintelligible] 

What did Dick, uh, Dick, uh, say, have to say about 
it JunintelligibleJ 

- 6 - 


( 113 ) 



UNIDENTIFIED: 
UNIDENTIFIED: 
MITCHELL : 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

Sure. The only lawyer — 

[Unintelligible] want to get on the wire right quick. 

On the specifics of what the question was and what the 
response to it. Now, I think [unintelligible] Gray 
[unintelligible] 

Uh, they got material where they wanted. The information 
was in the office. 

It was in the office? [Unintelligible] Hunt? 

I never — Down to this day I don't really know where 
Hunt’s safe was kept. Uh, I don’t think there was one — 
was there? [Unintelligible] 

John*s been over — John’s been with Ziegler this morning. 
Yeah, I left them to come over here and — 

You did? You were with them. They are, uh — 

They’re working on it too. 

[Unintelligible] they’re working on the specifics. 

Well, they are trying to get all the facts right now, 
as to what he might have reported as to how he came up 
with the transcript in the hearings, and then the frame up. 


- 7 - 


( 114 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

HALDEMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

DEAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


1 .' 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

You were trying to get through to — with the [unin- 
telligible] Silbert — you have to get the thing by 
Hunt, 

Not before the Grand Jury, 

You mean — ? 

[Unintelligible] 

Right. [Unintelligible], Tell Ron [unintelligible] 
[Unintelligible ] 

Well, maybe in the next twenty minutes I ought to shoot 
back over there and, and give her a call. 

Shoot back [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] 

About how long will it be? 

Uh, fifteen minutes. 

Well, John, uh, Howard Baker just had, uh — Hunt had 
this [unintelligible] sort of a buddy and, uh, Bittman 
just had lunch with Howard Baker's Administrative Assistant 


- 8 - 


( 115 ) 



PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 


1A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 y 1973 MEETING 
at the Administrative Assistant’s request. 

The same one that saw, uh, saw Colson? 

Uh, I don’t know that it was the same one, but I 
would guess. But this fellow, uh, wanted to get 
guidance from, uh, Timmons as to what the President 
was expecting out of the hearings and, uh, what, uh, 
he wanted to talk to him about this executive privilege 
business and, uh, where are we going to stand on that. 
Ke expressed the personal view that the President 
couldn’t waive executive privilege, uh, which that 
son-of-a-bitch [unintelligible] Ervin would accept 
the written interrogatories, and, and that they would 
probably go to the subpoena route [unintelligible]. 

Uh, but, uh, nothing was raised about Baker being con- 
cerned that he didn’t have contact — nothing on that 
other report was raised at all. Uh, but he did say 
that, uh. Baker was a little pissed off at Klein- 
dienst because, uh, uh, he had not met with him at 
all. He had had one meeting scheduled which they 
finally were able to set up, but Kleindienst cancelled 
it. And it has not been rescheduled, and so Baker has 
had no communication with Kleindienst. The day it was 
scheduled was the day you had your press conference and 


- 9 - 


( 116 ) 



MITCHELL : 

HALDEMAN : 
MITCHELL : 

HALDEMAN : 

MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN : 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 Z MEETING 
announced your executive privilege or announced that 
the President with Dean and nobody would go up, which, 
uh, caught Baker unawares. Uh, and, uh, the disturbing 
thing is that his understanding is [unintelligible] the 
view that, uh, Kleindienst would keep him informed of 
this next time. [Unintelligible] 

Plus the fact they’re having a meeting with that guy, uh, 
as soon as he — 

Oh, yeah. 

And all Weicker does is [unintelligible] Moore and 
Howard [unintelligible] Justice Department [unintelligible] 

Well he's objecting to the agreement that they made with 
Kleindienst, that Ervin made with Kleindienst, that, uh, 

FBI raw files would be made available to the Chairman and 
the ranking member. 

Yeah, well — 

Demanding that they be — He's going to demand that they, 
they subpoena the, uh. Attorney General and the Director 
of the FBI to produce all the files, the materials and 
so forth. 

I talked to Kleindienst last night and he raised that. 


- 10 - 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-9 


( 117 ) 



PRESIDENT: 
HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197Z MEETING 
And he said that he worked this out with, with Weicker, 
but Weicker was now dissatisfied with the arrangement. 
So he's going to the Chairman and the ranking minority 
member on the conflict. 

[Unintelligible] a letter to [unintelligible] 

That could be the [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] Baker’s idea. He wanted to talk to 
Kleindienst about it, didn’t want to talk to anybody 
else. That’s the way we left it. 

[Unintelligible] I think that Kleindienst ought to be 
aware of the fact that Baker is distressed that he 
hasn’t made any greater effort to see him. 

Good point. Yeah. 

I will. 

Fine [unintelligible]. Follow through and pick up on 
that idea. I just want — I think you’d better do 
it yourself. Don't you? 

Could I suggest that, that you call Kleindienst? You 
had the other conversation with him. Could you call 
him and say you've gotten a rumor that Baker's unhappy? 
Because [unintelligible] nobody else can do it. 


- 11 - 


( 118 ) 



HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL: 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 


PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 
HALDEMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 


l A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

I think he’s not really standing on his tippy-toes 
completely. 

[Unintelligible] 

The nature of the liaison — he’s got [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] communicate back and forth. 

[Unintelligible] will not want to be in position — 
Baker does not want to be in the position of talking 
to anybody in the White House . 

He doesn’t want to talk to anybody. 

[Unintelligible] collaborate with us. 

He doesn’t want to talk — 

But he wants to collaborate — this A. A. was saying, 
he wants to be helpful, he wants to work things out. 

He told the President he wanted to do that through 
the 

Yeah. 

Attorney General. 

That’s right. Said he did want to talk to Kleindienst. 
Does Kleindienst know that? 


- 12 - 


( 119 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

MITCHELL : 


Yes, of course. 

Well then, call Kleindienst. 

[Unintelligible] . Were you there? [Unintelligible] 

What are they going to collaborate on? 

[Unintelligible] what? 

Well, now, what are they going to collaborate on? 

Well, I suppose on such matters, uh, you may recall 
that Gray wants to, uh [unintelligible] wants the 
FBI; however [unintelligible] and so forth having 
Kleindienst [unintelligible] 

Well, again, I, I know exactly what the trouble is. 

Oh, okay. [Unintelligible] all done. [Unintelligible] 

I'm the one that should do it. But you — what Baker 
was thinking of, saye that Kleindienst cancelled [unin- 
telligible] I would think Kleindienst should have done it. 

[Unintelligible] broadcast [unintelligible] 

Well, that's another thing, that, uh [unintelligible] 

For instance, said to Timmons, Baker was expecting all the 
lawyers to try to get into the confidence of Ram Frvin that 

[unintelligible] 


- 13 - 


( 120 ) 



HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


EHRLICHMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22. 1973 MEETING 
Yeah, but he shouldn’t be too concerned about Baker’s 
public statements in agreement with Ervin with, uh, 
that established him [unintelligible] 

Well, he said that he [unintelligible] against it. 

That’s what he wants to do, [Unintelligible] Okay. 

Well, uh, you, you’re going to follow up about 2:30 

on, on. Gray [unintelligible]. He’s [laughs] a little bit on 

the stupid side, to be frank with you. 

The prospects to let himself get sandbagged until then 
won’t happen. 

You’d better counsel him about it. The problem with him, 
the problem with him, John, is, uh, with Gray, is uh, 
a certain stubborness [unintelligible] talk to Klein- 
dienst. Frankly, I think too, I think maybe, maybe 
Kleindienst ought to counsel him and talk to him. 

He has, uh, and he listened to him. John Ehrlichman 
talked to Kleindienst last night and said that’s where 
Gray was getting his guidance. 

The whole trouble is that Dick gives him guidance which 
is very general. Something like this comes up and 
Gray overreacts — it’s almost a spasm reaction. We 


- 14 - 


( 121 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 3 MEETING 
had, the other day — whether or not, you know, giving 
them access to the FBI files. 

Yeah. 

It was, it was the opposite of what Kleindienst told him. 

I know it. 

And, uh — 

He shouldn't have even needed guidance on that. 

Of course . 

Nobody — the Director of the FBI should not have 
even known — should have even known, second nature, 
that, uh, you never turn over raw files to a full 
committee . 

I talked to Dick Saturday night 
Yeah/ 

and he just was beside himself because of that. And, uh, 

he said, "Hell, we covered this , 11 he says, and, uh, he was 

really obsessed on it. And I feel — 

Well, okay. I'll, uh — I'll tell him. [Picks up 
phone] Try Mr. Kleindienst, please. [Hangs up] Well, 
were we, uh, — What, uh, words of wisdom do we have 


- 15 - 


( 122 ) 



EHRLICHMAN : 
MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 
from this august body on this point? 

Our brother Mitchell brought us some wisdom on execu- 
tive privilege which > I believe — 

Technically, Mr. President, I think the only problem 
[unintelligible] and I ! d prefer you just coming out 
and stating, 

That’s right. 

and, uh, and I would believe that, uh, it would be well 
worthwhile to consider to spoil the picture to the 
point where under the proper circumstances you can 
settle with certain former people in the White House 
and some [unintelligible] [telephone rings] some of the 
current people at the White House [telephone rings] 
under controlled circumstances should go up and, uh — 
[telephone rings] 

[Picks up phone] Hello. 

Oh, Dick, I wanted to tell you, you know, on, uh, on, 
uh, uh, Baker that, uh, his Administrative Assistant 
was talking to Timmons and, uh. Baker has, uh, ap- 
preciated, you know, [unintelligible] going to make 
a deal [unintelligible] was good. They've not been 
able to, uh, have the, uh, discussion [unintelligible]. 


- 16 - 


( 123 ) 



U1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


Well, I just wanted to tell you that, uh, you know, 
nobody here — you remember our conversation regarding 
any discussion at all with Baker, which I think is 
proper, don’t you? Now the point is, on the other 
hand, uh, that Baker wants — what it means, you 
know, contacted, and it really depends, so — 

I see. 

Really? Uh huh. 

Uh huh. 

Today. 

Yeah, by his Administrative Assistant. 

So, uh, I guess that the point is that, which we — 
you see we’re counting on you to be the man there, uh, 
Dick, and, uh, and I want to keep everybody else out 
of this and so — and, uh, you know, and I told Baker — 
I said [unintelligible] "All right, now who do you 
want to talk to?" And he said, "Kleindienst ," and I 
said, "Fine, he’s the man." And so I left it at that, 

and so he’s, he’s running down here — 

Yeah. 

Yeah. 

How’s this — why don’t you get him on the phone, get 
him down there. And say, "Now, look, [unintelligible]. 
He’s also — it’s sort of a line with Baker, now, that 


- 17 - 


( 124 ) 




1,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

he doesn’t have any contact with the White House 
officials, he didn’t want that, that’s not his 
fault — that’s not our fault. [Unintelligible] 
delighted except that it would not be the right 
thing. And, uh, on the other hand, in contact with 
you, it is essential for him to stick to your guidance. 

I get it he wanted everybody to come down in public 
session . 

Yeah . 

No way — and so forth. 

Well, we’ll keep in touch with you, Dick, uh, basically 
through Dean, uh, which is the best way, uh, in terms 
of, uh, in terms of, uh, of what, uh, of what we had 
done with the Committee [unintelligible] and that those 
were in our guidelines. But then I think you, you 
really got to be our Baker handholder, you know. That’s 
a hell of a tough job, but, uh, I, if you have, if you 
have to have him move in with you, then do it, huh? 

Yeah, better get his wife out of the way and move him 
in. Yeah. 

Yeah. Yeah. 

Yeah, I understand. Postponed — for two weeks? [Unin- 
telligible], Yeah, I know. 

Right, I know. 

Right. Right. 


- 18 - 


( 125 ) 




1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
Yeah. 

Yeah. 

Yeah, apparently down here it means that, uh, maybe he T s a 
bit phony, but, uh, the other aspect [unintelligible]. 
Yeah, the trouble is, you know, is, uh, opened — I, 

I understand you were as shocked as some, as I was 
that raw files had already been made available to the 
Committee . 

Yeah. 

Did he? What do you think about it? 

Yeah. Well, do what you can. 

Incidentally, with Weicker, did you work that thing out 
with him? Uh, he, he said in public he still 
hadn f t written a letter, you know — yeah. 

When did you talk to him? [Cough] 

Yeah. 

I expected that . 

That ' s right . 

Yeah. 

No, you don't, you never had done that before. No, 
that even goes further. 

Right. Right. But we're doing it in order that we 
get clear — Yeah. All right, then, let's leave it 


- 19 - 


( 126 ) 



PRESIDENT: 


UNIDENTIFIED : 
PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 s 197 3 MEETING 

this way — You’ll handle, uh, you’ll, you’ll handle 
Baker now, huh? You’ll babysit him, starting, like, 
like in about ten minutes? 

All right. Okay. 

[Hangs up] 

We’re fairly certain — You could probably hear this 
afternoon. He said, he said he’s called Baker about, 
oh, dozens of times, and Baker — it seems he’s out of 
town making a speech [unintelligible] and this trip 
just goes on, and on, and on. But, he’ll try. He’ll 
call him right away. He said he talked to Weicker for 
an hour on the phone [unintelligible] furnishing the 
files [unintelligible] . Well, anyway, he says he 
talked to him for an hour and a half . 

[Unintelligible] 

When I talked to Kleindienst [unintelligible]. Maybe 
it’s not Kleindienst; maybe it’s Baker. 

I would guess that there’s truth, truth to that, too. 

I have always said, they’re always down here bitching 
about nobody calling them, nobody giving them anything 
and all that. They say, "When you catch them, you can’t 
get to them." 


- 20 - 


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EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 


EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT : 
DEAN: 


UNIDENTIFIED: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT : 


hi TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
[Unintelligible] catch them [unintelligible] pass the 
word to Colson, Webster — 

That's right. 

And this — 

And his, and his, and incidentally, it just looks like he — 
his Administrative Assistant called Colson. Now that's 
what Colson informed me. And I said, "But, what the 
hell," he said, [unintelligible], but I said, uh — 

Well, that isn't a casual pitch. 

No. 

Maybe he's looking for some — Baker's looking for some, 
some sort of a link with the White House. Maybe that's 
what he's 

Well — 

trying to hint at. 

It's got to be Kleindienst. Go ahead on executive privilege, 
I suppose — How would you, uh, how would you handle it, uh? 

All I have worked out was 

Work out the arrangements. 

the best formula that we've discussed. 

Well, I guess under the, under the, uh, under the situation 

- 21 - 


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1 . 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 , 1973 MEETING 

that you, uh, under the statement that we have, we* re 

in a position to, to [unintelligible] I think we could, uh, 

we're in a position to, uh, negotiate with the Committee 

as to how, but we are not in a position to have, uh, 

to, uh, to cross the bridge in terms of saying that 

Hunt and Liddy will go down and testify and that members 

of the White House staff will testify in open, public 

session, or something like that. But you’ve got a 

lot of 


EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 


Formal — 
other things — 

Formal is the word. 

Formally is the word I use. 

Uh — 

And incidentally, that's what I told Baker, too. 

I said, "Fine that's the term." 

On executive — 

We begin with that proposition — I'd be comfortable 
there — and see what you can get by with. 

On executive privilege, Mr. President, stay well aware 


- 22 - 


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1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


EHRICHMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN : 


that some have waived it, and the more I think 
about it [unintelligible] 

Yes. 

And it hurts the more you do it, the more you — 

The more it f s less, uh, [unintelligible], 

[Unintelligible] Sherman Adams. 

Uh, the point, uh, beyond which you might be able to 
work it out here. 

Yeah. 

The, uh, the point being that this seems to be the only 
way in which you get involved [unintelligible] 

You do. 

I would, uh, lay out a formula and, uh, negotiate it with, 
with Sam Ervin or either through Baker or however else [unin- 
telligible] . And I would, I would also put together a damn 
good PR team. [Unintelligible] made available so that the, 
uh, the facts can be adduced without putting on a political 
road show. 

What about this? 

What about the President's team? The team is important. 

Okay, I've written this. I can see that Chapin, for 


- 23 - 


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UNIDENTIFIED: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
instance, could appear, without it in any way being 
germane to the Presidency* So I f tn going to decide 
right now 

Baker — 

that — 

Not Baker, that'll be a little too — 

Well, whoever you talk to* Uh, I've got a report here 
and I think I see where the danger points are and where 
they aren't. I'd want to reserve, obviously, as to any 
question that might be asked. 

Right. 

I can pinpoint some people now, but it really wouldn't 
make any difference. 

John, do you admit there's any danger point? You 
admit that any one member of the White House staff can 
testify because it's no danger point for him, but that 
some other one can't because it's a danger point with 


- 24 - 


( 131 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


EHRLICKMAN : 
HALDEMAN: 
EHRLICHMAN : 

MITCHELL: 


him. Then what you ? re saying is. 

Well, but the first — [unintelligible] 

then you’re saying the President was involved. 

I ! m, I’m, I’m saying danger in the sense of that he 
could, could, could — provocative. 

But [unintelligible] for the sake of going about dis- 
cussion, in other words that — Maybe we think that 
it’s appropriate at this time to formalize John’s theory 
on the Segretti matter and the Watergate matter based on 
the documentation from the FBI and [unintelligible] FBI 
[unintelligible] in other words based on — Can the 
Grand Jury — what we know came out of there, the trial 
[unintelligible] as far as that’s one Incident — whatever 
the record, uh, could have been available to me. This 
is why the investigation of — we had the memorandum 
with the back-up — you know, obviously the FBI after 
all [unintelligible] and so forth couldn f t find any- 
thing more. It’s not expected that you could or 
[unintelligible] get out by way of their interrogation 
[unintelligible] uh, two memorandum from Dean is 
important [unintelligible] appropriate time with it. 

John did, and say I [unintelligible] all the public 


-25 -r 


( 132 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22> 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL : 

DEAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

DEAN: 


records [unintelligible] 

We've tried that though, John. Uh — 

.[Clears throat] Why won’t ™ 

We still have grave doubts about it, though. 

Well, I don’t know — 

I did too before, Mr, President, I, I had severe 
doubts about it. The, uh, now that, now that the facts 
have come out as have the FBI reports, and we have had 
the trial, that you have some documentation [unintelligible] 

I think the, uh, the proof is in the pudding, so to 
speak it’s how the document is written and until I 
sit down and write that doc— I, I’ve done part "B” 
so to speak. I've done the Segretti thing. 

Uh huh, 

Uh, and I am relatively satisfied that we don’t have 
any major problems with that. All right, as I go to part 
"A" -- the Watergate — I haven’t written — I haven’t 
gone through the exercise yet, uh, in really whole 

- 26 - 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-10 


( 133 ) 



PRESIDENT: 
DEM : 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT. OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
effort to write such a report, and I really can’t 
say if I can do it — where we are. And I, I think 
it’s certainly something that should be done, though. 


Yeah. 


And, uh, but we — 

You never know — 

you never know until we sit down and try to do it. 

Now, let me say on the Watergate, that’s a case [unin- 
telligible] Segretti [unintelligible] 

We can’t, we can't be as complete 'cause we don't know. 
All we know is what, is whether — 

That’s a question [unintelligible] 

It’s a negative setting for us. 

In setting forth this general conclusion based on 
[unintelligible] all these questions. You are — that 
based on all of your consideration, uh, all of your 
analysis, and so forth, you, you’re, you have found and 
very carefully put down that this individual, that 
individual, that individual, were not involved. We're 
going [unintelligible] to have to presume that. Rather 
than going into every leaked story and other charge, 
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and knock this, this, 

" 27 - 


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DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 19 73 MEETING 

this, this, this, this down — I don't, I 
don't know - — 

Yeah, well that's why I'd like to, like to — and I 
don't think I can do it until I sit down. This evening 
start drafting. 

Exactly. 

I think you ought to hole up ™ now that you — for the 
weekend and do that. 

Sure. 

Let's put an end to your business and get it done. 

I think you need a — that's right. Why don't you do 
this? Why don't you go up to Camp David? And, uh — 

I might do that; I might do that, A place to get away 
from the phone. 

Completely away from the phone and so forth. Just go 
up there and, uh [unintelligible] I don't know what 
kind work this is, but I agree that that's what you 
could — see what you come up with. You would 
have in mind and assume that we've got some sort 
of a document [unintelligible] and then the next step 
once you have written it you will have to continue to 

- 28 - 


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1 

EHRLICHMAN: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN: 
DEAN: 
HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 


1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

defend [unintelligible] action. 

That would be my scenario, that, that he presents it 
to you as, at, at your request. And, uh, you then 
publish it. 

Well, that, that's — 

That introduces the problem for us [unintelligible] 

— trial. 

criminal trial and then appeals which may — 

I» I know that, but I don't care. 

Well you ought to be — 

I don't see why. You're not dealing with the defendant's 
trial. You're only dealing with the White House involve- 
ment. You're not dealing with the campaign. 

That's where I first [unintelligible] 

Well, you can write, you could write it in a way 

[Unintelligible] 


- 29 - 


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1 

PRESIDENT: 


EHRLICHMAN : 


DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 


.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

you could write it in a way that you say this report 
does not re — , it's not, not, will not comment upon 
and so forth and so forth, but, "I — as, as you di- 
rected, Mr. President, and without at all compromising 
the rights of defendants and so forth, some of which 
are on appeal, here are the facts with regard to 
members of the White House staff, et cetera, et cetera, 
et cetera, which you have asked from me. I 
have checked the FBI records ; I have read the Grand 
Jury testimony and this is it — these are my conclu- 
sions, chit, chit, chit, chit." 

As a matter of fact you could say, "I, I will not 
summarize some of the FBI reports in this document 
because it is my understanding that you may wish to 
publish this." Or, or you can allude to it in that 
way without saying that flatly. You can say that "I 
do not summarize all the FBI documents in this report.” 

Or I could say that all of the FBI [clears throat], 
it is my understanding that all the FBI reports have 
been turned over to the Ervin Committee. Another, another 
vehicle might — 

And, and he has only seen half of them. 

Yeah. 


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1 . 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 


EHRLICHMAN: 

DEAN: 


1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Oh, yeah. 

Another vehicle might be, take the report I write 
and give it to Ervin and Baker, 

Yeah. 

uh, under the same terms that, uh, they're getting the 
FBI reports. Say, "Now, this has innuendo in it, little 
things the press would leak from this and assume things 
that shouldn't be assumed. But I want you to know 
everything we know." And publicly state that you've 
turned over a Dean Report to the Ervin Committee. And 
then begin to say — the next step is, "I think that 
you can see that various people have various ingredients 
where they may be of assistance in testifying. But it 
is not worth their coming up here to be able to repeat 
really what is here in some forum where they are going 
to be, uh, treated like they are in a circus. But I 
am also willing, based on this document, to set some 
ground rules for how we have these people appear before 
your Committee." 

A case in point: the issue of whether or not I had a 

phone call reporting the burglary. 

Right. 


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EHRLICRMAN : 
DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 3 MEETING 

Now, that T s all I know about the damn thing is that 
the Secret Service, or some policeman phoned. 

But they could go on forever with you on that. 

Exactly. 

And I think it ought to be things like we've got in, 
in this report and this might be, you know, get, give 
it to Ervin on the confidence that we're not talking 
about documents being released. We're talking about 
something that's entirely facts. You could even 
[unintelligible] write a [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] accomplish our purpose if it isn't 
released . 

I think it, I think it -- 

And I, I thought the purpose — I thought John's con- 
cern [unintelligible] I guess you'd want him for me to 

I do, I — 

My thought is — 

In other words, rather than fighting it, we're not, 
we're not fighting the Committee -- we are, of course 


- 32 - 


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u 

EHRLICHMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 Z MEETING 

but what we’re fighting is a public relations battle. 

And I am looking to the future, assuming that some 
corner of this thing comes unstuck at some time, you 1 re 
then in a position to say, "Look, that document I 
published is the document I relied on, that’s the re- 
port I relied on and it codified and included all the 
secret, uh, identification of the FBI — ” 

This is all we knew. 

All the stuff we could find out — 

"And now, this new development is a surprise to m$ T and 

I’m going to fire A, B, C, and D — now." 

John, let me just raise this. If you take the document 
publicly, the first thing that happens is the press 
starts asking Ziegler about it, inspecting the document 
each day. "Well, why did Ehrlichman receive the call? 
How did they happen to pick out Ehrlichman?" 

That’s right. 

"Uh, what did he do with the information after he got 
it?" Uh, so on. Each, every item can be a full day of 
quizzing. 

- 33 - 


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UNIDENTIFIED : 
DEAN: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
Yeah. 

They'll just go through the document day after day 
after day. 

Now what is your concerned judgment as to when and 
under what circumstances — 

Another thing — However, 

[Unintelligible] 

let me say, that while Ziegler could be given all those 
questions, I would say those are questions — I think 
Ziegler should cut it off. 

Let it die. 

This — Yeah, fine. I think there should be a cut-off 
point which [unintelligible] . If John just sort of 
[unintelligible] I’m not going to comment on the basic 
questions that are properly before the Committee on 
the [unintelligible] 

Well, you, you’ve said you are going to cooperate with 
a proper investigation. 

Yeah, but I’m not going to comment on it while it is 
proper. 


- 34 - 


( 141 ) 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 


HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 J 1973 MEETING 
That’s right. 

As long as it's proper. 

So why would you, why not put ourselves in a frame- 
work where you’re way out above it? You’re cooperating 
with this Committee; you've turned over the materials. 

And then, no further comment. 

and no further comment. 

You see, I think you could get off with the Ziegler 
business. I mean, I don’t want Ziegler — I, I was 
trying to pull Ziegler off of that by my own state- 
ment, too. [Unintelligible] cooperate with the Com- 
mittee, give full cooperation, but we’re not going to 
comment while the matter is being considered by the 
Committee 

But you don*t say* 

unless the Committee does this and that. 

but you don* t say that people don’t give, don’t 
release, don't publish the, uh. Dean report. Only 
hand it over — 

— to a proper Investigative committee. 


- 35 - 


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PRESIDENT : 


EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 


HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

[Several 
voices] : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 


Ul TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Well, then if you turn over the, do that, though, then 
can we get anything out about the, uh, Republicans 
putting out that much of a report? Uh, can we still 
get out the fact that 

Well, the President — 

there has been a report in which everybody in the 
White House — which bears out the Presidents — 

Ron can make the statement. 

That’s right. 

That the President — 

[Unintelligible] 

John wants the statement — 

Another way to do this, and that would be for you to 
have a meeting with Ervin and Baker, 

Yeah. 

That would — I told them — 

Well, we’ve thought of that, I mean, we’ve thought 
of that and we’ve tried it. 


- 36 - 


( 143 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 3 MEETING 


EHRLIChrmiN : 


PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
UNIDENTIFIED: 
MITCHELL : 


But, but we didn’t have a reason for the meeting. This 
would be for the purpose of turning over the document 
and discussing the ground rules. Uh, before you did that 
you want to have that all agreed in advance as to what 
the ground rules would be. And, you’ve got quid pro quo 
here because you could come to, to Baker, and you could 
come to the Committee or to Ervin direct, and say, "Look, 
I’ll turn over the Dean report to you, provided we can 
agree, uh, on how witnesses will be treated up there." 

I can, I can even, uh, construe, uh. 

Right . 

executive privilege. 

John, for example, if you were, uh, just talking about 
executive privilege, this, this really gets down to the 
specifics in terms of the question what do you do when 
they say, "What about Colson?" Does he go or not? 

I think that Colson goes. 

He has to go? 

Right . 

I think Colson — 


- 37 - 


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hi TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 . 1973 MEETING 


HALDEMAN: 


MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 
HALDEMAN : 


Everybody goes under John’s -- including Ehrlichman and 
me — everybody except John Dean, who doesn’t go be- 
cause he’s, he’s got the lawyer privilege. 

I think what is happening to you and John and so forth 
with the Committee could be negotiated out of the con- 
tents of this report. 

We should negotiate it how? 

The President's report will show that uh, your simple 
thought — your simple involvement was missing in the 
pub bill. 

No, it would show more on my book, I’m afraid. 

But, they’ll still, they’ll still — 0ne strong 
argument — 

Let us, let us go. 

Yeah . 

I, I, I don’t see any argument against our going if you are 
going to let anybody go. 

That's right. 

Let us go. But, on the condition — you get less 
trouble with us than you do with some of the others. And 
if it’s not — and, now sure if you get, if you get the 

- 38 - 


( 145 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 
HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 


DEAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 


big fish up there in front of the television cameras, 
yes, I think that would be tough. I think Strachan 
going up wouldn’t get them nearly as excited as, as 
John and me going up. 

That’s Strachan and Chapin. 

Well, Chapin wouldn’t have to appear 

Well — 

as a focal point, but, but, uh, uh, I think, if you 
could do it in executive session, uh — 

Then I would [unintelligible] 

Then, then why hold us back? 

The executive session thing has always appealed to me. 
Now of course, you could say, "Well, in terms of people 
coming up here, of course you have to [unintelligible] 
session, but you got to convin — , the Committee feels 
constrained under executive session — 

We can invite the Committee down to the Roosevelt Room 
or the Blair House. 

Yeah. 


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1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 Z MEETING 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

HALDEMAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 


Oh hell, you could — 

Yeah, you could set it at a different venue, 
that’s true. You could put it in a different place. 
You could say we — which is what I — 

That would be hard to negotiate. 

Can, can we maintain informality? 

It will never — it would never fly. 

Never fly. 

Yeah, I don't know why not. Those others go up there. 
[Unintelligible] 

Well, would executive session fly? 

Executive session, I suspect, would at this point, 
yes sir, yeah, I, I really think these guys are con- 
cerned about this Mexican standoff that they've got, 
and I think they're — 

They'll also — 

I think that, that, the, uh — Ervin's crack on tele- 
vision about arresting people crossed the line. 

Right . 


- 40 - 


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EHRLICIiMAN : 
MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT : 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 
UNIDENTIFIED: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
That would take it quite a bit far. 

In addition to that you have the problem of the long 
lengthy litigation. 

It’s going to go on for a hell of a long time. 

Ervin doesn’t want that. 

Let him take it on the counsel 9 then. 

That’s what he doesn’t want. 

I know, but let him, if, if he, uh — 

We have offered to do it on Dwight Chapin. That’s 
the easy one for him. 

Yeah. 

You got some guy who had no contact with this [unin- 
telligible] 

It was quite, it was quite clear t q me that, it was 
quite clear to me that, uh, as long as, as long as Dean 

Won’t they test it? 

No, they didn’t test it. We asked them to -- 
Find out . 


- 41 - 


( 148 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: He said let's find out. They didn't bite that one 

very fast, did they John? 

HALDEMAN: Chapin's the guy they'd test it on. You try to hold 

privilege on Chapin and that's one they'd go to Court 
on. They, they'd — 

PRESIDENT: Probably. 

HALDEMAN: You might do pretty well, because here's a former 

employee, a guy who had no policy role, had no 

PRESIDENT : — contact — 

HALDEMAN: major contact with the President, and he'd have a hell 

of a time demonstrating — 

MITCHELL: Obviously you'll have to expect a subpoena. 

PRESIDENT: Chapin? 

MITCHELL: Yeah, because he's no longer employed. 

HALDEMAN: Well, because, 

PRESIDENT: What I'd — 

HALDEMAN: because with the subpoena, if he's called to testify 

regarding his appointment, but not, not regarding 
his — any present stuff. 

- 42 - 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-11 


( 149 ) 



MITCHELL : 

EHRLICHMAN : 
UNIDENTIFIED: 
EHRLICHMAN : 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT : 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MABCH 22* 1973 MEETING 

He doesn’t [unintelligible] legroom. They can get 
him up there. 

Well , the precedent 

I, I, I “ 

on this is interesting. I think that his lawyer would 
advise him to go. 

Couldn’t get anything, couldn’t do anything 
[unintelligible] 

They could get him to talk. 

We would have to express the trust — In the case of 
a present White House employee they couldn’t get him 
up here, right? 

Right. 

In the case of a past one you could get him up, but then 
he could, then he would have to go in front of the cameras 
and say, ”1 will not because of executive privilege.” 

Well, they can get up with him. 

But its your privilege — you interpose it. 

I see. 

And, and, uh, first we have the, the anomoly of Clark 

- 43 - 


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MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN : 
MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
UNIDENTIFIED 
EHRLICHMAN : 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Mollenhoff running up and, and, uh, trying to give 
testimony in a civil service area over here now. He f s 
running up saying, "Ask me a question, ask me a ques- 
tion, this is a kangaroo court, and, and I waive — " 

The hearing examiner just says, "Sit down and shut up." 

And what’s happening is that, that, the, uh, government 
is asserting the executive privilege. 

No, they are not. 

Well — 

Not executive privilege* 

Yeah, all right — 

In fact you have — 

: [Unintelligible] executive — 

All right. It’s the closest thing to it. But the point 
is, who’s privilege is it to assert? Now, what do you 
do if it’s Chapin? I think, I, I haven’t thought this 
— this is the reason I called you here to figure out what 
the scenario is — but I assume what would happen is that 
immediately the subpoena issued, that, that on behalf 
of the President a letter would go to the Committee saying 
the Executive asserts privilege. 


- 44 - 


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PRESIDENT : 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 
EHRLICHMAN : 

MITCHELL: 
HALDEMAN : 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Let me ask this. Uh, the, this question is for John 

Ehrlichman and, uh, John Dean. Uh, now you were the two 

who felt the strongest, uh, on the executive privilege 

thing [unintelligible] . If I am not mistaken, you 

thought we ought to draw the line where we did. [unintelligible]. 

Have you changed your mind now? 

No sir, I think it's a, I think it's a terrific state- 
ment. It’s — It, it puts you just where you should 
be. It's got enough flexibility in it. It’s — 

But now — what — all that John Mitchell is arguing, 
then, is that now we, we use flexibility 

That’s correct. 

in order to get on with the coverup plan. 

And, as I told him, I am, am so convinced we’re right 
on the statement that I have never gone beyond that. 

He argues that we’re being hurt badly by the way it’s 
being handled. And I am willing — let’s see -- 

That’s the point. 

I think that’s a valid evaluation, I think [unintelligible] 


- 45 - 


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MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

See 5 that’s the only point, the only point 

t* 

Yeah. 

where the President — 

That’s where you look like you’re covering up right 
now. That’s the only thing, the only active step you’ve 
taken to cover up the Watergate all along. 

That’s right. 

What is? 

Was that. 

Ev — , even though we’ve offered to cooperate. 

To the extent — and on legal grounds, and, and 
precedent , 

That’s right. 

and tradition, and constitutional grounds and all that 
stuff you, you’re just fine, but to the guy sitting 

at home who watches John Chancellor say that the Presi- 
dent is covering this up by re — , this historic re- 
view blankets the widest exercise of executive privilege 


- 46 - 


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MITCHELL : 

HALDEMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


EHRLICHMAN : 

HALDEMAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 197 3 MEETING 
in American history, and all that. He says, "What 
the hell's he covering up? If he's got no problem 
why doesn't he let them go and talk?" 

And it relates to the Watergate, it doesn't relate 
to Henry Kissinger 

That's right. 

or foreign affairs. 

That's right. Precedent and all that business — they 
don’t know what you’re talking about. 

Well, maybe then we shouldn't have made the statement. 

I think we should have because it puts you in a much 
better position to — They were over here. That’s 
what Ervin wanted. He wanted all of us up there — 
unlimited, total, wide open. We — The statement 
in a sense puts us over here. Now you move back to 
about here and probably you can get away^with it. 

Well, you can get away with it in the Watergate con- 
text. You see, you said 

That’s right. 

executive privilege would work and, and then, then you’ve 


- 47 - 


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1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 J 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

MITCHELL : 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


applied it in the first instance to Gray. You said 
this fellow can’t go. 

That’s right. 

And, I wouldn’t change that. 

I [unintelligible] 

I can’t — anything about that. 

Great. 

Exactly right. 

Right . 

At the same time — 

By the way isn’t that [unintelligible] 
[Unintelligible] 

That’s right. 

Uh ~ 

[Unintelligible] one syllable names. 

At the same time, uh, you are in a position to say, 
"Oh, well now this, this other case, and what I, 


- 48 - 


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1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22* 1973 MEETING 


HALDEMAN: 


UNIDENTIFIED : 
EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 
PRESIDENT : 
EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


what I T m going to do there, consistent with my 
statement, is so and so, and so and so." 

Because it very clearly — The questions that the 
Committee properly wants to ask don’t have any bearing 
on these people’s relationship to the President. 

Which they don’t. The President had nothing to do with 
it . 

I don’t know at all. I — 

There again, it’s going to be hard to get proof. Well, 
it’ll be hard to — if you — You’re right, we’re going 
to need some kind of a PR campaign. 

Yes, that’s true. 

That’s true, what? 

For the average guy. 

Is thinking about [unintelligible] Dean — 

This is ; — the argument will be, uh, the President’s 
backed off his rock solid position on executive privi- 
lege and is now letting, uh, Chapin, and Colson, and, 
and, Haldeman, and everybody testify. 

That the rest of us said that that’s perfectly 
[unintelligible] 


- 49 - 


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DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT : 
UNIDENTIFIED : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCS 22, 1973 MEETING 

It is. I think they 1 re 

— saying that there are PR problems. 

But people don ? t think so , Is that right? 

That’s right. 

Sure. 

In spite of what [unintelligible] 

Oh , yeah . They don 1 1: think the — 

I agree. I understand. I understand. 

They think you clanged down an iron curtain here 
and you won’t let anybody out of here, ever. 

That have ever worked here. Scour lady on up. 

It was my understanding — I thought from you, 
or maybe it was someone else — that the Committee’s 
operating rules do not permit witnesses to have 
counsel . 

That’s grand jury. I've never heard that about, 

— about the Committee? 

about the Committee no, I can't believe — 


- 50 - 


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PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED : 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

DEAN: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

The Committee, on the contrary, on the contrary, com- 
mittees, ever since the day I was there, they, they 
all allowed counsel. 

[Unintelligible] 

Can't imagine their not having counsel. 

[Unintelligible] 

No sir. Committees, committees allow counsel. 

If that's — it seems to me if you're going to do this, 
that becomes important in that any White House staff 
member who testifies should not only have private 
counsel if he wants it — personal counsel — but the 
President's counsel should be there because you're 
under a limited waiver of executive privilege and the 
President's counsel should be there to, to uh, uh, 
enforce the limitation and the witness should not 
have to be in the position of saying, "That's one I 
can't answer because it is outside the ground." You 
or Fielding or somebody should be doing that for 
him. 

Have you — the, the Executive Session thing? 

No. They, uh — 

They'll bitch about that, too. 

- 51 - 

y 


( 158 ) 



HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


DEAN: 
HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 


DEAN: 


1A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
What are you going to hide? If you're going to 
let them come up, why do you — why is that secret? 

Yeah, yeah. How do you handle that PR-wise? 

You don't. One of the hazards [unintelligible] another 
Roman holiday like they've had with Kleindienst and Gray, 

This, uh, fact-finding operation — they're to get the 
facts and not to put another political, uh, circus like 
they have in the past. 

And if — if there were no cameras up there, there would 
be no reason to have it executive session because, uh — 

Well, then they come back and say all right we'll do 

it in open session, but we'll,uh, permit television coverage. 

Oh no. They won't do that. That [unintelligible] their 
problem because of television. It'll kill them [unintelligible] 
executive session written testimony be released. I think 
that that's the basis of the relation. That is stupid to 
talk about formal sessions, so, uh, that, that gets away 
from it. That's a, that's a — It, it is a formal session. 
Executive session [unintelligible] release testimony. 

Correct? 

That's correct. We have said that no — 


- 52 - 


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HALDEMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 197Z MEETING 

Point of debate, too. You argue they shouldn't. 


UNIDENTIFIED : 
MITCHELL : 
EHRLICHMAN : 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED : 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

MITCHELL: 


Yeah, he does. 

Well, they won't buy it. 

Yeah, but I probably can't get away with it. [Unintelligible]. 
But it's a good thing to start with. 

Sure. 

You want a bargaining position, I think it's arguable that, 
uh, that all they're really interested in this, is informa- 
tion, and I think they don't need to release the transcripts, 
you know. 

Is there, uh, an executive session of a Senate Committee — 

Are other Senators permitted — they are, aren't they? 

Any Senator has the privilege of Committee [unintelligible] 

Yup. 

So Teddy Kennedy could come in and sit there. 

Sure. He can't ask questions. 

He can't? 

Not unless you're a member of the parent Committee. 


- 53 - 


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UNIDENTIFIED : 
MITCHELL : 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
Which he is. 

[Unintelligible] 

But this isn't, this isn't subject — 

Select, Select Committee. 

Other members cannot — whether — that, that should 
be worked on too. But I — It normally is the prac- 
tice that nobody can ask questions except members. 

Of course, Teddy could still sit there in the audience 
and then go out to the TV cameras and say, "Look 
[unintelligible] " 

Wouldn't it be wonderful if he would? 

Probably we're going to have that. 

I think if he did that, that would be terrific. 

I was just thinking that, in the membership of the 
Committee, we're in reasonably good shape. The mem- 
bers — the people that you have on the Committee are 
not as bad as most, as some Senators who would turn the 
use of TV afterwards for their own — 

Not as spectacular. What? 

You know, no way, and, and, uh [unintelligible] 


- 54 - 


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[Several 
voices] : 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT : 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED : 
PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 


U1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 . 1973 MEETING 

[Unintelligible] 

Well, I would say [unintelligible] 

It's very soon that we're going to be moving on 
[unintelligible] 

And I point out [unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] 

When do they start hearings now? 

The thing — 

There's no time set. 

How would they time that? 

Well, the top — , the hearings won’t be — we have 
plenty of time before the hearings, but what, uh ; — 

The PR. 

John’s concerned about, the PR, we don't have much 
time. 

Well, but — 

You don't have much. 


- 55 - 


( 162 ) 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


1,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 1973 MEETING 

PR is going to start on this right away with, with 
the termination of the Gray hearings for two weeks 
that’ll let some steam out of the — 

Yeah, Your PR would, 

Well, it’ll have to — 

the PR would — What I meant is, and any-*-, and anyway 
the main thing is to do the right thing- Don’t 
rush too fast on the PR but, uh, uh, it’ll take some 
time to write, uh, something- John’s got to have time 
to write this report. He’s got to have a chance to 
look at — I guess we don’t, we don’t breach, we don’t 
broach or do we broach this whether we have a report 
or not? 

I think you can broach that. 

Fine. 

Now — 

Let me ask you this: On the broaching of that, should 

we have Kleindienst be the broacher? The point is, 
who else? I can’t. 

That’s right. Well, Kleindienst in his conversations 


- 56 - 


( 163 ) 



MITCHELL: 

HALDEMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 
UNIDENTIFIED: 
MITCHELL : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCS 22, 1973 MEETING 

with Ervin and Baker — Ervin indicated that he would 
like to talk to Kleindienst about the executive privi- 
lege question. Uh, maybe it f s now time to get that 
channel re-opened again. Uh — 

Let me, let me make this suggestion. 

Write it out so, so Kleindienst said that both chapter 
and verse — on this — 

[Unintelligible] 

Without anybody else present. 

For a first step, for a first step, you're going to have 
that meeting and we’re going to keep John out of that. 

But you’re going to have everybody screaming about execu- 
tive privilege going on in a committee meeting again. 

And I think, well, before the Committee meeting is held, 
for somebody to say, "We want to discuss with the Chairman 
of the Committee his concept of the appearances of wit- 
nesses." And don’t discuss it with him until you get all 
your ducks in a row all layed ouit. But, at least you 
advise them that it is a discussion of the subject matter 
so they don’t come out and blast you [unintelligible] 


- 57 - 


( 164 ) 



EHRLICHMAN: 


HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETI NG 

Then ask him not to take a Committee vote on the subject 
either, until — 

[Unintelligible] committee locked in, but you can work 
something, maybe you can work on that. 

Well is this the time to, uh, I mean, the point is, uh, 
if the, if the, if the Committee — Is this the time to 
[unintelligible]. That's it. Who's going to talk to 
him? Who's going to be there? Who do you think should 
do it? 

Kleindienst talks — 

Talks to — in other words to Baker and Ervin, basically 
That conversation should occur like tomorrow. Why 
not? If you're going to move in this direction, regard- 
less of the report. We've got to move in this direction 
[unintelligible] start the negotiation. 

Well, I think that's too much lead time. Uh, in, in 
the process before the Committee meeting [unin- 
telligible]. Now, what's Wally Johnson's status? 


- 58 - 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-12 


( 165 ) 



DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

That's funny, because I — he is still here, hasn't 
gone up yet, but he's been announced apparently, I 
gather he'll be an assistant Attorney General. What 
I was thinking is maybe to preserve my counsel role 
with Ervin and Baker that I ought to be present with 
Kleindienst . 

I agree. 

And the four of us sit down and talk about executive 
privilege — we won't get into 

Yeah. 

any of the substance. 

Well, the thing about your being at this, uh, is 

that you can keep Kleindienst, uh, uh — I'm skeptical — 

Plus they, they would appreciate the fact they're dealing 
with me as counsel — that's another reason I am not. 

That's right. 

you know, when the final wire is drawn — 

Well, it's appropriate for the President's counsel 
to be present when the discussions take place. 


- 59 - 


( 166 ) 



1.1 TRAflSCRIFF OF MARCH 22, 197 3 MEETING 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

MITCHELL : 


That’s right. 

Well, all right. Now let's, let's get down to the ques- 
tion: How do we want: to do this? How do we start 
there? 

I would think that possibly Kleindienst, uh, ought to call 
today, uh, and let Ervin and Baker know that he would 
like to meet with them early next week to talk about execu- 
tive privilege, uh, indicate that I would be present to 
see if we can find 

A formula for 

a formula to resolve — 

getting information that they desire. 

That’s right. 

It’s an unpublicized meeting. 

Unpublicized . 

I think we’d, uh [unintelligible] go ahead. 

[Unintelligible] on top of that. I would say early in 
the week. You better say Monday so you can get them before 
the Committee meets . 

And, naturally cover Watergate first. 


- 60 - 


( 167 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


1A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

I don't know how far Ervin's going to go, uh — 

Ervin’s insistence on letting Dean testify — whether 
he might. We'd have to draw a line there, wouldn’t we 
John? 

I would agree wholeheartedly that you better not go back 
on your final statements on the subject. 

That's right. That’s right. 

Even if there hadn't been statements — 

That’s right. But the point is, we’ve got to accept the 
decision of Judge Byrnes [unintelligible] on the bail. 

The other thing to do on the Dean thing is say — you’d 
simply say, "Now, that’s out. Dean has — he makes the 
report. Here’s everything Dean knows." 

Right . 

That’s where, that’s why the Dean report is critical. 

I think, John, on Monday could say to Ervin if that, uh, 
question comes up, "I, I know the President’s mind on this. 
He’s adamant about my testifying, as such. At the same time 
he has always indicated that the fruits of my investigation 
will be known." And just leave it at that for the 
moment . 


- 61 - 


( 168 ) 



DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22* 1973 MEETING 

One issue that may come up as the hearings go along, if 
it then becomes a focus, is, what did Dean do? Uh, as 
you all know I was over — all over this thing like a 
wet blanket. I was everywhere — everywhere they look 
they are going to find Dean. 

Sure. 

Uh ~ 

That's perfectly proper. 

But it, but — I don’t think that’s bad. 

I don’t know. I was supposed to be. 

You were on it at the first. You were directed by the 
President to get me all the facts. Second, as White House 
Counsel you were on it for the purpose of, of representing 
any people in the Executive Branch who were being questioned 
on it. So you were there for the purpose of getting infor- 
mation. In other words, that was your job. Correct? 

That’s right. 

Then you heard — But, but the main point is that you can 
certainly tell them that Dean had absolutely no opera- 
tional — The wonderful thing about your position is , I 
think, as far as they’re concerned — Watergate — is 


- 62 - 


( 169 ) 



HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22* 1973 MEETING 

your position f s one of, of truly of counsel. It is never, 
never as an operator. That's the — 

You can even — In the private sessions, then, maybe, 
maybe, volunteer to give them a statement on the, the 
whole question of your recommendation of Liddy which is 
the only possible kind of substantive [unintelligible] that 
you could have and, and in that you can satisfy one of 
those arguments. 

[Unintelligible ] 

And that you — if you wanted to. 

At the, at the President's direction you've never done 
anything, any operational, you were always, always just 
as counsel, always just as counsel. Well, we've got to 
keep you out anyway: the Dean thing. I guess we just 
draw the line, so we give them some of it — not give 
them all of it. I don't suppose they'd say John — "No, 
we don't take him in executive session." Would he go up 
in public session? What would your feeling on that be? 

I wouldn't let him go. 

You wouldn't. 

I would not. 


- 63 - 


( 170 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


Why not? You just take the heat of being — uh, all 
right. How about you wouldn’t — but on the other hand 
you’d let Chapin go. And you’d let Colson go. 

No, he doesn’t. 

Because they’re former White House people. 

You can't keep them out of all those sessions. Now, I 
want to get back to that [unintelligible] Dean spoke to 
Chapin; on the basis of that Chapin talked to Segretti 
last weekend. 

Well, they can subpoena any of us. There’s no doubt about 
that. Uh, they, they, if they don’t serve us here because 
they can’t get in, they can serve you at home or some- 
where. They can ultimately find you. 

I’m going to move to Camp David. 

Right . 

By helicopter. 

[Laughter] 

Go ahead. [Unintelligible] 

So, the question is once you're served and you decline, then 


-64 


( 171 ) 


DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 1973 MEETING 

you've got a contempt situation. Now, I would say that it, 
it, it gets very difficult [sighs] to believe that they'll 
go contempt on people who — 

Present White House staff. 

Present White House staff. 

They would on Colson. They could do that, could they? 

That would be a good test case for them to go on. Uh, 
the other thing is, though, they could sub — ^subpoena 
Colson to come up there and Colson could then say, "Well, 

I, I decline to testify on the basis that I think this 
is a privileged communication, uh, or privileged activi- 
ties." And again you get a little, a little fuzzier as 
to whether or not you — 

I'd rather not answer the question that's asked. 

That's right. 

See my point. 

That's right. There it, then it would get much fuzzier 
as , as to whether or not they cite him for contempt or 
not. 

Suppose the Judge tomorrow, uh, orders the Committee to 


- 65 - 


( 172 ) 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 
MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 


EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 y 1973 MEETING 

show, show its evidence to the Grand Jury [unin- 
telligible] then the Grand Jury reopens the case 
and questions everybody. Does that change the game 
plan? 

[Unintelligible] send them all down. 

What? Before the Committee? 

The President’s asked [unintelligible] this. 

Now are you saying — 

Suppose the Judge opens — tells the Grand Jury and 
says, "I, I don’t, 11 says, ”1 want them to call Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman and everybody else they didn’t call before." 
What do you say to that? Then do you still go on this 
pattern with the Ervin Committee? The point is, if, if 
a grand jury> uh, decides to go into this thing, uh, what 
do you think on that point? 

I think you’d say, "Based on what I know about this case, 
uh, I can see no reason why I should be concerned about 
what the grand jury process — " 

All right. 

That's all. 


- 66 - 


( 173 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 


HALDEMAN: 


MITCHELL : 


DEAN: 


And that would change — 

Well, they go in — do both: Appear before the Grand 

Jury and the Committee? 

Sure. 

You have to bottom your defense, your position on the 
report . 

That's right. 

And the report says, "Nobody was involved," 

That's right. 

and, and you have to stay consistent with that. 

Well, theoretically, I think you will find the Grand 
Jury is not about to get out of the [unintelligible] 
substance. 

Right. 

Thus the danger of a grand jury is they bring indict- 
ments on the basis of — 

Which they've studied. 

Well, there are no rules. 


- 67 - 


( 174 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 . 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 


The rules of evidence before grand juries are not 
pretty fair at this point. 

That's right. 

Uh, when you have something that's,uh, reasoned 
and controlled — 

Yeah. 

You have attorneys — 

Yeah. 

[Unintelligible] the rules of the evidence meet. 
[Unintelligible] 

Somebody can get one in the form of a letter. 

[Unintelligible] according to [unintelligible] 

Well, what would happen? Would Silbert be the, be 
the, uh, prosecutor on this? 

Unless the, the Court appointed a special prosecutor, 
which he could do . 

Yeah. So r we better see tomorrow on that. But, uh, but. 


- 68 - 


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DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 3 MEETING 
the — So that, if that's the case how do we, uh — 
let's move now on the first one. Now who is to 
call, uh, Kleindienst? 

I am to follow through on [unintelligible] 

You going to call him and tell him what? 

I'm going to tell him to call Baker first, and then 
Ervin, and tell them that you would like to meet with 
them on Monday, uh, to discuss and explore a formula 
for providing the information they need in a way that 
does not cause a conflict with the President's general 
policies on executive privilege. 

Yet meets, and yet meets their, uh, meets their need 
for information. 

Right . 

Have they requested, they've requested that kind of a 
talk already, haven't they? 

Yes. 

And you'll sit down with Dick, Mr. President? 


- 69 - 


( 176 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


Yeah. Yeah. [Unintelligible] you're going to be 
so busy doing the report there will be no one — 

Well, I 'll work on that over the weekend, and, and, 
uh, actually it's good because things do slow down 
a little, over the weekend. 

Also write out a thing for Kleindienst so that — 

I think you can talk to him. I, I think you can do 
most of the talking. G€it the main — Get to thinking 
— You can do it. Say you have studied the subject. 

You also know what, what, uh, my position is. 

I don't think we ought to read anything in this first 
session but I think we ought to let him know that we 
are thinking about 

Right. 

reaching some sort of — 

Say, "Now, what is, uh, — What would you think here?" 
Well, just stay loose [unintelligible] 

Stay loose. 

I would say, I would say, "Now look, that's what, that's 


- 70 - 


( 177 ) 



DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT : 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

what we’re going to do. We’ll lay out the thing 
about, uh, with regard to this, we want to, we 
want to see what can be worked out with regard to, 
uh, uh — We, we talked about informal sessions. Is 
Ervin's position been he insists on formal sessions? 

Is that his position? 

Well, we don’t know. We’ve never really [unintelligible] 
[Unintelligible] gotten into that. 

His response to your position — that’s really what 
you’ve got now — 

Yeah. 

Ervin’s response to the, to the Nixon position and that 
is, "Written stuff isn’t any good. I want the body, you, 
you can’t ask paper, you can’t ask a piece of paper ques- 
tions." Okay. Now, what we’re saying meets that require- 
ment — 

The written, the written thing was in which? 

That was a, that was a, uh, Ziegler, I believe. 

I think so. 


- 71 - 


( 178 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 197 3 MEETING 


EHRLICHMAN : 
HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
HALDEMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


I don't know how it came out. It's not in a statement. 

No, but it's a general thing* I think 
Yeah. 

it was in your press conference where you said they will 
provide written, uh “ 1 think you said it. 

I may have said it and I don't — 

In a press conference. And I think Ervin's response 
was to that. 

Right . 

Your statement if, uh. 

Could have been. 

"These people will be happy to provide, uh, written answers 
to questions," 

Yeah. 

"that, uh — appropriate questions." 

You think — are you sure it wasn't in the statement, 
the written statement? 

No. 

No. 


- 72 - 


( 179 ) 



EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
UNIDENTIFIED : 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
I think, I am sure we 

Right . 

used formal, informal — 

It, it came up the first time is when I responded to. 

That , that 1 s right . Exactly . 

to Eastland, I responded to Eastland's invitation 
to — 

You said you would furnish written — 

Right . 

Furnish written — 

I think the — I think that's where you'll find it. 

And then you — and then it was repeated after that, uh, that 
we would be happy to supply information and, uh — 

I think we've been [unintelligible] 

But, then Ervin responded — he specifically rejected that 
only on the grounds that you can't ask questions of a piece 
of paper. 

Cross examine. 


- 73 - 


’ (180) 



2,2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 , 1973 MEETING 


HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 
DEAN: 


We need to deal with our questions. So we are giving 
him that opportunity. He hasn’t said that the processes of 
the Senate require that those questions be answered in 
[unintelligible] 

What is the, what is the argument that you give, John, to 
people who — and, uh — Why executive session rather than 
open session? 

Well, I — 

You can’t really give — 

I think we’ll have — 

You can’t really attack the Committee’s, uh, flamboyance. 

No, you can’t. 

So, what do you say? 

I think what I’d do is we’ll talk a little about the 
Constitution, and I’ll remind him of the position that he took 
so vocally in the Gravel case. 

That’s right. 

where he came out and said that legislative aides cannot be 
called to question for advice they give their Senator or 
Congressman. He just went on at great length and cited 
executive privilege — 

- 74 “ 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-13 


( 181 ) 



PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

Then he'll say, "This was not advice to the President." 

Go ahead. 

Well, and I’ll say, I’ll, and I’ll say that, that these 
are men who do advise the President. 

And that’s, that’s the principle involved. 

And we have to draw the line. 

And to have the principle discussed, uh, in open session, 
and so forth, is the kind of a thing where you’ve got to, 
you ought to go off to the bench, where the jury doesn’t hear 
it, basically. 

Well, I — 

I don’t think John or Dick should tip their hands in the 
Monday meeting as to an offer to appear in executive session 
and get them on to the executive session wicket. It seems 
to me 


No. No, I agree. 

they, they should only indicate a willingness to listen to, 
uh, ideas as to what would be done 

Yeah. 

and an open-mindedness to try and work something out. 


- 75 - 


( 182 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT : 
HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
Yeah. 

Because if you get to that, that's going to become the 
issue 

Yeah. 

and it seems to me that's an issue we could win publicly 
where we may not be able to win it with the 

I think, I — 

How about — 

Senate, but you [unintelligible] 

What about expressing the President's concern about the 
protection of his people from a spectacle? 

That's fine. 

Well, I'm also concerned about his, about frankly, the, uh, 
having, having, uh, matters that really are a subject of 
executive privilege debated publicly, rather — That's 
a matter that ought to be debated privately. 

That's right. 

Uh, other matters, we have no, and, and, and, without, 
and, and, and, and the fact that it's raised does not 
indicate guilt. That's part of his argument on Gravel, 


- 76 - 


( 188 ) 



DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

too. The fact that it's raised does not indicate guilt. 
That’s what we are really talking about here. But having 
it in public session does, uh, indicate that. 

Well, I will work out a complete, uh, negotiating scenario 
and have thought it through before I go up. 

Really all your, your objective in that meeting is simply 
to indicate to them a willingness to discuss. It’s not 

That’s right. 

to lay out a proposal 


I. 


for them 
I agree. 

to accept or reject. 

I will — 

John, as part of that, as part of the scenario, you want 
to hold executive session for the protection of those records. 

Very true. Uh — 

There, and it’s the record for the future. But that’s — 
that maybe you can tell Ervin, maybe on a mountaintop, that, 

- 77 - 


( 184 ) 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT : 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

that this is perhaps a good way to set up a procedure 
where we could do something in the future, and all. You 
know what I mean? 

Uh huh. 

Where future cases of this sort are involved. "We’re, 
we T re making a lot of history here, Senator. And, uh — ” 

And the Senator can be a great part of it. 

No, really. We’re making a lot of history. And that’s it — 
we’re setting a historic precedent. The President, after 
all, let’s point out that the President, uh, how he bitched 
about the Hiss case. Which is true, I raised holy hell about 
it. 

Ervin away from his staff — 

Huh? 

Ervin away from his staff is not very much, and I think he 
might just give up the store himself right there and lock 
himself in. I, you know, I’ve dealt with him for a 
number of years, and have seen that happen and have reached 
accord with him on legislation. 


- 78 - 


( 185 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 197 3 MEETING 


HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


That’s another thing, if you don’t offer him anything, 
you may get an offer 

That ’ s , 

from him 

that’s right. 

you can’t accept. He’ll ask you [unintelligible] 

That’s exactly what he’ll do. 

And if he just takes the adamant — Suppose now he just 
takes the adamant line? Nothing. 

Sits there and says, 

I’ll say, 

"I’ll think about that." 

’’That’s all right. 11 
You could go back — 

’’Doesn’t sound like you're interested in information," 
Yeah. 

"it sounds like you’re interested in, in fighting" 

Yeah. 

- 79 - 


( 186 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

UNIDENTIFIED : 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


"on principle." 

He says, "Look, we are just going to have public sessions. 
It’s got to be that or else," 

Then, "We’ve got a law suit Senator and it is going to 
be a long one." 

That’s right. 

,f How can you, you expedite your hearings?" 

Yeah. "If you want your hearings" — and uh, that’s the 
other thing. The other point is, would it not be helpful 
to get Baker enlisted somewhat in advance. If that could 
be done by not begging him [unintelligible] • If we can 
we put Kleindienst to that thing? 

On the second step — not on the opening. 

Well, even on the opening step the problem that I have here, 
if Baker sits there and just parrots Ervin’s adamant thing, 
saying, "Hell no, there can’t be anything except the public 
sessions," you have nothing to bargain with. 

But Mr. President you know how these Senators act. Baker 
will lay the whole thing out on the table. 

Yeah, I guess you are right. 


- 80 - 


( 187 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 


Including the contempt. They’ll be — 

Baker, on the other hand — Kleindienst should at least 
talk to him and say "Look Howard, why don’t you try to 
work something out here?” Why couldn’t he say that? 

He could say, "We're going to try — we want to work something 
out.” "Yeah, but then 

"Glad to work something out." 

work with us." 

Yeah. 

"We’re, we’re, we’re 
"Now, work, work 
questioning how you — " 

with us, but you can't, you can't be [unintelligible]. 

Right now, Howard, right now, Howard, ve-re just going 
for a law suit." Uh — 

"Give us a hand and try to open this up." That’s, that’s — 
Baker would be fine that much ahead of time. 

That’s right. 

Be positive this time around. 


- 81 - 


( 188 ) 



DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


EHRLICHMAN: 


HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 1973 MEETING 
Don’t lock yourself in. You hear every, 

Right . 
all -- 
Right . 

so you have another session or so, on it. 

Yeah. The other point is that you be reminded so you 
get to it. Now, just assume, however, it happens so 
[unintelligible] insists that [unintelligible] you just, 
then, then, then it becomes essential then to put the 
Dean report out, it seems to me, and say, and then have 
the law suit. 

We can say that if he really — I would say, "Well, okay, 
then, why don’t we now discuss how we frame the legal issue 
here?" And, uh, and, uh, "Perhaps we can at least agree on 
how to frame the legal issues, so that instead of taking 
three years it will only take a year and a half." 

Get it settled before this Administration leaves [unin- 
telligible] 

They know that it’s — depending upon who they are going 
after and the circumstances, that they’ve got a tough 
law suit ahead of them. 


- 82 - 


( 189 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


EHRLICHMAN : 
DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 s 1973 MEETING 
Uh huh. 

They’ve got to hire counsel to — 

Yeah. 

It’s going to cost money to brief it on their side. They 
don’t have the government repre — , you know they don’t 
have the Department of Justice to handle their case; they’ve 
got to bring in special counsel who probably knows nothing 
about executive privilege, has to be educated. Uh, get 
the Library of Congress clanking away at getting all the 
precedents out and the like, and — We’ve got all that. 

Of course, uh, it’s, it’s a major operation for them to 
bring in and they have to 

The other way — 

get a resolution of the Senate to do it, uh — 

Fortunately, Ervin is a Consitutional expert. 

Yeah. He calls himself — 

Self-certified. That’s a Constitutional expert — 

Well , anyway , 

While you do that — 


- 83 - 


( 190 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

HALDEMAN: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 r 1973 MEETING 
the, uh — Now, uh, we could — Have you considered any 
other poss — , have you considered the other, all other 
possibilities you see here, John? You, you T re the one 
who is supposed to — ■ 

That's right. I think we, 

You know the bodies . 

I think we've had a good go-round on — 

You think, you think we want to, want to go this route 
now? And the — Let it hang out, so to speak? 

Well, it, it isn't really that — 

It’s a limited hang out. 

It's a limited hang out. 

It's a modified limited hang out. 

Well, it's only the questions of the thing hanging out 
publicly or privately. 

What it's doing, Mr. President, is getting you up 
above and away from it. And that's the most impor- 
tant thing. 


- 84 - 


( 191 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 Z MEETING 

Oh, I know. But I suggested that the other day and we 
all came down on, uh, remember we came down on, uh, on 
the negative on it. Now what T s changed our mind? 

The lack of alternatives or a body. 

[Laughter] 

We, we went down every alley. [Laughter] Let it go over. 

Well, I feel that at,uh, I feel that this is, that, 
uh, I feel that at the very minimum we’ve got to have the 
statement and, uh, let's look at it, whatever the hell it 
is. If, uh, if it opens up doors, it opens up doors, 
you know. 

John says he's sorry he sent those burglars in there, 
and that helps a lot. 

That's right. 

You are very welcome, sir. 

[Laughter] 

Just glad the others didn't get caught. 

Yeah, the ones we sent to Muskie and all the rest; Jackson, 
and Hubert, and, uh [unintelligible] 


- 85 - 


( 192 ) 



EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN : 

PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED: 

PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 197 3 MEETING 

I get a little chill sitting over there in that part of 
the table there. 

Yeah [unintelligible]. Getting pr — , I, I, I y 
Yeah. 

I got to handle my Canadian friend 
Right. 

at the moment. Incidentally, uh, you don’t plan to 
have, uh, you weren’t planning to have a press briefing 
[ unintelligible] 

We hadn’t planned it. It wouldn’t hurt, uh — 
[Unintelligible] 3:30 with John [unintelligible]. All right. 
He is going to talk to the press tomorrow. 

Yeah, let’s let it go. [Unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] 

Suppose you take it, you take care of it now [unintelligible] 
and I won’t come over there. I — you might, if you get 


- 86 “ 


( 193 ) 



EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 
MITCHELL: 
EHRLICHMAN: 
PRESIDENT : 


UNIDENTIFIED : 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 
him waltzed around , you let me hear — 

All right. 

It would be my thought then that I would then break it 
off at 4:30, 

All right. Fine. 

Four o’clock will be the minimum [unintelligible] 

I, I think both of you [unintelligible] 

Yeah, I was thinking that we ought to, uh — yeah, I under- 
stand. But, but no. Bob, what time is the — is my take-off 
scheduled for 4:30 today? 

4:30. 

Yes, sir. 

Well, we won’t, we won't rush. George needs to talk, 
[unintelligible] get the chance to. 

[Unintelligible] 

Yeah. 

Three, uh, say fifteen, twenty minutes from now? 

Sure, sure. 

Okay. 

- 87 - 


( 194 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 1973 MEETING 


NOTE : At 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

UNIDENTIFIED 
PRESIDENT : 


DEM: 


this point, a portion of the discussion has been deleted. 


[Unintelligible] 

Yeah. 

Believe me, it T s a lot of work. 

Oh, great, I may [unintelligible]. Well, let me 
tell you, you ! ve done a hell of a job here. 

[Unintelligible] 

I didn’t mean for you. I thought we had a boy here. 
No, you, uh, John, uh, carried a very, very heavy load. 
Uh, both Johns as a matter of fact, but, uh, I was 
going to say, uh, uh, John Dean is, uh [unintelli- 
gible] got — put the fires out, almost got the 
damn thing nailed down till past the election and so 
forth. We all know what it is. Embarrassing God 
damn thing the way it went, and so forth. But, in 
my view, uh, some of it will come out; we will sur- 
vive it. That's the way it is. That's the way 
you've got to look at it. 

We were within a few miles months ago, but, uh, 
we're — 


- 88 - 


( 195 ) 





1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT; 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 


The point Is, get the God damn thing over with. 

That's right. 

That's the thing to do. That's the other thing that 
I like about this. I'd like to get — But you really 
would draw the line on ~ But, I know, we can T t make 
a complete cave and have the people go up there anc 
testify. You would agree on that? 

I agree. 

You agree on that, John? 

If we're in the posture of everything short of 
giving them a public session [unintelligible] and 
the whole deal. You're not hiding anything. 

Yeah. Particularly if, particularly if we have the 
Dean statement. 

And they've been given out. 

And your view about the Dean statement is to give 
that to the Committee and not make it public, however. 

That's correct, I think that's — 


- 89 - 


( 196 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


1A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 197 Z MEETING 

And say it’s, uh r-r 

Give it to the Committee for the purpose — 

— ^ the purpose of their investigation. 

[Unintelligible] to limit the number of witnesses 
Yeah, 

which are called up there, instead of a buck-shot 
operation, ^ 

And say here, and also say, "This may help you in your 

it 

investigation. 

Right . 

"This is everything we know, Mr. Senator/" That 1 s what 
I was preparing to say. "This is everything we know; 

I know nothing more. This is the whole purpose, and 
that’s that. If you need any further information, my, 
our counsel will furnish it, uh, that is not in here." 
It’d be tempting to — *^But this is all we know. 

Now, in addition to that, you are welcome to have, have 
people, but you’ve got to have 11 — I think that the 
best way to have it is in executive session, but 


- 90 - 


35-904 O - 74 - p t . 1 _ 14 


( 197 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCS 22 y 1973 MEETING 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 


incidentally, you say executive session for those 
out of government as well as in? 

That’s right. 

Chapin and Colson should be called in. 

[Unintelligible] 

I would think so. 

Sure. Because you have the same problem. 

You see we ask — but your point we ask for, uh, 
the privilege, and at least, you know, we, we, our 
statement said it applies to former as well as present 
[unintelligible ] 

Mow, our statement — - you leave a lot of flexibility 
that you normally — for one thing, taking the chance 
appearing, and uh, however, informal relationships 
will always be worked out [unintelligible] 

Informal relations. 

That’s right. 

You have the same basis - — 


- 91 - 


( 198 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 


Well, it might. When I say that, that, that — 
the written interrogatory thing is not as clear 
[unintelligible] maybe Ervin is making it that way, but 
I think that f s based on what maybe, uh, we said that 
the — I don’t think I said we would only write, in, 
in the press conference, written interrogatories. 

That’s right. I don’t think — 

I didn’t say that at all. 

Ervin just jumped to that conclusion as a result of my 
letter to, uh — 

I think that ’ s what it was . 

I think that’s what’s happened. 

Not that your letter was wrong — it was right. But, uh, 
the whole written interrogatory, we didn’t discuss other 
possibilities . 

With respect to your ex-employees, you have the same 
problem of getting into areas of privileged communica- 
tions. You certainly can make a good case for keeping 
them in executive session. 


- 92 - 


( 199 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITHCELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITHCELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


That’s right. 

[Unintelligible] 

And, and in this sense the precedent for working — you 
can do it in cases in the future, which [unintelligible] 
executive session, and then the privilege can be raised 
without having, uh, on a legal basis, without having the 
guilt by the Fifth Amendment, not like pleading the Fifth 
Amendment — 

Right. 

the implication always being raised. 

[Unintelligible] and self-protection in that view? 

What? Yeah. 

[Unintelligible] Fifth Amendment . 

That’s right. That’s what we’re going to do here. 

Those — boy, this thing has to be turned around. 

Got to get you off the lid. 

Right 

All right. 

All right, fine, Chuck. 

Good to see you. 

How long were you in Florida? Just, uh — 

- 93 - 


( 200 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


MITCHELL: 


PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 


I was down there overnight, I was four hours on the 
witness stand testifying for the government in these, 
uh, racket cases involving wiretapping. The God 
damn fool Judge down there let them go all over the 
lot and ask me any questions that they wanted to. Just 
ridiculous. You know, this had, all has to do with 
the discretionary act of signing a piece of paper 
that I'm authorized by the statute. There were twenty- 
seven hood lawyers that questioned me. 

You know, uh, the, uh, you, you can say when I [unin- 
telligible] I was going to say that the, uh — [Picks 
up phone] Can you get me Prime Minister Trudeau in 
Canada, please. [Hangs up] I was going to say that 
Dean has really been, uh, something on this. 

That he has, Mr. President, no question about it, he's 
a very — 

Son-of-a-bitching tough thing. 

You've got a very solid guy that's handled some tough 
things. And, I also want to say these lawyers that you 
have think very highly of him . X know that John 
spends his time with certain ones - — 


- 94 - 


( 201 ) 



PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

MITCHELL : 
DEAN: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22> 1973 MEETING 
Dean? Discipline is very high. 

Parkinson, O’Brien. 

Yes, Dean says it’s great. Well, you know I feel for 
all the people, you know, I mean everybody that’s in- 
volved. Hell, is all we’re doing is their best to 
[unintelligible] and so forth. [Unintelligible], That’s, 
that's why I can’t let you go, go down. John? 

It's all right. Come in. 

Uh — 

Did you find out anything? 

I was, I went over to Ziegler's office. They have an 
office over there. Paul O'Brien' 11 be down here in a 
little while to see you. I'm going over to Ziegler's 
office and finish this up now. 

Are you coming back? 

Yes, I'll come back over here then. 

Okay. 

Yeah. Well, when you come back — he can, uh, is that 
office open for John now? 


- 95 - 


( 202 ) 



1 A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

DEM: Yes. 

PRESIDENT: Then he can go over there as soon [unintelligible] this. 

uh, the, uh, the one thing I don't want to do is to — 
Now let me make this clear. I, I, I thought it was, uh, 
very, uh, very cruel thing as it turned out — although 
at the time I had to tell [unintelligible] ~ what 
happened to Adams. I don f t want it to happen with 
Watergate — the Watergate matter, I think he made a, 
made a mistake, but he shouldn't have been sacked, he 
shouldn't have been — And, uh, for that reason, I am 
perfectly willing to * — I don't give a shit what 
happens, I want you all to stonewall it, let them 
plead the Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, 
if it'll save it — save the plan. That's the whole 
point. On the other hand, uh, uh, I would prefer, as 
I said to you, that you do it the other way. And I 
would particularly prefer to do it that other way if 
it's going to come out that way anyway. And that my 
view, that, uh, with the number of jackass people that 
they've got that they can call, they're going to — The 
story they get out through leaks, charges, and so forth, 
and innuendos, will be a hell of a lot worse than the 
story they're going to get out by just letting it 
out there. 


- 96 - 


But , 


( 203 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 > 1973 MEETING 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT : 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL : 


PRESIDENT: 


Well — 

I don’t know. But that’s, uh, you know, up to this point, 
the whole theory has been containment, as you know, John. 

Yeah. 

And now, now we’re shifting. As far as I’m concerned, 
actually from a personal standpoint, if you weren’t 
making a personal sacrifice — it’s unfair — Haldeman 
and Dean. That’s what Eisenhower — that’s all he 
cared about. He only cared about — Christ, "Be sure 
he was clean." Both in the fund thing and the Adams 
thing. But I don’t look at it that way. And I just — 

That’s the thing I am really concerned with. We’re 
going to protect our people, if we can. 

Well, the important thing is to get you up above it for 
this first operation. And then to see where the chips fall 
and, uh, and, uh, get through this Grand Jury thing up here. 
Uh, then the Committee is another question. [Telephone rings] 
What we ought to have is a reading as to what is [telephone 
rings] coming out of this Committee and we, if we handle the 
cards as it progresses. [Telephone rings] 

Yeah. But anyway, we’ll go on. And, uh, I think in order 
— it’ll probably turn just as well, getting them in the 
position of, even though it hurts for a little while. 


- 97 - 


\ 


( 204 ) 



MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT; 

MITCHELL : 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 

Yeah. 

You know what I mean. People say, "Well, the Presidents 
[unintelligible]," and so forth. Nothing is lasting. You 
know people get so disturbed about [unintelligible] . Now, 
when we do move [unintelligible] we can move, in a, in a, 
in a, in the proper way. 

If you can do it in a controlled way it would help and 
good, but, but, but the other thing you have to remember 
is that this stuff is going to come out of that Committee, 
whether — 

That's right. 

And it's going to come out no matter what. 

As if, as if I, and then it looks like I tried to keep 
it from coming out. 

That's why it's important that that statement go up to 
the Committee. 

[Picks up phone] Hello. I don't want to talk. Sure. 
[Hangs up] Christ. Sure, we'll — ~ 

It’s like these Gray, Gray hearings. They had it five 
days running that the files were turned over to John 
Dean, just five days running — the same story. 


- 98 - 


( 205 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 


PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 
MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 


Same story. 

Right . 

The files should have been turned over. 

Just should have, should have demanded them. You should 
have demanded all of them. 

[Unintelligible] what the hell was he doing 
as counsel to the President without getting them? He 
was — I told him to conduct an investigation, and 
he did. 

I know. 

Well, it’s like everything else. 

Anything else for us to — 

Get on that other thing. If Baker can — Baker is not 
proving much of a reed up to this point. He’s smart 
enough. 

Howard is smart enough, but, uh, we’ve got to carry 
him. Uh, I think he has and I’ve been puzzling over 
a way to have a liaison with him and, and, uh — 

- 99 - 


( 206 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 197 Z MEETING 

He won 1 t talk on the phone with anybody according to 
Kleindienst. He thinks his phone is tapped. 

He does? 

Who’s tapping his phone? 

I don’t know. 

Who would he think, who would he think would tap his 
phone? I guess maybe that we would. 

I don’t doubt that. 

He must think that Ervin -- 

Maybe. 

Or, or a newspaper. 

Newspaper, or, or the Democratic Party, or somebody. 
There’s got to be somebody to liaison with Kleindienst 
to get in a position where — It’s all right from fore 
knowledge through Kleindienst. 


- 100 - 


( 207 ) 



PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL; 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 


PRESIDENT: 


1.1 TRANSCRIPT OP MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

You really wonder if you take Wally Johnson and, uh — 
He’s a pretty good boy, isn’t he? 

Yeah. [Unintelligible] 

You might, you might throw that out to Dean. Dean says 
he doesn’t want to be in such a, such a public position. 
He talked to the Attorney General [unintelligible] Wally 
Johnson. And he said that — 

Well, he will be in the Department, 

Yeah. 

talking to the Department. 

[Unintelligible] Mansfield’s down there - — * 

Everything else under control? 

Yeah, we’re all doing fine. I think, though, that 
as long as, uh, everyone and so forth is a, uh * — 
[unintelligible] still [unintelligible] 

All of Washington - — the public interest in this thing, 
you know. 

Isn’t Nash, [unintelligible] Earl Nash 

worries the shit out of us here in regard, regarding 

[unintelligible] 


- 101 - 


( 208 ) 



MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


2,2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING 

Just in time. 

But the point is that, uh, I don’t There’s no need 
for him to testify. I have nothing but intuition, but 
hell, I don’t know. I, but — Again you really have 
to protect the Presidency, too. That’s the point. 

Well this does no violence to the Presidency at all, 
this concept — 

The whole scenario. 

Yeah. 

No, it, uh, uh, d — , that’s what I mean. The purpose of 
this scenario is to clean the Presidency. [Unintelligible] 
what they say ’’All right, Here’s the report, we’re going 
to cooperate with the Committee,” and so forth and so 
on. The main thing is to answer [unintelligible] and that 
should be a God damned satisfactory answer, John. 

It should be. 

Shouldn’t it. 

It answers all of their complaints they’ve had to date. 
That’s right. They get cross-examination. 


- 102 - 


( 209 ) 



1.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL : 
PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 


PRESIDENT: 

MITCHELL: 

PRESIDENT: 


Right. They get everything but the public spectacle. 

Public spectacle. And the reason we don’t have that 
is because you have to argue 

They have to argue and — 

on a legal and you don’t want them to be, uh, 
used as a, uh, uh, for unfairly, to, to have 
somebody charged. 

It’s our fault that you have somebody charged with not 
answering the Committee’s questions [unintelligible] to 
John, make sure you put it in^ make sure that you put 
it again in the argument , the clean record , and that * s 
the reason why you have an executive session. Because 
the record that comes out of it is clean. But, uh, 
in areas of dispute — 

I’d rather think, though, that all of their yakking 
about this, uh, we often said, John — we’ve got 
problems . 

[Unintelligible] 

Might cost them [unintelligible]. Think of their 
problems. They, those bastards are really — 
they’re just really something. Where is their 
leadership? 


- 103 - 


( 210 ) - 



MITCHELL : 


1,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 METING 


They don't have any leadership, and they're leaping 
on every new issue. 


NOTE: At this point a portion of the discussion 

has been deleted. 


- 104 - 


( 211 ) 






i| S\C&jz~+<~ 

M 

:i 

;j 

•i 




DV 


( 212 ) 



2. On March 22, 1973, during the meeting specified in the preceding 

paragraph, the President telephoned Attorney General Kleindienst and 
spoke to him from 2:19 to 2:26 p.m. According to the White House log 
of meetings and conversations between the President and the Attorney 
General, except for the President's cabinet meeting on March 9, the 
last previous meeting or conversation between the President and Attorney 
General Kleindienst occurred on March 1, 1973. The President directed 
Kleindienst to be the Administration's contact with Senator Howard 
Baker in connection with the hearings to be conducted by the Senate 
Select Committee. He asked Kleindienst to give Senator Baker "guidance," 
to be "our Baker handholder," to "babysit him, starting in like, like 
ten minutes." 


Page 


2.1 Tape recording of meeting among the President, 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean, March 22, 1973, 1:57 - 3:43 p.m., 
and House Judiciary Committee transcript there- 
of 214 

2.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and Richard Kleindienst, March 22, 1973 (received 

from White House) 215 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-15 


( 213 ) 



2.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22 3 1973 MEETING 


NOTE: SEE_ TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT 

INQUIRY STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT 3 
JOHN MITCHELL 3 H.R. HALDEMAN, JOHN EHRLICHMAN 
AND JOHN DEAN ON MARCH 22 3 1973 FROM 1:57 TO 
3:43 P.M. 3 PAGES 108-211. 


( 214 ) 



2. 2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
RICHARD KLEINDIENST , MARCH 22. 1973 


Richard Kleindienst 


February 2, 1973 


-3- 


«3?sa 

r'1 


101544 


Swearing-In Ceremony for Cabinet and 
Subcabinet - - Kleindienst attended 


February 8, 1973 

AM 8:00 9:51 Breakfast Meeting with Members of the 

Cabinet -- Kleindienst attended 


February 16, 1973 

AM 9:39 9:44 Cabinet Meeting -- Kleindienst attended 


March 1, 1973 

AM 9:36 President received local call from Kleindienst 

10:52 10:56 President placed local call to Kleindienst 


March 9, 1973 


AM 10:14 12:09PM 


March 22, 1973 
PM 2:19 2:26 


Cabinet Meeting -- Kleindienst attended 


President placed local call to Kleindienst 


March 23, 1973 

PM 4:42 

4:59 5:12 


President placed long distance call to Kleindienst 
President received bng distance call from 
Kleindienst 


February 23, 1973 
AM 10:08 10:52 


President met with Kleindienst 


( 215 ) 




3. On the morning of March 23, 1973 Judge John Sirica read in open 

court a letter that James McCord had written on March 19, 1973. The 
letter alleged in part that political pressure to plead guilty and 
remain silent had been applied to the defendants in the Watergate trial; 
that perjury had occurred during the trial; and that others involved in 
the Watergate operation were not identified when they could have been 
by those testifying. At this time. Judge Sirica deferred final sentenc- 
ing of all defendants except Gordon Liddy. Judge Sirica stated that in 
imposing sentence he would weigh as a factor the defendants' cooperation 
with the ongoing Watergate investigations. 


Page 


3.1 United States v. Liddy docket, March 23, 1973, 

28-29 218 

3.2 United States v. Liddy transcript of proceedings, 

March 23, 1973, 2-6, 33-40 220 


( 217 ) 




UNITED STATES V. LIDDY DOCKET , MARCH 23, 1973 . 28-29 


CRIMINAL DOCKET 

Jilmtfi* JSlittcs ^District (£mui for tlie pishrirt of (ilnlumlna 

TT GEORGE GORDON LIDDY, et al „ „ 1827-72 ' 28 

United States vs . — Cr. No -Supplemental Page No. . 


Date Proceedings * 


ij L973Mai 12 #1, et al; NOTICE setting Friday, March 23, 1973, at 10:00 a.rn. , as 

| _ date for sentencing of d efts. Hunt, Barker, Martinez, Sturgis and 

__J Gon zalez, and for he aring of pending motions of defts. Liddy and McCord 

and in the event of denial of the motions, sentencing of these two'defts". 
will also take place immediately followin g such denial. (N) 

SIRICA , C.J. ______ ~ 

9 7 3 Mar 15 #1, et al: LETTER dated 3-1 3-73 from Senator Sam J . Ervin, Jr., to 

Chief Ju dge Sirica in re grand jury minutes and sealed portions of 

transcript. ~ 

973Mar 20 #1: RECORD returned from USCA; receipt acknowledged. 

* #3: RECORD returned from USCA; receipt acknowledged. 

973Mar 21 #1, et al: ORDER authorizing search for weapons and other dangerous 

K weapons by U.S. Mar sh al and/or hi s ag ents of any and all persons entering 

Courtroom on March 23, 1973* (N) SIRICA, C.J . 


?73Mar| 23 


(CONT INUED 


AS OF MARCH 20, 1973: 

#3: (McCord): Letter dated 3-19-73 from deft to Judge Sirica, together 
with carbon copy of a letter wr itt en by de ft to Walter Rugabee on 3-19-7 
both of which were inserted i n a white envelope 6 M x4" bearing a type- 

written notation "Judge John J , Sirica- Pers o nal 11 & with a pen. 1 & ink 

nota tion "J.W. McCord 11 appearing on re v erse and/or sealing side whic h d ef 
delivered to Judge Sirica 1 s chambers on 3-20-73, together with transcrip 
of proceedi ngs held in Judge Sirica's ch ambers thereafter, together wit 

note s of Cou rt Report er Nicholas Sokal T ORDERED SEALED UNTIL FURTHER 

ORDER OF COURT. 

#3 (McCo rd) : Bo th sealed let ters referred to in entry of 3-20-73. 

_toRet her with transcri pt of proceedings held in Judge Sirica 1 s chambers 
(p ages 1-1 1, incl. Nicholas Sokal, Court Reporter) (Court f s Co py) , ORDER 
UNSEA LED IN OP EN COURT & FILE D; stenographic notes returned to Mr. Sokal, 

Cour t R e porter. _ 

#3 ( McCord) : MOTION of deft filed 3-8-73 for judgment of acquittal o 

al ternative ly for a new trial ^ he a rd £ de nied. Order to be p re s ented . 

ON NEXT PAGE) 


( 218 ) 


3.1 UNITED STATES V . LIDDY DOCKET 3 MARCH 23. 1973, 28-29 


CRIMINAL DOCKET 


Jlmtei* States pistrict (llaurt for t!jc pistrht of (£ alumina 


*ted States vs. 


GEORGE GORDON LIDDY, ET AL 


1827-72 


.Supplemental Page No. 


Proceedings 


40X1-23. CGONXmUED_ ER.QM._P.REV LOUS. ...PAGE )_. 


J # 3 (McC o rd): Sent enc ing c on t inu e d unt i 1 3-30-7 3 

#1 ( Liddy) : M0T-I0N_o f deftfiledby de ft on 3- 1-73 _f or ju dgme nt of ^ 

j j acqui ttal or alternatively for a new trial & to arrest judgment on the 




fir st c ount of the indictment, he ard & denied; O rde r to be presente d, [j 

# 1 (Lid dy) : SEN TENCED: 20 month s t o 5 years & to pay a fine of j! 

$10 , 000 . 0 0 on Count 1 (Conspiracy-18 USC 371) ; |j 

5 years to 15- years on Counts 2 & 3 (Burg. II - 22 DCC 1801b; said sentences 

... t o .run concurr ent with each other & co ncurrent with sentence imposed on j 

Count 1; _ j 

2 0 month s to 5 years on each of Counts 4, 5 & 8 (unlawful endeavor to } 
intercept oral 6c wire communications- 18 USC 2511(1) (a) , said sentences j 
as to imprisonm ent under Counts 4 & 5 & 8 to run concurrent with each | 

_ other 6c consecuti ve to sentences imposed under Counts 1, 2 & 3 , but j 

sentence s as to the fines on Counts 4, 5 & 8 are to be cumulative; from 

foreg oing senten ces impo sed, it is Courts inte ntion that deft serve a . 

t otal sentence o f 6 years 6c 8 mont hs to 2 0__y ear s & to pay a fine of 

- $40.000,00; de ft to stand c o mmitted until fine is paid or deft is otherw i-S e 

__ released in accord a nce with law; remanded. |j 

#2,4,5, 6, 7 (Hunt, B arker, Mar tine z , _S tur g is 6c Gonzalez) : COMMITTED p ur s u ah t 

- to section 4 208(b), 18 US C, for observation , study, report & recommendati on, 

_ #2 (H nh fc) : def t . c ommitt ed ; commitment i s sued, j 

#4, 5 , 6 , 7 : Remanded . * |! 

SIRICA, C.J. Rep-N.Sokal 1-Peter L.Maroulis 6c Thomas a Kennelly , Attys j 
2-Wi lliam 0. Bittman 6c Austin S .Mittler , Attys | 

- 3 "Gerald Alch & Bernard Shankman, Attys ; 4 , 5 , 6,7- Daniel E . Schultz ,Atty ij 


#1: OR DER de n ying mot io ns of d eft, filed 3-1-73 for j udg 
a cquittal or alternatively for a new trial . (N) S IRICA, C . J . 


#3 : ORDER denying motion of deft, filed 3-8-73 f°T judgment of 
acquittal or alternatively for a new trial. (N) SIRICA^ C.J. 


#1: JUDGMENT AND COWIITb&m of 3-23-73 . 


(219) 



3.2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS , MARCH 23, 1973, 
2-6. 33^40 


(Defendants present in court.) 

THE COURT: Good morning. 

I have a preliminary matter which we will consider 
before arguments on the motions and sentencing. 

The defendant Mr. McCord sent a letter to me last 
Tuesday, March 20th, by way of a probation officer. In the 
presence of the probation officer, my two law clerks and the 
court reporter I opened the envelope and read into the record 
the two enclosures it contained. The letters and the transcript 
were then sealed until further order of the Court. I have con- 
sidered this communication from Mr. McCord as a supplement to 


i the presentence report in his case. I am now ordering unsealed 
those letters and the transcript of proceedings of March 20, 1S7 


3 


| They will be filed in the record. The two letters are brief anc( 

I will read them now for the benefit of counsel before we proceed 

further. Let me have the letter. 

(The clerk unsealed the envelope and handed 
the contents to the Court.) 

The first one I shall read is a copy of a letter dated 

{March 19, addressed to Mr. Walter Rugaber of the New York Times, 

Washington, D.C.: 

"Dear Hr. Rugaber: 

"The New York Tines issue of March 19, 1973, 
page 30 carries a story relative to ar. alleged strong-arm j 


( 220 ) 



3.2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS , MARCH 23, 1973, 3 

2-6, 33-40 


activities attributed to Mr. Bernard Barker and associates 
by one Reinaldo Pico. In the article by juxtaposition 
my name is mentioned in connection with such activities. 

"As I have telephonically advised ycur office after 
seeing the article I have no knowledge of or connection 
with any such strong-arm activities referred to in the 
article. Neither have I ever met Mr. Pico to my knowledge 

"You made no effort to contact my attorneys or me 
prior to publication of the article which I regret since 
we could have stated for publication what I just said above: 

Very truly yours, 

James W« McCord, Jr." 

The other letter dated March 19 on the letterhead of 
James W. McCord, Jr., 7 Winder Court, Puackvilie, Maryland, 
addressed to Judge Sirica states: 

- "Certain questions have been posed to me from your 
honor through the probation officer, dealing with details 
of the case, motivations, intent and mitigating circum- 
stances. 

"In endeavoring to respond to these questions, I am 
v?hipsawed in a variety of legalities. First, I may be 

i 

called before a Senate Committee investigating this 
matter. Secondly, I may be Involved in a civil suit; 

I and thirdly there may be a new trial at some future date. 


( 221 ) 



2. 2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS , MARCH 22, 1972, , 


2-6j_ 22-40 


"Fourthly, the probation officer may be called before the 
Senate Committee to present testimony regarding what may 
otherwise be a privileged communication between defendant 
and Judge, as I understand it; if I answered certain question 
to the probation officer, it is possible such answers coUL •! 
become a matter of record in the Senate and therefore 
available for use in the other proceedings just described. 

My answers would, it would sesn to me, to violate my Fifth 
Amendment rights, and possibly tny Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel and possibly other rights. 

"On the other hand, to fail to answer your questions 
may appear to be non-cooperation, and I can therefore expej 
a much more severe sentence. 

"There are further considerations which are not to be 
lightly taken. Several members of my family have expressed 
fear for my life if I disclose knowledge of the facts in 
this matter, either publicly or to any government repre- 
sentative. Whereas I do not share their concerns to the 
same degree, nevertheless, I do believe that retaliatory 
measures will be taken against me, my family, and ray 
friends should I disclose such facts. Such retaliation 
could destroy careers, income, and reputations of persons 
who are innocent of any guilt whatever. 

"Be that as it may, in the interests of justice, and 

i 

in the interests of restoring faith in the criminal justice 


( 222 ) 



3. 2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973, 
2-6, 33-40 

Indistinct document retyped by ^ 

House Judiciary Committee staff 

system, which faith has been severely damaged in this case, 

I will state the following to you at this time which I 

hope may be of help to you in meting out justice in this 

case: 

,f l. There was political pressure applied to the 
defendants to plead guilty and remain silent. 

"2. Perjury occurred during the trial in matters 

highly material to the very structure, orientation 
and impact of the government's case, and to the 
motivation and intent of the defendants. 

"3. Others involved in the Watergate operation were 

not identified during the trial, when they could 
have been by those testifying. 

"4. The Watergate operation was not a CIA operation. 

The Cubans may have been misled by others into 
believing that it was a CIA operation. I know 
for a fact that it was not. 

"3. Some statements were unfortunately made by a 

witness which- left the Court with the impression 
that he was stating untruths, or withholding 
facts of his knowledge, when in fact only honest 
errors of memory were involved. 

,f 6. My motivations were different than those of the 
others involved, but were not limited ta, or 
simply those offered in my defense during the 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


( 223 ) 



! 


3.2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDI TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973, 
2-6. 33-40 



system, which faith has beau severely eras 3 ad in this case 
I will state the following i t this tine which I 

hope may be of help to you i.r. me'.. in? cut justice in this 
case: 

"1. There was political pressure applied to the 

defendants to plead guilty and remain silent. 

"2. Perjury occurred during the trial in matters 

highly material to the very structure, orientati 
and impact of the gov a- rumen t’u case, and to the 
motivation and in', out of the defendants. 

”3. Others involved in the laser-gate operation were 
not identified during a . ; a trial, when they could 
have been by those testifying. 

• M 4. The Watergate operation fas net a CIA. operation. 

•The Cubans may have bean misled by others into 
believing that it was a CIA operation. I know 
for a fact that it: was not, 

"5 . Sane statements were unfortunately made by a 

witness which left: the Court with the impression 
that he was stating untruths, or withholding 
facts of his knowledge, when in fact only honest 
errors of memory were involved. 

' M 6,. My motivations were different: than those of the 
others involved, but wore not limited to, or 
simply those offer nil in my defense curing the 



i 


(224) 



3.2 UNITED STATES v. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS , MARCH 23, 1973, 6 


2-6j_ 33-40 


t 

f 


trial. This is no fault of my attorneys, but i 
cf the circumstances under which we had to pre- 
pare my defense. 

"Following sentence, I would appreciate the opportunity 
to talk with you privately in chambers. Since I cannot 
.feel confident in talking with an FBI agent, in testifying 
before a. Grand Jury whose U.S. Attorneys work for the . 
Department of Justice, or in talking with other govern- 
ment representatives, such a discussion with you would be 
of assistance to me. 

. "I have not discussed the above with my attorneys as a 
matter of. protection for them. 

n I give this statement freely and voluntarily, fully reali^ 
that I may be prosecuted for giving a false statement to 

e I 

a Judicial official, if the statements herein are knowingly 
untrue. The statements are true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 

James W. McCord, Jr." 

We i-rill take a 20 minute recess and I will hear any 
comments from any attorneys on this. 

(Brief recess taken at 10:10 a.m.) 


( 225 ) 


3.2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973, 33 

2-6, 33-40 


in fact as a practical matter made the individual cooperation of 
any one of them impossible. 

Secondly, despite the fact that prior to trial these 
four Defendants wished to plead guilty. It is a matter of recorjd 
that theirj^ttorney prevented them from so doing and over their 
objection proceeded to make an opening statement in which he 
raised a defense for**which there is no basis in law. In fact, 
though these four persons who in effect raay be perhaps following 
orders retained this one attorney. As matters turned out they 
were his captives in a relative sense, if the Court please, we 
think though their guilt is clear their moral cupability is of 
a lesser degree. 

Thank you. 

THE COURT: All right, let the Defendants be seated. 

Now with respect to the five Defendants who have 
.entered guilty pleas, that is,. Messrs. Hunt, Barker, Martinez, 
;Sturgis, .and Gonzalez, the Court finds that it requires more 
detailed information before it can make a final determination 
-of the sentences to be imposed. 

The Court will, therefore implement, at this time, the| 
.provisions of Title 18 United States Code Section 4208(b).. 

That section reads as follows: 

(b) If the Court desires more detail information 
a3 a basis for determining the sentence to be imposed) 
the Court may commit the Defendant to the custody 


( 226 ) 



34 

3.2 UNITED STATES v. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973, 

2-6, 33-40 __ 

of the Attorney General, which commitment shall be 
deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment 
prescribed by law, for a study as described in sub- 
section (c) hereof. The results of such study, 
together with any recommendations which the Director 
of the Bureau of Prisons believes would be helpful in 
determining the disposition of the case, shall be 
furnished to the Court within three months unless the 
- Court grants time, not to exceed an additional three 
months, for further study. After receiving such 
reports and recommendations, the Court may in its 
discretion: (1) Place the prisoner on probation as 

authorized by Section 3651 of this Title, or (2) affirm 
the sentence of imprisonment, and commit the offender 
under any applicable provision of law. The term of 
the sentence shall run from date of original" commit- 
ment under this section. 11 

Now the effect of the Court's ruling then is this: 
First, each of you five Defendants now before me are 
provisionally committed for the maximum sentence of imprison- 
ment prescribed by law for your offenses. 

Second, a study will be conducted under the direction 
of the Bureau of Prisons. Within three months, the Court will 
be furnished with the results of this study together with any 
recommendations made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 


( 227 ) 


3. 2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973 , 
2-g, 33 - 40 


35 


: j Should more than three months be required, the Court 

l> • . ' ‘ 

ijmay grant time for further study up to an additional three months 

!! I 

«) I 

tj Third, once the studies with respect to each Defendant 


||Vire completed and the Court has analyzed the information con- 

i* . 

jj- tamed therein, the Court will make a final disposition of your 

i* ■ ‘ • 

- 

‘leases. 

i . • • ■ . 


:{ The Court will have basically three alternatives: 

* * 

| (1) To affirm the sentence of imprisonment originally imposed, 

I that is, the maximum sentence; (2) to reduce the sentence of 

| iroprisonjnent as the Court deems appropriate; or, (3) to place 

I ■ *-.■■■ 

{the Defendant on probation. 

In any case, the terms of sentence will begin to run 
from' the date of original commitment. 

Wow the fact that I am submitting the matter for 
further study does not mean that I have given little or no 
thought to a sentencing decision. The Court has already given- 
a great deal of Consideration to sentencing in each of your 
cases. I have carefully studied the presentence reports and 
the trial transcripts. 

Among other things, I have taken into consideration, 
and will keep in mind, the fact that each of you voluntarily 
entered pleas of guilty. 

On the other side of the scale is the fact that none 


of vou have been willing to give the Government or other 

hi . 

appropriate authorities any substantial help in trying this 


( 228 ) 



36 


II . 

3.2 UNITED STATES V. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 3 MARCH 23, 19^3, 



case or in investigating the activities which were the subject 
of this case. 

! I think, under the case law, the Court is entitled to 

consider this fact in determining sentences. 

For the record, I will cite two cases which discuss 
this aspect of sentencing: United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 
181 (2nd Circuit 1972), and United States v. Vermeulen, 436 
F.2d 72 (2nd Circuit 1970) certiorari denied 402 U.S. 911, by the j 
Supreme Court. 

I believe I may also properly suggest to you that in 

the interval between now and when the Bureau cf Prisons studies 

are completed you give serious consideration to lending your 

full cooperation to investigating authorities. 

Now I % want to speak plainly about this matter. You 

will no doubt be given an opportunity to provide information 

to the Grand Jury which has been,, and still is, investigating 

, Select 

the Watergate affair and to the Senate / Committee on Presidential 

Campaign Activities. " - 

I sincerely hope that each of you will take full 
advantage of any such opportunity. My sentiments in this regard 
are identical to those expressed on February 28th iof. this, year 
by Judge Warren J. Ferguson, a United States District Judge in 
Los Angeles, California and a man for tvhom I have the highest 
admiration. Judge Ferguson has before him a matter which is, 
in many respects, analogous to this case. That proceeding grew 


35-904 O - 74 - pt, 1-16 


(229) 


3.2 UNITED STATES v. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, MARCH 23, 1973, 
2-6, 33^40 


37 


out of certain 'unlawful transactions revealed a few years' ago 
involving a one-time sergeant major of the Army. This man and 
others pleaded guilty before Judge Ferguson on the 28th to an 
information charging them with fraud and corruption in the 
operation of the United States military clubs in parts of Europe , 
Viet Nam and the United States. At the time of the plea. 

Judge Ferguson made a statement which I am going to read now. 

He has stated the matter exceptionally well. I quote: 

"There are various sentencing philosophies: To deter 

other people from committing crime, to deter the 
defendant himself from committing other crimes against 
the Government, to rehabilitate people and all of the 


other various philosophical reasons why judges sentence 


people. 

"In this case, for various reasons which are not 

necessary for the Court to express from the bench, 

' _ ' ' 0 . ' 

I am more concerned that the activities to which you 

have pled guilty will not occur in the future by any 

other sergeant of the Army, sergeant major of the Army, 

any master sergeant of the Army, or any staff sergeant 

of the Army or anybody else in the military system 

and I don’t know whether or not the three of you are 

isolated incidents of the things to which you have 

pled guilty and whether or not it is the system which 

permitted this activity to take place. 


( 230 ) 



M: 1 

3.2 UNITED STATES 
2-6 % 33-40 



LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS y MARCH 23 y 1973 


38 


"The things we say here, if I can paraphrase a great 
President, will not be long remembered. You and I ar^ 
individuals and life is pretty slender and what I do 
to you basically is not going to affect other sergeani 
majors in the Army and another war that comes along 
in our future, and they will come. But I want to do 
all I can to insure that in future wars or future . 
military operations that the system, the system itselje, 
prohibits the conduct to which you have .entered your 
guilty pleas. Because if that is accomplished, then 
there has been. a benefit to the Government, really. { 
"I don't think the Government wants a pound of flesh 
out of you. That is very little, benefit to the 
Government. That is very little benefit to society. 
.That is very little benefit to anybody except an 
expression that society does not approve of the 
things you have entered your guilty pleas to. But 
you will pass on and there will be other people takiilg 
your place and Wooldridge will be forgotten about ani 
Higdon will be forgotten about and nobody will 
remember Bass as individuals. There will be a. flurr^ 
of publicity as a result of your guilty pleas, 
naturally, but in a week or so it will be forgotten 
about. 

"But you see, I don't want it forgotten. So I have 


( 231 ) 


3.2 UNITED STATES V . LIDDI TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS y MARCH 23 y 1973 y 
2-6 ' 33-40 


told your attorneys that the sentence that I will 


impose upon you — and I am making no promise of 
leniencies; I want that clearly and positively under-^ 
stood; I am making no promise of leniency — but the 
sentence I will impose will depend primarily oh whether 
or not you cooperate with the permanent subcommittee 
on investigation of the United States Senate and if 
you are asked to testify and give evidence before that 
permanent subcommittee and if you testify openly and 
completely, regardless of what the implications are 
to yourself or to anyone else or to the system so that 
the. branch of the Government which can take corrective 
action of the system is able to take action on the 
system so that this activity simply does not occur 
again, then I will take that into consideration 
because I want to see something beneficial to the 
Government come out of these proceedings. 

"Now, I don't know what the subcommittee will do but 
I fully expect you to cooperate absolutely, completely 
and entirely with whoever from that subcommittee, 
whether it is a Senator or whether it is a staff 
investigator. Whoever it is who interrogates you, 
you will openly and honestly testify." V v 

Now I believe that the Watergate affair, gentlemen, 
the subject of this trial, should not be forgotten. Some good 


( 232 ) 



3.2 UNITED STATES v. LIDDY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS , MARCH 23, 1973, 40 

2-6 % 33-40 


can and should pome from a revelation of sinister conduct, when- 
ever and wherever such conduct exists. I am convinced that the 
greatest benefit that can come from this prosecution will be its 
ifnpact as a spur to corrective action so that the type of 
activities revealed by the evidence at trial will not be repeated 
in our nation. 

For these ^reasons I recommend your full cooperation 
with the Grand Jury and the Senate Select Committee. You must 
understand that I hold out no promises or hopes of any kind to 
you in this matter but I do say that should you decide to speak 
freely I would have to weigh that factor in appraising what 
sentence will be finally imposed in this case. Other factors 
will of course be considered but I mention this one because it 
is one over which you have control and I mean each one of the 
five of you. . .c';.-’ 

In conclusion, the Court’s aim is to acquire a 
thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the 
Defendants so as to be able to impose that sentence which most 


fully comports with justice in each individual case. 


( 233 ) 




4* On the morning of March 23, 1973 members of the press attempted 

to question John Dean regarding Patrick Gray's testimony at his confirma- 
tion hearings on the previous day that Dean "probably lied" when he told 
FBI agents on June 22, 1972 that he did not know whether Howard Hunt had 
a White House office. Later in the morning of March 23 Dean was informed 
by Paul O'Brien, an attorney for CRP, that a letter from James McCord to 
Judge Sirica had been read in open court. Dean has testified that he 
then telephoned Ehrllchman to inform him of McCord's letter and that 
Ghrlichman stated he had already received a copy. In the early after- 
noon of March 23 the President telephoned Dean from Key Blscayne. Dean 
has testified that the President told him, "Well, John, you were right 
in your prediction." Dean has testified that the President suggested 
that Dean and his wife go to Camp David and get some relaxation, and 
that Dean analyze the situation and report back to him. 


Page 

4.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1002-03 236 

4.2 L. Patrick Gray testimony, SJC, Gray Nomination 

Hearings, March 22, 1973, 671 238 

4.3 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 23, 1973 (received from 

White House) 239 


( 235 ) 


4.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY , JUNE 25. 1973 , 3 SSC 1002-03 


1002 

Senator Baker’s 3taff was very desirous of a meeting to get guidance. 
It was at this point that the" President called the Attorney General 
and told him that he should get up to meet with Senator Baker as 
soon as possible and get some of these problems regarding executive 
privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the com- 
mittee immediately. After the conversation with the Attorney General, 
there was a continued discussion of how to deal with the Ervin ccm~: 
mittee. I asked the President to excuse me from the meeting for a. 
moment because I was working with Ziegler on a response to a state- 
ment that Gray had made. The President asked me what that was. 
about and I then explained to him about Gray’s statement. I told him 
what Gray had said and I also told him what the facts were. He ex- 
cused me to use the telephone in his office and said that I should get 
that resolved as quickly as possible. 

When I returned to the conversation with the President, Mitchell, 
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, they were still talking about dealing with 
the Ervin committee. The President told me that the White House 
should start directly dealing with the committee and that I should go 
up and commence discussions with Senator Ervin as to the parameters 
or executive privilege. 

I told the President that I did not think this would be wise because 
I was very much the party in issue with regard to the Judiciary Com- 
mittee hearings and that it would be unwise for me to go to the ‘Hill 
and negotiate my own situation. The President agreed and Ehrlich- 
man said that he would commence discussions. 

The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White 
House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin committee hearings. 
There was absolutely no indication of any changed attitude and it was 
like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the 
talk was of strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any 
effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June 
17 and after June 17. 

Following this meeting with the President, it was ^apparent to me 
that I had failed in turning the President around on this subject, but 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman began taking over with regard to deal- 
ing with a new problem, which had become John Dean, as they were 
aware of the fact that I was very unhappy about the situation. 

Trip to Camp David 

On Friday morning, March 23, my house was surrounded by camera 
crews as a result of Gray’s statement the day before, that i had 
“probably lied.” Accordinglv, I decided to wait until the camera cru vs 
departed before going to the office. It was midmorn in <r when Paul 
O’Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica’s reading McCord’s letter 
in open court. O’Brien gave me the high points of the letter as they 
had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He also 
told me that McCord had only hearsay knowledge. I then called 
Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and 
read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly 

He responded : “Tt just came floating into my office.” He asked mfr 
what I thought about it and I t Id him I was nc' surprised at all 
and repeated to him what O’Brien had told me that McCord probablv 
had only hearsay knowledge. He asked me if I was in my office and 


( 236 ) 



4.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY. JUNE 25. 1973 3 3 SSC 1002-03 


1003 

I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in 
shortly. 

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Re- 
ferring to our meeting on March *21 and McCord’s letter, he said: 
“Well, John, you were right in your prediction.'’ He then suggested 
I go up to Cainp David and analyze the situation. He did not instinct 
me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, '“take your 
wife, and get some relaxation.” He then alluded to the fact that I had 
been under 

Senator Ervi>\ I will have to depart because I have less than 5 
minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the 
Olympics. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Baker, Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurry along but I 
stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in 
the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and 
one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest 
of time. If you do not mind you might continue now. 

Mr. Dean. Thank you, Senator. 

He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense 
pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you 
cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking 
at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we 
are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him 
I would go. 

My wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we 
entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing. 
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on 
the phone ; Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some 
time writing a report on everything I knew about the Watergate. I 
said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. 
_He s aid that would be decided later, 

I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this 
entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations 
I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement 
in the coverup. I did not know about Haldeman, but I assumed that 
he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the 
President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I 
should step forward because there was no way the situation was going 
to get better — rather, it could only get worse. My most difficult prob^ 
lem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the 
President. I had no answer, because I felt once T came forward the 
matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to 
decide. I finally concluded that I would have to think of some way for 
the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened 
to everybody else. 

I called Mr. Moore and talked with him about it. We talked about 
a Presidential speech, where the President would really lay the facts 
out ; we talked about immunity for everyone involved : we talked about 
a special Warren-type commission that would put the facts out; we 
talked about some half measures that might satisfy the public interest : 
but we both realized that nothing less than the truth won hi sell. As T 
mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked -about some of these con- 


( 237 ) 




4.2 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, MARCH 22, 1973, SJC, 
GRAY NOMINATION^ HEARINGS , 671 

071 


Senator Byrd. The next day Mr. Dean railed you at 10:25 a.m., re- 
garding leaks concerning material delivered to the FBI. What particu- 
lar leak and what specific material did lie have in mind? 

Mr. Gi:ay. lie was calling me then about those minors that were 
continuing, as he put it, to the effect that the FBI was dragging its 
feet in this investigation and that a gun had been found in Mr. Hunt's 
effects. This was the subject of that call, as best as I can recollect it, sir. 

Senator Byrd. On the same afternoon at 4:35 you called him. You 
state you have no recollection of the substance of that call. Could it 
have been with respect to Mr. Hunt’s properties? 

Mr. Gray. Xo, I do not think it was. I covered that pretty thor- 
oughly in that morning call. That is why I am sure it isn't. I have 
tried to remember it. It could have been on leaks, it could have been 
on toll call records, or it could have been on witness interviews, but I 
just don’t know. 

° Senator Byrd. Going back to Mr. Dean, when lie indicated that he 
would have to check to see if Mr. Hunt had an office in the Old 
Executive Office Building, he lied to the agents; didn't he? 

Mr Gray. I would say looking back on it now and exhaustively 
analyzing the minute details of this investigation, I would have to 
conclude that that probably is correct, yes, sir. 

Senator Byrd. Xow, you just conclude that at this point. 

How about on the 27th, the day after 

Mr. Gray. Xo, sir. Xo, sir, there were none of us that discussed it in 
that time frame. We did not even consider it. We didn't think about it. 

Senator Byrd. I cannot for the life of me, with all due respect to 
you, imagine how these things would not have occurred to you in the 
face of the chain of events that are on the record. 

Mr. Gray. We are looking at it in hindsight, Senator Byrd. 

Senator Byrd. I am talking about the 27th — looking back on the 
19th and the 22d of June. 

Mr. Gray. I think you have to place it in the proper perspective as 
we looked at it with a fast moving, fast-paced investigation, with 
events and reports and details coming in. I am saying to you that it 
did not occur to us then. We were concerned at the time about the 
chain of custody. There is no question about that. 

Senator Byrd. Mr. Gray, hindsight is a very useful agent. Let's 
take hindsight for a moment. You indicated that Mr. Dean probably 
lied to the FBI agents as you now look back, yet yesterday you said 
you woidd continue to send to him raw FBI files if he requested them. 
Why would von now continue to send raw FBI files to an individual 
who probably lied, to use your words, to an FBI agent? 

Mr. Gray. Well, Senator Byrd, I think that you have got to realize 
once again that I am a Bureau Chief in an executive department of the 
Government, that I have to take orders from somebody, that I do 
report to somebody, that I am just not out there in the open, you know, 
independent and doing exactly as I please, and that man is Counsel 
to the President of the United States. 

Senator Byrd. I recognize all this. 

Mr. Gray. I think you know that his first duty — I would like, if I 
may, to let the record clearly show that I have testified that his first 
duty was to the President of the United States in connection with the 


( 238 ) 



4.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN TEE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN > 
MARCH 23, 1973 

March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ha Idem an was also present for at least 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:01 President met withMr. Dean in the President's 

EOD office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman T (3 3 ir 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) J-'-' 
i/Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 



March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 

Mr. Haldema.n* (2:01-3:40) 

Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 


March 23, 1973 


PM 12:44 1:02 President talked' long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initialed the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in ‘Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp David, Md. ) 


No contact during the period April 1-14 


April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 

staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 
the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 

ra 

Nla 



( 239 ) 






5. On March 23, 1973 the President telephoned Patrick Gray at 

1:11 p.m. According to the President's logs the last time the President 
had spoken to Gray was on February 16, 1973. Gray has testified that 
he cannot remember the President's precise words, but that the call was 
a "buck up call" -in which the President told Gray that he knew the 
beating Gray had taken at his confirmation hearing; that it was very 
unfair; and that there would be another day to get back at their 
enemies. Gray has testified that he remembered distinctly that the 
President said to him, "You will remember, Pat, I told you to conduct 
a thorough and aggressive investigation." Gray also has testified 
that from March 21 on he received no order from the President or anyone 
implementing a Presidential directive to get all the facts with respect 
to the Watergate matter and report them directly to the President. 

5.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and L. Patrick Gray, March 23, 1973 (received 
from White House) 

5.2 L. Patrick Gray log, March 23, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 

5.3 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3489-91, 

3506-07 


Page 

242 

243 

244 


( 241 ) 



5.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
L, PATRICK GRAY, MARCH 22, 1973 


101538 



MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 

THE PRESIDENT AND L. PATRICK GRAY 

(June 15, 1972 to April 30, 1973) 


July 6, 1972 

AM 8:28 8:33 President placed long distance call to 

L. Patrick Gray 

November 22, 1972 

AM 10:41 10:42 President placed long distance call to 

L. Patrick Gray 


February 16, 1973 

AM 9:08 9:38 President met with L. Patrick Gray 

(Ehrlichman 9:08 - 9:38) 

March 23, 1973 

PM 1:10 . 1:24 President placed long distance call to Gray 

April 5, 1973 

PM 3:08 3:18 President received long distance call from Gray 


April 27, 1973 

AM 11:00 President received local call from Gray -- 

Larry Higby took call 


( 242 ) 
























5.3 L» PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST 6, 1973, 9 SSC 3489-91, 3506-07 


3489 

to question at this time to Senator Weicker, in which case Senator 
Weicker will not be subject, since he is exercising counsel’s time, will 
not be subject to the 10-minute rule. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gray, I would like to, if I could, just set the background prior to 
this questioning because of certain comments that have been made rela- 
tive to our relationship, the fact that I look upon you as I do because 
of a longstanding friendship, et cetera. 

Prior to 1969 when I came to Washington, at which time you came 
to serve Mr. Finch or with Mr. Finch, had you and I ever met ? 

Mr, Gray. No, sir, 

Senator Weicker. Have you been in my house or I in yours in a 
social sense aside from the meeting that we had in my home relative to 
this matter here? 

Mr. Gray. No, sir, I didn’t even know who you were. [Laughter,] 

Senator Weicker. And the positions that you were offered in the 
administration, these weren't positions that I recommended you for 
but rather positions that came about in your relationships with the 
administration, is that correct? 

Mr. Gray. Yes. I didn’t even know you, Senator Weicker, and I 
made no request of you and the only reason I got into the administra- 
tion at all was through Bob Finch and I had to labor mightily even 
to get in and come back here and serve my country at a tremendous 
financial sacrifice. 

Senator Weicker. It is true, however, that since the matter of 
Watergate has arisen and problems associated thereto that you and I 
have had increasing frequency of contact. 

Mr. Gray. Yes, Senator Weicker, that is correct. 

r Senator Weicker. Now, I would like to read to you, if I might, Mr. 

Gray, a portion of the President’s statement of April 30, 1973, specifi- 
cally that portion which states : 

Until March of this year I remained convinced that the denials were true and 
that the charges of involvement by members of the White House staff were false. 
The comments I made during this period and the comments made by my press 
secretary in my behalf were based on the information provided to us at the time 
we made those comments. However, new information then came to me which 
persuaded me that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were 
true, and suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the facts 
botli from the public, from you, and from me. As a result, on March 21 I per- 
sonally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into 
the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get 
all the facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office. 

My first question to you, in light of the President’s statement of 
April 30, where he states that on March 21 he personally assumed the 
responsibility for new inquiries and personally ordered those conduct- 
ing the investigations to “‘get all the facts and report them directly to 
me right here in this office.” My first question is : Did you ever receive 
after March 21 or from March 21 on a directive from the President 
of the United States relative to these Watergate matters, which direc- 
tive inquired of you as to what your investigations were producing, 
sir? 

Mr. Gray. No, sir. The President did telephone me on March 23 and 
this was the typical buck- up type of call 


( 244 ) 



5.3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST 6 , 1973, 9 SSC 3489-91, 2506-07 


3490 

Senator Weicker. May I stop here for 1 minute, Mr. Gray? Was the 
FBI investigating- — were they still involved in investigations of 
Watergate in March ? 

Mr. Gray. Yes; because it was due to the action that I took — I tried 
to take it in October and I did take it in December to get us into the 
activities that were political in nature, you might say. They involved 
the activities of Mr. Segretti and to the best of my knowledge, infor- 
mation and belief, and I believe that I have exhibits before this com- 
mittee which indicate all of what I am saying right now, Senator 
Weicker, we were at that time still investigating. 

Senator Weicker. And you received from March 21 on — we will get 
to the phone conversation in a minute — no order from the President 
as one who was conducting the investigation “to get all the facts and to 
report them directly to me,” the President, “right here in this office* 5 ? 

Mr. Gray. I did not, sir, and I received no such order from anybody. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

Now, would you please tell the committee as to what happened in the 
phone call of March 23 ? 

Mr. Gray. The March 23 phone call from the President, once again, 
it was a surprise to me. I did not really expect to see it. That followed 
the testimony I had given on Marcli 22 and which in response to a 
question from Senator Byrd I had said that Mr. Dean had probably 
lied when he was talking with our agents and the way the questions 
were phrased by Senator Byrd there was no other answer I could give. 
But the President called me on March 23 and it was in the nature of 
a buck-up call to say, and I cannot remember his precise words, but to 
say I know the beating that you are taking up there and it is very 
unfair and there will be another day to get back at our enemies and 
there will always be a place for you in the Nixon administration, and 
I thanked the President and then I remembered distinctly him saying, 
“You will recall, Pat, that I told you to conduct a thorough and aggres- 
sive investigation, 55 and I remembered that so distinctly because I had 
; the eerie feeling that this was being said to me but why. and I related 
it immediately to the July 6 telephone conversation I had had with the 
President in the previous year. 

Senator Weicker. Now, the July 6 telephone conversation as I recall, 
this one emanated from the west coast, is that correct ? 

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. That is the one that I testified to in my statement. 

Senator Weicker. Do you have any understanding as to where the 
Marcli 23 phone call emanated from ? 

Mr. G ray . No, sir, I do not know. I do not know as of this day and 
maybe I do not know if my telephone logs would show on March 23. 
We can take a look but I do not know of my own independent recol- 
lection right now. 

Senator Weicker. But you do recall the nature of the conversation. 
It was. No. 1, to buck you up in relation to your confirmation hearings, 
and having done that, the President turned to you and said, “You will 
remember, Pat — our previous conversation? 55 

Mr. Gray. No; he just said, “You will remember, Pat, I told you to 
conduct a thorough and aggressive investigation." 

My daily log, which was presented before this committee, for Fri- 
day, March 23, 1973, shows that at 1 :11 p.m., on that day “Presi- 
dent Nixon telephoned and spoke to Mr. Gray. 55 That would indicate 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-17 


( 245 ) 




5.3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY 3 AUGUST g, 1973, 9 SSC 3489-91, 2506-07 

3491 

L to me that that telephone conversation was made in Washington, since 
there is no reference at all to San Clemente or Key Biscayne and nor- 
mally the people who kept this log would make such references. 

Senator Whicker. Now, Mr. Gray, I would like to move along, if we 
can, to the events of April, more specifically those events which com- 
menced with your telling me of the burning of the files in your office on 
April 25. I think that lias been gone into in detail. If there is anything 
you want to add, any further question, I am sure they will develop 
that, but I would like to move from April 25 to the afternoon of April 
26 and have you recount to the committee in your own words what 
transpired in the late afternoon of April 26. 

Mr. Gray. Well, Senator Weicker, it was after 6 o’clock in the eve- 
ning when I was leaving and I believe it to be somewhere between 6 :15 
and 6 :30 and I was driving out the gate and the police officer there, of 
the G5A security force, Officer Cousin, whom I used to say hello to 
every night as we drove out, exchanging a few pleasantries, said to me 
that Mr. Petersen had called and it is urgent and you are to call him 
right away, and I got out of my car and I walked into the guard booth 
there and I telephoned Mr. Petersen and Mr. Petersen said that he had 
had a call from the Attorney General, Attorney General Kleindienst, 
and Attorney General Kleindienst wanted to meet with us in his office 
at T p.m, Mr. Petersen said he was calling from the golf course and was 
coming in directly from the golf course and it was about the stories 
and rumors that were on the media circuit that the files had been 
burned. And I said, fine, I will go back up to my office and wait a 
while, and I asked my driver, Special Agent Thomas Mote, who is also 
a good friend of mine, to park the car and wait for me, and I went on 
up to the office and at about 7 :15 p.m. I walked over to the Attorney 
General’s office and I found the main door locked and I walked to 
what we call an alcove door that leads almost directly into his own 
private office and I can remember pulling out my key and the door was 
open. I did not have to use my key. And I walked right in, walked 
through the conference room, walked into the secretary’s area and 
picked up the phone, called Mr. Petersen and told him that I was here 
in the Attorney General’s office and just then the Attorney General 
walked in — I could hear his footsteps — and I told Mr. Petersen the 
Attorney General walked in, come on up, and I went back immediately 
and the Attorney General said to me the President had called him and 
is concerned about the reports that these files were burned and that we 
had to meet and make some recommmendation to the President. 

By then Mr. Petersen had come up. We both sat in chair's in front 
of the Attorney General’s desk and I told them that I had spoken with 
you. I did not say to them that you had talked to the press, even though 
you had told me that you did. You said to me you are probably going 
to be the angriest man in the world at me for talking to the press and 
I told you, no, you ought to be the angriest man in the world at me. 

I did not say that you had given this information to the press but I 
said I believe that Senator Weicker knows all about this because I have 
spoken to him. 

Then Mr. Kleindienst said let’s have a drink. [Laughter.] And Mr. 

Petersen and Mr. Kleindienst and I all went into a little private office 
off of his main office and Mr. Kleindienst fixed a drink for himself 
and Mr. Petersen and I do not drink and I just sat there in an over-' 


( 246 ) 



PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY 3 AUGUST 6> 1973, 9 SSC 3489-91 y 3506-07 


3506 

Senator Inouye. In all the years that you have served in the Navy, 
did any superior officer request of you an illegal act? 

Mr. Gray. That is a pretty broad question, Senator Inouye, and I 
am trying to think very hard. I am thinking of some wartime opera- 
tions and thinking of some of the things we did. They could be classed 
as illegal, perhaps. And I am thinking particularly when I commanded 
a submarine during the Korean war. But 

Senator Inouye. And you followed those orders implicitly without 
questioning? 

Mr. Gray. Well, you know, Senator Inouye, you are getting me to 
the point where I am going to have to tell you what those orders are 
and those are very, very sensitive orders. 

Senator Inouye. What I am trying to say, did you feel a bit strange 
that the President was requesting you to do something which was 
rather illegal ? 

Mr. Gray. No, I haven’t testified that the President was requesting 
me to do that. That hasn’t been the thrust of my testimony. 

Senator Inouye. You have testified that you had assumed that the 
orders had come from the Chief Executive ? 

Mr. Gray. That I assumed that these men are acting within the 
color of their office and within their authority, absolutely there is no 
question about that. 

Senator Inouye. And you didn’t think it was strange for the Pres- 
ident through his subordinates to ask you to commit an illegal act? 

Mr. Gray. I think that I may have testified earlier that if I had 
stopped then and there and said, I want in writing from the Presi- 
dent of the United States to do this, that I wouldn't have gotten it; 
but I didn’t have that thought at that- tin*, Senator Inouye; there 
was no reason for me to have that tho^lit at that time, I was not that 
suspicious. 

Senator Inouye. Was this the practice that has been referred to as 
deniability ? 

Mr. Gray. Sir, I don’t know because I don’t know about that prac- 
tice of deniability, I know what it refers to, I know it refers to earlier 
testimony here, but I had never heard that utilized within the Depart- 
ment of Justice. 

Senator Inouye. Now, on March 23 of this year you had a conver- 
sation, a telephone conversation with the President. And you have 
just testified that when the President said, u Pat, remember, I told you 
to conduct a thorough investigation,” you said you had an eerie feeling. 

What did you mean by that? 

Mr. Gray. Yes, I thought he was trying to put chat on the record, 
so to speak, i*elating all the way back to the July 6 conversation. 

Senator Inouye. Are you suggesting that the President was putting 
this on tape? 

Mr. Gray. You know, at the time, Senator Inouye, I didn’t know 
that these conversations were being taped but, nevertheless, I had that 
eerie feeling that the President is reminding me of something and 
why. That was my reaction. But at that time I didn't know that these 
were on tape. 

Senator Inouye. Further elaborate on the eerie feeling. 

Mr. Gray. Sir? 

Senator Inouye. Can you further elaborate on the eerie feeling? 


( 247 ) 



5.3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY , AUGUST 6, 1973 3 9 SSC 3489-91, 3506-07 


3507 

Mr. Gray. No, it was just that I had the feeling that I was being 
reminded of something and the only thing that I could think of was 
the July 6 telephone conversation. 

Senator Ixotjye. You said reminding you of something to place it 
on the record. Is that what you said ? 

Mr. Gray. Yes. 

Senator Ixotjye. And what came to your mind at that point ? 

Mr. Gray. The prior conversation that the President had had with 
jne. 

Senator Ixotjye. I have just one final question. 

This may sound like a very ridiculous question, but three articles 
hare been written suggesting that the December 8 plane crash in Mid- 
way Airport in Chicago was not just an ordinary plane crash, and that 
there were some insidious activities involved. 

People have suggested that there were certain passengers with cya- 
nide in their system and that the FBI had refused to investigate this. 

Are you aware of these articles ? 

Mr. Gray. I hesitate to say “No 55 to you because I may have read of 
them, but when you say, Senator, “cyanide in their system,” I am quite 
sure I haven't read of that one and I am equally certain that there was 
no refusal on my part as acting director of the FBI to investigate 
that. I don’t know that the matter did come up. I would have to check 
to see whether or not a request was made. 

Senator Ixotjye. Did you request that the Midway crash 

Mr. Gray. Did I ? Did the FBI ? I do not know. I cannot answer that 
question. Usually a crash like that is investigated first- bv, it is my 
understanding that it is investigated first by the National Transporta- 
tion Safety Board but I would have to check FBI records to see 

Senator Ixotjye. Wasn’t the FBI a bit curious when one of the pas- 
senger's happened to be Mrs. E. Howard Hunt with $100 bills in her 
possession? 

Mr. Gray. I don’t know whether the FBI was a bit curious or not. 
Tcan’t really answer -that question. 

Senator Ixotjye. It was on the front pages of most of the papers of 
the United States. 

Mr. Gray. I realize that. I am aware of that. And the only thing I 
can say to you is at that period of time I was still hospitalized in Con- 
necticut and I don’t know whether a directive came over for the FBI 
to interview or not interview. I really don’t. 

Senator Ixotjye. Now, you riffled through these papers, I just 
wanted to give you time to think about this. Can you recollect as to the 
contents of those other papers in the Hunt file ? 

Mr. Gray. The only recollection I have of those. Senator Inouye, is 
that they were onion skin copies of correspondence, that is whatthey 
appeared to be to me. 

Senator Ixotjye. After reading the Diem cablegram you were not 
curious about the other papers ? 

Mr. Gray. No, sir; I was not and I did not read them or I would 
testify today to you what was in them. I wish I could. If I may I would 
like to correct one thing at least in my testimony. You know when I 
took that action I didn’t consider that to be an illegal action at the 
inception or at the end, Senator Inouye, on my part, and I still don’t. 


( 248 ) 



6. On March 23, 1973 the President met with H. R. Haldeman in Key 

Biscayne, Florida from 1:25 to 1:45 p.m. and from 2:00 to 6:30 p.m. 
Haldeman has testified that on March 23 the President told him that he 
had been informed about the McCord letter and its contents, and that 
the President asked Haldeman to call Charles Colson to ask if Colson 
had ever offered Howard Hunt clemency or had any conversation with 
Hunt about clemency. Haldeman telephoned Colson some time before 
2:15 p.m. on March 23 and asked what commitment Colson had made to 
Howard Hunt with respect to the commutation of his sentence. Colson 
reported to Haldeman on this matter. Immediately after this conver- 
sation Colson dictated a memorandum of the conversation for the file. 
Colson's memorandum states, in part, that he told Haldeman that he 
made no representations nor used any one else's name in the conversation 
that he had only told Hunt's lawyer that as long as he was around he 
would do anything he could to help Hunt. Colson's memorandum states 
that Haldeman asked what would happen if Hunt "blew" and that Colson 
replied that "it would be very bad" and that Hunt "would say things 
that would be very damaging." Colson's memorandum states that Haldeman 
replied, "then we can’t let that happen." 


Page 


6.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and H. R. Haldeman, March 23, 1973 (received from 
White House) 250 

6.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC 3075-76 251 

6.3 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for 

delivery to the SSC, September 1973, 1, 41-43 253 

6.4 Memorandum for the file from Charles Colson, March 

23, 1973 (received from SSC) 257 


( 249 ) 



6. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND H.R . HALDEMAN, 
MARCH 2Z, 1973 

•H. R . I laid e man -53- 


March 20, 1973 

AM 10:47 12:10PM President met with Haldeman 

Ehrlichman 11:40 - 12:10- 


PM 

6:00 

7:10 

President met with Haldeman 



March 21, 1973 




AM 

10:05 

11:55 

President met with Haldeman 






John Dean 

10:12 - 

11:55 

PM 

3:02 

3:03 

President received local call from Haldeman 


3:05 

3:45 

President met with Haldeman 




5:20 

6:01 

President met with Haldeman 






Ziegler 

4:53 - 

5:25 




Dean 

5:20 - 

6:01 




Ehrlichman 

5:25 - 

6:01 




Scowcroft 

5:27 - 

6:05 


6:25 

6:30 

President placed local call to Haldeman 

V 


March 22, 1973 


*01542 

AM 

8:44 

9:03 

President attended a briefing on foreign 





and domestic policy for members of the 





Sub -Cabinet and commissioned WH Staff 





members -- Haldeman attended 




9:08 

9:09 

President received local call from Haldeman 


9:11 

10:35 

President met with Haldeman 



PM 

2:01 

3:40 

President met with Haldeman 






De an 

1:57 - 

3:43 




Phrlichman 

2:00 - 

3:40 




Mitchell 

2:01 - 

3:43 

March 23, 1973 




PM 

1:10 


President placed local call to Haldeman 



1:25 

1:45 

President met with Haldeman 




2:00 

6:30 

President met with Haldeman 






Ziegle r 

3:25 - 

6:30 


» . , ’<• 
I • 

l ; '1 


:: r 

v 4 :i 

H 


( 250 ) 


g . 2 H.E. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY , JULY 31, 1973 , 8 SSC 3075-76 


3075 

^ r - Thompson. And he told that to the President, too, as best you 
can remember? 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes, I think he did. 

And then he, I believe, said that his concern, as far as the White 
House was concerned, as far as the White House was involved in the 
pre-June 17 area, was in two possibilities. One, that there had been a 
phone call from Colson to Magruder which could have been con- 
sidered or could he construed as pressure by Colson on Magruder to 
go ahead with this project. He, I do not think, went into any real 
specifics on that, and the other point was the question of whether 
Haldeman had seen the, as he called them, I think, the fruits of the 
bugging activity, because it was his understanding that the fruits had 
been sent to Strachan. 

Mr. Thompson-. What was the basis of his understanding ? 

Mr. Haldeman. I do not know that he identified a basis, I do not 
recall that he did. I think he simply said it. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he at any time subsequent to that talk to you 
about where he was getting his information, where he got his infor- 
mation, that you possibly might have seen the fruits of some of this 
surveillance activity? 

Mr. Haldeman. I think at that veiy — it is hard to put this into 
when, but he had told me that Magruder had told him that he had 
sent bugging material to Strachan. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he tell you that Strachan had said anything 
to him about his receiving such material? 

Mr. Haldeman. No; the only recollection I have as far as Strachan 
is concerned, is that he had consistently said that he had not received 
such material. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. Does that pretty well cover the pre-June 
17 discussion? 

Mr. Haldeman. Those two points were basically it, as far as pre- 
June 17. F 

Mr. Thompson. What about post- June 17? 

Mr. Haldeman. Post- June 17, lie said that there were also two areas 
of concern. That one was clemency and the other was money, and in 
the clemency area where he felt there was a potential problem was 
this— the fact that, as he put it, at that time, as best I can recall, Colson 
had talked with Hunt or Bittman about clemency. There had been a 
conversation, I do not think he went any further than that, I do not 
think he asserted that there had been any offer or anything of that sort, 
simply that there had been a conversation. 

Mr. Thompson. Was there any mention at any time, either in your 
presence or out of your presence that you heard from the tape, about 
Colson’s offering Hunt Executive clemency, or possibly relaying a 
message that he could expect it through someone else? 

Mr. Haldeman. Well, there was in the sense that on March 23 when 
I got to Key Biscayne, the President had gone down the day before, 
the President called me over to his house- and he then having read the 
McCord letter — he had not read it but had been given, had been told 
of the reading of the McCord letter, and the allegations that were 
contained in that, had raised the point with me that here we were 
with new ongoing developments on the Watergate and the White 


( 251 ) 



g,2 H.R, HALDEMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 31, 1973 , g SSC 3075-76 


3076 

House was still not moving ahead to get this thing cleared up, and 
he had picked up facts from Dean and he had information from Dean 
that he was concerned about, and he specifically asked me to call 
Colson and to ask him about this question of whether he had offered 
lemency or had any conversation regarding clemency with Hunt. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. All of this that you have been relating, 
is from the tape, as I understand it? 

Mr. Haldeman. No; no, sir, not by March 23 has nothing to do 
with it. 

Mr. Thompson. I am sorry, I am not talking about March 23; I 
will just jump back a little bit. 

Mr. Haldeman. Yes; anything that I am talking about in terms 
of the March 21 meeting in the morning is— — 

Mr. Thompson. From the tape? 

Mr. Haldeman [continuing]. Is of necessity from the tape, yes. 

Mr, Thompson. You are talking about a personal conversation with 
the President on the 23d? 

Mr. Haldeman. That is right. You asked if there had been any 
conversation after that. 

Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Haldeman. Of course, there wasn’t— - I don’t recall any con- 
versation after that in the March 21 meeting if that is what you meant 
and I am sorry, I didn’t understand that to be your question. 

Mr. Thompson. What about during the 21st meeting? 

Mr. Haldeman. I am sorry, about what? 

Mr. Thompson: Was there any mention at any time in the 21st meet- 
ing which you participated in or part of the meeting which you did 
not, of the general subject matter of Colson, or anyone else, having 
offered Hunt Executive clemency ? 

Mr. Haldeman. That is the point I just said. Dean did report to the 
President that one of his two post- June 17 concerns was clemency, 
and that in that regard the reason for his concern was that it was his 
understanding that Colson had talked with Hunt or with Bittman 
about clemency. 

Mr. Thompson. All right. 

The discussion of the 23d, of course, followed that, along the same 
line? 

Haldeman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. You have already mentioned the so-called blackmail 
point that was discussed. 

Mr. Haldeman. That is right, which was cited as an example of 
the problem of money. 

He also — -that was the most recent example — he did describe to the 
President some background in the sense of money for defendants, that 
there, had been an effort, in fact, money had been obtained and pro- 
vided to the defendants, and I am virtually certain that he said that 
this was for legal fees. In other words, let me put it the other way, 
I do not recall in that meeting either when I was there or at any time 
prior to when I came in, but what I heard from the tape, any reference 
to money being supplied for defendants’ silence. 

Mr. Thompson. But only what you have related. 

What did you hear on the tape concerning the Ellsberg matter? 


( 252 ) 




6.3 CHARLES COLSON DRAFT STATEMENT^ SSC, SEPTEWER , 1973, 1, 41-43 


Op ening; Statement of Charles W. Colson 
Before Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, United States Senate 


I appreciate the opportunity to present this opening 
statement to your Committee. I shall first attempt to the best 
of my recollection to recount ay knowledge of the events 
surrounding the Watergate Affair. 

I will also attempt, if I may, to give this Committee 
some insight into the mood and atmosphere which existed in 
the White House during the Nixon years. I have followed your 
proceedings to date; it is clear that you are seeking to deter- 
mine not only what in fact happened, hut why and how these 
© 

things could have happened. 

AS TO THE FACTS: 


I first heard that there had been a burglary at the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters on the radio. It 
was Saturday, June 17, 1972. I thought it was no more than 
ordinary burglary -- one more addition to the D„ C. crime 


an 


( 253 ) 



6.3 CHARLES 'COLSON DRAFT STATEMENT, SSC, SETTEmEB, 2973, 1 , 41-43 

41. 

probably leam I had recommended to the President the 
appointment of an independent special counsel, I would 
rather have him hear it directly from me. I therefore 
told him of the recommendation. 

Mr. Dean has testified before this Committee that 
he was on that day very disappointed that the President had 
decided, as he put it, not to act. ( Yet his response to 
me that evening was that the appointment of a special counsel 
would "never work". He said the only way it could possibly 
work would be to have the special counsel"reporting to him", 
that is. Dean. I told John Dean that that would never work, that 
the President had to have a counsel who had not been involved 
in any way, who had no personal interest, and who was 
completely free to get all the facts and recommend whatever 
had to be done to clean up the mess. Mr. Dean's reaction to 
my proposal was not that of a man seeking a solution or a way 
for the President to get to the truth but rather the reaction 
of a man desperately seeking to retain control of the 
investigation. I now realize why Mr. Dean would not want 
an independent counsel appointed; he would have been exposed. 

On the next day, March 23, Bob Haldeman called to 
ask what representations I had made to Howard Hunt with 
respect to the commutation of his sentence. I told him 


( 254 ) 



g. g CHARLES' COLSON DRAFT STATEMENT, SSC^SEPTEMER, 1973, 1, 41-43 


42 . 


I had made no such representations, that I had not seen 
Hunt since before the Watergate, that I had seen his lawyer 
on two or three occasions, but no commitment of any kind 
had ever been made. I told him that I had met with Mr. 

Bittman in early January and had given only a general 
expression of sympathy, that I had assured Mr. Bittman I m 

would do anything I could to help Howard Hunt. I to*ld Mr. 
Haldeman further that I had written a memorandum to the file 
and had advised Messrs. Ehrlichman and Dean fully. 

He asked whether I had ever met McCord or had 
anything to do with him. I had not and told him so. 

Mr. Haldeman then asked me about the phone conversation 
I had had with Jeb Magruder in February of 1972. He said that 
Magruder was contending that he had been "ordered to get the 
operation started by you" or words to that effect. I told 
Bob that that was untrue, that I had never been able to order 
Magruder to do anything. I also said that it was strange 
that Jeb Magruder \«nild now be remembering the phone conver- 
sation, that it had never come up before, and that I doubted 
that Magruder honestly believed I was urging him to do anything 
with respect to Watergate or anything like it. I also explained 
to Mr, Haldeman that I had described this conversation in a 
memo to the file of June 20. I told him I had sent the 


( 255 ) 



£.3 CHARLES COLSON DRAFT ' STATEMENT , SS £ , SEPTEWER, 1973, 1 } 41-43 


memo to Mr. Dean on August 29 and Dean had told me to 
destroy it . 

We also discussed the question of executive privilege 
and the question of all White House aides voluntarily 
appearing before the Grand Jury. Mr. Haldeman said that 
he was concerned that the President not appear to be 
covering up. A copy of my memorandum to the file regarding 
this conversation with Mr. Haldeman has been furnished to 
the Committee staff. The more I reflected upon Mr. Haldeman' s 
question regarding my phone call to Magruder over a year 
earlier, the more apprehensive I became. Was someone now 
going to use this innocent call as a means for putting the 
blame on me? I had seen Magruder dozens of times since that 
call. He had never once mentioned it to me. No one had. Why 
now? 


I then phoned John Dean to ask him whether he was 
aware that Magruder was now alleging that I had urged him 
(Mr. Magruder) to approve the Watergate. I reminded Dean 
that I had sent him. Dean, in August 1972, a memo of the 
phone call. Mr. Dean asked me whether I had kept a copy 
of the memo and I told him I had. Dean then told me he 
had heard Magruder 's story, that I should pay no attention 


( 256 ) 



e.4 CHARLES COLSON MEMORANDUM. MARCH 23, 1 9 7A- 


March 23, 1973 
2:15 p. m. 


MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE 
FROM: CHARLES COLSON 


r5ob Haldeman just called and asked what representations I had 
made to Howard Hunt with respect to the commutation of his sentence. 

I told him that I had made no representation, that I had not seen 
Howard Hunt since the Watergate, that I had seen his lawyer twice, 
perhaps three times, at his lawyer's request {and at John Dean's 
request). Bob asked what I had told Bittman, and I simply said 
that I told him essentially that I considered myself Howard Hunt's 
friend, that I would do anything anytime that I possibly could for 
Howard. 

1 

Bob asked* .whether I told;Howard Hunt that his sentence v/ould be 
commuted before: Christmas and I said;noi that I had not, ..that his his 
lawyer had come to me and said Hunt :did not want- 16 £ 0 _lo j^il, -ill, 
that. .he was going;to jail, ‘ but didn't \vant. to. stays in jail beyond- the end end 
of this year. I told Bittman that I had noic.ontrol oyer that, that I ~r * 
couldn't make any representations in any respect, but that so long as -- * 

I was around, I would do anything I could to help Hunt, that I felt he 
had been punished enough and that he should not be subject to further 
punishment. I told Bob that I was very clear in what I had said to 
Bittman, that in fact I wrote it down as I was saying it so that*there 
would never be a misunderstanding, that I had made very explicit 
memoranda for the file and that I had advised Ehrlichman and Dean of 
the conversations since I had been asked by Dean to see Bittman. 

Bob asked whether I had ever used anyone else's name in the con- 
versation and I said no, that I had not. He asked whether Hunt might 
have the impression from my communication with Bittman that lie. Hunt, 
would not serve beyond the end of this year in prison and I said that he 
might well have drawn whatever conclusions he wanted to from my 
having said that I would do anything I could to help him, having said that- 
in response to the specific point that Hunt did not want fco serve beyond the 
end of the year. However, Bittman, in my conversations with him, under 
stood fully that I was not in a posiLion to say* anything more explicit than 
what 1 did say. 


NfrlKAJL • 


5 ^ 

- /*),'/' < - 7 i / 




( 257 ) 



6.4 CHARLES COLSON MEMORANDUM* MARCH 23 3 1973 

haldcman asi;l whether I had ever met McC^-d or had anything to 
do with McCord and I said no. He asked whether i ad ever made any 
representations to McCord and I said no. I explained that I had made 
no representations direct or indirect to anyone. Bob again asked 
whether Hunt could get the impression from what I said that he might 
be out before the end of the year and my answer was that Hunt could 
get any impression he wanted from the fact that I ha'd stated I was his 
friend and that I would help him in any way I could but that I was explicit 
in my recollection that I had not said anything that would give anyone 
any cause to have any specific understandings. In fact, there was no 
understanding. 


Bob asked whether I ever mentioned the fact that I had discussed 
this with anyone else and I said no, I nad not, although in fact X did 
discuss it with Dean and Ehrlichman. 


Bob then asked me what would happen if Hunt "blew”. I said I thought 
it would be very bad, that from what I knew he would say things that would 
he very damaging. Bob said, "then we can’t let that happen". I told Bob 
that I did not knew how much Howard Hunt knew first hand, but that he had 


said things in one conversation with me (recording of which I have} and had 
said things to Shapiro and apparently Bittman, that would be highly incrim- 
inating, that this was one reason that acting on Shapiro's advice, I had 
nothing to do^with Hunt or. his lawyer over the past two weeks and have 
stayed out of any contact between Hunt;or. anyone else, ro. 


Bob then asked me about .a -phord conversation Lhad with Jeb Magruder. 
I told him'precisely how’I remembered the conversation; that Hunt; and \Lidd 
had come in my office one night, unannounced, that it was sometime: in. > 
January *or February (I could not remember when), that Hunt told me 
Liddy had been across the street, had some excellent plans* and ideas for 
intelligence and countcr-intelligcncc, bxit that he hadn't been able to get 
anyone to approve his plans. They started to explain what the plan was 
and I told them that I wasn't interested, that this was not my area, that 
I didn't want to get involved or spend the time, but that I would call 
Magruder and ask him to see them. I told Haldcman that I had called 
Magruder and asked Mag ruder to advise them, that is. Hunt and Biddy, 
or specifically Biddy, whether he was going to be used in the campaign or 
not. Biddy's position was that "if I*m just going to be sitting around, I 
don't want to waste my time:; I have some ith^as of how I can be helpful, 
but I don't want to just sit and waste time at the Committee". Magruder 


( 258 ) 



6.4 CHARLES COLSON MEMORANDUM m MARCH 2Z> 1973 


3 - 


assured me that he would see that their plan was considered and that he 
would attend to it. 1 explained to Jcb that I wasn’t advocating their plan 
because I didn’t know what it was, but that Hunt was a good man and if 
they had some ideas that ought to be explored and used, that they should 
have an opportunity to talk to someone that could cither authorize them, 
to do something or not. Haldeman said that may not be the way Mag ruder 
remembers the conversation. Magruder, he said, seems to think that he 
was told to get their operation started by Colson. I told Haldeman that I 
had never been abl • to order Magruder to do anything- 

I also did not urge him to do anything other than to let L#iddy make a 
presentation of w ha lever his ideas were and in fact I specifically did not 
endorse them because I didn’t know what the proposals were- I asked 
Bob whether he knew whether Magruder had any different recollection 
and he said no, but hi-, had reason to think that he might* . . . 

I explained to Boh that Magruder didn’t even remember the conversation,, 
that I had written a memorandum right after the Watergate of* everything I 
could remember and in it I had that phone conversation- When I showed 
the memo to . John Dean,. Dean said, in effect: ."don’t show that to anyone 
because Magruder. does, not ever. Temember.your calling and injact,ahask&s .* , 
already testified!; -John told me,;. the ref ore - ,, not to leave the mem or lying* ing 
around and not to use it because it might impeach Magruder* s; testimony.- ny. 

I told Bob therefore that I was confident that Magruder either ‘didn't 
remember the conversation or if he did now, certainly wasn’t remembering 
it very accurately. 

Haldeman went on to say that the reason for his call was the question before 
the House, i.e. , should all White House aides volunteer immediately to go 
before the Grand Jury waiving all privilege. I told Bob if we did that we 
would in turn be waiving all privilege before the Hill and that we would end 
up in my opinion worse off, particularly since the Grand Jury has no rules 
of evidence, than if we simply continued to adhere to a sound position, on 
executive privilege. 


Bob said he was concerned that the President not appear to be covering 
up. T told Bob that I didn’t think the President had done so. 

Bob asked me in the conversation with Magruder whether I had said I 
wa s calli ng t a : iy i * : 1 r. o ’ s Ire cl ion. and I said no, that I realize th e 
gravamen o: his ouosiiou which was, had I used the President’s name and the 
answer. was obviously no since I never did that and since the particular call, 
in any event, had not arisen out: of anything that luid come up with the President* 






7. According to Colson's memorandum to the file regarding the 

telephone conversation between Colson and Haldeman described in the 
preceding paragraph, Haldeman also questioned Colson about a telephone 
conversation Colson had had with Magruder. Colson reported to Haldeman 
that one night in January or February 1972 Hunt and Liddy had come to 
Colson's office, and Hunt had stated that Liddy had some excellent plans 
and ideas for intelligence and counterintelligence which he had not 
been able to have approved at CRP. Colson told Haldeman that without 
learning of the details of the plan or endorsing the plan, Colson had 
telephoned Magruder, had asked Magruder to advise Liddy whether he 
was going to be used in the campaign, and had told Magruder that Hunt 
was a good man and that his ideas should be considered. Colson told 
Haldeman that Magruder had assured Colson that the plan would be con- 
sidered. Haldeman told Colson that Magruder might not remember the 
conversation the same way and that Magruder thought Colson had told 
him to start Liddy's operation. Haldeman also told Colson that the 
reason for Haldeman 's call was to help decide whether all White House 
aides should volunteer immediately to go before the Grand Jury waiving 
all privilege. Haldeman said he was concerned that the President not 
appear to be covering up. 


Page 

7.1 Memorandum for the file from Charles Colson, 

March 23, 1973 (received from SSC) 262 

See Book I, Tab 6 for additional evidence regarding 
Colson's 1972 telephone conversation with Magruder. 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-18 


( 261 ) 




7,1 CHARLES COLSON MEMORANDUM, MARCH 23, 1973 

March 23, 1973 
2:15 p. m. 


MEMORANDUM FOR THE FIDE 
FROM: CHARLES COLSON 

Bob Haldeman just called and asked what representations* I had 
made to Howard Hunt with respect to the commutation of his sentence. 

I told him that I had made no representation, that I had not seen 
Howard Hunt since the Watergate, that I had seen his lawyer twice, 
perhaps three times, at his lawyer’s request (and at John Dean’s 
request). Bob asked what I had told Bittman, and I simply said 
that I told him essentially that I considered myself Howard Hunt*s 
friend, that I would do anything anytime that I possibly could for 
Howard. 

Bob asked whether I told .Howard Hunt that his sentence v/ould be 
commuted. before; Christmas and I said.- no; that* I had not, that his his 
lawyer had come to me and said-th^t Hunt : did not want 16 to jail, ^;l, - 
that. he was going;to jail/ but didn’t want.to. stay-in jail beyond- the en jdcr.d 
of this year. I told Bittman that I had noicontrol over that,. : .that 1 
couldn’t make any representations in any respect, but that so long as 
I was around, I would do anything I could to help Hunt, that I felt he ' 
had been punished enough and that he should not be subject to further 
punishment. I told 3ob that I was very clear in what I had said to 
Bittman, that in fact I wrote it down as I was saying it so that*thei\e 
would never be a misunderstanding, that I had made vex*y explicit 
memoranda for the file and that I had advised Ehrlichman and Dean of 
the conversations since I had been asked by Dean to see Bittman. 

Bob asked whether I had ever used anyone else’s name in the con- 
versation and I said no, that I had not. He asked whether Hunt might 
have the impression from my communication with Bittman that he. Hunt, 
would not serve beyond the end of this year in prison and I said that be 
might well have drawn whatever conclusions he wanted to from my 
having said that I would do anything I could to help him, having said that- 
in response to the specific point that Hunt did not want to serve beyond the 
end of the year. However, Bittman, in my conversations with him, under 
stood fully that I was not in a position to say anything more explicit than 
what I did say. 


N/Hlgcl '■ 


y^/V/ 


( 262 ) 



7 A CHARLES COLSON MEMORANDUM t MARCH 2Z> 197Z 
Haldcman ask ( whether I had ever met Mc.Cp“d or had anything to 
do with McCord and E said no. He asked whether i. ad ever made any 
representations to McCord and 1 said no. I explained thaL I had made 
no representations direct or indirect to anyone*: Bob again asked 

whether Hunt could get the impression from. what I said that he might 
be out before the end of the year and my answer was that Hunt could 
get any impression he wanted from the fact that I ha'd stated I was his 
friend and that I would help him in any way I could but that I was explicit 
in my recollection that I had not said anything that would give anyone 
any cause to have any specific understandings. In fact, there was no 
understanding. 


r 


Bob asked whether I ever mentioned the fact that I had discussed 
this with anyone else and I said no, I had not, although in fact I did 
discuss it with Dean and Ehrlichman. 


Bob then asked me what would happen if Hunt "blew". I said I thought 
it would be very bad, that frem what I knew he would say things that would 
very damaging. Bob said, "then v/e can't let that happen 11 . I told Bob 
that I did not know how much Howard Hunt knew firsjt hand, but that he had 
said things in one conversation with me (recoi'ding of which I have) and had 
said things to Shapiro and apparently Dittman, that would be highly incrim- 
inating, that this was one reason that acting on Shapiro's advice, I had 
nothing to do^with Hunt or. his lawyer over the past two weeks and have 
stayed out. of any contact between Hunt ; or. anyone else... sc. 


Boo then asked ‘me about. 4- phono conversation I 'had with Jeb Mlagr.uder.^ 
I told him ‘precisely how M remembered the. conversation; that Hunt-land rJbiddy 
had come in my office one night, unannounced, that it was sometime: f — 
January or February (I could not remember when), that Hunt told me 
Liddy had been across the street, had some excellent plans* and ideas for 
intelligence and counter-intelligence , but that he hadn’t been able to get 
anyone to approve his plans. They started to explain wliat the plan was 
and I told them that I wasn't interested, that this was not my area, that 
I didn't want to get involved or spend the time, but that I would call 
Magrudcr and ask him to see them. I told Haldcman that I had called 
Magrudcr and asked Magrudcr to advise them, that is. Hunt and Liddy, 
or specifically Liddy, whether he was going to be used in the campaign or 
not. Liddy* s posiLion was that "if I’m just going to be sitting around, I 
don't want to waste my I have some ideas of how I can be helpful, 

but I don't want to just sit and waste time at the Committee". Magrudcr 


( 263 ) 



7,1 CHARLES COLSOfl MEMORANDUM, MARCH 23 , 1973 


3 . 


assured me that he would see that their plan was' considered and that he 
would attend to it. 1 explained to Jcb that I wasn’t advocating their plan 
because I didn’t know what it was, but that Hunt was a good man and if 
they had some ideas that ought to be explored and used, that they should 
have an opportunity to talk to someone that could either authorize them 
to do something or not. Haldeman said that may not be the way Magruder 
remembers the conversation. Magruder, he said, seems to think that he 
was told to get their operation started by Colson. I told HaHeman that I 
had never been abl * to order Magruder to do anything. 

I also did not uige him to do anything other than to let Liddy make a 
presentation of whatever his ideas were and in fact I specifically did not 
endorse them because I didn’t know what the proposals were. I asked 
Bob whether he knew whether Magruder had any different recollection 
and he said no, but hi-, had reason to think that he might. 

I explained to Boh that Magruder didn’t even remember the conversation*, 
that I had written a memorandum right after the Watergate of- everything I 
could remember and in it I had that phone conversation. When I showed 
the memo to . John Dean,. Dean said, in effect: .’’don’t show that to anyone 
because. Magruder. does, not ever, remember/your calling and In&ct/ahashas . 
already testified;;: John told me, xthe ref ore',- not to leave the me mot lying -ing. 
around and not to use it because it might impeach Magruder' s; testimony*- ny. 

I told Bob therefore that I was confident that Magruder either 'didn't 

remember the conversation or if he did now, certainly wasn’t remembering 
> 

it very accurately. 

Haldeman went on to say that the reason for his call was. the question before 
the House, i.e. , should all White Hoxise aides volunteer immediately to go 
before the Grand Jury waiving all privilege. I told Bob if we did that we 
would in turn be waiving all privilege before the Hill and that we would end 
up in my opinion worse oil, particularly since the Grand Jury has no rules 
of evidence, than if we simply continued to adhere to a sound position, on 
executive privilege. 

Bob said he was concerned that the President not appear to be covering 
up. T told Bob that I didn't think the President had done so. 

Bob asked me in the conversation with Magruder whether I had said I 
was calling M any tine disc’s dire cl ion and I s ai d no, that I realize the 
^ ftiviirucn oi Ins ciuestiun which was, had I used the President's name and the 

O 

answer. was obviously no since I never did that and since the particular call, 
in any event, had not arisen out of anything that liud come up with the President. 


( 264 ) 



8. On the afternoon of March 23, 1973 Dean and his wife went to 

Camp David, Maryland. The White House compilation of meetings and 
conversations between the President and John Dean indicate that the 
President spoke by telephone with Dean at Camp David from 3:28 to 3:44 
p.m. Dean has testified that after the operator said that the President 
was calling Haldeman came on the line and said that while Dean was at 
Camp David he should spend some time writing a report on everything he 
knew about Watergate. Dean has testified that when he asked whether 
the report was for internal or public use Haldeman said that would be 
decided later. Haldeman has testified that Dean had been told to write 
a report prior to the time he left for Camp David. 


Page 


8.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1002-03 266 

8.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901 268 

8.3 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John Dean, March 23, 1973 (received from White 
House) 269 


( 265 ) 


8A JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUN E 25, 1973, Z SSC 1002 r 03_ 

m2 

/ . ' 

Senator Bakers staff was very desirous of a meeting to gee guidance. 
It was at this point that the President calied the Attorney General 
and told him that he should get up to meet wish Senator Baker as 
soon as possible and get some ox these problems regarding cxecutivo 
privilege and the turning of documents over resolved with the com- 
mittee immediately. After the conversation with the Attorney General, 
there was a continued discussion of how to deal with the Enin corn- 
mittee. I asked the President to excuse me from the meeting for: a. 
moment because I was working with Ziegler on a response to a state- 
ment that Gray had made. The President asked me what that was. 
about and I then explained to him about Gray’s statement. I told him 
what Gray had said, and I also told him what the facts were. He ex- T 
cused me to use the telephone in his office and said that I should get . 
that resolved as quickly as possible. . - ■_ 

When I returned to the conversation with the President. Mitchell, 
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, they were still talking about dealing witlr 
the Ervin committee. The President told me that the White House 
should start directly dealing with the committee and that I should go 
up and commence discussions with Senator Ervin as to the parameters 
of executive privilege. 

I told the President that I did not think this would be wise because 
I was very much the party in issue with regard to the Judiciary Com- 
mittee hearings and that it would be unwise for me to go to the Hill 
and negotiate my own situation. The President agreed and Ehrlich- 
man said that he would commence discussions. 

The meeting was almost exclusively on the subject of how the White 
House should posture itself vis-a-vis the Ervin committee hearings. 
There was absolutely no indication of any changed attitude and it was 
like one of many, many meetings I had been in before, in which the 
talk was of strategies for dealing with the hearings rather than any 
effort to get the truth out as to what had happened both before June 
17 and after J ime 17. 

Following this meeting with the President, it was apparent to me 
that I had failed in turning the President around on this subject, but 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman began taking over with regard to deal- 
ing with a new problem, which had become John Dean, as they were 
aware of the fact that I was very unhappy about the situation. 

Trip to Camp Davtd 

I On Friday morning, March 23, my house was surrounded by camera 
jerews as a result of Gray’s statement the day before, that I had 
Improbably lied.” Accordingly, I decided to wait until the camera c-'uws- 
departed before going to the office. It was midmornincr when Paul 
O’Brien called to tell me about Judge Sirica’s reading McCord's letter 
in open court. O'Brien gave me the high points of the letter as they 
had been reported to him by someone from the courthouse. He also 
told me that McCord had onlv hearsay knowledge. I then called 
Ehrlichman to tell him about it. He said he had a copy of the letter and 
read it to me. I asked him how he received a copy so quickly. 

He responded : "It just came floating into my office." He asked me 
what I thought about it and I t Id him I was no* surprised at all 
and repeated to him what O'Brien had told me that McCord pmbablv 
had only hearsay knowledge. He asked me if I was in my office and 


( 266 ) 



5.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973 a 3 SSC 1002-03 

1003 

I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in 
shortly. 

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Re- 
ferring to our meeting on March 21 and McCord’s letter. he said: 
‘‘Well, John, you were right in your prediction.^ He then suggested 
I go up to Camp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct 
me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, "take your 
wife, and get some relaxation.' 7 He then alluded to the fact that I had 
been under 

Senator Ervin. I will have to depart because I have less than 5 
minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the 
Olympics. 
fRecess.] 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurry along but I 
stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in 
the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and 
one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest 
of time. If you do not mind you might continue now. 

Mr. Dean. Thank you, Senator. 

He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense 
pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you 
cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking 
at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we 
are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him 
I would go. 

My wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we 
entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing. 
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldoman came on 
the phone ; Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some 
time writing a report on everything I knew r*bont the Watergate. I 
said I would do sc. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. 

L He s aid that would be decided later. 

I spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this 
entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations 
I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement 
in the coverup. I did not know about Haldeman, but I assumed that 
he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the 
President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I 
should step forward because there was no way the situation was going 
to get better — rather, it could only get worse. My most difficult prob- 
lem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the 
President. I had no answer, because I felt once I came forward the 
matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to 
decide. I finally concluded that I would have to think of some way for 
the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened 
to evervbodv else. 

T called Mr. Moore and talked with him about it. We talked about 
a Presidential speech, where the President would really lay the facts 
out ; we talked about immunity for everyone involved : we talked about 
a special Warren-typo commission that would put the facts out: we 
talked about some half measures that might satisfy the public interest ; 
but we both realized that nothing less than the truth wouM sell. As T 
mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked about some of these con- 


( 267 ) 


i 


8.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY Z0 3 1973 , 7 SSC 2901 


2901 

over the following week, regarding the White House staff going to the 
Senate committee without executive privilege; but more importantly, 
regarding the assignment to John Dean to prepare a full and complete 
report on all of the facts of the matter. After the March 22 meeting in 

r the afternoon, the President left for Key Biscayne. The rest of us 
remained in Washington. I went to Key Biscayne the next morning to 
join the President for the weekend. John Dean went home to write his 
report, but found that he was besieged by reporters as a result of the 
Pat Gray allegation that he had lied, and so the President, in talking to 
him on the phone the next day, suggested that he go to Camp David 
where he would be free from the press and would have an uninter- 
rupted opportunity to get his report prepared. I am convinced that 
there was a discussion of Dean writing a report, and that when w'e left 
the meeting on the afternoon of the 22d it was clear in all of our minds 
that that was Dean’s assignment and that he was expected to do so over 
the next couple of days. 

( CAMP DAVID 

Over the weekend that Dean was at Camp David I had several 
p hone conversations with him. There was a story that Dean and Ma- 
gruder knew about the bugging and that was a matter of concern 
to Dean with which he was dealing. He had obviously been working 
on the report he was supposed to be preparing and perhaps talking 
to people. He seemed now to feel that Magruder was definitely in- 
volved. He gave that indication, which he had given before, on the 
phone. He was not at all sure about whether or not Mitchell was 
involved. 

On the 26th, I had a long phone call with Dean. It is interesting 
^because he said there was no communication on that day of any 
significance. 

I had called Dean — this is on the 26th — to ask if he would have 
any problem if the President announced that day that he was request- 
ing that Dean be called to the grand jury without immunity, and 
I specified that because in the earlier discussions Dean had made the 
point of immunity. Dean said, “No, I would have no problem with 
that.” Then he said, “I have been working on this whole thing and 
trying to analyze what our problems are.” 

He said there is a problem with Magruder regarding the planning 
meetings, because apparently he has testified as to the number of meet- 
ings and the content of the meetings and his testimony was different 
than what mine would be if I went to the grand jury now. He said 
there was only one meeting, and it was for the purpose of discussing 
campaign spending laws; while, in fact, there were two meetings and 
they w r ere for the purpose of discussing intelligence presentations 
by Liddy. 

He said, “In looking over this whole thing, there are several areas 
of concern.. One is the blackmail area. Blackmail started way back.” 
This was the first time he spelled this out to me. Mitchell was hit 
by Parkinson or O’Brien, who were hit by Bittman, who was hit 
by Hunt, who had been hit by the defendants saying that they needed 
money and if they did not get it they were going to cause trouble. 
It was not spelled out much more than that, I do not think. 


( 268 ) 



8.3 


/arch 21, 


MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 
MARCH 23, 1973 

a % . : 


1973 



TEE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN > 

N. 


AM 10:1.2 


11:55 


President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Kaldcxnan was also present for at least 
part of the time. 


PM 5:20 

6:01 

Pres id e r» t me t with M r . Dean in the President's 
EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman . . iron 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) 
l/^Oan. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 

1973 


PM 1:57 

3:43 

President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 
EOB Office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 

Mr. Haldeman- (2:01-3:40) 

Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 

March 23, 

1973 


PM 12:44 

1:02 

President talked' long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in 'Washington, D. C.) 

3:28 

3:44 

President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp David, Md* ) 



No contact during 

the period April 1-14 


April 15, 1973 


PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the Presidents 

EOB Office. 


.March 22: Deleted 

f s 


(Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the Presidents 
staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 
the President attended from S:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not c on f i r rn a cl o n this brief! ng . ) 


( 269 ) 




9 . 


Between March 23 and March 28, 1973 John Dean stayed at Camp 
David and attempted to prepare a report on matters relating to the 
break-in at the DNC headquarters and the investigation of the break-in. 
A draft of portions of a report was prepared by Dean, and partially 
typed. It related certain events before and after the Watergate 
break-in. The draft report made no reference to Dean f s meetings with 
the President or to any statements or actions by the President. Dean 
has testified that during his stay at Camp David he decided that he 
would have to think of some way for the President to get out in front 
of the matter and that, during a telephone conversation with Haldeman, 
he discussed the creation of an independent Warren-type commission. On 
March 28, 1973 Haldeman called Dean and requested that he return to 
Washington to meet with Mitchell and Magruder. 


Page 


9.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1003-06.... 272 

9.2 John Dean testimony, SSC Executive Session, June 

16, 1973, 132-35 276 

9.3 John Dean Camp David report, SSC Exhibit No. 

34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93 280 


( 271 ) 



9.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973 3 3 SSC 100Z-06 

1003 

I informed him that I was a prisoner of the press and would be in 
shortly. 

After my conversation with Ehrlichman, the President called. Re* 
ferring to our meeting on March 21 and McCord's letter, he said: 
“Well, John, you were right in your prediction.” He then suggested 
I go up to (."amp David and analyze the situation. He did not instruct 
me to write a report, rather he said to go to Camp David, u take your 
wife, and get some relaxation.” He then alluded to the fact that I had 
been under 

Senator Ervt>\ I will have to depart because I have less than 5 
minutes to get over there. This is good training for running in the 
Olympics. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dean, we are not trying to hurry along but I 
stayed on the floor of the Senate until this rollcall began because in 
the last short rollcall vote Senator Weicker and I missed the vote and 
one or two others did, and so we are going to interchange in the interest 
of time. If you do not mind you might continue now. 

Mr. Dean. Thank you, Senator. 

He then alluded to the fact that I had been under some rather intense 
pressure lately, but he had been through this all his life and you 
cannot let it get to you. He said that he was able to do his best thinking 
at Camp David, and I should get some rest and then assess where we 
are and where we go from here and report back to him. I told him 
I would go. 

My wife and I arrived at Camp David in the midafternoon. As we 
entered the cabin in which we were staying, the phone was ringing. 
The operator said it was the President calling but Haldeman came on 
the phone. Haldeman said that while I was there I should spend some 
time writing a report on everything I knew about the Watergate. I 
said I would do so. I asked him if it was for internal use or public use. 

^^He said that would be decided later. 

m ^ im . £ spent the rest of the day and the next day thinking about this 
entire matter. I reached the conclusion, based on earlier conversations 
I had with Ehrlichman, that he would never admit to his involvement 
in the coverup. I did not know about Haldeman, but I assumed that 
he would not because he would believe it a higher duty to protect the 
President. The more I thought about it the more I realized that I 
should step forward because there was no way the situation was going 
to get better — rather, it could only get worse. My most difficult prob- 
lem was how I could end this mess without mortally wounding the 
President. I had no answer, because I felt once I came forward the 
matter would be for the American people to decide, and not for me to 
decide. I finally concluded that I would have to think of some way for 
the President to get out in front of the matter, despite what happened 
to everybody else. 

T called Mr. Moore and talked with him about it. Wc talked about 
a Presidential speech, where the President would really lay the facts 
out; we talked about immunity for everyone involved : we talked about 
a special Warren-tvpe commission that would put the foots out: we 
talked about some half measures that might satisfy the public interest : 
but we both realized that not lung less than the truth won Id sell. As T 
mentioned earlier, Moore and I had talked about some of these eon- 


( 272 ) 



9. 1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973 , 3 SSC 1003-06 

1004 

cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that 
would bring the full truth out because of the criminal implications 
of the behavior of those involved. 

On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing 
a report. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sunday, and Mon- 
day reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to 
come to Camp David, bring certain documents that I had requested, 
and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to 
reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or 
even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing 
my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day. 

On Sunday evening, March 25, 1 was informed that the Los Angeles 
Times and the Washington Post were going to print a story that Ma- 
gruder and I had prior knowledge of the June IT bugging of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do 
today. Upon learning that the story was going to be printed, I contacted 
an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We dis- 
cussed the matter. . He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to 
preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr. 
Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk 
with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about some- 
one who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning to take 
certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking 
at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable 
criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone in- 
volved — from the President on down — to get independent advice on 
what I should do. 

On Monday morning, March 26, I had a conversation with Halde- 
man about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was pre- 
pared to file a libel suit and had retained a lawyer to put the newspapers 
on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17 
Watergate break-in in advance, that my knowledge of the entire mat- 
ter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell's office. I told Haldeman 
that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not 
know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact 
that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape 
his conversation. 

I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver. 
I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation 
to the committee; the long and short of this conversation was that 
Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a i; bum 
rap” for me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in. 

[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34-40.*] 

Mr. Deax. My secretary arrived at Camp David on Monday after- 
noon and began typing the report. On Monday night, I had given addi- 
tional thought to how the President might get out in front of this 
matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I 
called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems, 
and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it 
might solve the awful problem. J have submitted to the committee a 
copy of my notes outlining my concept. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34—41.**] 


•Soe p. 1258. 
**Seo p. 1261. 


( 273 ) 



9 ,1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 2S 3 1973, 3 SSC 1003-06 


1005 

Mr. Deax. In brief, the President would create an independent 
panel — that would be investigator, prosecutor, and judge and jury for 
everyone involved. It would have the power to remove officials from 
office, levy fines, and impose criminal sanctions. It was designed to give 
every man a fair and full hearing, and proceed in a manner where 
people would not be tried publicly. 

Finally, after all the facts were in, the panel would render its judg- 
ments on the individuals involved and report to the public, I might 
note that if the special prosecutor and this committee were merged, 
made independent, and proceeded in camera, it would be very close to 
the concept I had proposed back on March 26. 

Moore liked the idea and suggested I call Haldeman, which I did. 
He was intrigued, but not overwhelmed. It was becoming increasingly 
clear that no one involved was willing to stand up and account for 
themselves. 

After I had read in the newspaper on Tuesday, March 27, that the 
President had called me on Monday morning, March 26 — which he had 
not — and expressed great confidence in me and the fact that I had not 
had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee. I decided to attempt to contact Mr. Liddy, who was the one 
man who could document the fact that we never had talked about his 
plans following the February 4 meeting in Mitchell’s office. I called 
Paul O’Brien and asked him how I could get in contact with Mr. 
Maroulis, Mr. Liddy’s attorney. O'Brien gave me Maroulis’ phone 
number, but told me I could not reach him until late in the afternoon, 

I called Mr. Maroulis about 5 :30 and asked him if I might get some 
sort of sworn statement from Liddy regarding my lack of prior 
knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. I 
told him of the two meetings in Mitchell’s office, and that Mr. Liddy 
and I never talked about his plans after the second meeting. To this 
day, I am convinced that if and when Mr. Liddy ever talks, he will tell 
the truth as he knows it. I was hopeful that he would give me some 
sort of an affidavit attesting to the facts, but his lawyer was concerned 
about his fifth amendment problems. 

Mr. Maroulis called me back on March 29 after I had returned from 
Camp David, after he had talked with Mr. Liddy. I requested O’Brien 
to make a memorandum of the call, as he was with Mr. Maroulis when 
he made the call. I have submitted to the committee a copy of this docu- 
ment in which Maroulis advised me his client could not make such a 
statement because it might result in a waiver of his fifth amendment 
privileges, that to give such a statement could be detrimental to others, 
but Liddy did wish to convey that his reasons for not providing such a 
statement was not because he disagreed with the facts, but because of 
the advice of counsel. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-42.*] 

Mr. Deax. It was the day before I received this call, March 28, that 
Haldeman had called me at Camp David and requested that I return to 
Washington. He told me that he was meeting with Mitchell and 
Magruder and that they wished to meet with me. I told Haldeman that 
I really did not wish to meet with Mitchell and Magruder* but he was 
insistent that I return and meet with them. I returned from Camp 
David about 3 :30 and went directly to Haldemairs office. He told me 


•See p. 1262. 



9,1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY y JUNE 25, 1973 , 3 SSC 1003-06 

1006 


that Mitchell and Magruder were waiting in another office for me. I 
asked him why they wanted to talk to me and he said that they wanted 
to talk to me about my knowledge of the meetings in Mitchell’s office. 
I told Haldeman that they were noth aware of the situation and I was 
not going to lie if asked about those meetings. Haldeman said that he 
did not want to get into it, but I should go in and work it out with 
Mitchell and Magruder. 

Before discussing the meetings with Mitchell and Magruder, I feel 
I should comment on my reaction to the discussion I had just had with 
Mr. Haldeman. Knowing how freely and openly he had discussed 
matters in the past, I could tell that he was back-peddling fast. That 
he was now in the process of uninvolving himself, but keeping others 
involved. This was a clear sign to me that Mr. Haldeman was not 
going to come forward and help end this problem, rather, he was begin- 
ning to protect his flanks. It was my reaction to this meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman and his evident changed attitude, and my earlier dealings 
with Ehrlichman where he had told me how I should handle various 
areas of my testimony should I be called before the grand jury, that 
made me decide not to turn over to them the report I had written at 
Camp David. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the Camp 
David report, part of which was typed by my secretary at Camp David 
and the remainder in longhand, which I had not put in final narrative 
form before I was called back to Washington. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-13.*] 


Meeting With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder 

Mr. Dean. After departing Mr. Haldeman’s office, I went to meet 
with Mitchell and Magruder. After an exchange of pleasantries, they 
told me they wished to talk to me about how I would handle any testi- 
monial appearances regarding the January 27 and February 4 meetings 
which had occurred in Mitchell’s office. I told them that we had been 
through this before and they knew well my understanding of the facts 
as they had occurred at that time. Mitchell indicated that if I so testi- 
fied, it could cause problems. Magruder then raised the fact that I had 
previously agreed, in an earlier meeting, that I would follow the testi- 
monial approach they had taken before the grand jury. 

I told them I recalled the meeting. -Magruder then said that it had 
been I who had suggested that the meetings be treated as dealing 
exclusively with the election law and that explained my presence. At 
this point in time, I decided I did not wish to get into a debate regard- 
ing that meeting. They both repeated to me that if I testified other 
than they had it would only cause problems. I said I understood that*. 
I told them that there was no certainty that I would be called before 
the grand jury or the Senate committee and that if I were called, I 
might invoke executive privilege, so the question of my testimony 
was still moot. I did not want to discuss the subject further so I tried 
to move them off of it. They were obviously both disappointed that I 
was being reluctant in agreeing to continue to perpetuate their earlier 
testimony. 

The only other matter of any substance that came up during that 
meeting was when I made the point that I had never asked Mitchell 


•See p. 1263. 


( 275 ) 



9.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY^ JUNE 16, 197 Z, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION > 132-35 

132 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


I asked him, "What does that mean", that is w h en I was asked 
to write this written Dean Report. And I said that at this 
time I would suspect that the Grand Jury would reopen, and the 
whole situation would change. 

Mr. Dash. After the election? 

Mr. Dean. After the election. 

Mr. Dash. Before the trial? 

Mr. Dean. Before the trial. I said it was very likely 
that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Mitchell, Dean, and the 
like, would be fighting indictments. 

Mr. Thompson. Who did you tell this to? 

Mr. Dean. To Haldeman. He said, "That doesn’t seem like 
a very viable option, does it", and I said, "Well, I’m ready 
to stand up at any time, and it’s an option that we ought to 
continue to presume. 

Mr. Shaffer. Can we go off the record? 

(Discussion off the record) 

r — * . Thompson. If we can go to the 23rd, that is when you 
went to Camp David? 

Mr. Dean. Right. 

Mr. Thompson. Can you tell us how that came about? 

Mr. Dean. Well, as I said, the President called me shortly 
after I talked to Ehrlichman that morning — first of all, let 
me go back and tell you what happened that morning. That morning 
I received a call from Paul O’Brien and he said, "Are you aware 


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House Jtidiciarv Committee staff 


( 276 ) 



9.2 JOHN DEM TESTIMONY i JUNE 16, 1973, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION 132-3S_ 


Indistinct document retyped by 133 

House Judiciary Committee staff 

of what McCord did down in the Court Room”, and I said, ’’No". 

He said, "Well, I got a report from the Court House, and he 
wrote a letter", and he gave me the highlights of the letter. 

I then called Ehrlichman and asked if he was aware of what 
McCord had done down in the Courthouse, and he said, "Yes". 

I said, "As a matter of fact, I f ve got a copy of the letter, 
and how did it get here so quickly", and he said, "Well, it 
just sort of floated in here", and I didn’t pursue it. 

He said, "Well, what does it mean to you", and I said, 

"Well, I don’t know"; from my conversation with O’Brien, he 
said that he felt that McCord had a lot of hearsay knowledge, 
and that would be all, and I reported that back to Ehrlichman. 

That was about the sum and substance of the conversation. 

Then, I was still surrounded by the press, and he asked 
me if I w T as in my office, and I said, "No, I’m still surrounded 
by the press", I would wait until they departed. 

Then I had a call from the President, and he said to me - 
he had said that on several other occasions - that I ought to 
come up to Camp David and take a break; he said nothing about 
a report, or anything like that. 

So, I called back and asked Higby how you arrange to go 
to Camp David, Higby or someone else, I’m not sure who it was; 
the President had suggested that I go up there, and I wanted lo 
find out how the arrangements were made. 

It was late afternoon when I got up there, and just a9 I 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-19 


(277) 




House Judiciary Committee staff 


walked in the cabin that I was staying in, I had a call. 

The phone was ringing, and they said it was the President 
talking. Well, it wasn't the President, it was Bob Haldeman 
on the line. The operator had said it was the President, but 
it was a call from the President’s office, but it was Bob 
Haldeman on the line. He said, ’’While you are up there, what 
you ought to do is sit down and write a report of all your 
knolwedge of this whole thing”. 

I said, "Fine, I’ll be happy to”, so I spent the next 
couple of days reconstructing, and making some notes; and 
thinking about the whole situation. 

Mr. Thompson, Did he say what the purpose was for which 
the report was going to be prepared? 

Mr. Dean. I think at one point I said, "Is this an 
internal document , or a public document" , and he said , ”we 
haven’t decided yet. 

Mr. Thompson. Did it depend how it turned out? 

Mr. Dean. Well, he didn’t say that to me. He said, "Just 
rough this out, and then we’ll see." So, I started — first 
of all I started to reconstruct what happened over the period 
of a year, and I began writing sort of a "soft" document that 
didn’t cause anybody any problems. When I got to Haldeman 
and Strachan I didn’t write anything, exactly as I had planned 
because I was only speculating, I left that blank. I knew 
something had happened. 


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( 278 ) 



9.2 JOHN DEM TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 16, 1973 M SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION 3 132-35 
Indistinct document retyped by 

House Judiciary Committee staff 135 

I wrote about the fund-raising by Kalmbach, and the use 
of the 350, and the executive clemency, and those sorts of 
things. I tried to reconstruct the whole picture, the high- 
lights of everything I could remember by doing it. 

While I was up at Camp David I also had several discussions 
with Dick Moore about, you know, how do we and this thing; and 
at one point in time came up with an idea how a special panel 
might be appointed by the President, whereby anybody involved 
in any way would go before that panel. 

Mr. Thompson. Sort of a Warren Commission type of thing? 

Mr. Dean. Sort of a Warren Commission type thing, but 
giving them the power of prosecutor, judge, jury, executioner, 
sort of a special prosecutor in a Senate Committee, as a 
matter of fact; and everybody that was in any way involved would 
go before this panel, and do it in an in camera manner so that 
the rights of the individuals would be protected, and they 
would get a fair hearing , and everybody would come forward , 
subject to this panel. I had notes on this, that I’ll submit 
also. Moore liked it, and he said, "Why don't you run that 
by Haldeman" . 

Mr. Thompson. Notes on this proposal, or notes on the 
report? 

Mr. Dean. I've got both. In fact, on Monday I had my 
secretary come up and start typing; she came up and started 
typing it. I was still writing. I hadn't gotten everything 

Indistinct document retyped by” 

House Judiciary Committee staff 


( 279 ) 




3.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT t SSC EXHIBIT NO, 34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93 


Exhibit No. 34-43 

Pre June 17th 

(I) White House involvement and Knowledge of Liddy’s Intelligence Operation 
at CRHP. 

During the entire first four years of the administration the President had 
been subjected to mass demonstrations relating to the war in Vietnam. I do n ot 
remember exactly when, but believe it was in June or July of 1971, that HRH 
asked me to make a recommendation as to how the Re-Election Committee should 
handle the problem of demonstrators. HRH raised this with me, because one of 
my White House responsibilities has been to keep informed regarding potential 
demonstrations that might affect the President. I had been involved in this area 
while at the DOJ and when I went to the White House my office served as a 
liaison office for metropolitan police/FBI/DOJ and SS intelligence regarding 
demonstrations. 

Haldeman and Ehrlichman have always been critical of the insufficiency and 
weakness in the intelligence that has been provided to the White House by 
various federal agencies regarding demonstration activities. The intelligence 
always seemed to be too little and too late. While the evidence would appear 
that the demonstrations were well orchestrated and well financed, no one could 
every [sic] find hard information as to who was behind it and what motivation 
might exist other than the obvious anti- war theme. 

The demonstrations were having a dual impact on the President First it made 
the atmosphere of public opinion much more difficult for the President to negoti- 
ate an honorable peace in Vietnam and secondly, when the government dealt 
firmly with the demonstrators we would be charged with oppressive tactics even 
though the demonstrators were seeking to tie the government into knots. 

There were several efforts to improve the government’s ability to gather in- 
telligence regarding demonstrations, but these efforts really never accomplished 
much. For example, before I came to the White House, a study group headed 
by Tom Huston had re-examined the entire structure of the domestic intelligence 
security operation, but the plan that was ultimately developed by the study 
group was vetoed by Hoover because of the fact that it would have involved the 
FBI assuming less than a dominant position in the intelligence community. A 
compromise arrangement was worked out with Hoover to establish within the 
Department of Justice a coordinating team of all the domestic intelligence 
agencies but the product was less than satisfactory and often the newspapers 
appeared to have more information than the intelligence gatherers. 

When Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations he would — 
and rightly so — express continual dissatisfaction. I assume it was because of the 
weaknesses of the government system that Haldeman urged that consideration 
be given to the campaign committee developing its own capability to deal with 
demonstrators in the forthcoming Presidential campaign. Not only did we expect 
problems for Presidential anoearances, but U was also felt that the demonstrators 
would seek to cause extremely serious problems for the Republican 1972 Conven- 
tion with the aim of creating a similar situation as that which occurred at the 
1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. 

It was suggested that the person who head up this operation be a lawyer who 
could also serve as general counsel to the Committee and it was not anticipated 
that the intelligence operation would be a particularly consuming activity. Jeb 
Magruder indicated to me that he would like to have my Deputy Counsel, Mr. 
Fred Fielding, assume the position of General Counsel and the man to be con- 
cerned with demonstrations and security. I discussed the matter with Fielding, 
but we agreed that it would handicap my office’s operations greatly if he were to 
leave the office during the chaos of a campaign year. I informed Magruder that 
I could not let Fielding go, because I couldn’t get along without him. Magruder 
then asked if I would recommend some other lawyer who could fill the function. 

I next discussed this with Bud Krogh because Bud is a lawyer and had had 
responsibility for demonstrations prior to my arrival at the White House. I 
suggested that David Young, who worked for Bud, might make an excellent 

(1263) 


( 280 ) 



9.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT. SSC EXHIBIT NO. 34-43, 3 SSC 1263 - 9 3. 


1264 

man for the job, but Krogh informal me that it was not feasible because Young 
was too busy on the declassification project. Krogh did, however, suggest Gordon 
Liddy as a man who could do the job. He told me that Liddy was a fine lawyer, 
had prepared some excellent legal documents for him and that he was a fast 
study on the law, and he was quite confident that he would quickly grasp the 
campaign laws. Krogh also told me that Liddy had an FBI background and 
assumed that his background with the FBI would qualify him for dealing with 
the demonstration problems during the campaign. Krogh informed me that he 
would have to check with Ehrlichman before he signed off on his recommendation 
which he did and after that I informed Mitcheell [sic] and Magruder that I had a 
recommendation. 

I frankly do not recall if I explained the job to Liddy or if Bud Krogh explained 
the job to Liddy. However, I do recall that I informed Liddy that one phase of 
the position would involve his tracking on domestic intelligence regarding dem- 
onstrations and the threat of demonstrators to the Republican Convention. I 
informed him that I was not an expert in intelligence and did not have any idea 
how such operations were conducted, but he assured me that he was familiar with 
intelligence gathering and would be able to handle the post. I arranged for John 
Mitchell to meet with Gordon Liddy on November 24, 1971, for a job interview. I 
attended the meeting and attached is a agenda that Liddy had prepared for the 
meeting and passed out at the meeting. As I recall the meeting, it was a normal 
job interview type meeting in which Mitchell asked Liddy about his background 
and his knowledge of the election laws. I had already informed Liddy that I 
would do everything possible to assist him in becoming familiar with the election 
laws, including the new election law, the passage of which was imminent. 

Liddy thought I could be very helpful to him in getting geared up with regard 
to the election laws, that they were complex, that they must be followed to the 
letter. I do not recall any discussion of intelligence operations at this meeting 
other than the fact that Liddy said lie would put together the plan for Mr. 
Mitchell’s approval. The interview also involved discussions in some detail 
regarding salary and title, which were agreed upon but I am unable to recall the 
specific salary although I do recall Mitchell agreed that Liddy should be called 
the General Counsel. 

After this meeting, I recall that Magruder requested that I bring Liddy over 
for an interview with him in that Mitchell had said to him that he would have 
the final say as to whether or not Liddy was acceptable to him because he was 
the person who would have the working relationship with Liddy. I explained 
this to Liddy and Magruder asked that we come over on Friday, December 8, 
1972 (?) at which time Magruder interviewed Liddy also. Again, there was no 
discussion of Liddy’s intelligence responsibilities other than Jeb’s expressed 
"concern regarding the demonstration threat to the Convention. Liddy indicated 
that he thought he could be helpful in getting information regarding demonstra- 
tors for Magruder and that he would draw up a plan. At that meeting Magruder 
agreed to hire Liddy and asked him to start as quickly as possible. 

The next contact that I had with Liddy was through a man in my office, 
David Wilson, who I had instructed to provide Liddy with all background mate- 
rial on the election laws and to tell Liddy some of the areas that he should have 
particular concern with. 

On January — r, 1972, Magruder requested that I attend a meeting in Mitchell’s 
office with Gordon Liddy. At the time I went to the meeting, I had no idea of 
the subject matter to be discussed, but when we were going over to the meeting 
together, I learned that Gordon was going to present his proposal for an intel- 
ligence operation. Liddy had prepared a series of charts to explain his plan but 
I frankly had some trouble following it as Mitchell later told me he did, because 
all of the operation* were in unusual code names. However, I do recall c orae of 
the items that were in the plan. I recall that it called for a $1 million budget, 
and included such recommended capacities as the ability to kidnap demon- 
stration leaders in an effort to throw the demonstrators into disarray, strong 
arm teams, teams to infiltrate operations with demonstrators, and the ability 
to conduct, what Liddy called the most sophisticated electronic surveillance in the 
world. The plan also set forth how convention security could be handled, and 
general security for other aspects of the campaign to deal with demonstrators. 

As the plan was unfolded I felt sorry for Liddy because he thought he was 
providing the answers for the intelligence needs, but I knew that John Mitchell 
would never agree to any such proposal or plan. I didn’t know how Mitchell 
would turn it off, but knowing John Mitchell, I knew he would not blast Liddy 


( 281 ) 



9.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93 

1265 

out of the room, rather would subtly tell him that this was not what he had in 
mind. In fact, the meeting terminated with Mitchell telling Liddy that this is 
not what he had in mind, that it was a little exhorbitant, and more extensive 
than anything, that .would be needed. Liddy said that he understood and would 
provide another plan. 

After the meeting, I talked with both Mitchell and Haldeman and Magruder 
and informed them that such a plan was disaster. I advised Jeb that he had 
better guide Liddy before the matter goes further. 

On January — , 1972, Jeb requested I attend another meeting with Mitchell and 
Liddy and himself. I had not at any time discussed this plan further with him, 
although I do recall him telling me that he was going to totally revise it. I 
arrived at this second meeting very late and Liddy was in the process of present- 
ing his revised plan. 

After sitting in the meeting for approximately 15 or so minutes and hearing 
the same sort of things starting to come out again, as have been contained in the 
earlier plan, I could see that Mitchell was very upset, but trying to maintain his 
composure. I must also say that I was frankly quite upset and decided that I had 
best interject myself into the matter in an effort to cut it off from any further 
discussion. I told Liddy and the others that the things that were being discussed 
here could not be discussed with a man who is the Attorney General of the 
United States and if there was going to be any intelligence operation, it would 
have to be taken up at another time. I felt that I got Mitchell off the spot without 
embarrassing Liddy who agreed that this* would be discussed sometime after 
Mitchell had come over to the Re-Election Committee. Again, I felt sorry for 
Liddy, and I felt no one had given him any guidance as to what was or was not 
expected of him, but I did not believe it was my role to get any further involved 
other than to attempt to stop what it saw developing. 

After the meeting, I informed Liddy that I could never discuss his intelligence 
operation with him further, and that he should not look for me for any guidance 
on the matter. I informed him that our dealings would have to be limited strictly 
to matters of election law and Liddy said he would honor that request. I never 
discussed the subject with Gordon Liddy again. 

Also, after that meeting, I informed Haldeman of what had transpired in 
Mitchell's office and the fact that I had interjected myself into the meeting in an 
effort to cut it off. I told Haldeman that I had informed Liddy that I would not 
discuss this subject with him further, and that if anything like this was develop- 
ing in the White House, I had to stay totally out of it. Haldeman fully agreed 
and told me that I should not become involved in any way with the Re-Election 
Committee intelligence operation and I never did. 

I never received any intelligence from the Re-Election Committee and I cannot 
recall ever providing the government intelligence regarding demonstrations to 
the Re-Election Committee, rather, I provided all such information directly to 
Haldeman via Strachan. I have no knowledge before the incident which occurred 
on June 17th, as to what was or was not done regarding Liddy’s intelligence 
gathering functions. And I never discussed -this subject with any other person 
at the Re-E’.ection Committee before June 17th. 

POST June 17th 

(1) The Dean Investigation 

I landed in San Francisco on June 18th, having been out of the country to 
give a speech on drug law enforcement. I called Fred Fielding of my office to 
check in and he informed me of the news story regarding the break in at the 
DXC headquarters. 

I arrived in Washington, D. C. late in the afternoon of June ISth and Fielding 
informed me that one of the men arrested had a letter with a check signed by 
Howard Hunt in his possession. I realized aLthat point that I would be asked 
to assemble all of the facts so that the White House could be fully informed as 
to whtft had transpired and how it might affect the President. Having been on 
an airplane for approximately 25 hours, I did nothing further than evening. 

On Monday morning, after reading all the news accounts of the incident, I 
spoke with John E. who instructed me to get the facts together and report to 
him. I called the A.G. to ask him what facts he knew and he said that both the 
metropolitan police and the FBI were investigating. He also told me that Gordon 
Luldy and Powell Moore had tracked him down on Sunday, June ISth. at Burning 
Tree CC and Liddv had said lie must talk with him about the man who had been 
arrested at the DXC. The A.G. said he refused to talk with Liddy about the 
matter. 


( 282 )' 


9.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT , SSC EXHIBIT NO. 34-43, 3 SSC 1263-93 


1266 

I then called Liddy and requested he come to my office. When he came over I 
suggested we take a walk. I asked him what he knew about the incident which 
had occurred at the DXC and he told me that this was his operation that had 
gone bad. He told me that he had been pushed into doing it, when he did not 
want to do it. He said that they had been in the DXC before and the bug they 
had placed in the DXC was not transmitting properly, so they were seeking to 
correct it. He also said that they had observed what appeared to be stolen 
classified documents in the DXC and had been instructed to make copies of them. 

I asked Liddy if anyone at the White House was involved and he told me no. 

I did not ask him who pushed him to do this, but he intimated it was Magruder. 

I did not question him further about the incident. 

Liddy also expressed concern for those who had been apprehended and I told 
him there was nothing I could do. He said he understood. He told me that he 
deeply regretted that the matter had occurred and he ifianned to remain totally 
silent. As we parted I remember he said you can count on me to be a soldier. 

I told him that I was trying to ascertain the seriousness of the problem — in that 
it was obviously a political bomb shell — -and that I would not have any further 
contact with him. He said lie understood and we parted. 

During the days and weeks that followed I discussed the incident with everyone 
who I thought might have any knowledge or involvement. Set forth below are the 
findings from these conversations. 

Chuck Colson 

Because of Colson’s relationship with Hunt, I thought he may have either 
knowledge or involvement in the matter, but Colson assured and reassured me 
that he had no involvement whatsoever. 

Colson told me that he was aware of the fact that Hunt was working with 
Liddy. He said that in late January — early February (?), 1972, Hunt and Liddy 
came by his office late one afternoon to visit him. He said that it was a casual 
“stop-by” type visit and during the course of their conversation Hunt and Liddy 
mentioned to Colson that they had an intelligence operation plan, but they could 
not get anyone at CREP to focus on it and sign off. Colson says that they em- 
plored upon him to call CREP to see if he could get some action. Colson stated 
that he called Magruder and told Magruder that he did know what Hunt and 
Liddy had for a plan, but they should not be left hanging. Someone should focus 
on it and make a decision one way or the other. 

Colson told me that the only time he requested Hunt to do anything for him 
after that was during the ITT hearings, when he requested Hunt to go to Denver 
to interview Dita Beard. Colson states that he wanted to know if Beard had 
really written the famous memo and decided to sent Hunt to find out. When Hunt 
was in "Colson’s office, Colson asked him how he was going to pay for the trip. 
Hunt then telephoned someone and said he needed $1,000 and solved the problem. 

Magruder has intimated to me that Colson had more involvement than Colson 
says. Magruder says that they let Liddy and Hunt proceed with their intelligence 
operation because Magruder was concerned that Colson might try to take over 
the operation himself and they did not w’ant Colson involved. However, Magruder 
feels that Colson was aware of everything Hunt and Liddy did and that Colson, 
in fact, gave Hunt assignments from time to time. Magruder says that the 
Brigham Young student — Gregory — was working for Hunt to get scheduling in- 
formation for Colson. Magruder says he had no use for such information, but 
Colson did. 

Magruder also says that he received more than one call from Colson telling 
him to approve the Hunt and Liddy intelligence operation, and it was Colson 
who was pushing to get something done. Colson denies this. 

Colson received a letter from Howard Hunt on — — (Attach- 

ment ^ ^ This letter would appear to indicate that Hunt is saying that 

Colson was not involved in the incident at the DXC headquarters. 

Colson received a telephone call from Howard Hunt on Dur- 

ing the course of that conversation Hunt states that Colson had nothing to do 
with the incident at the DXC headquarters. Colson recorded the conversation. 
(Attachment .) 

Colson has stated under oath on two occasions that he was not involved in 
the incident. These statements were contained in depositions — one for the federal 

grand jury investigation and the other (Attachment ) in connection 

with the civil lawsuit filed by the DNC. 


( 283 ) 



9.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT 3 SSC EXHIBIT NO , 34-4 3 3 3 SSC 1263-93 

1267 


JE 

I found that E had absolutely no knowledge regarding the intelligence opera- 
tions at the CREP. Bud Ivrogh had discussed with E that he was recommending 
Liddy to serve as General Counsel at the CREP and the fact that Liddy might 
also be given responsibilities for intelligence regarding demonstrations that 
would affect the campaign. However, E had. to the best of my inquiries, no 
knowledge of anything Liddy was engaged in after his departure from the 
Domestic Council staff. I also found that E had only incidental dealings with 
Liddy ^vhiie he was on the Domestic Counsel staff and knew of his work in the 
area of gun control, narcotics, and that he worked for David Young and Bud 
Krogh on the problem of leaks and matters relating to national security. 

E only recalls one occasion meeting with Howard Hunt, in connection with 
an interview Hunt had conducted with a former CIA operative and relating to 
a matter of national security. E was aware of the fact that Hunt had been 
placed on the White House staff as a consultant. Colson had recommended re- 
taining Hunt in connection with the Pentagon Papers matter and E — according 
to Colson — told Colson to place him on his (Colson’s) staff. 

Bud Krogh 

Krogh has testified twice under oath regarding his relationship with Liddy and 
Hunt. Once before the federal grand jury investigating the incident at the DXC 

headquarters, and once at his confirmation hearings (Attachment ). 

My independent inquiry confirmed that Krogh had absolutely no knowledge 
regarding any activities of Hunt or Liddy once they departed from the White 
House. When Krogh recommended Liddy to me as a person who would make 
an excellent General Counsel and as a person who could assist the CREP in 
keeping abreast of the problems that demonstrations might cause, the campaign, 
he told me that Liddy has an outstanding legal mind. He cited several examples 
of legal briefs Liddy had prepared and told me that he was confident that Liddy 
could quickly and thoroughly grasp the campaign laws 


( 284 ) 




9.3 JOHN DEAN REPORT , SSC EXHIBIT NO. 34-43. 3 SSC 1263-93 


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( 310 ) 




10. On March 26, 1973 the Los Angeles Times reported that James 

McCord had told Investigators for the Senate Select Committee that both 

John Dean and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the break-in at the 
DNC headquarters. On this same morning, H. R. Haldeman, who was with 
the President in Key Biscayne, Florida called Dean at Camp David. They 
discussed Dean's recollection of facts relating to the authorization 
of the Liddy Plan. Haldeman has testified that he asked Dean if he 
would have any problems if the President announced that day that he was 
requesting that Dean go to the grand jury without immunity; Dean replied 
that he would have no problem with appearing before the grand jury, but 

that his testimony concerning the number and purpose of the meetings 

among Dean, John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy and Magruder would conflict 
with the testimony previously given by Magruder; Dean stated that there 
were other areas of concern, such as payments to the defendants by 
Kalmbach, the $350,000, the Hunt threat, and Colson's talk about helping 
Hunt. Following his telephone call with Dean, Haldeman met with the 
President. Haldeman has testified that the President decided to drop 
his plan to announce that Dean would be requesting an appearance immedi- 
ately before the grand jury. Haldeman has testified that the problem was 
that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that point and it was 
not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury. 


( 311 ) 




Page 


10.1 Los Angeles Times , March 26, 1973, 1, 12 313 

10.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and H. R. Haldeman, March 26, 1973 (received from 

White House) 315 

10.3 H. R. Haldeman calendar, March 26, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 316 

10.4 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2901-2902 317 


( 312 ) 





John W. Dean ! 1 1 

irn shots 



Jeb Stuart Magruder 

TlrnM Bftsta 


Claims Political 
Pressure, Lying 
on Watergate 

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON 
and RONALD J. OSTROW 

Tlm*i StiH Wrttan 

\V A S H INGTOX — Convicted 
Watergate conspirator James \V\ 
McCord Jr. has told Senate investi- 
gators that White House counsel 
John W. Dean 1U and former pres- 
idential aide Jeb Stuart Magruder 
had prior knowledge of the bugging 
of Democratic National Committee 
headquarters last year. The Times 
Jgarned Sunday. 

McCord's accusations were made 
during private sessions Friday and 
Saturday with Samuel Dash, chief 
rounsel for the special Senate com- 
mittee investigating the Watergate 
case and related matters. 

Dean was the man named by Pres- 
ident Nixon last summer to conduct 
a separate Watergate investigation 
for the White House to learn if any 
Administration officials were in- 
volved. 

During the FBI’s investigation of 
the case. Dean also sat in on the 
questioning of White House person- 
nel. according to testimony of L. Pa- 
trick Gray III. acting FBI director. 

Will Give Documentation* 

Dash said Sunday in a news con- 
ference that McCord told him he 
would give the committee "doc- 
umentation and other information 
that will corroborate his testimony.* 


McCord, elaborating on a letter 
made public in court Friday in 
which he charged that political pres- 
sure marred iaauary *r 

Watergate trial told Dash that Ma- 
gruder perjured himself during the 
trial according to a source familiar 
with Ihe interviews. 

McCord said Magruder was not 
telling the truth when he dented ad- 
vance knowledge of the break-in at 
Democratic Headquarters in the 
Watergate complex last June IT. the 
source said. McCord said Magruder 
also should have named Dean as an- 
other having prior knowledge, the 
source said. 

Magruder. who was deputy direc- 
tor of President Nixon's reelection 
campaign, denied McCord's charges 
concerning him Sunday night. 

Claims No ’Prior Knowledge* 

"As I have stated before, and as 
has been stated by Mr. (John NA 
Mitchell (former attorney general 
and Nixon campaign director*, we 
did not have prior knowledge of the 
bugging.'* Magruder* said. 

"I have no idea about anyone out- 
side our committee. I cannot speak 
for John i Dean’ " 

Magruder is presently director of 
policy development for the Com- 
merce Department. 

Dean could not be reached for 
comment However, at the Florida 
White House. Gerald Warren, depn- 
tv press secretary, said: "We cate- 
gorically deny that Dean had any 
prior knowledge " 

McCord told Dash that Dean had 
knowledge of and was involved in 
preparations for the bugging. The 

Please Turn in Pus*# 1 C Crd. f 


( 313 ) 



10.1 LOS ANGELES TIMES 3 MARCH 26, 1973, 


• r^-2g«ai3gart2ft .'P 

McCord Says Pair j 

SCnaw of Watergate f 


Continued from Flrjt Fiji 
Times’ source aid. 

But McCord refused to 
provide the committee 
wjth further details pend- 
ing hla private meeting 
this week with Chief U.S. 
Dhft. Judge John J. Sirica, 
wjo delayed his sentenc- 
ing? last Friday .and urged 
McCord and other defend- 
ants to cooperate with the 
Senate committee and the 
federal grand jury. 

McCord faces a maxi- 
mum sentence of 45 years 
in prison and a $50,000 
fine. 

Charges Others 

McCord, the source said, 
charged that others be- 
sides Dean and Magruder 
had advance knowledge of 
the Watergate operation 
but told Dash he would 
supply their names later. 

Dash also said at Sun- 
day's press conference that 
he and another committee 
investigator had met with 
McCord and McCord had 
named other persons not 
yet prosecuted and added 
that he "will continue to." 

Although Dash declined 
to disclose any- informa- 
tion that McCord had sup- 
plied during their week- 
end sessions, he described 
the former GOP security 
director as "a very valua- 
ble witness.* 

Dash, a law professor 
with considerable exper- 
ience as a prosecutor and 
defense attorney, told 
newsmen he was ’’thor- 
oughly impressed with 
Mr. McCord's sincerity in 
giving us a full and honest 
disclosure." 

'Documentation' Pledge 

McCord, it was learned, 
abo told Dash that former 
White House consultant 
E. Howard Hunt Jr, who 
pleaded guilty a:! 
charge* against him rar'y 
in the Watergate *r-.! e\- 
- r? r r 4 , ''r. ’>.r 

’li .. a ' mi ' 


men told him that Hunt 
promised "executive cle- 
mency" and monthly pay- 
ments to them, the source 
said. McCord also claimed 
he was pressured himself 
to plead guilty but did not 
give further details, It was 
reported. 

Only McCord and G. 
Gordon Llddy, the Nixon 
campaign’s former finan- 
cial counsel, stood trial 
and were convicted. 

M c C o r d* s allegations 
- that Dean had advance 
knowledge of the bugging 
are likely to further com- 
plicate Senate confirma- 
tion of Gray as FBI direc- 
tor. 

Gray has testified at 
Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee hearings on his embat- 
tled nomination that he 
sent Dekn S2 FBI inter- 
view reports in the Water- 
gate investigation without 
telling Atty. Gen. Richard 
G. Kleindienst or anyone 
in the FBI. Gray also told 
the committee that Dean 
sat in on the FBI's ques- 
tioning of White House 
personnel. ? 

Gray said he took these 
actions because Dean re- 
quested them in line with 
his assignment from Pres- 
ident Nixon to ascertain 
whether any White House 
employes were involved in 
the Watergate affair. 

Testimony Invited 

The Judiciary Commit- 
tee invited Dean to testify, 
but the President’s coun- 
sel declined to appear, cit- 
ing executive privilege. 
He offered instead to an- 
swer written questions, 
but committee Democrats 
condemned the offer and 
r.o vote has been taken on 

Premier* X : \ * r. * ■-* 




-- 

Samuel Dash 


volved In the Watergate 
cases, a declaration the 
White House has repeated- 
ly Invoked. Mr. Nixon pre- 
sumably used these words 
because Hunt was a former 
White House consultant 
and Uddy was on the 
White House staff before 
moving to the reelection 
committee. 

:/$a$h, asked about Pres- 
ident Nixon's statement 
concerning presently em- 
ployed members of his ad- 
ministration; said: "l don't 
want to comment." 

Dash said McCord’s in- 
formation would not be 
made public until the com- 
mittee had time to confirm 
and corroborate it He said 
this probably would take 
. place at a public hearing, 
possibly as early as May. 

'McCord, according to 
Dash, intends to give in- 
. formation that would clear 
the names of some persons 
mentioned in news reports 


l t ' 12 

j cn tS* cue as weU as to 
, fr^ p o them 

McCord, fa ids inter- 
views with Dash and com- 
mittal investigator Harold 
Upset, dari fieri the state- 
mentis bis letter to Judge 
. dries that be did not feel 
c onfident in talking with 
the FBI. 

"He said be made that 
statement only because of 
the revelations at the Ju- 
diciary Committee hear- 
ings on the -confirmation 
of Mr. Gray — that Infor- 
mation obtained by Uie 
FBI in the Watergate in- 
vestigation was ^given to 
White House ofiidais,' 
Dash said.* 

McCord also told Dash 
that he feared any Infor- 
mation he might give the 
grand jury in the presence ’] 
of Justice Department : 
prosecutors 'would be 
made immediately availa- j 
ble to White House offl- i 
dais," Dash said. 

Dash said he would try j 
to contact lawyers for the 1 
other six defendants to- 
day. He said it was "un- 
derstandable" that they ! 
had not contacted him vet, 
because "some soul- 
searching has to take - 
place. 

Dash’s sessions with Mc- 
Cord, which each ran ; 
three hours and were tape- 
recorded, were conducted 
in the law office of Ber- 
nard Fensterwald, who 
was acting as substitute 
counsel for McCord. His 
regular lawyer. Gerald 
Alch, was out of town over 
the weekend.* 


( 314 ) 



10.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN TEE PRESIDENT AND H.R . HALDEMAN, 
MARCH 26, 1973 

H. K- Haldeman -59- 


March 24, 197 3 

AM 11:36 President placed local call to Haldeman 

PM 12:15 2:55 President met with Haldeman 


March 25, 1973 

AM 9:35 President placed local call to Haldeman 

10:10 1:05 President met with Haldeman 


March 26, 1973 


AM 

9:39 

10:15 

1:00PM 

President placed local call to Haldeman 
President met with Haldeman 

Ziegler 11:00 - 12:15 




PM 

1:15 

3:45 

President met with Haldeman 


Ziegler 3:10 - 3:11 


March 27, 1973 




AM 9:47 
11:35 


10:55 

1:30PM 


PM 4:20 5:20 

6:05 7:10 


March 28, 1973 


AM 

8:4 5 

9:00 

PM 

12:45 

1:45 


4:20 

4:40 


7:17 

7:32 


8:50 

9:09 


President met with Haldeman 
President met with Haldeman 

1:30 
11:40 
11:46 and 
1:17 

President met with Haldeman 


Ehrlichman 

Ziegler 

Bull 

President met with Haldeman 


11:10 

11:30 

11:45 

1:16 


President met with Haldeman 
President met with Haldeman 

Bull 1 : 1 6 - 1:17 

President met with Mr. Haldeman 
President placed local call to Haldeman 
President received local call from Haldeman 






( 315 ) 



«* ft 


20.3 H.R. HALDEMAN CALENDAR . MARCS 26, 197± 


A 



1973 APRIL 1973 


Monday, March 26 

85 


5 m r w t f s 

• 2 3 15 6 7 

8 9 10 II 12 13 ti 

15 16 17 I a 19 20 21 

22 23 2 * 23 26 27 23 

29 30 



( 816 ) 





2901 


over the following week, regarding the White House staff going to the 
Senate committee without executive privilege; but more importantly, 
regarding the assignment to John Dean to prepare a full and complete 
report on all of the facts of the matter. After the March 22 meeting in 
the afternoon, the President left for Key Biscayne. The rest of us 
remained in Washington. I went to Key Biscayne the next morning to 
join the President for the weekend. John Dean went home to write his 
report, but found that he was besieged by reporters as a result of the 
Pat Gray allegation that he had lied, and so the President, in talking to 
him on the phone the next day, suggested that he go to Camp David 
where he would be free from the press and would have an uninter- 
rupted opportunity to get his report prepared. I am convinced that 
there was a discussion of Dean writing a report, and that when we left 
the meeting on the afternoon of the 22d it was clear in all of our minds 
that that was Dean’s assignment and that he was expected to do so over 
the next couple of days. 

CAMP DAVID 

Over the weekend that Dean was at Camp David I had several 
phone conversations with him. There was a storj 7 that Dean and Ma- 
gruder knew about the bugging and that was a matter of concern 
to Dean with which he was dealing. He had obviously been working 
on the report he was supposed to be preparing and perhaps talking 
to people. He seemed now to feel that Magruder was definitely in- 
volved. He gave that indication, which he had given before, on the 
phone. He was not at all sure about whether or not Mitchell was 
involved. 

On the 26th, I had a long phone call with Dean. It is interesting 
because he said there was no communication on that day of any 
significance. 

I had called Dean — this is on the 26th — to ask if he would have 
any problem if the President announced that day that he was request- 
ing that Dean be called to the grand jury without immunity, and 
I specified that because in the earlier discussions Dean had made the 
point of immunity. Dean said, “No, I would have no problem with 
that.” Then he said, “I have been working on this whole thing and 
trying to analyze what our problems are.” 

He said there is a problem with Magruder regarding the planning 
meetings, because apparently he has testified as to the number of meet- 
ings and the content of the meetings and his testimony was different 
than what mine would be if I went to the grand jury now. He said 
there was only one meeting, and it was for the purpose of discussing 
campaign spending laws; while, in fact, there were two meetings and 
they were for the purpose of discussing intelligence presentations 
by Liddy. 

He said, “In looking over this whole thing, there are several areas 
of concern. One is the blackmail area. Blackmail started way back.” 
This was the first time he spelled this out to me. Mitchell was hit 
by Parkinson or O’Brien, who were hit by Bittrnan, who was hit 
by Hunt, who had been hit by the defendants saying that they needed 
money and if they did not get it they were going to cause trouble. 
It was not spelled out much more than that, I do not think. 


( 317 ) 



10.4 


H.R HALDEMAN TESTIMONY^ JULY 30 i 1973j, 7 SSC 2901-02 


2902 

Mitchell told Dean — this is Dean now recounting to me what his 
report apparently was showing — to tell Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
to get Kalmbach to raise the money and Dean did. Kalmbach raised 
some $70,000, which he ga,ve to LaRue. 

Then, we got to the question of the $350,000 and there was a problem 
there because the $22,000 was spent out of that and there was a 
problem of how to return it and account for the missing $22,000. 

Then there was the problem of blackmail to the White House 
directly. He said there were two instances of that, one — Mrs. Hunt 
called Colson’s secretary and said something about a demand for 
money. The other was Hunt’s the preceding week. 

Regarding clemency, he said Colson talked to Bittman. He did not 
make any commitment but told him he would help. 

He referred to a letter McCord had written to Caulfield requesting 
a meeting. Mitchell told Dean to have him see him and find out what 
he was up to. 

Another problem area was Dean’s delay in turning over the evidence 
in Hunt’s safe to the FBI. Another was a call Liddy had made to 
Krogh. Apparently, he had been given a brushoff by Krogh and that 
had made Liddy mad. 

Following that phone call, the President dropped his plan to an- 
nounce that Mr. Dean would be requesting an appearance immediately 
before the grand jury in order to lay out all the facts as he knew them. 
The problem was that Dean had not really sorted out the facts at that 
point and it was not appropriate for him to go to the grand jury. 

Dean has said in his testimony that there was no discussion in the 
March 26 phone call of his going to the grand jury — yet, that was the 
Reason for the call. 

In one of the phone calls from Camp David, I believe on the 27th, 
Dean told me that he had talked with Paul (TBrien who had told him 
Magruder had said that lie had gone ahead with the Watergate opera- 
tion on orders from Strachan, who said Haldeman had ordered it be- 
cause the President wanted it done. This is the same report that Dean 
testified he had given to me in early February. Another confusion in 
dates — blit an important one. 

By the 30th, Dean had not delivered any report and he said he had 
not been able to write one; and the President stopped dealing with 
Dean. In effect, he had stopped dealing with him after the 23d. 

I do not believe my attitude toward Dean had changed at that point. 
I was puzzled and maybe Dean was reading some puzzlement ; but I 
had been in frequent communication with him in quite lengthy phone 
conversations while he was at Camp David — contrary to the implica- 
tion he has created that he was practically incommunicado while he 
was up there. I had the feeling that lie was telling me quite openly 
what the problems were and what he was trying to work out. 

On March 30, the President made the announcement that nobody in 
the White House would go to the Senate hearings but that all members 
of the "White House staff would, of course, appear before the grand 
jury, if called, and would cooperate fully. 

Also on the 30th, the President put Mr. Ehrlichman officially on the 
Watergate investigation and told him to develop the' facts in the case 
and try again to get to a final conclusion. 


( 318 ) 



11. On March 26, 1973 the President, in the presence of H. R. 
Haldeman, instructed Ronald Ziegler, his press secretary, to express 
the President's confidence in John Dean. Ziegler announced publicly 
on that day that the President had "absolute and total" confidence in 
Dean. 


Page 


11.1 Ronald Ziegler testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 12, 1974, 62-65 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 320 

11.2 Los Angeles Times , March 27, 1973, 1* 11 324 


11.3 AP and UPI wire clips, March 26, 

1973 (received from Watergate Grand -Jury) 325 


( 319 ) 




. 1 RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY* FEBRUARY 12 . 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY J _gg- gj 


1 recall that? 


DV 


Yes, I can. 


3 Q That was on the 23rd. Do you recall making a state- 

4 ment personally to the press on the 26th indicating that the 

5 President had called Mr. Dean to discuss the Los Angeles Times 

6 story with him? 

7 A I recall making the statement on the 26th, yes. 

g Q What statement do you recall making? 

9 A I recall making a statement on the 26th that the 

10 President had confidence in Mr. Dean. 

11 Q Did you make that statement as well? 

12 A Yes, I did. I made the statement. The President 

13 didn T t. I made the statement. 

14 Q Do you recall the statement being the President has 

15 complete confidence in Mr. Dean? 

16 v A Yes, I do. 

17 1 Q Do you recall further stating that the President 

18 wanted you, Mr. Ziegler, to express his absolute and total 
19 1 confidence in Mr. Dean? 

20 1 A Yes, I do. | 

2i | Q And did you discuss that with the President prior to! 


22 1 making it? 


Yes, I did. 


Q And what do you recall your discussion being? 

A I recall, primarily, that we were having some problens 


( 320 ) 



11.1 RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY. FEBRUARY 12. 1974. WATERGATE GRAND JURY 3 62-65 


QV 63 

1 

with Che — I'm recalling this conversation — with the pri- 

2 

soners of war, at that point, and the major part of my con- 

3 

versation with the President related to the prisoner of war 

4 

problem. 

5 

During Che course of Chat conversation, I briefly 

6 

raised the point of the McCord letter and I was told to ex- 

7 

press confidence in Mr. Dean and I did. 

8 

BY MR. GOLDMAN: 

9 

Q Was anyone present? 

10 

A Mr. Haldeman was present. 

11 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

12 

Q Well, did Mr. Haldeman anything? 

13 

A I don't remember specifically what Mr. Haldeman said 

. 14 

or specifically what the President said, but I do remember 

15 

that the discussion along the lines that we've talked about. 

16 

We were talking about the North Vietnamese had had 

17 

a problem or it caused a problem in relation to POW's. 

18 

Q Did the President tell you he had spoken to Mr. 

19 

Dean that morning? 

20 

A No, and I subsequently had cleared that up in a 

21 

press briefing. I surmized or embellished, in that particular 

22 

press conference, that it was my understanding that he had 

23 

Q Where did you get that? 

24 

A Just an assumption that I drew. 

25 

Q That he’d spoken to him that morning? 

DV 


( 321 ) 



11.1 RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY x FEBRUARY 12 . 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 62-63 


2 

3 

4 
3 
6 

7 

8 

9 

10 
11 
12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 
21 
22 

23 

24 

25 


ov 

A Yes, that is correct. 

Q And whb told you he hadn't? 

A Well, later on, the story broke that Mr. Dean — tha 
the President had not spoken to Mr. Dean that day at Camp 
David and 1 checked and publicly stated that, indeed, Halderaan 
had talked to Mr. Dean on that occasion, and I so stated in 
the briefing. 

Q So it wasn't until the press story came out that 
you corrected your error? 

A That's right. It wasn't really until the press 
statement came out that I realized my assumption was Incorrect 

Q No one from the White House corrected you? 

A No, they did not. 

Q After the statement was made? 

A Because that did not, as I remember, play that domi- 
nant part in the stpry. 

Q Well, for any reason, no one corrected you? 

A No, they did not. 

Q No one corrected you in terms of expressing the 
President's completely and absolute total confidence in Mr. 
Dean? 

A No. And I must say that the embellishment in the 
statement Itself was partially mine. 1 was not given the 
precise language from the President. 

Q Generally, you better vouch for Mr. Dean as far as 


DV 


( 322 ) 



IhJL — RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY , FEBRUARY 12 


1974, 


WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 62-65 


1 

2 

3 

4 
3 
6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 
21 
22 

23 

24 

25 


DV 

we're concerned, Chen? 

A No. It was express confidence in John — 

Q Express confidence. 

A That's right. 

Q And that's the way, you did it? 

A That's right. 

Q And it didn't strike you as an unusual way to do 
it at the time, I .take it? 

A No, it didn't, because I had confidence in John 

Dean. 

Q Now, did the President or anyone else ever explain 
to you why he made that statement in view o p what the Presi- 
dent had been told by John Dean as of the 21st? 

A No, they did not. 

Q Did you ever ask? 

A No. 

Q Do you have any understanding? 

A 1 can only give you my understanding in my mind on 
supposition. 

Q What is that? 

A Could I do that? 

Q What is it? 

A Well, my impression, during that period, is that the 
President was trying to -- this is not based on what I knew 
then, but it's based on what I've been able, in my own mind. 


s 


( 323 ) 



11,2 LOS ANGELES TIMES, MARCH 27, 197 Z, 

Nixon Voices Total Confidence' 
in Dean After Telephone Talk 

McCord's Charge That Attorney Knew of Watergate in 
Advance Denied; Senator Hints Others Will Be Implicated 


BY ROBERT L. JACKSON and RONALD J. OSTKOW 


TtfTHi ttatf Wrirvt 


WASHINGTON’— President Nixon 
Monday expressed "absolute, loial 
confidence” in his counsel, John W. 
Dean ITT,- aft pr conferring with him 
on thp Watergate case by telephone 
a=aB jjom the Florida White House. 

^^Trheir conversation, announced by 
presidential Press Secretary Ronald 
Ziegler, followed disclosure hy The 
Times that convicted Watergate 
conspirator Tames W. McCord Jr. 
had accused Dean of having advance 
knowledge of the hugging of Demo- 
cratic national headquarters. 

McCord made the charges to Sam- 
uel Dash, chief counsel of the se- 
lect Senate Committee probing the 
Watergate incident, in two tape-re- 
corded interviews .last weekend. Mc- 
Cord also said that former presiden- 
tial aide Jeb Stuart Magruder had 
prior knowledge of the bugging and 
that he had perjured himself at the 
trial. 

"The President. . , , had an inter- 
est in calling his counsel and 
talking to him about it," Ziegler 


said. "As a result, of that discussion, 
1 again specifically deny as absolute- 
ly faise the fact that Mr. Dean had 
prior knowledge." 

Magruder too has denied the accu- 
sations. 

Meanwhile, there were these 
developments: 

—Sen. Lowell P. Welcker Jr. (R- 
Cnnn.i, a member of the select com- 
mittee. told newsmen he believed 
additional White House aides would 
he implicated in the Watergate case. 
Weicker declined to say whether he 
was referring to Dean or Magruder. 
. — G. Gordon Liddy, another con- 
victed Watergate Conspirator, in- 
voked the Fifth Amendment against 
Please Turn to Page 11, Col. 1 


Continued frwm F!r«t Fuse 

possible sr; i -i non n», non 
Jd times m re!'.: <iiu: T o tell 
a federal grand jury if any 
other Nixon Administra- 
tion officials knew of the 
bugging beforehand. Lid- 
dy also would not say 



whether he had divulged 
information from bugged 
Democratic phone conver- 
sation* to anyone else. 

— Ziegler confirmer! a re- 
port that Dean had calk'd 
Acting I'D 1 Director L.. 
Patrick Gray III minutes 
after Gray told a Senate 
hearing last week that 
Dean "probably" lied to 
the FBI in the Watergate 
investigation. Gray re- 
fused Dean's request that 
he "correct* his remark, 
Ziegler said. He said the 
President still supported 
Gray’s nomination. 

— McCord, encountered 
on the street by Washing- 
ton newspaper columnist 
Mary McGrory, told her he 
had made the charges to 
Dash as reported by The 
Times. He declined to ela- 
borate, Miss McGrory said. 

Atty. Gen. Richard G. 
Kleindienst said he would 
ask U.S. Dist. Judge John 
J. Sirica to share with the 
Justice Department any 
new information he get* 
on the bugging case. 



BRIEFING — Ronald 
Ziegler speaks to news- 
men at Key Biscoyne. 

Committee Criticised 
Ziegler, in discussing the 
allegations against Dean, 
criticized the select com- 
mittee’s handling of its 
Watergate investigation. 

. He said that Dash, in his 
"hastily called" Sunday 
press conference to an- 
nounce that the committee 
had interviewed McCord, 
was not proceeding in the 
orderly and judicious way 
promised by committee 
Chairman Sam J. Ervin 
Jr. (fVN.C.l. t 


Liddy. appearing before 

a new session of the fed- 
eral grand jury that in- 
dicted the seven Water- 
gate defendants last Sep- 
tember, declined tc an- 
swer such questions as: 

"Do you know directly or 
indirectly of any advance 
knowledge of the Water- 
gate break-in by others? 

"Did you discuss the 
break-in with anyone at 
the Committee to Reelect 
the President after last * 
June 17? 

"Do you know anyone 
who had information de- 
rived from logs of bugged 
telephone conversations?" 

Another Refusal 
Liddy also declined to 
uy whether he had dis- 
cussed the results of the 
bugging with anyone oth- 
er than the other defen- \ 
dants. 

A former White House ; 
and Treasury' official and ! 
ex-financial counsel to the j 
Nixon campaign. Liddy j 
looked pale and thin. He 
had a bloodied left ear. the 
result of a fight with a 
cellmate over possession 
of Liddy's hair brush!. 

To some of the ques- ; 
tions. Liddy' asserted his 
Fifth A mendmen t 
protection along with 
claim$ that he had an at- 
tornev.ciient relationship 
with E. Howard Hunt. Jr., 
a former White House • 
consultant who pleaded ! 
guilty- to bugging and con- 
spiracy charges early in . 
the trial. Liddy is a law- i 
yer. \ 

After 80 minutes of ? 
fruitless questioning, f 
government prosecutors ' 
went into court to ask Siri- 
ca to grant Liddy immuni- ! 
ty from further prosecu- 
tion so that he might testi- , 
fy. » 


hJl 


Sirica granted a motion J 
by Liddy’s attorney to de- 
lay a decision on this mat- ; 
ter until Friday. < 

The grand jury may call ■ 
other witnesses, including 
more convicted Watergate 
figures, to question them 
about the possible involve- 1 
raent of others. '* 
Emerging from a closed- 
door meeting of the select 
committee, Weicker, Er- 
vin and Sen, Howard H. 
Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) de- 
clined to comment on a 
hriefing from Dash about 
McCord’s statements. 

Baker did say he was 
certain that news reports 
of McCord's statements 
"will in no way prejudice 
our objective e\a'uation" 
of the Watergate case. 

Asked about Mr. Nixon's 
expression of total confi- 
dence in Dean, Weicker 
said: "The President is en- 
titled to his opinion. The 
committee is entitled to ■ 
pursue its objective, and j 
the American people are 
entitled to the truth." 

Weicker made clear that 
his criticism of the White 
Tlou did not extend to 
the President. 

”1 have complete faith In 
the President, in the fact 
that he personally has 
nothing to hide," Weicker 
said, "l restrict my com- 
ments to the President of 
the United States." 

The President relumed 
to the While House Mon- 
day evening after a five- 
day stay in Florida. 


( 324 ) 



UPI AND AP WIRES FOR MARCH 26, 1973 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


(DEAN) 

KEY BISCAYNE (UPI) — PRESIDENT NIXON MONDAY EXPRESSED "ABSOLUTE 
AND TOTAL CONFIDENCE" IN WHITE COUNSEL JOHN W. DEAN III, WHO 

[unreadable] LOS ANGELES TIMES SAID HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY CONVICTED WATERGATE 
CONSPIRATOR JAMES MCCORD AS HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN THE BUGGING OF 
THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. 

PRESS SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLER SAID NIXON CALLED DEAN IN 
WASHINGTON TO "DISCUSS THE STORY WITH HIM." 

FOLLOWING THAT CONVERSATION, AND BASED ON THAT CONVERSATION, I 
[unreadable] AGAIN FLATLY DENY ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF MR. DEAN 
REGARDING THE WATERGATE MATTER, " ZIEGLER SAID. 

1 unreadable] THE PRESIDENT HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN MR. DEAN. HE WANTED ME 
TO EXPRESS HIS ABSOLUTE AND TOAL CONFIDENCE IN MR. DEAN." 

ZIEGLER SAID DEAN'S PRIVATE ATTORNEY CALLED NEWS ORGANIZATIONS TO 
[unreadable] POSSIBLE LIBEL ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION 
[unreadable]. BUT HE ADDED, "OF COURSE THAT'S MR. DEAN'S PEROGATIVE (sic) AS A 
[unreadable] TO PROCEED AFTER HE HAS BEEN FALSELY MALIGNED." 

ZIEGLER SAID THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SPEAK BY TELEPHONE WITH JEB 
STUART MAGRUDER, NIXON’S FORMER ASSISTANT CAMPAIGN MANAGER, WHO WAS 
[unreadable] IN THE LOS ANGELES TIMES REPORT. 

MR. ZIEGLER SAID MAGRUDER HAS DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE. 

ZIEGLER ALSO CRITICIZED SAMUEL DASH, COUNSEL TO THE SPECIAL SENATE 
[unreadable] COMMITTEE, FOR CONDUCTING A "HASTILY CALLED SUNDAY 
AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE" TO REVEAL THAT HE HAD QUESTIONED MCCORD. 

"THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE AN ORDERLY AND JUDICIOUS 
[unreadable]." ZIEGLER SAID. 

UPI 03-26 03:09 PES 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-22 


( 325 ) 



11.3 UPI AND AP WIRES FOR MARCH_26 , 1973 


DV 






3i?!?J7DS JRSES HCCORD riS HBYIS8 BEES INVOLVED IS THE BUGGING OF 
^ .ircprjfjTir HRT t SJiHL CO-HTEH; 

"■•^SsIeCRETBRy" ROSBLD ZIEGLER SBID NISON CBllED DEBS IN 

T •*' • • ri ii t n - p '’Iif *" T < i r £7 HO'J l-7 T** • ■ I * 

T^^Sfattlwi^ * Q # i uL. rfl wi\i «ii:i ***•*• 

— »» i . «»»»■! I- a r*n...»r TNr n-r-1 r ;! ; i *• rjL £ £ ^ - T! Ti\ T«PT pflXV?? -.ftT *']*, 1 

TTtELvsiiitf inn! </ -j n v z a -2- n ! i 0 n j nn/ cnvcy v si inn; t * yiu 1 

- } - - ^ i v ri f:?\ n rirvii r. «> >1 r. r, i r. ri y «■ r* j> \ £ f' f: £ fj ~ P P PVT f* P I? V f) P fl *J 

.*, r ;ni N r u n i L i L ; z n r nn r r x : u n mi v ^ k - -0 s y .» i nc r r. n i v.- .«%• 

iiUSi-ISS |«£ jjBTEROBTE H377ER, “ ZIEGLER SBID. 

rec PRESIDENT HBS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN BR. DEBS. HE R8H7ED BE 
n 3SESS BIS B3S0LUTE BSD 70781 CONFIDENCE IN NFL DEBS. * 

HESlEJ SB ID DEBS' 5 rRIYBTE BT70RNEV CBLLED SENS GRS8SI2871QSS TO 
' V-sT POSSIBLE LIBEL RC7I0NS PRIOR 70 7 HE PRESIDES!' S C08YER5B718S 
BUT HE BDDEDj ’OF COURSE THBT'S NR. DESK'S PER0G8TIYE P.5J* 
10 PROCEED BF7ER HE HBS BEEN FBLSELY BBL16SED. “ " ' / 

FEELER SBID THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SPEBK BY TELEPHONE KITH JE8 
'RSRUDER, NIXON'S FORBER BSSIS7RN7 CBBPB1SS HBS8GER, SHO BBS 
-■L'ED IN THE LOS BS6EIES TINES REPORT. 

ZIEGLER SBID rBGRODER HBS DENIED BNV ISYOLYEHEST IS THE CBS5. 

LI i 'L'9 si cn rjntM?'!'. c assy, prinscc} -Tf! 7 UC Epsrift! tSfeStTC 

•*.'!£ COnnlTTESi FOR CONDUCTING 8 ’HB57ILY CBLLED SUNDRY 
’’ ■••OON PRESS CONFERENCE* TO REYEBL THBT HE HBD QUESTIONED nCCSSD. 
>S DOES SOT SEES TO BE TO BE BH ORDERLY BSD JUDICIOUS 
- ; .£ > * ZI SSLE?* SrilD. 

- * J :/»• ;o ■ % c* o:; 


DV 


( 326 ) 



11.3 UPI AND AP WIRES FOR MARCH 26 3 1973 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 

a245 

Ibwlu [unreadable] 

Watergate Bjt [unreadable] 460 

By JOHN CHALWICK 
Associated Press Writer 

I WASHINGTON AP - The White House Monday denied that presidential 
I counsel John W. Dean III had prior knowledge of the Watergate 
I bugging incident and quoted President Nixon as voicing "absolute 
| and total confidence" in Dean. 

The statement was issued at Key Biscayne, Fla., where Nixon was 
staying. 

At the Capitol, the Senate f s special Watergate investigating 
committee was urged by Republican Leader Hugh Scott to hold public 
hearings as quickly as possible. 

"We should have the full story," Scott told newsmen. He said 
last week Nixon had authorized him to say that the White House 
had nothing to conceal. 

Scott’s comments were made shortly before a closed meeting of the 
committee set up by the Senate to investigate the bugging of 
Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex and other alleged 
political espionage and sabotage in last year's presidential 
campaign . 

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the President 
telephoned Dean in Washington during the morning because of 
what Ziegler called very extraordinary and serious charges leveled 
against Dean. 

He was referring to a report by the Los Angeles Times that James 
W. McCord, jr., (sic) one of the convicted Watergate defendants, had told 
a Senate investigator that Dean and Jeb Stuart Mag ruder, a former 
presidential assistant and campaign official, had prior knowledge of" 
the Watergate incident last June. 

Ziegler said that, based on Nixon’s conversation, "I will again 
deny any prior knowledge on the part of Mr. Dean." 

Then asked about Magrudcr, Ziclger said "I’m not prepared to speak 
for those who are not on the White House staff." He noted that 
Magruder has denied having any advance knowledge of the affair. 

McCord met Friday and Saturday with Samuel Dash, chief counsel of 
the Senate panel. Dash told a news conference Sunday that McCord had 
named others who were involved, but Dash declined to say who they 
were. 


McCord, encountered on a Washington street Monday by a Star-News 
reporter said that published accounts of what he had told the 
Senate aides were correct. He would not elaborate. 

McCord apparently was referring to the Los Angeles Times reports. 
Dash said that McCord, an ex-FBI and CIA agent who was security 
director of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, 
has agreed to continue to meet with him and tell all he knows about 
the Watergate affair. 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


( 327 ) 



1 1 . Z UPI AND AP WIRES FOR MARCH 26 3 1973 

Indistinct document retyped by 
H ouse Judiciary Committee staff 

bcott said anything made available to the investigating 
committee's Democratic majority should be made equally available to 
the Republican minority "so we can make a judgment" on the 
fairness of the probe. 

Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, asked by newsmen about the 
Watergate bugging, said "my personal feeling is that the 
President very likely didn T t know what was going on." 
cr439pcs mar 26 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


( 328 ) 




11.3 UPI AND AP WIRES FOE_MARCH 26 i 


f£.q 


J I'brlu Trrr-^n 
3a terra *ca B J t :oi 460 

37 JOEL CEALWm 

« 350 Ci.r/nd ^'rc.Ps Writer , » * 

^ *1G IlTC-ilOII -2 - ilic Whits Eouse Monday denied thar rrceidontial / 7 
ounce! John H-> loon HI fcrl -prior k;:o7;iod^e of the Wauor/'ats / / 

i:: si-lout ar.i Quoted Presidon*;; uizon aa ?o icing - -absolute / / 
cid total ccn^uenco* * in lean* _ 1 1 

^Sbe statement raa issued, at Kay Biscayno, Lla*, vhcro Sir on naa 

staying# 

At the Caritol, *be Senate? 3 special TTaternate investigating 
brrmitteo U3 urged by Republican Leader. Hugh Scott to hold public 
tourings as quickly ao Possible* 

**ra should nave the full story , 9 9 Scott told nov^men, He said 
last ueek ITIron had authorised him to say that tbo White House 
bed nothing to conceal* 

Scott*3 cements rore sade shortly before a closed meeting oi the 
omittoo oe t up by the Senate to investigate tho bugging of 
Ler.ocratic hecdouarters in tho Watergate complex and other alleged 
plitical espionage and sabotage in last yearns presidential 
onraign. * n 

Foita House Breso Secretary Ronald L, 2iegler said tbo President j I 
lolerhonad Lean in Washington during the corning because of / / 

that" Ziegler caliGd very extraordinary and serious .charges leveled / j 

f ains t Loan,. 

e vas referring to a report by the Los Angeles TLmeo that Janes 
H 0 McCord, Jr*, cue of the coanctod Watergate defendants, bad told 
a Senate investigator that Loan and Jeb Stuart Macrudsr, a forcer 
presidontlal assistant and empsigu, official, bad prior knowledge of 
ibo Watergate incidont lc3 1 June* 

Ziegler said that, based on iixon*s conversation, f *1 trill again 
deny any Trier knowledge on the raxt of Mr, Lean*** 
then asked. about Uagruder, Ziegler said ¥ I 5 m not prepared to speak 

fer those TTbo ar e no ^ on the White House eta £f#>* He noted that 
Magruder b£3 denied having any advance knoHlodga of tho affair, 

McCord cat Friday and Saturday Pith Samuel Lash, chief counsel of 
Ihe. Senate panel* Lash told a nans conference Sunday that McCord had 
nosed others ubo were involved, but Lash declined to say uho they 
tare* 

.McCord, oncountered on a Washington street Monday by a Star-Uercs } ^ 
Joportor, said that published accounts of That be had told the . /«d~" 
Senate aides cere correct* Eo nould not elaborate s / ^ 

McCord apparently ras referring to the I-oa Angeles Tinea r oporto, 

Lash said* that McCord, an ex- -id I and CIA agent rho tras security, 
director of the Cemittee for the R9v31ection of the Rrcaidont, 
tas forced to continue to meat nith bin and toll all ho kno^s about 
the Watergate affair* 

Scott a aid anything cade available to the investigating 
ccsQittoess Lomocratic majority should be cade eoually available to 
tie Republican minority 4 4 bo r.s can make a Judgaent** on tho 
iairnoss of the probe, 

Lornocratic loader Mike Mensfiold, asked by nensnen about the 
i^tergato cugglry, said ri% my personal feeling is that tho 
•frosiden t vary 71 kaly didn*t Ircon vhat uaa going o n*>» 

CI ‘439pcn/car zS\ 


DV 


( 329 ) 




12. March 26, 1973 John Dean telephoned Jeb Magruder and Dean made 
a recording of the conversation. Dean has testified that at Haldeman's 
suggestion he telephoned Magruder and taped this conversation. Magruder 
acknowledged that the Los Angeles Times story stating that Dean had 
prior knowledge of the break-in was a "bum rap" for Dean. There was 
also discussion about the number and purpose of meetings among John 
Mitchell, Gordon Liddy, Magruder and Dean. Magruder told Dean that 
Magruder had testified that there had been "one meeting, not two," and 
that the purpose of the meeting was to go over the general framework 
of the job of CRP general counsel. 


Page 


12.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1004 332 

12.2 Taped conversation between Dean and Magruder, 

March 26, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 34-40, 3 SSC 

1258-59 333 


( 331 ) 



12,1 JOHN. DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 197Z, 3 SSC 100± 


1004 

cepts on previous occasions, but we still did not have an answer that 
would bring the full truth out because of the ci'iminal implications 
of the behavior of those involved. 

On Saturday, I began reconstructing all I knew and began writing 
a report. I spent Saturday afternoon and evening, Sunday, and Mon- 
day reconstructing and writing. On Monday I asked my secretary to 
come to Camp David, bring certain documents that [ had requested, 
and commence typing. I did not realize how difficult it would be to 
reconstruct my knowledge from memory. I had not kept a diary or 
even a calendar of all my activities, thus, I have been reconstructing 
my knowledge of this matter since March 23 to this day. 

On Sunday evening, March 25, 1 was informed that the Los Angeles 
Times and the Washington Post were going to print a story that Ma- 
gruder and I had prior knowledge of the June 17 bugging of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee. I considered the story libelous then, as I do 
today. Upon learning that the story w as going to be printed, I contacted 
an attorney, Mr. Tom Hogan, who was familiar with libel law. We dis- 
cussed the matter. He then decided to put the newspapers on notice to 
preserve a libel suit in the event they printed the story. I also told Mr. 
Hogan that when I returned from Camp David that I wanted to talk 
with him about this entire matter and asked him to think about some- 
one who was a good criminal lawyer because I was planning- to take 
certain steps in the near future. I might add that it was my thinking 
at that time that I would explain all the facts to a knowledgeable 
criminal lawyer to determine the potential problems of everyone in- 
volved — from the President on down — to get independent advice on 
wha^I should do. 

j^vJn Monday morning, March 26, 1 had a conversation with Halde- 
man about the story in the Los Angeles Times. I told him I was pre- 
pared to file a libel suit and had retained a' lawyer to put the newspapers 
on notice. I told him that he knew that I had not known of the June 17 
Watergate break-in in advance, that my knowledge of the entire mat- 
ter ended with the second meeting in Mitchell’s office. I told Haldeman 
that Magruder knew that I had no prior knowledge, but I did not 
know if he would admit it publicly. Haldeman concurred in the fact 
that I had no prior knowledge and suggested I call Magruder and tape 
his conversation. 

I did call Magruder and by using a dictaphone held to the receiver. 
I recorded the call. I have submitted a transcript of this conversation 
to the committee; the long and short of this conversation was that 
Magruder acknowledged that the newspaper accounts were a “bum 
lira fo r me because I had not had prior knowledge of the break-in. 

[The transcript was marked exhibit No. 34-40.*] 

Mr. Dean. My secretary arrived at Camp David on Monday after- 
noon and began typing the report. On Monday night, I had given addi- 
tional thought to how the President might get out in front of this 
matter and how we could get everyone involved to speak the truth. I 
called Moore, who is fairly conservative in his solutions to problems, 
and told him of my idea, which I said was so far out that I thought it 
might solve the awful problem. J have submitted to the committee a 
copy of my notes outlining my concept. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-41.**] 


•See p. 1258. 
•♦See p. 1261. 


( 332 ) 



12.2 TRANSCRIPT OF DEAN /MAGRUDER CONVERSATION, SSC EXHIBIT 
NO. 34-40, 3 SSC 1258-59 


wmmm mmmm. EXHIBIT NO. 34-^0 

Dean : Is he in, John Dean calling. 

Magruder: Hello. 

Dean : Hi, Jeb. 

Magruder: Hello. 

Dean : How are you doing? 

Magruder : I’m doing fine ; how are you doing? 

Dean : Pretty well, incredible. 

Magruder: Is it? 

Dean : Just incredible. 

Magruder : Well the DA. Times, God, we got splashed all over that one, let me 
tell you. 

Dean : Is that right? 

Magruder : I haven’t seen it yet but my friend called me, said Christ yon take 
up the whole front page. 

Dean : Is that right? 

Magruder : Yea, you and I, pictures, the whole works. 

Dean : I’m taking a bum rap, Jeb. 

Magruder : Well I know that. 

Dean : That’s the incredible thing. 

Magruder : We’ve got to figure — John, I think wo gotta just figure out how we 
can handle this. I don’t know what we — I mean I don’t know what we can do 
right now, I don’t know if there is anything we can do right now. 

Dean : We’ll just have to take the heat right now until the thing sorts itself out. 

1 can’t conceive of how McCord could have that impression. 

Magruder : Now I’ll tell you what— John, can we talk here? 

Dean: Yea. 

Magruder : Okay. Here’s what I figure has happened. And I’m positive of this. 
One, John, there is absolutely no substantive evidence that McCord could pos- 
sibly have in any way, shape or form that could connect anyone other than the 
seven of us. Okay. 

Dean : Yes. 

Magruder: I'm positive of that. Now I’ve gone right — you know I just went 
back through the process, was there anything at all that even could remotely 
imply any connection. Okay. 

2 Dean : Yes. 

Magruder: So there is no evidence of what I call documentation. Now" what he 
probably may have, John, is that when Liddy probably was working up numbers 
for his own benefit, and doing that kind of work, he probably used McCord to do 
that, because McCord bought all his equipment according to Silberts. 

Dean ; But Liddy knows damn good and well that the last time that I, for 
example, had any conversation with him on that thing was when we walked out 
of that office and I told him I could not talk to him about it any further and he 
never — he — he never once ever raised it. 

Magruder : I’m sure he must have raised — I'm sure thought when he talked to 
his friend McCord 

Dean : He was a name dropper, 

Magruder: He’s a name dropper. And I’m sure he said that well you know I 
don’t really trust this idiot Magruder but Mitchell and Dean and Haldeman are 
all behind it and Gordon Strachan, I’m sure that obviously Mitchell’s name will 
come up and I would take a guess if he still said “others” if you noticed, which 
is pure 

Dean : That’s right, that’s right. 

Magruder : So he is going to be talking probably about Mitchell and I would 
take a guess either Gordon Strachan or Colson. That would be my guess. 

Dean : Just incredible. 

Macruder: So, one, he had no substantive evidence. I’m positive of that: two, 
what he is probably referring to is simply discussions that Liddy had with him 
as they sat around drinking at the Watergate. Yon know — and only that. McCord 
never met with either myself or anyone else at our committee. 

( 1258 ) 


( 333 ) 



12.2 TRANSCRIPT OF DEAN/MAGRUDER CONVERSATION 3 SSC EXHIBIT 
NO. M-40j, l SSC 1258^59 

1359 


Dean : Yes. 

Magbudeb : Never, so there is no personal discussion he would have of any kind. 

Dean : Well I thought maybe I was losing my mind. But I know — I know what 
I know and I know that one, I tried to turn the damn thing off. 

Magbudeb: Right. 

Dean : I know that I’d told Haldeman after that meeting that it had to be 
turned off. Now what happened in the interim I don’t have any idea, I don’t want 
to know, I can only opine and speculate. 

Magbudeb. I would hope so, John, of course on that meeting that I have testi- 
fied that that meeting that we’ve had with Liddy and Mitchell was simply on 
the general counsel’s job and so on. 

Dean. I understand. 

Magbudeb. I mean that’s important I think, you know for Mitchell’s and my 

Dean. Well I don’t plan to go out and talk in any forum. 

Magbudeb. You know, if we ever get to the grand jury stage, I think they — 
I have testified that that meeting that you and I had was one meeting, not two, 
and that we had a meeting with Mitchell that just went over — since you had been 
helping me as a counsel — that we just went over the general framework of the 
job and the new law and those kind of problems, the typical cursory sort of 
post-employment meeting. That that was the extent of it. 

Dean. Well I was just trying to get straight in my own mind, you know, in 
case a guy like Liddy goes and starts giving his side of the story and — — 

Magbudeb. Well, if he did, of course what he would say is . You know 

that’s one thing I would hope we’d be working on and that part is Liddy, 

Dean. Yea. 

Magbudeb. But McCord’s information would only be hearsay, it would only 
have been from Liddy. 

Dean. Okay, Jeb, well all we can do is sit tight right now. 

Magbudeb. A couple of other points, John, let me ask you. Parkinson wants to 
sit down with me and is going to represent me and as far as I’m concerned that’s 
appropriate. 

Dean. I think that that’s a personal decision of yours, by yourself, and that 
you know he’s knowledgable and I think that’s quite a good idea. 

Magbudeb. Well I mean, you know, from my standpoint, it would seem that 
somebody who is well aware of the situation and it would look funny it would 
seem to me if I changed attorneys. 

Dean. I agree, I think that's a good idea for you. 

Magbudeb. And he is certainly qualified. 

Dean. And I do think you ought to have counsel too. 

Magbudeb. What? 

Dean. I do think you ought to have a lawyer who’s representing you per se. 

Magbudeb. Well that would be what he would — you mean another one? 

Dean. Well I mean no— I mean like Parkinson. 

Magbudeb. Right, well that’s what I thought because I think for sure we’re 
going to have to — I’m going to have to rely on you or whatever when we have 
to go down to the grand jury. 

Dean. I would imagine that day is coming. 

Magbudeb. That’s right. Of course, I think we have a hell of a case on the 
bond and who placed the bond for him and the written statement, how well it 
was done and why he waited until the last day. To me that makes it very clear. 

Dean. I don’t, I’m not aware of what you are talking about. 

Magbudeb. McCord. In other words, where did McCord get his bond. You 
know, he got it from a Democratic lawyer. He’s got a new lawyer. He’s obviously 
made a deal and a person in that position obviously is panicked facing S years 
or whatever he is facing. And he’ll throw out names all over the place, John. 

Dean. I suspect that’s true. 

Magbudeb. Just because he knows that’s what they want to hear. If you read 
his. letter, his letter is a perfect letter obviously not written by an individual 
but by a lawyer. 

Dean. I wonder if he drafted it? 

Magbudeb. And he’s talking about fifth amendment, sixth amendments rights, 
all sorts of things that . 

Dean. Yea, okay, just hang in. 

Magbudeb. Yea, well that’s what I planned on doing and I just wanted to 
check with you from your standpoint. But I’m positive there’s no substantive 
evidence of any kind. 

Okay. 


( 334 ) 



13, On March 26, 1973 the District of Columbia United States 
Attorney’s office filed in open court a motion for an order compelling 
Gordon Liddy to testify under a grant of immunity before the grand jury 
investigating the Watergate break-in. As of March 27, 1973 Judge Sirica 
granted leave to proceed forthwith with grand jury interrogation of 
Howard Hunt and other of the convicted Watergate defendants. From 
March 28, 1973 through April 5, 1973 hearings were held in open court 
and orders were entered compelling Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy and the 
remaining Watergate defendants to testify before the grand jury under 
grant of immunity. 


13.1 In re Grand Jury , Misc. 47-73, docket, March 26 
1973, March 28 - April 5, 1973 


Page 

336 


( 335 ) 


13,1 IN RE GRAND JURY, MISC. 47-73 DOCKET, MARCH 26, 1973, 
MARCH 28 - APRIL 5, 19? 3_ 


MISCELLANEOUS POCKET 

XHnitei* States District Court tor ti)t District of Columbia 


H ? - f 


Parties 


Petitioner's Atty. 


IN RE - GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 


Respondent’s Atty. 

PET KR L MEROULI S 
TI:CKA:V A. ; J. REEL AY 

1819 i! ft., N.V. 

V-A s hing ton , D . C . 


1973 
Mar 26 


Iftar] 26 


Mar 27 


Mar 2 c 


Mar 2c 


Mar 26 


Mar 29 


Mar I 29 


Proceedings 


Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. 
Atty. Gen. to Harold H. Titus, US Atty., advising 
that request for authority to apply to USDC for an 
order requiring -George Gordon Liddy to give testiraor 
before grand jury with a grant of immunity pursuant 
to. 18 USC 6003 and 28 CFR 0.175 is approved. 

Motion by US Atty. for D.C. for an order compelling 
George Gordon Liddy to give testimony before granc 
jury with a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC 
6001 et seq., filed in open court, heard in part 
and continued for further hearing until March 30, 
1973; counsel for respondent Liddy to file opp. tc 
motion not later than 10:00 A.M, flfarch 29, 1973; 
deft. Liddy present and remanded to D. C. Jail. 
(Rep: N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J. . 

AS OP MARCH 27, 1973 

Case called by Asst'.' US Atty. for purpose of obtain- 
ing leave to Court to proceed immediately with Grand 
Jury .interrogation of Everette Hunt, Bernard L. 

Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis and 
Virgilio: R. Gonzalez; leave to proceed forthwith 
granted. (Rep: N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J. 

Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry E. Petersen, Asst. Att3 
General, to Harold H. Titus, Jr. U.S. Atty, Granting 
request for authority to apply to USDC for an order 
requiring Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., to give testimony 
a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 USC 6001 et seq. FI 

Sirica, C.J. 

Motion by U.S. Atty for an order compelling Everette He 
Jr. to give testkmony before grand jury with a grant c 
pur to 18 USC 6001 et seq. Filed in Open Court, Heard 
& GRANTED. (Rep-N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J. 

Order directing Everette Howard Hunt, Jr., to give test 
before grand jury with a grant of immunity pur to 
IS USC bOOl et seq, (N) Sirica, C.J. 

Deft. Liddy 1 s response to Govt motion under Title l8, 
U.S. Code. Section 6001, et al; c/s 3-29-73* Filed. 

Sirica, C.J 

Transcript of proceedings of 3-26—73* pages l-2o, incl 
Court 1 s copy. (Rep-N. Sokal) Sirica, C.J. 


Fees Total 


Hurt, 

1 uni ty 


( 336 ) 







13fl m RE gr AND JURY , MI SC, 47-73 DOCKET , MARCH 26 3 1973 
MARCH 28 v APRIL 5 3 1973 


IN RE: Grand Jury Proceedings 


. vs. . 


No. 


47.-73 


bate 


973 

Mar. 


Ha?* 

Apr. 


Apr. 


Apr. 


Apr. 


Apr. 


Apr. 


| Apr. 
Apr. 


Apr.. 


30 


30 + 

3 


11 


12 


Proceedings 


•etel 


Further hearing held on motion by U.S. Atty for an ord^ 
compelling George Gordon Liddy to give testimony be 
fore Grand Jury pursuant to lo USC 6001 et. seq. 
Motion by U.S. Atty; Granted. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica 

Motion by Govt, to adjudicate George Gordon Liddy in 
for his refusal to ansv/er certain questions before 
as he was ordered to on 3-30-73^ Filed In Open Cou 
Heard & Granted. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J.j 

Order finding that George Gordon Liddy has without ju 
cause refused to testify before grand jury as previl 
ordered & directing that Mr. Liddy be confined unti] 
such time as he is willing to testify as ordered, 
provided, however, that the period of confinement 
not exceed the life of the grand jury, including exj* 
8c shall in no case exceed lo months, & further dir< 
Mr. Liddy be confined in the D.C. Jail for the duri 
under the contempt statute; counsel for Govt, to prl< 
proposed findings of fact & conclusions of law to at 
order no later than 4-9-73. (N) Sirica, C.J 

Order staying execution of sentence in Cr. 1827-72 as 
this date to recommence at the conclusion of his 
confinement for contempt as ordered. (Original file|< 
In Cr. 1827-72) (N) Sirica, ( 

Motions (4) by US Atty for an order compelling Bernard 
L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis 8c 
Virgilio R. Gonzalez to give testimony before grancj 
jury with a grant of Immunity pur to 18 USC 6001, 
et. seq, together with letter from Henry E. Peters 4 
Asst. Atty. General, dated 3-15-73 to Harold H. Ti 
Jr., U.S. Atty, Granting request to seek order as 
respondent. Filed in Open Court, Heard & Granted; 

4 Orders, one pertaining to each respondent, signeq 
(Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, C.J 

Copy of Letter dated 3-15-73 from Henry S. Petersen, A; 
Atty. General, to Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty, 
.approving request for author! t 5 r to apply for an orc^ 
compeling James N. McCord Jr; to testify before gr; 
Jury with a grant of immunity pur. tol8 USC 6001 et 
filed in Open Court. (Rep-N.Sokal) Sirica, c 

Motion by Asst. U.S. Atty for an order compelling James 
Jr. to , testify before grand jury with a grant of in 
to T.18 USC 6001 et. seq. Heard & Granted. (Rep-N. 

Sirica, C.J. 

Order compelling James W. McCord Jr., testify before 

grand jury with a grant of immunity pur. to 18 USC, I 
6001 et. seq. (N) (Rep-N.Sokal) * Sirica., C.Of 

Notice of appeal by deft. George Gordon Liddy from the 
judgment of April 3* 1973; Copy mailed to Earl J. 
Gilbert, Asst. U.S. Atty; Deposit by Maroulis, 
$ 5 . 00 . 

In Re: George Gdrdon Liddy: Findings of fact & conclujs 

of Law finding George Gordon Liddy, without just ca 
haa refused to comply with an order of Court that h 
testify before grand jury^^JjJj^^g-Sokal) Sirica, 


content 
the 


ijt, 
st 

ouslyj 


shall 
tensi 
ting) 
■alt ion 
eparej 
ccompj 

of 


.J. 


Fees 


C.J 


pt 

Granjd Juxjy 


4ons| 
t; 
iof 


;any] 


ius, 
tjo eacjh 

st . 

er 
4nd 

sect 
.J. 

W. V 
Jmunii 
okal) 


5 

ions 

Use, 

.J. 


Total 


hki 


00 


t 

Impril 


CCdrd 
y pur. 


:orynei 


0C 


( 337 ) 




14. 


On March 27, 1973 Jeb Magruder met with John Mitchell in New 


York City and discussed the potential of Magruder' s being brought before 
the grand jury on a perjury count. Magruder has testified that he 
received from Mitchell assurances respecting continued salary and that 
they discussed executive clemency. Mitchell has testified that with 
respect to support, he told Magruder that he "was a very outstanding 
young man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I 
could help him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so." 
Mitchell has testified that he did not make any promises of executive 
clemency. During the conversation, Magruder asked for a meeting with 
Haldeman. 




Page 

14.1 

Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 806-07 

••• 340 

14.2 

Jeb Magruder testimony, SSC Executive Session, 
June 12, 1973, 111-12 

. .. 342 

14.3 

John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1633-34 

. . . 344 


( 339 ) 


14,1 JEB MAGKUDER TESTIMONY. JUNE 14 % 1973, 2 SSC 806-07 


806 

Doan began to indicate some reluctance to discuss those meetings in 
the same terms that I had discussed them at the grand jury, I knew the 
story would not hold up under a second investigation by your com- 
mittee, which, of course, had begun to hold hearings and also the grand 
jury. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Haldeman in January 
1973? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Dash. Could you briefly tell us what the nature of that meeting 
was and what was discussed ? 

Mr. Magruder. The meeting was for two purposes. I was the director 
of the inaugural at that time and was to discuss future employment 
regarding myself and also at that time there was a problem regarding 
Mr. Porter’s employment and I had made certain assurances, Mr. 
Mitchell had, about his employment and I wanted to be sure Mr. Hal- 
deman was aware of that. And then, third, and I realize now that these 
were probably taped conversations, I had some conversations with Mr. 
Dean in his office where he indicated a certain lack of memory to 
events, and I became rather concerned. He indicated at one point that, 
wasn’t that surprising how this plan was ever put into operation, and 
I said, “Well, John, surely you remember the meetings we attended” 
and he didn’t seem to remember those meetings, and I said to myself 
something is going to happen here if that continues. I think as it turned 
out these conversations were taped, so I thought I had better see Mr. 
Haldeman and tell him what had actually happened. I thought prob- 
ably that this was becoming scapegoat time and maybe I was going to 
be the scapegoat, and so I went to Mr. Haldeman and I said I just want 
you to know that this whole Watergate situation and the other activ- 
ities was a concerted effort by a number of people, and so I went 
through a literal monologue on what had occurred. That was my first 
discussion with Mr. Haldeman where I laid out the true facts. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what day or date approximately in Jan- 
uary that occurred ? 

Mr. Magruder. It would have been before the inaugural because we 
were still working on the inaugural but I would have to look in my 
^iary^as to what date specifically. 

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you met with Mr. Mitchell 
sometime after the trial ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes. Well, the McCord letter basically activated 
great concern in the sense 

Mr. Dash. That letter, I think the record will show, was March 23. 

Mr. Magruder. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. That was read out by Judge Sirica in the courtroom on 
the sentences on March 23. 

Mr. Magruder. That is correct, and that, of course, accelerated the 
process of concern on, I think, all of the participant parties. I, on Mon- 
day, the 25th, went to see the two lawyers for the committee. As you 
are aware at this time I did not have my own counsel so I was depend- 
ing on counsel basically from our committee, and I went over my prob- 
lems with them, which I think were more acute at that time than the 
other participants and they agreed that I had a serious problem and 
suggested that I see, retain my own counsel. I think they then trans- 
mitted that concern of mine to Mr. Mitchell because on Tuesday he 


( 340 ) 



14,1 JER MAGRUDER TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 14 3 1973 , 2 SSC 806-07 

807 

called me in the Commerce Department and asked me to come to New 
York. I flew to New York that afternoon, and discussed with him 
Mr. Dash. Do you know, what date that was ? 

Mr. Magruder. That would be March 27. 

Mr. Dash. 27? 

Mr. Magruder. A Tuesday. 

Mr. Dash. And the year we are talking about 1973? 

Mr. Magruder. 1973. 

Mr. Dash. What was your discussion with Mr. Mitchell in New 
York? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, I went through all of the problems I thought 
could occur because of the problems that renewed interest in this case 
would bring from your committee and from the grand jury and indi- 
cated what should I do, and he indicated that I should hold, that he 
would take care of things, that everything would be taken care of. 

Now, at that time I realized that lie was no longer directly involved 
at the White House, as he had been, and so I asked to see Mr. Haldeman 
with him the next day he was going to Washington. 

Mr. Dash. But at that meeting, Mr. Magruder, what did you ask 
Mr. Mitchell to assure you of ? 

Mr. Magruder. Again I asked for the same assurances of salary and 
being taken care of if I had to go away for any period of time. 

Mr. Dash. Did you mention Executive clemency ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Then you say you asked for a meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I feel that it would be appropriate since this 

L was something now that he was more directly involved on a day-to-day 
basis. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have that meeting with Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. When? 

Mr. Magruder. On the following day, Wednesday, March 28, 1 think. 
Mr. Dash. Who was present? 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell, and myself. 

. Mr. Dash. What was discussed ? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, we discussed the same things that we had 
discussed with Mr. Mitchell, that I discussed with Mr. Mitchell. Mr. 
Haldeman was very careful to indicate to me that he would help me 
in any way as a friend but could make no commitments for the Presi- 
dent; indicated that the real problems were differences of opinion 
over meetings, particularly the January and February meetings, 
where, of course, my view was that since the three, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. 
Dean, and I, had agreed to my testimony that they, therefore, should 
stay with that agreement. 

Mr. Mitchell indicated, of course, he was willing to do this but 
Mr. Dean indicated that he had some question about it. 

Mr. Dash. But. Mr. Magruder at this time everybody knew. 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman 

Mr. Dash. Everybody knew that that agreement was an agreement 
based on a false story, was that not true? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, that is correct. 


( 341 ) 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-23 



Mjl JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY . JUNE 12. 1973. SSC EXECUTIVE^ SESSION. 111-12 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


Mr. Magruder. Earlier than that. 

Mr. Dash. — tell us what happened. 

Mr. Magruder. We knew the Grand Jury was reconvening and 
we knew one mistake the prosecutors made, and the only mistake 
in defense of the prosecutors, that I think they made is they 
somehow missed Mr. Reisner. I knew as soon as they got to him 
the thing would collapse and when they got — when they all got 
to Mr. Reisner I was fully aware then much more so than McCord 
because I knew Mr. McCord* s testimony would be hearsay but as 
soon as they got to Reisner I knew that the case would start 
^^Tollapsing rather quickly. So I went up to New York on a 

Tuesday and talked to Mr. Mitchell and went through the whole 
list of things I thought that I would need if I was going to be 
able to keep up with this story. 

Mr. Dash. What was that? 

Mr. Magruder. Oh, you know, family, taking care of the 
family, job, that kind of thing. Executive clemency. 

Mr. Dash. What did Mr. Mitchell say? 

Mr. Magruder. He was very positive but I knew he was only 
speaking for himself and he made that quite clear. In fact, I 
said I can’t accept it just now from you because you are here 
in New York, so he asked me to meet with him and Haldeman the 
next day which I did. At that meeting — I think Mr. Haldeman 
taped it as I understand — Mr. Haldeman was very careful to 
say he would do anything he could as a friend to help me but he 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


111 


( 342 ) 



14, 2 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY, MNE 12, 1973. SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION £ 111-12 

112 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 

couldn't speak for the President. There was a controversy over 
the meetings. 

Mr. Dash. Who was present at that? 

Mr. Magruder. Haldeman, Mitchell and myself. 


Mr. Dash. When was that? 

Mr. Magruder. The Wednesday after the Friday McCord — 
the end of the trial. That would be March. 

Mr. Dash. March 23 was when Mr. McCord's letter was read. 

Mr. Magruder. Tuesday I went to New York, at Mr. Mit- 
chell's request vent to New York, discussed the problem. I 
indicated — I had already decided that if it got to a Grand 
Jury place again that I would not be able to personally go 
through this process again but that I would still try to hold 
if we could work out some reasonable way we could hold with 
that story. Then — 

Mr. Dash, Then you. 

Mr. Magruder. I went through with Mr. Mitchell all the 
questions . 

Mr. Dash. You said that. You weren't satisifed. 

L Mr. Magruder. I asked to see Mr. Haldeman, We met with 
Mr. Haldeman next morning. 

Mr. Dash. The 29th? 

*Mr . Magruder . The 29 th. 

Mr. Dash. Who was present? 

Mr. Magruder. Just the three of us. 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


( 343 ) 



14.3 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY 3 JULY 10 a 7373, £ SSC 1633-34 

1633 


Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am sure it occurred to me and probably on 
hindsight I probably should have. I do not think there is any doubt 
about it. 

Mr. Dash. Did you not think it was the President's prerogative to 
know what to do about these matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The decision had to be made, and it is a tough one, 
whether or not he is not involved in it but he does not know about 
them, will this go away. I knew they were going to change the person- 
nel in the White House and hopefully they would be gone and he would 
not have to deal with it and he could go on to his second term, the 
second Presidency, without this problem. 

Mr. Dash. But you were taking a major risk, were vou not, Mr. 
Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. I think you are taking a major risk any time you 
have to deal with the White House horrors under any circumstances. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, you spoke to the President quite frequently on the 
telephone, you met with him, your logs indicate, so you did have plenty 
of opportunities, and on no occasion, I think it is your testimony, did 
you speak to the President about these matters ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Xow, which matters are we talking about ? 

Mr. Dash. Again, the White House-- — 

Mr. Mitchell. About disclosing these matters. 

Mr. Dash. Disclosing the matters, the White House horrors, the 
break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. I did not — well, let us not pass this over to the point 
where — on the 20th of June when I talked to him I apologized to him 
for not knowing what the hell had happened and I should have kept a 
stronger hand on what the people in the committee were doing, et 
cetera. And then, further on down the road in these political meetings 
that are shown on the logs, there were discussions about appointing a 
commission of the type of the Warren commission to investigate this 
matter, and special prosecutors and things like that. I do not want to 
leave the impression that it was never touched under any circum- 


stances. 

Mr. Dash. I am not talking about when you talked about Water- 
gate as such. I am talking about the so-called coverup, the White House 
horrors and what your own knowledge, based on information given 
you, as to who was involved in the break-in of the DXC. * 

Mr. Mitchell. I answered that I did not talk to him about it. 

Mr. Dash. I know, but on the 20th — — 

Mr. Mitchell. I also answered in hindsight it probably would have 



been a better idea if I had. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, also on March 27 did Mr. Magruder come to see you 
in New York? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, he did. 

Mr. Dasii. And do you recall that he testified that he came because 
he began to be aware or concerned that things might unravel and, 
therefore, wanted assurances from you that he be taken care of. Do you 


recall that ? 

Mr. Mitciiell. I recall very well, Mr. Dash, because of the fact that 
there was, based in the McCord letter to Judge Sirica, and Mr. Ma- 
gruder wanted to talk to me about the potentials of his being brought 
back before the grand jury on a perjury count. 


( 344 ) 




14,3 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY , JULY 10 3 1973 3 4 SSC 1633-34 


1634 


Mr. Dash. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that 
to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you 
would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabil- 
itation, any of the things we have been asking about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never 
promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I 
could. 

With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I 
told Jeb Magruder w r as that I thought he was a very outstanding young 
man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help 
him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so. 

And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day 
down at Haldeman’s office. 

Mr. Dash, Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman? 


i 


Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still 
in the White House ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. And met with Mr. Haldeman on the 28th of March? 

- Mr. Mitchell. 28th of March, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Ma- 
gruder there and what was being given to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Magruder was again concerned — well, he did 
not express it too directly — that he thought he might become the fall 
guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this 
all thought they were going to become a fall guy. 

Mr. Dash. Did you, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did I? No. Contrary to the story that I have read I 
did not believe that to be the case. I am quite anxiously waiting to see 
if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel 
who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be 
made. 


Mr. Dash. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder’s meet- 
ing with you on March 28 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it was the same general discussion, “I may have 
problems with my perjury, I don't have any money, am I going to be 
deserted, are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get 
counsel, 55 and this tvpe of conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Haldeman make any kind of promises to Mr. 
Magruder at that time, in your presence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. None other than the fact to help him as a friend and 
I think Mr. Haldeman has testified to that. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder 
and Mr. Dean after that meeting with Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. 

Mr. Dash. What was that meeting about? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was held at Magruder’s request because 
he again was concerned about this perjury question that he might 
have, and the meeting was a quick run through again of the recollec- 
tion of the individuals as to what was discussed prior to Mr. 
Magruder’s third appearance before the grand jury back in September. 


( 345 ) 




15. On March 27, 1973 the President met from 11:10 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. 
with John Ehrlichman and from 11:35 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. with H. R. Haldeman. 
Ehrlichman has testified that at this meeting the President directed him 
to contact Attorney General Kleindienst. The President has stated that 
on March 27, 1973 he directed that Kleindienst be told to report directly 
to the President anything he found in the Watergate area. The President 
has produced an edited transcript of this conversation and a summary of 
that transcript has been prepared. 


Page 


15.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and H. R. Haldeman, March 27, 1973 348 

15.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 

and John Ehrlichman, March 27, 1973 349 

15.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-48 350 

15.4 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 352 

15.5 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of conversation among the 
President, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, March 

27, 1973, 11:10 a.m. — 1:30 p.m 354 


( 347 ) 


15.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND H.R. HALDEMAN. 
MARCH 27^ 1973 


H. R- Haldeman 


-59- 


ti U itt 1 1 

March 24, 197 3 

AM 11:36 President placed local call to Haldeman 


PM 12:15 2:55 President met with Haldeman 


March 25, 1973 





AM 

9:35 

10:10 

1:05 

President placed local call to Haldeman 
President met with Haldeman 


March 26, 1973 





AM 

9:39 

10:15 

1:00PM 

President placed local call to Haldeman 
President met with Haldeman 

Ziegler 11:00 - 

12:15 

PM 

1:15 

3:45 

President met with Haldeman 
Ziegler 

3:10 - 

3:11 

March 27, 1973 




AM 

9:47 10:55 

President met with Haldeman 




11:35 

1:30PM 

President met with Haldeman 
Ehrlichman 
Ziegler 
Bull 

11:10 - 
11:30 - 
11:45 - 

1:30 
11:40 
11:46 and 

PM 

4:20 

6:05 

5:20 

7:10 

President met with Haldeman 
President met with Haldemaja 

1:16 

1:17 


March 28, 1973 



AM 

8:45 

9:00 

President met with Haldeman 

PM 

12:45 

1:45 

President met with Haldeman 

Bull 1:16 - 1:17 


4:20 

4:40 

President met with Mr. Haldeman 


7:17 

7:32 

President placed local call to Haldeman 


8:50 

9:09 

President received local call from Haldeman 


( 348 ) 


15.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN EHRLICHMAN , 
MARCH 27^ 1973 


•John D. Ehrlichman 
March 23, 1973 


- 43 - 



AM 11:34 11:41 


President received long distance call from 
Mr. Ehrlichman 


11:46 12:05PM President received long distance call from 

Mr. Ehrlichman 


March 27, 1973 

11:07 11:08 President placed local call to Mi*. Ehrlichman 

AM 11:10 1:30PM President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(Mr. Ziegler 11:30-11:40) 

(Mr. Haldeman 11:35-1:30) 

(Mr. Bull 11:45-11:46) 


PM 6:03 6:05 President placed local call to Ehrlichman 


March 28, 1973 


PM 7:55 7:56 


March 29, 1973 
PM 5:35 6:24 

PM 2:45 4:20 

6:25 6:26 

March 30, 1973 
AM 9:07 10:18 

PM 12:02 12:18 


President placed local call to Ehrlichman 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 2:46-4:45) 

(Mr. Ziegler 3:01-3:30) 

(Marjorie P. Acker 4:05-4:06) 
President placed local call to Ehrlichman 


President met with Messrs. Ehrlichman, 
Helmut Sonne nfeldt, George P. Shultz to 
discuss domestic issues Sec. Shultz's 
trip to Western Europe & U. S.S.R. 

President met with Messrs. Ehrlichman and 
Ziegler 


( 349 ) 



35.3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY. JULY 27. 197 Z. 7_ SSC 2747-48 


2747 

other words, he was not going to move against anybody until he had 
tliis down and could see what this fellow really had and'then would 
forward. ° 

Senator Gurney. Well now, around about (his time or somewhat 
later, and there are so many meetings here that I have really forgotten 
which occurred when, so perhaps I am going to have to relv on vou for 
that, but did the President lift the phone up at any time and say' “John 
I want you to come over to the office here and talk about Watergate, 
what you know about it.” 

Mr. Ehelichman. No, sir, not until way late in the game. He lifted 
up the phone one day and called me down and said, “I am satisfied 
that John Dean is in this so deeply that he simply cannot any longer 
have anything to do with it.” 

Senator Gurney. That is when he transferred the assignment to 
you? 

Mr. Ehrlich nr an. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. What date was that? 

Mr. Ehrlich man. March 30. • / • 

Senator Gurnet. And tell us again precisely what transpired in 
that phone conversation beyond what you have already. 

Mr. Ehruchman. Well, that was a meeting in the President’s office 
on March 30, and it was, as I recall, quite brief. We had had, we were 
getting ready tp leave that same day, as a matter of fact, for Cali- 
fornia, and he called me down, I am looking for the time to help me, 
to recall the time of departure here. Yes, we leave at 3 o’clock in 
the afternoon, we had had a long meeting that morning with Secre- 
tary Shultz and Mr. Sorinenfeld about the economy, and that ran 
from 9 a.m. to about, I don’t know, what, 10 a.m. or 11 am., something 
of that kind, a long session, as I recall. He called me down for just 
about 10 minutes at noontime, and said what I have just- told you, 
and I said, “Well, what is it you expect me to do basically” and he 
said, “I want you to step into what Dean has been doing here. I need 
to know about executive privilege, I need to know about attorney- 
client privilege, I need to have somebody set this strategy with regard 
to testifying at the committee and the grand jury and these other 
^places and I need to know where the truth lies in this thing.” And 
the only tipoff that ‘I had had to that was a request from him on the 
27tli, I believe it was, yes, on the 27th. 

Senator "Gurnet, Is that the meeting between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. 
with the President? 

Mr, Ehruchman. I believe — yes, yes indeed. That was for the pur- 
pose of dictating to me a list of questions that he wanted put to the 
Attorney General, and I believe that telephone call to the Attorney 
General which actually was not completed until the next day because 
he was traveling, is in your -file, phone call with Kleindienst on the 
' 28 th, and I then went down a handwritten list of questions that the 
President had put to me about the progress of the case, about the 
involvement of John Mitchell, possible, any possible evidence that 
Kleindienst might have, any possible evidence of anybody else being 
involved at the Committee To Re-Elect, any evidence of any White 
I fouse staff being involved and the President' told me to tell the Attor- 
ney General that if he had any such evidence or if he developed any 


( 350 ) 




15.3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY , JULY 27 , 7^75,, 7 2747-48 


274S 


such evidence, that lie was then to transmit it directly to the President, 
not through, me, not through anybody else at the White House but 
direct to the President, and in that message I did, as you see in the 
transcript-, that I did transmit to the Attorney General. 

Senator Gurney. Do we have those questions that he 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, you do not. They are a part of my notes 
of the meeting of the 27th which are in the President's file. 

Senator Gurney. How many questions were there? 

Mr. Eheltchmax. Well, there are about 10 or 12 topics, I think, 
written out on a piece of paper. 

Senator Gurney. Would you give us to the best of your recollection 
what the topics were and what the questions were ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think I can do that best. Senator, by looking at 
that telephone conversation and — because I think that that transcript 
is quite* faithful to the list. I just went down the list in talking with 
the Attorney General. I don't seem to have that in my 

Senator Gurney. The telephone. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The telephone call with Mr. Klein dienst on the 
28th. ‘ . - 

Senator Gurnet. I wonder if the committee would hand this to the 
witness, Mr. Ehrlichman. That apparently is it. If we have another 
copy I wish I could have it, too, but I think it is better you have it at 
the moment. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We have a copy here ; I may have stuck it back in 
the file. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Gurney. I have a copy here now. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign that the appropriate exhibit 
number. - 

_ [The document referred to was marked exhibit Ko. 99.*] 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Actually the first sentence, as I recall, is only 
partly oiy this transcript and it said, “There are a number of things 
the President wanted me to cover with you,” and only the latter half 
of that sentence is in the transcript. 

Senator Gurney. If we could, Mr. Ehrlichman, this is very impor- 
tant, but if you could summarize these as briefly as you can it will help 
out the committee because I think my own time is running out here. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You will see in the fourth paragraph I said. 
“Is o. 1, he wanted me to ask you these- two things that I did yesterday 
about the gyand jury and about Baker,” meaning Senator Baber, and 
then we go into an inquiry about some statements that Senator Weicker 
had made to the press which the President had asked Pat Gray to check 
into. Then, and the President wanted a report on whether Senator 
Weicker had any evidence or not to support these assertions. 

Senator Gurney. I think perhaps you had -better explain a little 
more about Senator Baker who is not here so we can know that there 
is no 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the President had designated .John Dean as 
the \\ Kite Mouse contact on Watergate, or the White House leadmau 
on \\ atergace, as I say in February. lie had also designated the Attor- 
ney Genera! as the administration contact to the eommitree. and had 

p. 2944. 


( 351 ) 



IS. 4 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, AUGUST 22, 1973 , 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1016 3 1019 


PKtSIDsNrtAl DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 


1 C 1 6 

ACTION 

4-1 nnounccment of Intention To Nominate 
Harry J. Hogan To Be Associate Director for 
Policy and Program Development. 

August 21, 1973 

The President today announced his intention to nomi- 
nate Harry J. Hogan, of Bethesda, Md., to be Associate 
Director of ACTION for Policy and Program Develop- 
ment. He will succeed Charles W. Ervin, who resigned ef- 
fective September 4, 1973. 

Since 1972, Mr. Hogan has been director of govern- 
ment relations for Catholic University, in Washington, 
D.C. From 1971 to 1972, he was engaged in the private 
practice of law, served as a consultant on educational and 
environmental matters, and was professor of law' at Dela- 
ware Law School, in Wilmington, Del. From 1969 to 
1971, lie was counsel of the House Special Subcommittee 
on Education, 


He was born on May 2, 1914, in Newark, X.J. ,\[ r 
Hogan was graduated magna cum faude from Princeton 
University, received his LL.B. from Columbia Law 
School, and received his Ph. D. in American Historv from 
George Washington University. He served in the U.S. 
Navy during World War II, attaining the rank of 
commander. 

From 1947 to 1952, Mr. Hogan was on the legal staff 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. From 
1952 to 1961, he was engaged m the private practice of 
law in The Dalles, Oreg., where he was twice elected Dis- 
trict Attorney (1956 and I960). From 1961 to 1968, Mr. 
Hogan served as general counsel of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, in Portland, Oreg.; as Associate Solicitor 
for Water and Power of the Department of the Interior, 
and as Legislative Counsel of the Department of the 
Interior. 

Mr. Hogan is married and has three daughters. The 
Hogans reside in Bethesda, Md. 

note: The announcement was released in San Clemente, Calif. 


THE PRESIDENT’S NEWS CONFERENCE OF 
, AUGUST 22, 1973 

Held at the Western White House 

Secretary of State 

© 

The President. Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement before 
going to your questions. 

It is with the deep sense of not only official regret, but personal 
regret, that I announce the resignation of Secretary of State William 
Rogers, effective September 3. A letter, which will be released to the 
press after this conference, will indicate my appraisal of his work as 
Secretary of State. 1 

I will simply say at this time that he wanted to leave at the con- 
clusion of the first 4 years. He agreed to stay on because we had some 
enormously important problems coming up, including the negotiations 
which resulted in the end of the war in Vietnam, the Soviet summit, the 
European Security Conference, as well as in other areas — Latin America 
and in Asia — where the Secretary of State, as you know, has been quite 
busy over these past 8 months. 

As he returns to private life, we will not only miss him, in terms of 
his official sendee, but I shall particularly miss him because of his having 
been, through the years, a very dose personal friend and adviser. 

That personal friendship and advice, however, f hope still to have 
the benefit of, and I know' that I will. 

1 Fur an uAuhatwe ol Liters between the Presirh-nt and Secretary of State Rogers, 
.Sf-e page. 1025 of this issue. 

Volume 9 — Number 34 


( 352 ) 



15.4 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, AUGUST 22, 1975, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1016, 1019 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 


1 -re President. i don't believe, Fust, ic would satisfy 
the public mind, and it should not. The second point is 
that as Mr. Wright, who argued the case, T understand 
very well, before Judge Sirica this morning, has indicated, 
to have the tapes listened to — he indicated this also in 
his brief — either by a prosecutor or by a judge or in 
camera , or in any way, would violate the principle of con- 
fidentiality, and I believe he is correct. That is why we 
are standing firm on the proposition that we will not agree 
to the Senate committee's desire to have, for example, its 
chief investigator listen to the tapes, or the Special Prose- 
cutor s desire to hear the tapes, and also why we will op- 
pose, as Mr. Wright did in his argument this morning, 
any compromise of the principle of confidentiality. 

Let me explain very carefully that the principle of 
confidentiality either exists or it does not exist. Once it 
is compromised, once it is known that a conversation that 
is held with the President can be subject to a subpoena by 
a Senate committee, by a grand jury, by a prosecutor, and 
be listened to by anyone, the principle of confidentiality 
is thereby irreparably damaged. Incidentally, let me say 
that now that tapes are no longer being made, I suppose 
it could be argued that, what difference does it make now, 
now that these tapes are also in the past. What is involved 
here is not only the tapes; what is involved, as you ladies 
and gentlemen well know, is the request on the part of 
the Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor, as well, 
that we turn over Presidential papers, in other words, the 
records of conversations with the President made by his 
associates. Those papers, and the tapes as well, cannot be 
turned over without breaching the principle of confiden- 
tiality. It was President Truman that made that argument 
very effectively in his letter to a Senate committee, or his 
response to a Congressional committee, a House com- 
mittee it was, in 1953, when they asked him to turn over 
his papers. So whether it is a paper or whether it is a tape, 
what we have to bear in mind is that for a President to 
conduct the affairs of this office and conduct them effec- 
tively, he must be able to do so with the principle of con- 
fidentiality intact. Otherwise, the individuals who come 
to talk to him, whether it is his advisers, or whether it is 
a visitor in the domestic field, or whether it is someone in 
a foreign field, will always be speaking in a eunuch-like 
way, rather than laying it on the line as it has to be laid 
on the line if you are going to have the creative kind of 
discussion that we have often had, and it has been respon- 
sible for some of our successes in the foreign policy period, 
particularly in the past few years. 

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us who you personally 
talked to in directing that investigations be made both, in 
j tuic of ’72, shortly after the Watergate incident, and last 
March 21, when you got new evidence arid ordered a 
more intensive investigation? 

I f'K President. Certainly. In June, 1, of course, 
sulked to Mr. MacGregor first of all, who was the new 
( h.unnaii of the committee. He told me that he would 
f-wt^rkict a thorough in\ estigation as far as his entire com- 


1019 

mittee staff, was concerned, ipparendy that investigation 
was very effective except for Mr. Magruder, who stayed 
on. But Mr. MacGregor does not have to assume respon- 
sibility for that. I say not responsibility for it because ba- 
sically what happened there was that he believed Mr. 
Magruder, and many others have believed him, too. He 
proved, however, to be wrong. 

In the White House, the investigation’s responsibility 
was given to Mr. Ehrlichman at the highest level, and in 
turn he delegated them to Mr. Dean, the White House 
Counsel, something of which I was aware, and of which 
I approved. 

Mr. Dean, as White House Counsel, therefore sat in 
on the FBI interrogations of the members of the White 
House Staff because what I wanted to know was whether 
any member of the White House Staff was in any way in- 
volved. If he was involved, he would be fired. And when 
we met on September 15, and again throughout our dis- 
cussions in the month of March, Mr. Dean insisted that 
there was not — and I use his words — “a scintilla of evi- 
dence” indicating that anyone on the White House Staff 
was involved in the planning of the Watergate break-in. 

Now, in terms of after March 21, Mr. Dean first was 
given the responsibility tc write his own report, b ut I did 
not rest it there. I also had a contact made with the Attor- 1 
nev General himself, Attorney General Kleindienst, told 
him — it was on the 27th of March — to report to me di- 
rectly anything that he found in this particular area, and I 
gave the responsibility to Mr. Ehrlichman on the 29th of 
March to continue the investigation that Mr. Dean was 
unable to conclude, having spent a week at Camp David 
and unable to finish the report. 

Mr. Ehrlichman questioned a number of people in that 
period at my direction, including Mr. Mitchell, and I 
should also point out that as far as my own activities were 
concerned, I was not leaving it just to them. I met at great 
length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean 
and Mr. Mitchell on the 22d. I discussed the whole matter 
with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had had 
throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth 
out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt, and it was 
there that Mr. Mitchell suggested that all the individuals 
involved in the White House appear in an executive ses- 
sion before the Ervin committee. We never got that far, 
but at least that is an indication of the extent of my own 
investigation. 

Q. Mr. President, you have said repeatedly- that you 
tried to get all the facts, and just now* you mentioned the 
March 22 meeting. Yet former Attorney General John 
Mitchell said that if you had ever asked him at anv time 
about the Watergate matter, he would have told you the 
whole story, chapter and verse. Was Mr. Mitchell not 
speaking the truth when he said that before the 
committee? 

The President. Now, Mr. Lisagor, I am no; going to 
question Mr. Mitchell s vernciu, and 1 will only sa\ that 
throughout T had confidence in Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitch- 


Volume 9 — Number 34 


( 353 ) 



15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT , MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION _ 

SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT 
MARCH 27, 1973, 11:10 A. M. TO 1:30 P.M. 

On March 27, 1973, the President met in his EOB office 
with Haldeman , Ehrlichman and Ziegler between 11:10 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. 

The meeting opened with a brief discussion of creation of a ,f Watergate 
Commission." (pp. 1-2) The President then discussed with Ziegler and 
Ehrlichman possible responses to press inquiries concerning whether 
John Dean would testify before a grand jury. (pp. 2 ff.) In the 
middle of this discussion there is a notation "Material unrelated to 
Presidential action deleted." (p. 4) The President instructed Ziegler, 
should an inquiry be made, to "stall them off today" by stating that 
"that is not before us at this time" but that "there will be complete 
cooperation consistent with the responsibilities that everybody has on 
the separation of powers" and consistent with Mr. Dean's responsibility 
as Counsel. (p. 6) The President told Ziegler to refer to Dean as 
Counsel to the White House rather than Counsel to the President. (p. 4) 
The discussion of this topic concludes with the notation "Material un- 
related to Presidential actions deleted." (p. 7) 

Ehrlichman told the President that he would soon be given 
names of possible nominees for the position of Director of the FBI. 
Ehrlichman said, "I hope you will look into that guy that (unintelligible) 
mentioned." The President responded that "A judge with a prosecuting 
background might be a hell of a good thing." The President indicated 


( 354 ) 




15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 

that a new nomination should be announced at the same time as with- 
drawal of Gray’s nomination is announced, and he hoped this would take 
place the following week. (p. 7) 

The President and Ehrlichman discussed getting Attorney 
General Kleindienst "out front." The President at one point apparently 
misinterpreted a statement by Ehrlichman to mean "get him [Kleindienst] 
out of the office" [of Attorney General] , and said "I am afraid its 
(unintelligible) of canning him right away." (p. 8) 

Haldeman said all he had was Dean’s report and that "I did 
not talk to Mitchell, because this thing changed what you might want 
from Mitchell." Haldeman said that Paul O’Brien thought "Mitchell could 
cut this whole thing off, if he would just step forward and cut it off"; 
that O’Brien said "The fact of the matter is as far as [O’Brien] could 
determine, Mitchell did sign off on the Liddy Plan; according to O’Brien, 
"if that’s what it is, the empire will crack." Haldeman said Dean also 
believed Mitchell did sign off, but that neither O’Brien nor Dean was 
able to prove that. (p. 9) 

According to Haldeman, Magruder told O'Brien that the Liddy 
plan was put together "by the White House, by Haldeman, Dean and 
others." Haldeman said he did have a discussion with Mitchell about 
the need for intelligence activity, but that this was before Liddy was 
hired by the Committee. (p. 10) Haldeman related that O'Brien said Liddy, 
after having joined CRP, developed two intelligence plans that had 


- 2 - 


( 355 ) 



15,5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT 3 MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION , 

been rejected or "didn’t get bought," but that later Colson told 
Magruder to "at least listen" to the plans, and that Strachan called 
Magruder and said Haldeman told him to get this going, "[t]he 
President wants it done and there is to be no more arguing about it." 
Haldeman said Magruder told Mitchell that Strachan "had told him to 
get it going on Haldeman ’s orders on the President’s orders" to 
which Mitchell allegedly responded "OK, if they say do it, go ahead," 
referring to the Liddy program including the bugging, (pp. 10-11) 
Haldeman then said Magruder said that at some later point Mitchell read 
the riot act to Liddy "on the poor quality of (unintelligible)." 

Haldeman mentioned Dean’s theory that Mitchell and Magruder 
realized "that they now have their ass in this thing, and . . . are 
trying to untangle it," not necessarily "working together again." 
Haldeman said Dean believed that "In the process of that they are mixing 
apples and oranges for their own protection" and "remembering various 
things in connection with others, like Liddy and Hunt." At this point 
the transcript notes "Material not related to Presidential actions 
deleted." (p. 12) 

Haldeman then said that Dean said Magruder did not realize 
how little Dean told Liddy and that Dean "never got into any setting 
up an elaborate intelligence apparatus." Haldeman reiterated what 
Dean said occurred at the two Liddy plan meetings in Mitchell’s office, 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


and then told the President that after the second meeting Dean told 
Haldeman "that he had just seen this wrap-up on it, and that it was 
impossible," that "they shouldn’t be doing it," and that "we 
shouldn’t be involved in it and we ought to drop the whole thing," 

(pp. 13-14) Dean further had told Haldeman Dean thought "’they 
had turned it off and in any event I wanted to stay ten miles away 
from it, and did.’" After that, Haldeman said Dean told him, the 
problem from early January was that Liddy "was never really given any 
guidance" from Mitchell or Magruder. (p, 14) 

Haldeman told the President that "O’Brien says that Magruder ’s 
objective in holding at the moment is a meeting with Mitchell and me" 
and that "what he has told the lawyers, that will be a shot across the 
bough [sic] and tear down the meeting place." According to Haldeman, 
"O’Brien doesn’t really believe Jeb, but he's not sure." (p. 15) 

The President asked whether O’Brien and Parkinson were involved in 
the Watergate matter and Haldeman responded that they were involved 
in post-June 17 activities. 

Haldeman told the President that Hunt was at the grand jury 
that day and "we don’t know how far he is going to go." (p. 16) 

Haldeman said, referring to Hunt, "The danger area for him is on the money, 
that he was given money." Haldeman stated to the President that Hunt was 
not as desperate today as he was yesterday, but that he was still on the 
brink or at least shaky. Haldeman said the reason Hunt was shaky was 


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35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-24 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF MITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT* MARCH 2?* 197 Z CONVERSATION 

that McCord had talked and probably would walk out scot free* The 
President said "Scot free and a hero," and Haldeman said "And he 
[Hunt] doesn't like th^t. He figures here's my turn* And that he may 
go — ." The President responded, "That's the way I would think all 
of them would feel." However, O'Brien felt, according to Haldeman, 
that Hunt would not seek "to get people" but would gradually "do what 
he had to do" to "take care of himself" and get himself into the same 
position as McCord. Haldeman said, "He feels, in summary, that on 
both Hunt and Magruder questions we're not really in the crunch that we 
were last night" and "he is not as concerned as he was when he talked 
with you last night." (p. 17) 

Haldeman (apparently passing on Dean's view) said Judge Sirica 
probably would grant immunity to Liddy, and that Liddy's "intention, as 
of now at least, is to refuse to talk" despite immunity, so he would be 
in contempt. The President said, "I will almost bet that is what Liddy 
will do." (pp. 17-18) 

The President and Ehrlichman stated that they believed that 
Dean had no prior knowledge of the break-in. (pp. 18-19) The President 
also stated that he knew "most everybody except Bob, and perhaps you, 
think Colson knew all about it," but indicated he did not think that 
Colson knew about the intelligence plan. The President said Colson was 
"always coming to me with ideas" but didn't mention it, although "I 
think he would have said, 'Look we've gotten some information.'" "But," 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


the President said, "I was talking to Colson, remember exlusively 
about — and maybe that was the point — exclusively about issues." 

(p. 19) The President said "as a matter of fact I didn T t even know — 

I didn’t know frankly that the Ellsberg thing, etc. — electronically 
thing — you know what I mean?" The President, after an "unintelligible" 
remark by Ehrlichman, went on to say "And I guess you deliberately 
didn’t want me — ", to which Ehrlichman responded "Well, sir, I 
didn’t know . . . what this crowd were up to until afterwards." The 
President said "Right." (p. 20) 

The President said that 


Well, the thing is too, that I know they talk 
about this business of Magruder's, saying that 
Haldeman had ordered, the President had ordered, 
etc., of all people who was surprised on the 17th 
of June — I was in Florida — was me. . . . And 
I read the paper. What in the name of (expletive 
removed) is this? I just couldn’t believe it. 

So you know what I mean — I believe in playing 
politics hard, but I am also smart. What I can’t 
understand is how Mitchell would ever approve. 

(p. 21) 


The President said that Mitchell and Liddy could both be 
telling the truth, because although Mitchell could say he never approved 
the plan, Liddy just assumed he had abstract approval. (p. 23) The 
President said 


You’ve got to figure the lines of defenses that 
everybody’s going to take here. That’s Mitchell’s. 
Right? What’s Haldeman ’s line of defense? Haldeman ’s 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT „ MARCH 27 3 1973 CONVERSATION 


line of defense, "I never approved anything of 
the sort. I just" — you know that — What’s 
Ehrlichman ’s? There is no doubt he knows 
nothing about it. (pp. 23-24) 

After a brief discussion of earlier wiretapping involving 
Ehrlichman, which the President suggested "You would say it was 
ordered on a national security basis," Ehrlichman said: 

Let me go back and pick up this business about 
taps. I think — I have done some checking and 
I want you to get the feel for what I would say 
if this Hunt thing slopped over on me. (p. 24) 

The President responded that "Incidentally, my view is — I don’t know 
Hunt — I don’t think Hunt will do that." Ehrlichman said he did not 
think so either, and the President said, "You don’t think he is going 
to have to take a fall for (unintelligible) any burglary? If he does 
. . . . " Ehrlichman then outlined his proposed "line of response," that 
from the time he [Ehrlichman] was Counsel to the President "we were very 
concerned" over national security leaks; that there had been three 
serious national security breaches: Szulc, the Pentagon Papers and 

the Pakistan-India incidents; that Hunt became involved because 
at the time of the Pentagon Papers "we" had concerns about the relation- 
ship of that leak to other leaks. (pp- 24-25) Ehrlichman told the 
President that "we moved very vigorously on the whole cast of characters 
in the Pentagon Papers thing" and that "some of our findings have never 
come out." (p. 25) Ehrlichman told the President that it was not until 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 27, 1973, CONVERSATION 


after the Los Angeles operation occurred that he found out about the 
entry into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, Ehrlichman informed the 
President that a request was made for a second entry, but he denied 
the request. (p. 26) 

Ehrlichman said that Krogh admitted to having authorized the 
Ellsberg burglary and if asked was willing to say so and to resign 
from the Department of Transportation and get out of town. The Presi- 
dent asked, "Should he [resign]?," and Ehrlichman said 

I don’t think he will have to. Number one, I don’t 
think Hunt will strike him. If he did, I would put 
the national security tent over this whole operation. 

The President said "I sure would." (p. 26) 

Ehrlichman then said he would say a lot of things went on in 
the national interest that involved taps, entry, interrogation, and a 
lot of things, "and I don’t propose to open that up to (unintelligible) 
just hard line it." The President said "I think that is what you have 
to do there." (pp. 26-27) 

Haldeman then returned to the subject of Dean’s idea of estab- 
lishing a Commission — a "super panel" — that would possess complete in- 
vestigative and judicial responsibility over the entire Watergate affair, 
(pp. 27-28) Haldeman told the President that Dean saw two major advantages 
to the Commission. The first was that the Commission would take a long 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT^ MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


time to get set up and it would not complete its hearings and make 
its findings before the '74 election. The second advantage, Haldeman 
said, was that the President would maintain "the ultimate stroke" of 
being able to pardon anybody on January 19, "so the potential ultimate 
penalty . . . could be about two years." (pp. 30-31) Haldeman said 
that Dean also thought that the President should meet alone with Mitchell 
to find out "Mitchell's true perception of what did happen." The Presi- 
dent asked "What do we do if Mitchell were to admit, 'Yes, I did it,’" 
and Haldeman said "It ! s greater knowledge than we possess right now — 
if he would only confess." (p. 32) Haldeman said that "I didn't call 
Mitchell because I need (unintelligible) but we should go ahead with 
Magruder, I think," and the President agreed. (p. 33) The President 
said 


I have not really had from Mitchell but I have had 
from Haldeman, I have had from Ehrlichman, I have 
had from Colson cold, flat denials. I have asked 
each of you to tell me, and also Dean. Now the 
President, therefore, has not lied on this thing. I 
don't think that yet has been charged. Liability has 
been charged, but they haven't charged the President 
with any offense. They are (unintelligible) in trying 
to protect his people who are lying. But I don't — 
doesn't anybody suggest that I (unintelligible) this 
whole damn thing? (p. 34) 

Haldeman then said that "As of now it is all saying that you are being 
ill-served by (unintelligible)." "By my people," the President said, 
"But I don't know about Mitchell. I never asked him." The President 


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15,5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT^ MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION : 


indicated he would "get Mitchell down." (p. 34) 

A discussion of Magruder ’s going "public" with what he knew 
followed, the President saying at first that it would "ruin" Magruder 
if he did that. (p. 35) The President asked how perjury by Magruder 
could be proved, asking whether Hunt might testify to it, and Haldeman 
said Magruder "knows he did perjure himself" and hence was worried 
someone might prove it. Haldeman said Barker was more likely to be able 
to do so because Barker worked for Magruder. (p. 36) Haldeman said 
that Barker said he couldn’t remember who he delivered the tap reports 
to. At this point the transcript notes "Material unrelated to Presi- 
dential actions deleted." (pp. 37-39) 

In discussing options available to Mitchell, the President 
said that Mitchell would probably say that he may have been responsible 
but that he did not realize what they were up to, and that Mitchell 
would never admit to perjury. The President asked Haldeman to call 
Mitchell and ask him to come to Washington to meet with Magruder, Haldeman 
and the President, (pp. 37-40) 

The President asked, concerning Magruder ’s possible testimony, 
"what stroke have you got with Magruder? I guess we’ve got none." After 
some discussion Haldeman said he would advise Magruder to seek immunity 
and testify that he had lied earlier, suggesting Magruder would say 
"Nobody asked me to do it." (pp. 40-43) 


- 10 - 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT , MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


There was further discussion of establishing a Commission 
to consider the Watergate matter, and of the possible composition of 
such a Commission. (pp. 44-48) Haldeman said that he would arrange 
to meet with Bill Rogers to discuss it. (p. 48) 

Ehrlichman said he was going to meet with Kleindienst, and 
the President told Ehrlichman that the only thing to tell Kleindienst 
was that "we are going to have to break with Gray who is killing us" 
and to find out from Kleindienst what Gray was going to do. (p. 48) 

Haldeman told the President that Senator Weicker had made 
a statement that day in which he said he had absolute proof that it 
went to the White House staff, but that he would not name names until 
he got his evidence in hand. There was discussion of who Weicker might 
be obtaining information from, in which Magruder, Porter, McCord, Gray 
and Colson were mentioned as possibilities. (pp. 49-51) The President 
asked Ehrlichman to talk to Pat Gray to ask him what Weicker was up to. 
(p. 51) The President said that Ehrlichman should ask Gray to ask 
Weicker what his information is. As Director of the FBI, the President 
said, Gray is supposed to get all the information he can now, and if 
there is anybody, the President wants the information. 

The President said that members of the White House staff who 
are indicted, etc. would have to take a leave of absence, but that 
"they have to mention cutting off at the pass some place here." (p. 52) 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT 3 MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


Hal deman said to the President that once it was established that he 
was following that route, "if they were smart they would just start 
naming everybody just so you’d have no choice." The President replied 
that there was no way except that. Ehrlichman said that, number one, 
was to insulate the President; to make him appear "to be ahead of the 
power curve" and also to have some symbolic act of absolution after the 
thing is over, so that the President could take them all back on (after 
they had been absolved of wrongdoing). (pp. 52-53) 

At this point in the meeting Haldeman received a telephone 
call from Mitchell, who reported that Magruder was with him. The Presi- 
dent asked Haldeman to call Mitchell back that afternoon to get a 
report on his conversation with Magruder. 

Ehrlichman told the President that Gray would see Weicker, 
and the President said that he was anxious to get his report. (pp. 55-56) 

Ehrlichman said that the most important thing was that the 
President "keep the momentum of the business going," and the President 
agreed. (p. 57) The President then said that the "long seance with 
Mitchell tomorrow is going to be very difficult," but he would get it 
done. After the President commented that he felt pretty well, there is 
a notation of material unrelated to presidential actions deleted. (p. 57) 

Haldeman told the President that Mitchell was distressed that 
Kleindienst wasn’t "stepping up to his job" as the contact with the 


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25.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT , MARCH 27, 197 3 CONVERSATION 


Senate Select Committee, "getting Baker programmed and all that." 

(p. 58) Haldeman said Mitchell also blamed Kleindienst for the 
fact that Dean "is not getting information from Silbert on those things 
said at the grand jury." Haldeman said "Mitchell finds that absolutely 
incompetent, and says it was Kleindienst f s reponsibility." (p. 58) 

The President told Ehrlichman to tell Kleindienst that "you’re not 
asking nor in effect is the White House asking;" that Mitchell said 
that Ehrlichman had to "have this information from the grand jury at 
this time and that ’you owe it to him. 1 " (p. 58) The President advised 
Ehrlichman to put it on that basis "so that everybody can’t then say 
the White House raised hell about this, because we are not raising 
hell." The President further told Ehrlichman to tell Kleindienst that 
Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson had no prior knowledge and that 
if Kleindienst has any information to the contrary you want to know. 

He also told Ehrlichman to tell Kleindienst that "there is serious 
question here being raised about Mitchell." (p. 59) 

There was then discussion of the allegations made by McCord 
and Magruder. The President said "What is shocking to me is his 
[Magruder] blowing off against the one fair guy you wouldn’t think he 
would cut up, against Haldeman;" said that "he also knows it’s not true;" 
and asked Haldeman why Magruder was "tossing it off to you rather than 
to Mitchell." (pp. 59-60) Haldeman replied that Magruder hits Mitchell 
too, but that he "is just trying to wrap me because he wants to get you 
in." Magruder, Haldeman said, was firing a threat to the President to 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT, MARCH 27j, 1973 CONVERSATION ■ 


try to get people shook up. Ehrlichman said that Magruder was trying 
to get a line around the President for his own protection. (p. 60) 
Haldeman then said. 

In other words, if all Magruder is going to do is take 
the dive himself, then we are not going to hear about 
it. If he makes us worry that he is going to get 
Mitchell and you and me — . (p. 60) 

The President then asked Ehrlichman if there was any way 
Magruder could stick to his story. Ehrlichman replied that he thought 
he could because he was an ingenious witness and "[h]e is saying the 
things they want him to say." The following then appears in the 
transcript: 

P. No, no, no. I don’t mean if he says — 

E. Oh if he sticks to his old story — I see, I 

see. I thought you meant the story he is laying 
out here. 

P. Oh, no no. This story. They would take that in 
a minute. (p. 61) 

Ehrlichman then told the President that he was to the point where he 
didn't think "This thing is going to hold together," and that it was 
his hunch that anybody who tried to stick with a story not susceptible 
to. corroboration would be in serious difficulty. He expressed the view 
that Magruder ought to move to "a real and immune confession of perjury 
if he can do it. There's too many cross-currents in this thing now." 
(p. 61) The President said "Yeah. This is my view," and that if 


-14- 


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35,5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT 3 MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


Magruder "is going to lie about it, you know, I am sure he checked 
it out." (pp. 61-62) He asked what the hell was in it for Magruder, 
and Haldeman and Ehrlichman replied, "Immunity." The President asked 
who had authority to grant immunity, and after a brief discussion of 
the subject there is a deletion of "Materials Unrelated to Presidential 
Actions." (p. 62) 

The President said "This is a bad rap here" and "we are not 
going to allow it." He said "our real problem is Mitchell." He in- 
quired whether it was "too dangerous" to have the Attorney General 
call Silbert to find out what was being said to the Grand Jury, but 
Ehrlichman explained it was not necessary since Henry Petersen could 
let Kleindienst know. (p. 62) The President acknowledged a "problem" 
if Kleindienst would have to admit furnishing "the Grand Jury things to 
the White House." The President instructed Ehrlichman to "just tell 
Dick" that he should furnish information to the White House because 
"our interest here ... is whether there are any White House people 
involved here and we will move on them," and Erhlichman added "the 
President wants to know." The President said "That is the purpose," 
not to protect anybody "but to find out what the hell they are saying." 

The President apparently indicated Ehrlichman should tell Kleindienst 
he wanted to get information every day "so that we can move one step 
ahead here" and not have to wait "until a grand jury drags them up there." 
(pp. 62-63) 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION 


There was further discussion about whether to have all 
White House personnel testify before the Grand Jury or alternatively 
be questioned by Judge Sirica, (pp. 63-64) The President and Ehrlichman 
agreed the President had to "Do something" so that he was "out front" 
on this issue. (p. 65) Waiving executive privilege was discussed 
and Ehrlichman said lf You could say I have never had a communication 
with anybody on my staff about this burglary — "; the President said 
"I have never had any — , " and Ehrlichman then suggested the President 
say, "Since I had no communication with anybody on the White House 
staff about this burglary or about the circumstances leading up to it, 
there is no occasion for executive privilege in this matter." The 
President then said, apparently further indicating what he would say 
publicly, "With regard to this, I want you to get to the bottom of it. So 
there will be no executive privilege on that. On other matters — ". 

Haldeman then said, "And that takes you up to the June 17th" and inquired, 
"What do you do after June 17th?" The President replied, "Use the 
executive privilege on that." (p. 67) To which Ehrlichman said: 

Yeah, but there would be questions like, "Did you 

ever discuss with the President, Mr. Haldeman, the 

matter of executive clemency for any of these defendants." 

The President said "Both of them say no." Haldeman said "Or the Payment 

of money. The payment of — ," and the President said "Haldeman and 

Colson would both say no, there’s no question." (p. 67) Haldeman responded. 


- 16 - 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT , MARCH 27, 1972 CONVERSATION 


"Since you want to waive privilege so that we can say no, rather than 
invoking it — and the President said "You can say that." Haldeman 
said "I think you've got to say that because basically their situation 
— well, Colson will be very disturbed by that and he must have a reason 
why he should." (pp. 67-68) The President said "Well, why don't you 
get (unintelligible) in so that I can hear it clearly and I will know. 

What is it, Bob, as you will recall at the moment, and then I will 

let you go." Haldeman referred to Colson's view that "don't do any 

line [sic] to break your privilege, because if you get into (unintelligible) 

you may want it." During this discussion the President said "Colson 

says don't give anything away that you don't have to, but you don't 

have to, but you don't know what the hell is going to happen to you 

if you if you go in and lie." (pp. 67-68) 

The discussion then turned to the suggestion that the President 
request and recommend to Judge Sirica that the judge appoint a special 
prosecutor. (p* 70) The Commission idea was again mentioned, the 
President saying, however. 

The idea that a Commission might go through the '74 
election, etc. — my view is I can't have this 
(unintelligible) I think the damn thing is going to 
come out anyway, and I think you better cut the losses 
now and just better get it over much sooner and 
frankly sharper. Let's just say, "Well Judge, let's go." 

(p. 70) 

Further discussion followed about the special prosecutor idea 
and of the President going on television to announce that course. At the 


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15.5 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE EDITED 
TRANSCRIPT 3 MARCH 27, 1973 CONVERSATION - 

close of that discussion Ehrlichman said that "Surely nothing troubles 
me." The transcript at that point notes "Materials unrelated to 
Presidential actions deleted." (p. 72) Thereafter the President said 
to Ehrlichman, "Inform me as soon as you get something from Gray on 
Weicker" and "as soon as you’ve got something on Kleindienst. " The 
President told Ehrlichman to say to Kleindienst, "Mitchell is just 
damn disappointed, and he will jump up and down and shout." (p. 72) 


- 18 - 


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16. On March 28, 1973 Mitchell and Haldeman met with Magruder In 
Haldeman's office. They discussed Magruder ' s false testimony regarding 
the approval of the Llddy Plan. Haldeman telephoned Dean and requested 
that he return from Camp David to meet with Mitchell and Magruder. Dean 
has testified that on his return he went directly to Haldeman's office; 
that Haldeman told him that Mitchell and Magruder were waiting In another 
office to discuss with Dean his knowledge of the January and February 
1972 meetings In Mitchell's office; that Dean said he would not lie 
about those meetings; and that Haldeman said he did not want to get 
into It but Dean should work It out with Mitchell and Magruder. Dean 
met with Mitchell and Magruder. Following the meeting, both Mitchell 
and Dean reported to Haldeman that there was a problem as to what the 
facts were regarding the 1972 meetings. 


Page 


16.1 H. R. Haldeman deposition. Democratic National 
Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 213-18, 



ZZZ-ZJ, zzy 

374 

16.2 

John Dean testimony^ 3 SSC 1005-07 

383 

16.3 

John Dean testimony, 4 SSC 1379, 1425 

386 

16.4 

H. R. Haldeman telephone log, March 28, 1973 
(received from SSC) 

388 

16.5 

John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1634-35 

389 

16.6 

John Mitchell testimony, 5 SSC 1914 

391 

16.7 

Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 807-08 

392 

16.8 

Jeb Magruder testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

June 12, 1973, 111-14 

394 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-25 


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16.1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION , MAY 22 , 1973, DNC_ V. MoCORD, 213-18 , 222-23, 
229 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 

213 

he, as I recall, remained at his residence and worked rather than 
coming into the office because he was besieged by press at that 
period and didn’t want to go out and discuss these things with 
the press. I think there probably were a series of communica- 
tions, and I think it was by phone, continued. 

Q And did he tell you anything further concerning pre- 
June 17th events? 

A Not that I recall. I don’t believe so. 

Q Did there come any time later when he did come back to 
his office at the White House and after that occurred did he 
have any meetings with you? 

A I am not absolutely clear. I am sure he came back to 
the White House and I don't recall any meetings in that period. 

We now get to — Well, let’s see. Yes, that gets us to the 28th, 
if that is the correct date, and I believe it is. What is the 
day? 

A That would have been a Wednesday, I believe, approxi- 
mately. 

r “" A I think it was the 28th that there was the meeting first 
with Mitchell and then with Mitchell and Magruder and then Mitchell 
and Magruder met separately with Dean. 

Q Let us now go to the 28th and that first meeting you 
had that day. That was with Mitchell? 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


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16.1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION , MAY 22, 1973, PNC V. MoCORD, 213-18, 222-23, 
v 229 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 

214 

A Yes, 

Q Was that in your office? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there anyone else present? 

A That was with Mitchell alone. 

Q Would you tell us, please, the substance of that con- 
versation as it related to pre-June 17th events? 

A Mitchell had sought that meeting, as I recall, mostly 
in relation to this question of the disparity between his view 
and Dean's on the question of the meetings that had been held. 

He had the day before, I believe, met with Jeb Magruder, I think, 
in New York. I think he had asked Magruder to come up and meet 
with him and he had had a meeting with Magruder. At the meeting 
with me on the morning of the 28th he reported to me on his 
meeting with Magruder and I don't recall the specifics of that 
but it had to do with Magruder 's recollection of the facts re- 
lated to these meetings and Magruder* s recollection of the facts 
regarding the Watergate, as I recall; and this has to be classi- 
fied as recollection because it can be confused with subsequent 
information I was given. In other words, I am not positive that 
this developed at this point in time but I believe it did. 

Q All right. 

A That Magruder 's outline as of that time, as expressed 


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16.1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION , MAI 22, 1973, PNC V. MoCORD, 213-18, 222-23 
229 

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215 

to Mitchell the day before and as reported by Mitchell to me 
was that the Watergate project, the entry and bugging of the DNC 
had been conducted with Magruder 1 s knowledge and approval and 
that it had been done — I think the theory he spelled out at 
that point in time — 

Q He being Mitchell? 

A No, he being Magruder. 

Q Magruder speaking to Mitchell? 

A Speaking to Mitchell and Mitchell reporting it to me. 
This is one of the several different Magruder theories and that 
is why I am not sure of all of the things reported to me by 
Mitchell as to what Magruder 1 s recollection of the facts was, but 
that he had been under pressure to get various kinds of informa- 
tion. I am not sure specifically whether this was specified from — 
I think it was from the White House was his theory (I don't think 
he spelled out who from the White House) and that under the pres- 
sure of needing to get information he had launched a Liddy intelli- 
gence program which included the DNC project. Whether he specif- 
ically intended that it include the DNC project or whether that 
was Liddy's, it was included on Liddy 1 s cognizance, I am not sure. 
But, in any event, Magruder had approved this under what he 
claimed at that point was pressure from the White House to get go- 
ing on the fact gathering projects. I think that really covers 

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16,1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22, 1973, PNC V. McCORD, 213-18, 222-23, 
229 . 

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216 

what his theory on the facts and the facts in that area were. 

Then he got into the question of the meetings and what the facts 
were regarding meetings and he, Mitchell, indicated Magruder's 
concurrence in Mitchell's recollection of the meetings. That is 
about all I can recall of the substance of Mitchell's coments 
there. 

Q What did Mr. Mitchell tell you as to how many meet- 
ings he recalled having at which Liddy was present? 

A He indicated, as I recall, that there had been one 
meeting and that that meeting had been for the purpose of campaign 
expenditure regulation review and that sort of thing, a legal 
meeting, not an intelligence meeting. 

Q Did you mention to him at that meeting what you had 
learned from Dean relative to the presentation by Liddy at that 
meeting? 

A He mentioned it to me. He was aware of Dean's position. 

Q He was aware? 

A Yes, he was. That was his point of concern and, basic- 
ally, I think, the reason for his coming down for the meeting. 

Q Did he disagree with Dean's position on these meetings 
that were had? 

A I believe he did, yes. 

Q When he recounted to you what Magruder had told him the 


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16.1 H.R . HALDEMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22. 1973. DEC V. McCORD. 213-18. 222-23. 
229 

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217 

previous day in New York did he state whether he had asked 
Magruder who at the White House was putting this alleged pressure 
on Magruder? 

A I don T t think so* I don't — 

Q Did you ask him — 

A I don't recall that* 

Q I am sorry. You don't recall that* Mr. Haldeman, did 

you ask him whether he had asked Magruder who was putting this 
pressure on him from the White House? 

A I am sure I must have or it must have been explored or 
raised in some way, or he simply said he didn't know who, that the 
point was pressure from the White House. Now, as I indicated 
there were reported to me in this time period this report from 
Mitchell and at some point in this general area a report from 
Dean, which (I think this probably came later) also evolved a 
Magruder theory which was in conflict with this in some ways. I 
am not sure I can remember the specifics of all of them. But 
in various forms or at various times from variou§ sources I was 
told that Magruder f s position was (1) this White House thing. 

There was a reference by Magruder at one of these discussions 
(and this, I think, was also referred to by Dean) to a phone call 
that Magruder had received from Chuck Colson urging him to get 
going on getting information, a phone call that — No, no, that 


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16.1 H. R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22, 1973, DN£ V. MaCORDj , 213-18, 222-23, 
229 

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218 

theory came earlier because I can remember having that question 
raised when I was in Key Biscayne getting some reports back and 
forth on the telephone. All of these, incidentally, are areas 
that were in my view under the old guidelines covered by execu- 
tive privilege because they were in the nature of the President 
pushing to get information out, get information back in to Dean 
and to him and to explore things that he wasn T t satisfied with 
being explored. Some of these points were reported directly to 
the President, probably most of them, as they evolved step by 
step. I was in communication with the President during that week- 

I end in Key Biscayne as well as when we were up here. This phone 
call, Magruder — 

Q Are you speaking to a phone call while you are still in 
Florida? 

A No, no. I am speaking of a report while I was in 
Florida of a phone call that was made prior to June 17th from 
Colson to Magruder saying get going on getting information. 

Magruder at one point in time put that as being a significant 
factor in getting the Watergate going, initiating the project. 
Colson, who I talked with about this phone call-- 
Q When was that conversation? 

A While I was in Key Biscayne. That is why I remember 
the Colson call because I didn't have that many communications on 

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16.1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22, 1973, DNC v. MoCORD, 213-18, 222-23, 
229 


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222 

taped a meeting and I have never had a stenographer present at 
any meeting on any subject at any time. 

Q Did you make notes at any of these meetings? 

A I probably did. I may have. 

Q Do you know whether you still have those notes? 

A Let me say 1 have made a habit of making notes of meet- 

ings or conversations which I intended to report to the President 
or which required action on my part. My practice was then to 
take the action that was required and then throw away the notes 
or if it involved a conversation with the President to have the 
conversation with the President and whatever note evolved of 
that conversation I have turned over to the President 1 s files and 
I did this on a periodic basis through all the time I was there. 

Q You don f t have any notes today relative to any of these 
conversations involving these — 

A No, sir, I don f t. 

r Q Tell us about the meeting*with Mitchell on the 28th of 
March and who said what relative to the pre-June 17th events? 

A We have pretty well covered it because you asked what 
Magruder said. One meeting went into the other. Mitchell was 
in my office and then Magruder arrived and then the joint meet- 
ing. 

Q At that meeting did Magruder tell you that he did know 


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16,1 H.R. HALDEMAN DEPOSITION , MAY 22, 1973, PNC V. McCORD, 213-18, 222-23, 
229 — 

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223 

about the wiretapping of the Democratic National Committee Head- 
quarters? 

A I have that impression. 

Q What is your best recollection rather than your im- 

pression? This is a sensitive point and I don't want to rely 
on an impression. I would rather have a good recollection. 

A The question in my mind is whether he indicated or 
gave even the impression that he knew of the DNC bugging specif- 
ically as contrasted to his knowledge of the implementation, 
approval and implementation by him, as I understood it, of an 
intelligence program by Liddy which he was, I think, assuming 
that the Watergate was a part. The question that I have is 
whether he indicated that he knew the Watergate was a part and 

L that — I have to leave that as a question in my mind. I am 
not sure. 

Q Let me ask you this question (and I am jumping ahead, 
it is likely) : has Magruder at any time ever told you that he 

knew in advance of June 17th, 1972 of the wiretapping and bugging 
of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters? 

A I don't know that he has in so many words. 

Q Has he ever said anything to you from which you 
gathered a clear inference that he did, in fact, know prior to 
June 17th, 1972 of the bugging and wiretapping of the DNC 

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16.1 H.R. RALDEMAN DEPOSITION , MAY 22, 1973, PNC ». McCORD , 213^18, 222-23, 
229 

229 

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Q That same day, March 28th, I think you testified you 
had a third meeting which Dean was involved in, I believe. 

A No. Mitchell and Magruder met with Dean and I was not 
present* Subsequent to the meeting we had had they then, the 
two of them, went and met with Dean separately from me. 

Q That day Magruder had three meetings. You had two 
meetings and Mitchell had two meetings? 

A No. Mitchell had three meetings. Mitchell met with me 
alone and then with me and Magruder and with Magruder and Dean. 

I met with Mitchell alone and then with Mitchell and Magruder. 

Q Did you get a report from either of those three gentle- 
men as to the third meeting that day or shortly thereafter? 

A I have the impression that I did have a sort of general 
report, I think, from Mr. Mitchell and I think probably also from 

( Dean that they had talked the question over and that there was a 
problem as to what the facts were. 

Q Now, when you use the word "impression* 1 in that context, 
are you really saying you have a recollection? 

A I don’t have a recollection of a specific conversation 
but I have a recollection of the information. I do recollect 
hearing that following that meeting it was felt by Dean and 
Mitchell that there was a real question as to what the fact was 
regarding these meetings. 


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.16.2 JOtm DEM TESTIMONY „ JUNE 25 3 1973 3 3 SSC 1005-07 

1005 

Mr. Dean. In brief, the President would create an independent 
panel— that would be investigator, prosecutor, and judge and jury for 
everyone involved. It would have the power to remove officials from 
office, levy fines, and impose criminal sanctions. It was designed to give 
every man a fair and full hearing, and proceed in a manner where 
people would not be tried publicly. 

Finally, after all the facts were in, the panel would render its judg- 
ments on the individuals involved and report to the public. I might 
note that if the special prosecutor and this committee were merged, 
made independent, and proceeded in camera, it would be very close to 
the concept I had proposed back on March 26. 

Moore liked the idea and suggested I call Haldeman, which I did. 
tie was intrigued, but not overwhelmed. It was becoming increasingly 
clear that no one involved was willing to stand up and account for 
themselves. 

After I had read in the newspaper on Tuesday, March 27, that the 
President had called me on Monday morning, March 26— which he had 
not — and expressed great confidence in me and the fact that I had not 
had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee, I decided to attempt to contact Mr. Liddy, who was the one 
man who could document the fact that we never had talked about his 
plans following the February 4 meeting in Mitchell’s office. I called 
Paul O’Brien and asked him how I could get in contact with Mr. 
Mavoulis, Mr. Liddy’s attorney. (TBrien gave me Maroulis’ phone 
number, but told me I could not reach him until late in the afternoon. 

I called Mr. Maroulis about 5 :30 and asked him if I might get some 
sort of sworn statement from Liddy regarding my lack of prior 
knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee. I 
told him of the two meetings in Mitchell’s office, and that Mr. Liddy 
and I never talked about his plans after the second meeting. To this 
day, I am convinced that if and when Mr. Liddy ever talks, he will tell 
the truth as he knows it. I was hopeful that he would give me some 
sort of an affidavit attesting to the facts, but his lawyer was concerned 
about his fifth amendment problems. 

Mr. Maroulis called me back on March 29 after I had returned from 
Camp David, after he had talked with Mr. Liddy. I requested O’Brien 
to make a memorandum of the call, as he was with Mr. Maroulis when 
he made the call. I have submitted to the committee a copy of this docu- 
ment in which Maroulis advised me his client could not make such a 
statement because it might result in a waiver of his fifth amendment 
privileges, that to give such a statement could be detrimental to others, 
but Liddy did wish to convey that his reasons for not providing such a 
statement was not because he disagreed with the facts, but because of 
the advice of counsel. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-42.*] 

Mr. Dean. It was the day before I received this call, March 28, that 

ITaldeman had called me at Camp David and requested that I return to 
Washington. He told me that he was meeting with Mitchell and 
Magruder and that they wished to meet with me. I told Haldeman that 
I really did not wish to meet with Mitchell and Magruder, but he was 
insistent that I return and meet with them. I returned from Camp 
David about 3 :30 and went directly to Haldeman’s office. He told me 


•See p. 1262. 


( 383 ) 



16.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 2S 3 1973 3 3 SSC 1005-07 

1006 

that Mitchell and Magruder were waiting in another office for me. I 
asked him why they wanted to talk to me and he said that they wanted 
to talk to me about ray knowledge of the meetings in Mitchell’s office. 
I told Haldeman that they were both aware of the situation and I was 

U not going to lie if asked about those meetings. Haldeman said that he 
did not want to get into it, but I should go in and work it out with 
Jditchell and Magruder. 

Before discussing the meetings with Mitchell and Magruder, I feel 
I should comment on my reaction to the discussion I had just had with 
Mr. Haldeman. Knowing how freely and openly he had discussed 
matters in the past, I could tell that he was back-peddling fast. That 
he was now in the process of uninvolving himself, but keeping others 
involved. This was a clear sign to me that Mr. Haldeman was not 
going to come forward and help end this problem, rather, he was begin- 
ning to protect his flanks. It was my reaction to this meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman and his evident changed attitude, and my earlier dealings 
with Ehrlichman where he had told me how I should handle various 
areas of my testimony should I be called before the grand jury, that 
made me decide not to turn over to them the report I had written at 
Camp David. I have submitted to the committee a copy of the Camp 
David report, part of which was typed by my secretary at Camp David 
and the remainder in longhand, which I had not put in final narrative 
form before I was called back to Washington. 

[The document was marked exhibit No. 34-43.*] 

Meeting With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder 

Mr. Dean. After departing Mr. Haldeman’s office, I went to meet 
with Mitchell and Magruder. After an exchange of pleasantries, they 
told me they wished to talk to me about how I would handle any testi- 
monial appearances regarding the January 27 and February 4 meetings 
which had occurred in Mitchell’s office. I told them that we had been 
through this before and they knew well my understanding of the facts 
as they had occurred at that time. Mitchell indicated that if I so testi- 
fied, it could cause problems. Magruder then raised the fact that I had 
previously agreed, in an earlier meeting, that I would follow the testi- 
monial approach they had taken before the grand jury. 

I told them I recalled the meeting. Magruder then said that it had 
been I who had suggested that the meetings be treated as dealing 
exclusively with the election law and that explained my presence. At 
this point in time, I decided I did not wish to get into a debate regard- 
ing that meeting. They both repeated to me that if I testified other 
than they had it would only cause problems. I said I understood that. 
I told them that there was no certainty that I would be called before 
the grand jury or the Senate committee and that if I were called, I 
might invoke executive privilege, so the question of my testimony 
was still moot. I did not want to discuss the subject further so I tried 
to move them off of it. They were obviously both disappointed that I 
was being reluctant in agreeing to continue to perpetuate their earlier 
testimony. 

The only other matter of any substance that came up during that 
meeting was when I made the point that I had never asked Mitchell 


•See p. 1203. 



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16.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY. JUNE 25 , 1972 , 3 SSC 1005-07 


1007 . 

about his involvement in the matter and I had no intention of asking 
him at that time, I said to this day I do not fully understand how 
the Liddy plan got into operation and can only speculate based on 
the tidbits of information I know. I then offered my hypothesis of 
what had happened, that is, that at some point after the second meet- 
ing in Mitchell’s office there had been pressure put on to get the plan 
approved and that it had been approved without anyone really under- 
standing its full import. Mitchell said something to the effect that 
my theory was not far from wrong, only they thought it would be 
three or four times removed from the committee. The meeting termi- 
nated shortly thereafter, It was not a lengthy meeting and as far as 
Magruder and Mitchell were concerned, it was certainly less than 
satisfactory for them. 

March Meetixg With Mr. Egil Krogh 

On either March 28 or 29, Mr Krogh came to my office because he 
happened to be in the Executive Office Building. He said he had come 
to express sympathy for me as a result of the adverse publicity I had 
received during the Gray hearings. He then began telling me that he 
had not himself had a good day since his own confirmation hearings 
and that he had been haunted bv his experiences at the White House. 

I told Krogh that I thought that there was a very likely possibility 
that the Senate Watergate committee could stumble into the Ellsberg 
burglary. I told him that there were documents in the possession of 
the Justice Department which had been provided by the CIA in con- 
nection with the Watergate investigation which contained pictures 
of Liddv standing in front of Sir. Ellsberg’s doctor’s office in 
California. 

I told him that I had learned from the CIA that these pictures had 
been left in a camera returned by Hunt to the CIA and the CIA had 
developed the pictures. I said I did not believe that the Justice Depart- 
ment knew what the pictures were all about but that any investigator 
worth his salt would probably track down the incident as a result of 
the pictures. 

I told him that Ehrlichman had requested that I retrieve the docu- 
ments from the Justice Department and get them back to the CIA 
where they might be withheld from the committee investigators but 
the CIA had been unwilling to do so. 

Krogh was very distressed to hear this news but said that maybe it 
was for the best in that he had personally been haunted by this inci- 
dent for so long that he would like to get it out in the open. We then 
entered into a discussion about the incident and I asked him if he had 
received his authorization to proceed with the burglary from Ehrlich- 
man, knowing well that Krogh would not undertake such a mission 
himself. 

Krogh responded that no; he did not believe that Ehrlichman had 
been aware of the incident until shortly after it had occurred; rather, 
he had received his orders right out of the “oval office.” I was so sur- 
prised to hear this that I said, “You must be kidding.” And he repeated 
again that he had received his instructions out of the oval office. 

Mr. Krogh also indicated to me that he thought he might have per- 
jured himself during his confirmation hearings and he was very both- 


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16,3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 27, 1973 3 4 SSC 1379 , 1425 

1379 

Mr. Dean. That is correct. 

Senator Gurney. And he, in turn, communicated with Mr. McCord, 

I guess, through Ulasewicz one time and then himself; is that correct? 

Mr. Dean. That is my understanding. 

Senator Gurney; And my understanding also is that the offer of 
clemency was made to Mr. McCord, I think, in terms like this : That 
it comes from the highest authority in the White House ; is that sub- 
stantially correct ? - 

Mr. Dean. That is correct ; yes. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever advise the President of the United 
States about that? 

Mr. Dean. No, sir. As I had explained in my testimony, I was pro- 
ceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehr- 
lichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had 
talked directly with the President about the matter, something which 
was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with 
him. 

Senator Gurney. Did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder, 
let me see on this, in January or December, in which there was a dis- 
cussion about the planning of the Watergate? Do you remember any- 
thing about that? 

Mr. Dean. I recall Mr. Magruder coming to my office one time, arid 
this is — I saw part of Mr. Magruder’s testimony on this before this 
committee. It is one if I have seen 3 hours total I would be surprised, 
but I did see part of Mr. Magruder, I caught one section of the ques- 
tioning of him, I believe it was during the questioning of him, in which 
he made a reference to this. 

I think what he is referring to 

Senator Gurney. What did he refer to ? 

Mr. Dean. He was referring to the fact that my memory had gotten 
suddenly foggy. I have never, as I testified before this committee, 
understood what happened between, with any clarity, between Feb- 
ruary 4 and June 17, and I was — we were talking about that. 

I think he also was referring to the meeting on — he may have been 
mixing the meetings and referring to the fact that on March 28, when 
I came back from Camp David, that I was playing very dumb, I was 
playing very reluctant — and I was. I did not want to engage in a dis- 
cussion of my recollection of those meetings, because we had gone over 
that before and I had made my decision by that time as to what I was 
agoing to do and I did no* want to get into a debate on it. 

I believe he also referred to the fact that I taped that conversation. 
That is not correct. 

Senator Gurney. Let me refer to his testimony when he was here 
before the committee. He said : “Well, I think the one occasion that did 
crop up when I asked for an appointment with Mr. Haldeman.” 

I said : “When was this ?” 

He said: “That was probably in January, probably in early Janu- 
ary, December” — that would have been January of this year or De- 
cember of last year — it was before that meeting with Haldeman. so 
it must have been in December. It was when he indicated to me that 
he did not know how the Watergate had ever been planned, some- 
thing to that effect. 


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16.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 27. 1973. 4 SSC 1379 , 1425 

1425 

when there was more discussion of different essentially coverap tech- 
niques without getting into great detail because I cannot recall in 
great detail, everything they were saying the President was asking me, 
do I agree and I was saying no, and finally, at one point in that meeting 
I said that, right in front of the President that, I felt that Dean, 
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman could be indicted for obstruction of justice 
and this has to be recognized. And I think as a result of that meeting 
they saw that I had begun to change my attitude about any further 
involvement in a coverup. 

Senator Inoute. “On March 21 Dean gave the President a more 
complete, but still laundered version of the facts and so surprised the 
President that according to press accounts of what Dean is saying ‘the 
President came out of his chair.’ ” 

Mr. Dean. I do not know where that press account came from. The 
President did not come out of his chair. I have never seen the President 
come out of his chair other than very easily and slowly at the time 
that he got up on April 15 to walk around to the corner of the EOB 
office and then raise something with me. The President of the United 
States does not come flying out of his chair. 

Senator Inouye. “At this meeting Dean indicated that Magruder 
was involved but that he did not know about Mitchell.” 

r Mr. Dean. That is correct. As I have said before this committee I 
have never had a direct conversation with John Mitchell to ask him 
what his involvement was. On the 28th when I came down from Camp 
David after there was this discussion about whether I would be willing 
to perpetuate the story that there had been one meeting in Mitchell’s 
office, there had been a discussion of the election laws and that that was 
the reason for my presence and it was to introduce Mr. Liddy, at the 
end of that discussion I said to Mr. Mitchell “I have never asked you 
of your involvement and I will not ask you of your involvement but 
a J I want to hypothesize what I see to be the situation,” and I then gave 
them my hypothesis of the situation and, as a result of that hypothesis, 
Mr. Mitchell said “that is not far from accurate, but we thought it 
I w ould be two or three times removed.” 

Senator Inoute. If you did not know about Mitchell why did you 
advise the President that Mr. Mitchell could be indicted? 

Mr. Dean. Because based on the information Mr. Magruder had 
given me, which was inferential and my general assumption of the 
fact, I was aware of the fact that he had received the information from 
the electronic surveillance. 

Senator Inoute. Did you so advise the President ? 

Mr. Dean. Did I so advise the President? I do not recall that I got 
into a detailed discussion. I was giving the President what I would 
say was a general overview and letting him come back and ask any 
specific questions lie might wish to ask. 

Senator Inoute. Do you not feel it was important enough to advise 
the President of the United States that his former Attorney General 
was involved and implicated? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I told him I thought he could be indicted but I 
told him I did not have the facts for certainty myself that he was 
indictable. 

Senator Inoute. I thought you had just testified that Mr. Magruder, 
Mitchell, and Dean were indictable? 


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MISDATED ON THE LOG AS 1972; IT SHOULD READ 1973 


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( 

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16.5 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY J JULY 10, 1973 , 4 SSC 1634-35 

1634 

Mr. Dash. Did you promise him at that time, as he testified, that 
to the best of your ability, though you no longer were in office, you 
would help him to either get Executive clemency, support, or rehabil- 
itation, any of the things we have been asking about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us take Executive clemency. No, I have never 
promised that to anybody. Obviously, there is no basis upon which I 
could. 

With respect to, you were talking about support and so forth, what I 
told Jeb Magruder was that I thought he was a very outstanding young 
man and I liked and I worked with and to the extent that I could help 
him in any conceivable way, I would be delighted to do so. 

And this was exactly the same conversation that we had the next day 
down at Haldeman ? s office. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Magruder then ask for that meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did he feel he needed that assurance from somebody still 
in the White House ? 

Mr, Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr, Dash. And met with Mr Haldeman on the 28th of March ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 28th of March, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What kind of assurances were being sought by Mr. Ma- 
gruder there and what was being given to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr Magruder was again concerned — well, he did 
not express it too directly— that he thought he might become the fall 
guy. It seems to me that everybody around this town involved in this 
all thought they were going to become a fall guy. 

Mr Dash. Did you, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did I ? No. Contrary to the story that I have read I 
did not believe that to be the case. I am quite anxiously waiting to see 
if there is some possibility of that other than some misguided counsel 
who wrote a piece of paper from which cross-examination was to be 
made. 

Mr. Dash. Getting back to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Magruder’s meet- 
ing with you on March 28 — — 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it was the same general discussion, “I may have 
problems with my perjury, I don’t have any money, am I going to be 
deserted, are you people still going to be friends, will I be able to get 
counsel,” and this type of conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Haldeman make any kind of promises to Mr. 
Magruder at that time, in your presence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. None other than the fact to help him as a friend and 
I think Mr. Haldeman has testified to that. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you ever have a meeting with Mr. Magruder 
and Mr. Dean after that meeting with Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes sir. 

Mr. Dash. What was that meeting about ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this was held at Magruders request because 
he again was concerned about this perjury question that he might 
have, and the meeting was a quick nmthrough again of the recollec- 
tion of the individuals as to what was discussed prior to Mr. 
Magruder’s third appearance before the grand jury back in September. 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-26 


( 389 ) 



16.5 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY, JULY 10. 1972, 4 SSC 1634-35 

1635 

Mr. Dash. Did you agree at that time, Mr, Mitchell, that you would 
hold the line, at least, if you were called, to limit the meeting to a 
discussion of the election laws ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, that was not the basis, to hold it to the election 
laws, Mr. Dash. The basis of it was for the recollection of what had 
happened and how it would have affected Mr. Magruder in perjury. 

You see, if you go back Magruder had said there only had been one 
meeting when there actually had been two, and so forth. It wasn't a 
question of holding the line on anything. It was a question of the recol- 
lection of what actually did happen vis-a-vis what Magruder ap- 
parently had testified to. 

Mr. Dash. He was obviously concerned as to what your position 
was going to be if you were called before the grand jury. Did you make 
any assurances to Mr. Magruder at that time f 

Mr. Mitchell. Any assurances as to what ? 

Mr. Dash. How would you testify before the grand jury if you were 
called as to the meetings ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I made no assurances as to how I 'was going to testify. 
Obviously I was going to testify as to what happened. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean make any assurances? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Dean had a very hazy recollection of what had 
happened. Obviously, as I think Mr. Dean testified, he didn’t want to 
discuss the matter. He had already, of course, gone to counsel and was 
looking after Mr. Dean’s problems.. 

Mr. Dash. Did you learn during April that Mr. Magruder and Mr. 
Dean had gone to see the prosecutors ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I learned about Mr. Magruder, I didn’t learn about 
Mr. Dean. 

Mr, Dash. And were you personally aware of Mr. Dean’s meetings 
with the President in ‘March and April that he testified to before 
this committee ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Only the meeting of March 22 at which, of course, 

I was present. 

©Mr. Dash. What I am talking about are the meetings of Septem- 
ber 15, 1972, the meeting of February 28. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Dash, you are talking about 1972. 

Mr. Dash. The meetings of September 15, 1972, with the President, 
February 28, 1973, March 13, 1973, and March 21. Are you aware 
of those meetings? 

Mr. Mitchell. Let me put it this way. The only meeting that I 
was aw r are of, of Mr. Dean and the President, was the one I attended 
on March 22. 

Mr. Dash. At that meeting was there any discussion by the Presi- 
dent, by you or by Mr. Dean, concerning the Watergate, either 
coverup or who may be involved in an indictment or anything like 
that on the 22d? 

Mr. Mitchell. None whatsoever. The total discussion had to do 
with the White House’s response to this committee, and I think it 
was prompted, or at least that was mv understanding at the time, it 
was prompted by the fact that the President was getting a pretty 
good knocking around in the press on the question of executive 
privilege. I believe it arose with respect to the Gray hearings but it 
certainly was to be applicable to this committee’s hearings. 


( 390 ) 



16_.6 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY 3 JULY 12 , 197 Z , 5 SSC 1314 

1914 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us what the nature of your discussions 
with Mr. Dean was? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have had so many discussions with Mr. Dean on 
the matter, I cannot isolate that one. 

Mr. Dash. Could you search your mind? I think it is the first time 
in the public press your name became identified with the break-in. 

Mr. Mitchell. It would have been discussed, I am sure, in the con- 
text of what was said in the letter to Judge Sirica or with respect to 
what came out of your executive session as to what the facts, or allega- 
tions, I probably should say, were contained in the particular items. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, following up at least that McCord episode, 

were your meetings with Mr. Magruder on March 27, where he was 
beginning to be concerned about the unraveling of the operations, so 
far as he was concerned, your meeting with Mr. Magruder and Mr. 
Haldeman on March 28 and your later meeting with Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Magruder, and yourself, on a discussion of what Mr. Magruder was 
going to do at the grand jury ? 

Mr. Mitchell, That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. So this was coming to a head at this point, was it not ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was coming to the point where conversations 
increased as the information came forth from this committee or Mr. 
McCord or whoever it came forward from. 

Mr. Dash. And at that time, were you not in active discussion with 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Magruder as to how the grand jury testimony was 
to be carried out? 

Mr, Mitchell. We had that meeting that I have already testified to, 
Mr, Dash. That is the one meeting we had on the subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. And was that the meeting where Mr. Dean had indicated, 
at least, that you were going to hold fast to your position that there 
was no discussion of electronic surveillance or intelligence at that 
meeting ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never heard that. If you are referring to the 
memorandum that Mr. Dean wrote after the April 10 meeting, I do not 
believe that that is contained in there. With respect to the meeting that 
was held with Dean and Magruder, obviously not. There was no such 
concept discussed that there would not be revelation of the fact if 
there had been discussions with the Justice Department on electronic 
surveillance. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Mr. Magruder had made the decision as to what he 
was going to do. If you all three stood together, he could continue to 
testify as he had. He had testified to the grand jury in August, he 
testified at the trial about those meetings. In fact, lie said there was one 
meeting that had been canceled and all he discussed was the election 
laws. If all three of you had agreed to that, he could have gone back 
to the grand jury and stuck to that. What he was concerned about, his 
testimony is, was that the two of you, you and Mr, Dean, were not 
going to stay with him and it was unraveling as to him, that lie had 
committed perjury and he would go back 

Mr. Mitchell. That was not the discussion between Dean and Mit- 
chell and Magruder on March 28; the fact that there had been two 
meetings that were shown in the logs and that the question was whether 
or not Magruder had perjured himself by the basis upon which he had 
presen ted his testimony to the grand jury on this subject. 


( 391 ) 




16.7 JEB MAGEUDEE TESTIMONY, JUNE 14 » 1972 3 2 SSC 807-08 

807 

called me in the Commerce Department and asked me to come to New 

York. I flew. to New York that afternoon, and discussed with him 

Mr. Dash. Do you know, wh at date that was ? 

Mr. Magruder. That would be March 27. 

Mr. Dash. 27? 

Mr. Magruder. A Tuesday. 

Mr. Dash. And the year we are tal kin g about 1973 ? 

Mr. Magruder. 1973. 

Mr. Dash. What was your discussion with Mr. Mitchell in New 
York? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, I went through all of the problems I thought 
could occur because of the problems that renewed interest in this case 
would bring from your committee and from the grand jury and indi- 
cated what should I do, and he indicated that I should hold, that he 
would take care of things, that everything would be taken care of. 

Now, at that time I realized that he was no longer directly involved 
at the White House, as he had been, and so I asked to see Mr. Haldeman 
with him the next day he was going to Washington. 

Mr. Dash. But at that meeting, Mr. Magruder, what did you ask 
Mr. Mitchell to assure you of ? 

Mr. Magruder. Again I asked for the same assurances of salary and 
being taken care of if I had to go away for any period of time. 

Mr. Dash. Did you mention Executive clemency ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did. 

“Mr. Dash. Then you say you asked for a meeting with Mr. 
Haldeman? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I feel that it would be appropriate since this 
was something now that he was more directly involved on a day-to-day 
basis. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have that meeting with Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. When? 

Mr. Magruder. On the following day, Wednesday, March 28, 1 think. 

<Mr. Dash. Who was present? 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Mitchell, and myself. 

Mr. Dash. What was discussed? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, we discussed the same things that we had 
discussed with Mr Mitchell, that I discussed with Mr. Mitchell. Mr. 
Haldeman was very careful to indicate to me that he would help me 
in any way as a friend but could make no commitments for the Presi- 
dent; indicated that the real problems were differences of opinion 
over meetings, particularly the January and February meetings, 
where, of course, my view was that since the three, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. 
Dean, and I, had agreed to my testimony that they, therefore, should 
stay with that agreement. 

Mr. Mitchell indicated, of course, he was willing to do this but 
Mr. Dean indicated that he had some question about it. 

Mr. Dash. But, Mr. Magruder at this time everybody knew. 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Haldeman 

Mr. Dash. Everybody knew that that agreement was an agreement 
based on a false story, was that not true? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, that is correct. 


( 392 ) 



jg.7 JEB MAGEUDEE TESTIMONY . JUNE 14. 1V7Z, 2 SSC 807-08 

808 

Mr. Dash. And Mr. Haldeman knew that then, did he not ? 

Mr. Magrtjder. I cannot recall in my meeting with him in J anuary 
whether — yes, I am sure I did discuss those meetings, yes. 

Mr. Dash. So the attempt to get together and agree on that meet- 
ing was an attempt to get together and agree on at least from your 
point of view, would be the full story? 

Mr. Magrtjder. That is correct, Mr. Haldeman recommended that 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and I meet, which we did that afternoon. 

Mr. Dash. What was the result of that meeting? 

Mr. Magruder. I realize that Mr. Dean had different opinions then 
as to what he would do probably, and so then my — I thought that 
probably it was more appropriate that even on that Monday that I 
get separate counsel so that I could get advice independent of the 
individuals who had participated with me in these activities. 

Mr. Dash. In other words, you really could not agree at the meet- 
ing with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Magruder. Well, it was cooperative. 

Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Dean’s position? 

Mr. Magruder. He would not indicate a position. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Did there come a time when you did get 
independent counsel? 

Mr. Magrtjder. Yes, Mr. Parkinson, who was counsel of the com- 
mittee, recommended Mr. Bierbower and on that Saturday I went 
to meet him, he was out of the country, and I met him and we agreed, 
he agreed to be my counsel that Saturday evening. 

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you decided that you should 
go to the U.S. attorney’s office ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. When did you go to the U.S. attorney’s office? 

Mr. Magruder. We agreed, they discussed the things with the U.S. 
attorney, I think on April 12 and I saw them informally on April 13 
and saw them formally on April 14 on Saturday, April 14. 

Mr. Dash. At that time did you tell everything to the assistant U.S. 
attorneys? 

Mr. Magrtjder. Yes, I cooperated. 

Mr. Dash. Who did you meet with ? 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Silbert, Mr. Glanzer, and Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Dash. Did you tell them everything you are now telling this 
committee ? 

Mr, Magrtjder. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have a meeting afterward with Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, Mr. Ehrlichman called while I was with the 
U.S. attorneys and asked me would I come over and talk to him about 
the case. We talked to the U.S. attorneys and they agreed as a courtesy 
that we should and Mr. Bierbower and the other attorney with Mr. 
Bierbower and I went to see Mr. Ehrlichman that afternoon. 

Mr. Dash. Then, according to that meeting that you had with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, vdiat happened? 

Mr. Magrtjder. We told him in rather capsule form basically what I 
told you this morning. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Xow, I have just two final questions. I want to go back to the time 
when you came back from California to Washington, putting you back 


( 393 ) 


JEB MGRUDM TESTIMONY. JUNE 12. 197 Z. SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION x 111-14 
Indistinct document retyped by 

House Judiciary CoCTnittee staff 111 

Mr. Magruder. Earlier than that. 

Mr. Dash. — tell us what happened. 

Mr . Magruder . We knew the Grand Jury was reconvening and 
we knew one mistake the prosecutors made, and the only mistake 
in defense of the prosecutors, that I think they made is they 
somehow missed Mr. Reisner. I knew as soon as they got to him 
the thing would collapse and when they got — when they all got 
to Mr. Reisner I was fully aware then much more so than McCord 
because I knew Mr. McCord's testimony would be hearsay but as 
soon as they got to Reisner I knew that the case would start 
collapsing rather quickly. So I went up to New York on a 
Tuesday and talked to Mr. Mitchell and went through the whole 
list of things I thought that I would need if I was going to be 
able to keep up with this story. 

Mr. Dash. What was that? 

Mr. Magruder. Oh, you know, family, taking care of the 
family, job, that kind of thing. Executive clemency. 

Mr. Dash. What did Mr. Mitchell say? 

r Mr . Magruder. He was very positive but I knew he was only 
speaking for himself and he made that quite clear. In fact, I 
said I can't accept it just now from you because you are here 
in New York, so he asked me to meet with him and Haldeman the 
next day which I did. At that meeting — I think Mr. Haldeman 
taped it as I understand — Mr. Haldeman was very careful to 
say he would do anything he could as a friend to help me but he 


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( 394 ) 



25.8 JEB MAGRUDEE TESTIMONY* iUHE lit l£Zh SSC E ^ CUTIVE SESSION , 111-14 

Indistinct document retyped by 112 

House Judiciary Committee staff 

couldn't speak for the President. There was a controversy over 
the meetings. 

Mr. Dash. Who was present at that? 

Mr. Magruder. Haldeman, Mitchell and myself. 

Mr. Dash. When was that? 

Mr. Magruder. The Wednesday after the Friday McCord — 
the end of the trial. That would be March. 

Mr. Dash. March 23 was when Mr. McCord’s letter was read. 

Mr. Magruder. Tuesday I went to New York, at Mr. Mit- 
chell’s request went to New York, discussed the problem. I 
indicated — I had already decided that if it got to a Grand 
Jury place again that I would not be able to personally go 
through this process again but that I would still try to hold 
if we could work out some reasonable way we could hold with 
that story. Then — 

Mr. Dash. Then you. 

Mr. Magruder. I went through with Mr. Mitchell all the 
questions. 

Mr. Dash. You said that. You weren’t satisifed. 

Mr. Magruder. I asked to see Mr. Haldeman. We met with 
Mr. Haldeman next morning. 

Mr. Dash. The 29th? 

Mr . Magruder . The 29th . 

Mr. Dash. Who was present? 

Mr. Magruder. Just the three of us. 

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( 395 ) 



46.8 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 12 3 1973 , SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 111-14 


Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 


Mr. Dash. Mitchell — 


Mr. Kagruder. Haldeman and myself. He indicated he would 
do anything he could personally to help. 

Mr. Dash. What did you say to Haldeman? 

Mr. Ilagruder. In January I had explained to Mr. Halde- 
man the problem . I explained to him what had happened that 
night. I didn’t know whether he knew the facts in the case and 
I explained to him all the facts in the case. I went through 
the whole story in January. This was an interview that he and 
I had about what I might do after the Inaugural. 

Mr. Dash. Did he indicate he knew or didn’t know when you 
told him? 

Mr. Magruder. He didn’t indicate anything. He just 
listened, said he understood the problem. That was always — 

Mr. Dash. Mow we are at March 29. 

Hr. Magruder. He said he would do anything he could 
personally as a friend to help. He had always had been a 
very good friend and somebody I respected tremendously and 
enjoyed working for. He said you and John Dean and John 
Mitchell have to work out this situation. So Mitchell, Dean 
and I met and the conflict was over these meetings. My point 
was we all agreed that I would say this about those meetings. 
Mow either you are going to support that or you are not. If 
you are not going to support that, I am in a serious jam here, 
and Mr. Dean wouldn’t make any commitment. I became very 


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( 396 ) 



16,8 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY ,, JUNE 12, 197 Z* SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION 3 111-14 


Indistinct document retyped by 
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concerned at that knowing that Mr. Reisner was probably going 
to be following on one hand and Dean on the other hand. I 
went to the two attorneys. They said you — 

Mr. Dash. Which two? 

Mr. Magruder. Parkinson and O'Brien. 

Mr. Dash. What did you tell them? 

Mr. Magruder. I said I think I have got serious problems 
and went through the problems. If Mr. Reisner went, if Mr, 

Dean said this I would be the one caught in the box here. 

Mr. Dash. Was this the first time you spoke to Mr. 
Parkinson and Mr. O'Brien about the matter of your involvement? 
Mr. Magruder. I don't want to say the first time. 

Mr. Dash. Earlier you had given Mr. Parkinson the full 


114 


story. 

Mr. Magruder. Yes. So I would say in any detail, yes, in 
detail. We mentioned it other times. I saw a lot of Parkin- 
son and O'Brien during the entire investigation.. 

Mr. Dash. After the trial or before? 

Mr. Magruder. After the trial. 

Mr. Dash. After the trial did you then raise with Parkin- 
son and O'Brien your involvement? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, and they suggested it might be time 
for me to get independent counsel and they suggested Mr* 
Bierbower and I went down to see Mr. Bierbower. Within six 
days we had agreed that the only alternative for me to do is to 


Indistinct document retyped by 
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(397) 




17 . 


On March 28, 1973 John Ehrlichman telephoned Attorney General 
Kleindienst on the President’s instructions and asked Kleindienst a 
series of questions which the President had dictated and which Ehrlich- 
man had hand written on a piece of paper. Ehrlichman, during the con- 
versation, told Kleindienst that the President directed him to tell the 
Attorney General that the best information he had or has is that neither 
Dean, Haldeman, Colson nor Ehrlichman nor anybody in the White House 
had any prior knowledge of the Watergate burglary and that the President 
was counting on the Attorney General to provide him with any informa- 
tion to the contrary and to contact him direct. Ehrlichman also told 
the Attorney General that serious questions were being raised with 
regard to John Mitchell and the President wanted the Attorney General 
to communicate to him any evidence or inferences on that subject. 


Page 


17.1 John Ehrlichman log, March 28, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 400 

17.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-50 401 

17.3 Richard Kleindienst testimony, 9 SSC 3569..... 405 

17.4 Transcript of recorded telephone conversation 
between Ehrlichman and Kleindienst, March 28, 

1973, SSC Exhibit No. 99, 7 SSC 2944-46 406 

17.5 Dictabelt recording of a telephone conversation 

between Ehrlichman and Kleindienst on or about 
March 28, 1973 and House Judiciary Committee trans- 
script thereof 409 

17.6 President Nixon statement, August 15, 1973, 9 Presi- 
dential Documents 991, 993 422 

17.7 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 424 


( 399 ) 



17.1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN LOG. MARCH 28. 1973 


TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1973 




8:15 HRH_offi.ee 

9:45 Cole, Whitaker, Sneed, Garment (Wounded Knee) 

11-1 President 

2:30 ~ Rhone interview with Oakland Community College (Detroit) 

Eric Thuma 
3:30 .Haircut 

4 :45 David Young 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1973 


8:15 

9:30 

*10:30 

- 11:00 


.IDE of fice (HRH group) 

Sneed, Whitaker, Garment, Hu 11 in (Wounded Knee) 

Call to AG J 

Natinrds Business cover story interview (jack Wooldridge, 
Robert Gray, Wilbur Martin) 

Julie Eisenhower 

Aldo Beckman, Glen Els ass er, Louise Hutchinson, Ed Rohrbach 


THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1973 


8:15 JHRH office 

9:30 American Newspaper Publishers Association 

Wellington Hotel * 

11:00 Energy meeting - Shultz, Kissinger, Scowcroft, DiBona, Simon 

1:30 Lunch in HRH office 

2;40 JEx.esident 

4:30 Timmons 

5;j)0 TTimmo ns, Pat Gray 

5:3.0.*— — ~~P resident 
7:00 Dixie Lee Ray 


( 400 ) 



17. 2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY JULY 27, 1973 , 7 SSC 274 7-50 


2747 

other words, he was not going to move against anybody until he had 
this down and could see what this fellow really had and then would go 
forward. 

Senator Gurney. Well now, around about this time or somewhat 
later, and there are so many meetings here that I have really forgotten 
which occurred when, so perhaps I am going to have to rely on you for 
that, but did the President lift the phone up at anytime and say, “John 
I want you to come over to the office here and talk about Watergate, 
what you know about it.” 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not until way late in the game. He lifted 
up the phone one day and called me down and said, “I am satisfied 
that John Dean is in this so deeply that he simply cannot any longer 
have anything to do with it.” 

Senator Gurney, That is when he transferred the assignment to 
you? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. What date was that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. March 30. 

Senator Gurney. And tell us again precisely what transpired in 
that phone conversation beyond what you have already. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that was a meeting in the President’s office 
on March 30, and it was, as I recall, quite brief. We had had, we were 
getting ready to leave that same day, as a matter of fact, for Cali- 
fornia, and he called me down, I am looking for the time to help me, 
to recall the time of departure here. Yes, we leave at 3 o’clock in 
the afternoon, we had had a long meeting that morning with Secre- 
tary Shultz and Mr. Sonnenfeld about the economy, and that ran 
from 9 a,m. to about, I don’t know, what, 10 a.m. or 11 a.m., something 
of that kind, a long session, as I recall. He called me down for just 
about 10 minutes at noontime, and said what I have just told you, 
and I said, “Well, what is it you expect me to do basically” and he 
said, “I want you to step into what Dean has been doing here. I need 
to know about executive privilege, I need to know about attorney- 
client privilege, I need to have somebody set this strategy with regard 
to testifying at the committee and the grand jury and these other 
places and I need to know where the truth lies in this thing.” And 
the only tipoff that I had had to that was a request from him on the 
27th, I believe it was, yes, on the 27th. 

Senator Gurney. Is that the meeting between 11 a.m. and 1 pan. 
with the President? 

"Hffr. Ehrlichman. I believe — yes, yes indeed. That was for the pur- 
pose of dictating to me a list of questions that he wanted put to the 
Attorney General, and I believe that telephone call to the Attorney 
General which actually was not completed until the next day because 
he was traveling, is in your file, phone call with Kleindienst on the 
28th, and I then went down a handwritten list of questions that the 
President had put to me about the progress of the case, about the 
involvement of John Mitchell, possible^ any possible evidence that 
Kleindienst might have, any possible evidence of anybody else being 
involved at the Committee To Re-Elect, any evidence of any White 
House staff being involved and the President told me to tell the Attor- 
ney General that if he had any such evidence or if he developed any 


( 401 ) 



17.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 27 3 197 7 SSC 2747-50 


2748 

such evidence y that he was then to transmit it directly to the President, 
not through me, not through anybody else at the White House but 
direct to the President, and in that message I did, as you see in the 
transcript, that I did transmit to the Attorney General. 

Senator Gurnet. Do we have those questions that he 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, you do not. They are a part of my notes 
of the meeting of the 27th which are in the President’s file. 

Senator Gurney. How many questions were there ? 

M r. Ehruchmax. Well, there are about 10 or 12 topics, I think, 
written out on a piece of paper. 

Senator Gurney. Would you give us to the best of your recollection 
what the topics were and what the questions were ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think I can do that best, Senator, by looking at 
that telephone conversation and — because I think that that transcript 
is quite faithful to the list. I just went down the list in talking with 
the Attorney General. I don’t seem to have that in my 

Senator Gurney. The telephone. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The telephone call with Mr. Kleindienst on the 
2Sth. 

Senator Gurney. I -wonder if the committee would hand this to the 
witness, Mr. Ehrlichman. That apparently is it. If we have another 
copy I wish I could have it, too, but I think it is better you have it at 
the moment. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We have a copy here ; I may have stuck it back in 
the file. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Gurney. J have a copy here now. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign that the appropriate exhibit 
number. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 99.*] 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Actually the first sentence, as i recall, is only 
partly on this transcript and it said, “There are a number of things 
the President wanted me to cover with you,” and only the latter half 
of that sentence is in the transcript. 

Senator Gurney. If we could, Mr. Ehrlichman, this is very impor- 
tant, but if you could summarize these as briefly as you can it will help 
out the committee because I think my own time is running out here. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You will see in the fourth paragraph I said. 
“No. 1, he wanted me to ask you these two things that I did yesterday 
about the grand jury and about Baker,” meaning Senator Baker, and 
then we go into an inquiry about some statements that Senator Weicker 
had made to the press which the President had asked Pat Gray to check 
into. Then, and the President wanted a report on whether Senator 
Weicker had any evidence or not to support these assertions. 

Senator Gurney. I think perhaps you had better explain a little 
more about Senator Baker who is not here so we can know that there 
is no 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Well, the President had designated John Dean as 
the White Mouse contact on Watergate, or the White House leadman 
on Watergate, as I say in February. He had also designated the Attor- 
ney Genera l as the administration contact to the committee, and had 

•See p. 2044. 


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17, 2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973 t 7 SSC 2747-50 

2749 

asked the Attorney General to be in touch with Senator Baker with 
regard to committee rules and technical matters of that kind. 

Senator Gurney. This was just a liaison matter '( 

Mr. Ehklichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gtjrney. So he can find out what was going on, what the 
committee planned to do, that sort of thing ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. So he was asking for a report 
from the Attorney General on that. 

•By the way, it comes back to me that in the meeting that Dean and 
Mitchell and Haldeman and I had in the President’s office on the 22d 
that the President had picked up the phone and called the Attorney 
General and had given him some questions to ask Senator Baker about 
committee timing and that kind of thing so that he would be advised 
of the facts, and he had not yet had the report back; from the Attorney 
General on that. 

Then this first page is about Senator Weickers statements, which 
was one of the items on the list. 

Then at the bottom of page 2 I said, “The President said for me to 
say this to you that the best information he has had and has, is that 
neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson nor I nor anybody in the com- 
mittee has had any prior knowledge of this burglary. He said that he 
is counting on you to provide him with any information to the contrary 
if it ever turns up. And you just contact him direct. Now as far as the 
Committee To Re-Elect is concerned he said that serious questions 
somebody raised with regard to Mitchell and he would likewise want 
you to communicate with him any evidence or inferences from evidence 
on that subject.” 

Senator Gurney. I think we had better stop there. 

The chairman points out to me that we have a vote on the Senate 
floor. 

,J Senator Ervin. We will stand in recess. 

[ Recess. J 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney will resume the questioning of the 
witness. 

Senator Gurney. I think we were there at the bottom of page 2, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir; I saw during recess that I had skipped 
over the Attorney General’s remarks in the middle of page 2 where in 
response to my general inquiry, a previous inquiry also, he said he has 
been emphasizing publicly that “The President wanted the matter in- 
vestigated, to let the chips fall where they may, but second, if anybody 
has any information we not only want it, we expect to get it, so we can 
investigate it and if these indict other people and that anybody who 
withheld information would be obstructing justice.” The Attorney 
General was saying this to the press and he was getting this out in 
every way that he knew how. 

Now, then at the top of page *3 the significance of the McCord letter 
which was drafted by Mr. McCord and handed to Judge Sirica and 
which J udge Sirica read publicly was discussed and evaluated by the 
Attorney General. 

Then, we return to the question about whether or not Mr. Mitchell 
was involved, and that led to a statement by the Attorney General that 


( 403 ) 



17.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 27 3 19 73 , 7 SSC 2747-50 

2750 

if Mr. Mitchell were to be involved, and he says here that he has no 
evidence at this time that he is, but if he were, that we should give some 
thought in such an event to having a special prosecutor, the Attorney 
General would feel he would have to recuse himself. Then I asked 
him what the President’s position would be in the event of such a 
thing and at the bottom of page 3 and middle of page 4 he advises such 
a procedure. Then we discussed, and again this is an item on my list, 
the matter of immunity; who determines whether immunity will be 
granted mechanically, and he said the Department of Justice deter- 
mined that insofar as the grand jury was concerned but so far as the 
Senate committee is concerned that it made that determination in 
conjunction, I don’t think he said in conjunction with the court, but 
that these were two separate procedures. 

Then another item on my list was the status of the court action which 
I have referred to previously in testimony here, in answer to a question 
by Senator Weicker, and then finally I was asked to tell him that there 
was a possibility that the President wanted to see him in San Clemente 
the following Saturday. The Attorney General at that time was in 
Arizona, was planning to be in Los Angeles, and in point of fact that 
a^jneeting did take place in San Clemente subsequent to this phone call. 

Senator Gurney. Did the President tell you at the time he gave these 
questions to you why he was asking you to inquire of the Attorney Gen- 
eral rather than Mr. Dean, did that come up ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, it did not come up and I did not ask. 

Senator Gurney. But in retrospect you think he was perhaps having 
doubts whether he was getting a full story or not ? 

Mr. Ehruchmax. Yes, up until then Mr. Dean had been the contact 
with the Attorney General in matters of this kind. 

Senator Gurney. Then on what date did the President give this full 
assignment to you to run Watergate down for him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Two days later, 

Senator Gurney. I think I had better stop there, Mr, Chairman, 
because I have taken enough time. 

Senator Ervin. Well, Senator, I would not want to cut you off. This 
is a very serious investigation we are making and you could proceed 
until noon if you have further questions and then we can recess for the 
lunch hour, 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me then complete, if we can, the assignment you had from the 
President to now, be the sort of chief Watergate investigator in the 
White House. 

Would you tell the committee about that, what you found and what 
you reported to the President ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I have tried to disclaim the designation “investi- 
gator,” Senator, because I don’t consider what I did to be an investiga- 
tion, to a conclusive result. 

Senator Gurney. You certainly can define your role. I didn’t mean 
to imply something you were not doing. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I had to get up to speed on this. I was not follow- 
ing the law on the matter and so the first thing that I did in another 
conversation with the Attorney -General was to arrange to have some- 
one in the Department of Justice prepare for me a thorough brief of 


( 404 ) 




17 m 3 RICHARD KLEINDIENST TESTIMONY 3 AUGUST 7, 1973, 9 SSC 3569 


3569 

have a new Attorney General, confirmation and all the problems, and 
somebody coming in brandnew right now.” 

As I always have tried to do, I tried to respect the wishes of the 
President of the United States. I said, “ I hope it is not going to be long 
after September. I won’t be thinking of that date now. I want to get 
out of here as soon as I can, but I will agree with you that I will not 
submit my resignation in September.” 

Mr, Dorsex. I am going to pass by certain other events that oc- 
curred in this period, including any role you may have played in the 
confirmation hearings of Mr. Gray, your receipt of any records from 
the CIA, and discussions as to the role you were perhaps to play in 
connection with this committee, and direct your attention instead at 
this time to a conversation I believe you had with Mr, Ehrlichman on 
March 28, 1973. 

Do you recall that conversation ? 

Mr, Kleindienst. No, sir, 

Mr. Dorsen. May we have shown to the witness what purports to 
be a transcript of a conversation on March 28, 1973, between Mr. 
Kteindienst and Mr. Ehrlichman? 

Mr. Kleindienst. Is that the one that Mr. Ehrlichman taped? 

Mr. Dorset. That is correct. 

Mr, Kleindienst. Then I — I have had my memory vividly refreshed 
with respect to that conversat ion. 

Mr. Dorsen. Did Mr. Ehrlichman, before that conversation started, 
tell you he was taping it ? 

Mr. Kleindienst. No, sir. And if he had, some of the words that I 
used and that appear in this exhibit would not have been said by me, 
Mr. Dorsen. 

Mr. Dorsen. Well, in the interests of moving along I will not at- 
tempt to question you about the contents of that conversation but 
merely about Mr. Ehrlichman’s not advising you. 

Do you know whether Mr. Ehrlichman made a practice of recording 
these phone calls? 

Mr. Kleindiexst. I don’t know. I learned of this as a result of these 
hearings. I don’t think I have language, appropriate language in a 
public hearing of this kind, to describe the reaction that I had when 
I learned of this. I think it is reprehensible. I think it is incredible. 
The concept of somebody at the White House taping a telephone con- 
versation with the Attorney General of the United States when he is 
talking to them about business that relates to the President of the 
United States is just bevond my comprehension. And like I say, I don’t 
want to be subjective but I don’t think I have at my command language 
that adequately expresses my feelings about this incident. 

Mr. DoRsex. Does that document that I have shown you appear to 
be an accurate transcription of the conversation ? 

Mr. Kletxdtenst. T think so. 

Mr. Dorsex. Mr. Chairman, may T request that the transcript be 
placed in evidence? 

Mr. TC t.etxdtexst. T would like to have the opportunity for the bene- 
fit of two persons who used to l>o friends of mine. Senator Weicker 
and Judge Sirica, to explain some of the concepts that T had and why 
T used some of the language that T did as a result of mv conversation 
JSitli Mr. Ehrlichman. 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-27 


( 405 ) 



17.4 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/KLEINDIENST CONVERSATION s MARCH 
28 . 1973, SSC EXHIBIT NCR 99, 7 SSC 2944-46 

2944 

Exhibit No. 99 

Conversation with AG Kleindienst, March 28, 1973 

K. Kleindienst 

E. Ehrllchman. 

E. The President wanted me to cover with you. Are you on an outside line? 

K. I’m at my parents’ house. 

E. Oh, fine, OK, so it’s a direct line? Number one, he wanted me to ask you 
those two things that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about Baker. 

He had me call Pat Gray and have Pat contact Lowell Weicker to ask 
- Weicker about this second story that he put out yesterday to the effect that 
he had information about White House involvement. And Weicker told Gray 
that he was talking there about political sabotage and not about the Water- 
gate. 

K. About the Segretti case? 

E. Yeah, and that he was quite vague with Pat as to what he had. 

K. I called him also, you know, after I talked to the President on Monday. 

E. Well, the President’s feeling is that it wouldn’t be too bad for you in your 
press conferences in the next couple of days to take a swing at that and jnst 
say we contacted the Senator because we continue to exercise diligence in 
this thing and we’re determined to track down every lead and it turns out 
he doesn’t have anything. 

K. I would really at this delicate point question the advisability of provoking, 
you know, a confrontation with Weicker. He’s essentially with us, he and 
Baker get along good. 

E. Is he? 

K. Baker has had a long talk with him and told him to shut up and said that 
he would and I talked with him on Sunday after he said he didn’t have any- 
thing but he's kind of an excitable kid and we just might not want to 
alienate him and I think that if he finds himself in a direct word battle with 
the White House and me and loses face about it I think in the long run we 
might need that guy’s vote. 

E. I see. You don’t think that this is evidence of alienation to the point of no 
return then? 

K. No. You mean by Lowell? 

E. Yeah. 

K. No I don’t. He’s pretty disenchanted with the whole concept of it. Connect- 
icut politician 

E. Well, use your own judgment on it, Richard. 

K. On TV I guess 7 or 8 times this Sunday when I finished my testimony before 
my appropriations committee all three networks I referred to the letter that 
I sent to Sirica and I also emphasized and repeatedly said (a) the President 
wants this investigated, let the chips fall where they will but secondly that 
if anybody has any information we not only want it we expect to get it so 
we can investigate it and if necessary indict other people and that anybody 
who withholds information like that is obstructing justice. But I did not 
refer to Weicker. And my judgment right now is not to do so. 

E. OK, OK. 

K. If he gets to that point, the hell with him. 

E. Well, our uneducated and uninformed impression was that he was trying 
to develop an attack line here on the White House or the President. 

K. If that ... if we would conclude that that is what he’s up to that he is 
completely alienated then I say we've got to take him on. 

E. Well, keep track of that and you'll be talking to Baker and you get a fed of it. 

OK, now, the President said for me to say this to you. That the best in- 
formation he had and has is that neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson 
nor I nor anybody in the White House had any prior knowledge of this 


( 406 ) 


17.4 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLI CRM AN /RLE INDIES ST CONVERSATION 3 MARCH 
28j 1973 , SSC EXHIBIT^ NCH 99 , 7 SSC 2944 -46. 

2945 


burglary. He said that he’s counting on you to provide him with any in- 
formation to the contrary if it ever turns up and ^ou just contact him direct. 
Now as far as the Committee to re-elect is concerned he said that serious 
questions are being raised with regard to Mitchell and he would likewise 
want you to communicate to him any evidence or inferences from evidence 
on that subject 

K. With respect to them, unless something develops with these 7 people who 
were convicted all those people testified under oath before a grand jury and 
their testimony was not contradictory and until something comes along I 
think this fellow McCord if he has something besides his own testimony in 
addition to -that to refute the sworn testimony, then you’d have to do it 
The comment that I made yesterday about McCord was that it takes 

E. Take him for what he is. 

K. He’s facing a long jail sentence and he has all kinds of motives to say all 
kinds of things but I also pointed out that most of the people, well, these 
people who were involved were interviewed by the FBI and they testified 
under oath before a grand jury to the contrary of what McCord is saying. 
But I understand the President's direction. 

E. He’s concerned about Mitchell. 

K. So am I. 

E. And he would want to have a private communication from you if you are 
possessed of any information that you think he ought to have with regard 
to John. 

K. Now' he ought to think about John— 'McCord or LIddy or Hunt or any of 
these 7, you know, testify under oath specifically to their knowledge they 
have a basis for saying so that Mitchell or any of these guys knew about it ; 
we have a very serious problem. Possible perjury, possibility of going back 
to the grand jury, they have a grand jury determine when anyone should be 
indicted. When you talk about Mitchell and me that really creates the 
highest conflict of interest. And we want to give some thought to having 
in such an event having a special prosecutor. 

E. What is the procedure for that? 

K. Well, I don’t know. I think that the President could appoint somebody as 
a special prosecutor to direct the FBI to cooperate with him, giving them an 
opportunity to hire some attorneys, you know, on his staff and then just 
have complete authority to have his own investigation and if there’s evidence 
that comes out that there were acts of criminal behavior have them presented 
to a grand jury then proceed with it. 

E. Could you have somebody brief out how that’s done? Just so we know? And 
the question would be whether the President or Sirica or you or you know 
who actually does it? 

K. Well it wouldn’t be the judge. The judge has no jurisdiction. I think it 
would be the President 

E. OK. 

K. But it has its own problems that by doing that you In effect say publicly 
well OK the Department of Justice and the Attorney General the U.S. 
Attorney and the FBI all corrupt. I’ve now found that out and have got to 
get myself a new 

E. Of course we’ve resisted that right straight through. 

K. I think that we have to do it in the event that it appears that Mitchell him- 
self is going to be involved in any further litigation because all the men who 
are doing this who have worked for him been appointed and X think if it 
came down to him that that’s what I would seriously start thinking about, 
recommending. 

E. Also this business of the grant of immunity to witnesses before the grand 
jury, is that peculiarly in the province of the court? 

K. No, that’s the Department of Justice. 

E. That is? 

K. In almost every criminal case of any consequence when we convict some- 
body the next thing to do is haul them back in before a grand jury to find 
out what they know. You have to do it in this case — always going to do it. 
Quite a limitation posed on us John is that — who couldn’t cut it (inaudible). 
But you have two really distinct situations here. You have the Watergate 
inquiry by Senator Ervin, that’s the political side of it. And then you have 
the obligation imposed upon us to investigate criminal conduct. Two separate 
distinct operations. They’re getting all fuzzed up. 


( 407 ) 


17.4 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/KLEINDIENST CONVERSATION } MARCH 
28^ 1973 , SSC EXHIBIT NO. 99, 7_ SSC 2944-46 

2946 

E. What progress are they making right now, have you had a reading on it? 

K. Well, the last time I talked to Henry Monday because of Sirica’s sentencing 
procedures it got a little boxed up. Sirica is really lousing this thing up. I - 
don’t know. I’m going to talk to Petersen this morning and I'll call you 
back. 

E. OK, great, that’s all I had on my list. 

K. Thanks, John. 

E. Now, he said that there was a possibility he'd like to see you in San 
Clemente Saturday morning first thing. So you might just keep that in the 
back of your mind. Don’t rearrange any of your schedules or anything but 
I’ll let you know if that materializes. We'd send a chopper up to DA for you. 

Thank you. 

K. OK. 


( 408 ) 



27,5 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28 3 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 

TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF A 
RECORDING OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN 
RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST AND JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN 
ON MARCH 28, 1973 

Uh, the President VTanted me to cover with you — are 
you on an outside line? 

I f m at my parents 1 house. 

Oh, fine, okay, so it’s a direct line? 

No problem. 

Uh, number one, he wanted me to ask you those two things 
that I did yesterday about the grand jury and about 
Baker. Uh, he had me call Pat, Pat Gray and have Pat 
contact Lowell Weicker to ask Weicker about this second 
story that he put out yesterday to the effect that he had 
information about White House involvement. And, uh, 
Weicker told Gray that, uh, uh, he was talking there 
about political sabotage and not about the Watergate. 

Talking about the Segretti testimony. 

Yeah, yeah, and that, uh, uh he was quite vague with Pat 
as to what he had. 


( 409 ) 



17.5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28. 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


Yeah, I called, I called him also, you know, after I 
talked to the President on 

Yeah. 

Monday [unintelligible] 

Right. Well, the President's feeling is that, uh, it 
wouldn f t be too bad for you in your press conferences 
in the next couple of days to take a, to take a swing 
at that 

Okay. 

and just say, uh, we contacted the Senator because we 
continue to exercise diligence in this thing and we're 
determined to track down every lead, and uh, it turns 
out he doesn't have anything. 

I would really, uh, at this delicate point question the 
advisability of provoking, you know, a confrontation 
with Weicker. He's essentially with us, he and Baker 
get along good. 

Is he? 

Baker is — had a long talk with him and told him to 
shut up and said he would and I talked to him on 


- 2 - 


( 410 ) 




Sunday and, you know, after he said he didn't have 
anything, uh, but tie's kind of an excitable kid and 
[clears throat] we just might, just might not want to, 
you know, alienate him and I think that if he finds 
himself in a direct word battle with the White House 
and me and if he gets his, you know, his face [chuckles] 
loses face about it 

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. 

KLEINDIENST: I think in the long run we might need that guy's vote. 

EHRLICHMAN : I see. 

KLEINDIENST: You know. 

EHRLICHMAN: You think, you, you don't think that this is evidence of 

alienation to the point of, uh, no return then? 

KLEINDIENST: No. You mean by Lowell? 

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. 

KLEINDIENST: No, I don't. 

EHRLICHMAN: Okay. 

KLEINDIENST: But it's, you know, he's pretty disenchanted with the 

whole concept of it and he is also willing to talk about 
this Connecticut politician — 

- 3 - 

( 411 ) 



17.5 
EHRLICHMAN: 
KLEINDIENST : 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28. 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 
Well, use your own judgment on it, Richard, 

In, uh, [clears throat] on T.V. I guess seven or eight 
times this Sunday when I finished my testimony before 
my appropriations committee [unintelligible] all three 
networks out there, I referred to the letter that I sent 
to Sirica and I also emphasized and repeatedly said 
(a) the President wants this investigated, let the chips 
fall where they will, but secondly that if anybody has 
any information, you know, uh, we not only want it, we 
expect to get it so you can investigate it and if neces- 
sary indict other people 

Right. 

and that anybody who withholds information like that, 
you know, is, uh, obstructing justice. 

Right. 

Uh, but I did not refer to Weicker. 

Okay. 

And my, my judgment right now is not to do so. 

Okay , okay . 


- 4 - 


( 412 ) 



17.3 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28 , 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: 
EHRLICHMAN : 
KLEINDIENST: 
EHRLICHMAN : 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


If he gets to that point, the hell with him. 

Well — 

If he gets to that point, uh * — 

our I clears throat] our, uh, uneducated and uninformed 
impression was that he was trying to develop, uh, uh, 
an attack line here on, uh, the White House or the 
President. 

Well, if that ... if we would conclude, you know, 
that that is what he’s up to, and that he is completely 
alienated, you know, then I say we’ve got to take him on. 

Well, keep, keep track of that and, uh, you’ll be 
talking to Baker and, and you get a feel of it. Okay, 
now, the President said for me to say this to you. 

That [clears throat] the best information he had, and 
has, is that neither Dean nor Hal deman nor Colson nor 
I nor anybody in the White House had any prior knowledge 
of this burglary. 

if*;.. 

Right. 

He said that, uh, he’s counting on you to provide him with 
any information to the contrary if it ever turns up 


- 5 - 


( 413 ) 




17,5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28, 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: That's right. 

EHRLICHMAN: and, uh, you just contact him direct. Now as far as 

the Committee to Re-elect is concerned, uh, he said 
that, uh, uh, uh, serious questions are being raised 
with regard to Mitchell and, uh, he would likewise want 
you to communicate to him any, uh, evidence or inferences 
from evidence, uh, on that subject. 

KLEINDIENST: Well, with respect to them, unless [clears throat] 

something develops, you know, with these seven people 
who were convicted, you know, all those people testified 
under oath before a grand jury and their testimony was 
not contradicted, uh, and until something comes along I 
take this fellow McCord, you know, not that I — 

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. 

KLEINDIENST: indicate a link to Magruder — if he has something besides 

his own testimony, you know, in addition to that to refute 
the sworn testimony, then you'd have to do it. The comment 
that I made yesterday about McCord was that it takes — 

EHRLICHMAN : [Unintelligible] Yeah. 

KLEINDIENST: convicted felon. 


- 6 - 


( 414 ) 




17.5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28 % 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


Yeah. 

He f s facing a long jail sentence and he has all kinds 
of motives to say all kinds of things but I also pointed 
out that [clears throat] most of the people, well, these 
people who were involved were interviewed by the FBI and 
they testified under oath before a grand jury to the 
contrary of what McCord is saying. So, but I T m, I 
understand the President's direction. [Unintelligible] 

He f s, he T s concerned about Mitchell, and uh. 

So am I. 

Uh, he, he would want to have a private communication from 
you if you are, uh, possessed of any information that you 
think he ought to have, uh, with regard to John. 

I understand. 

Uh, now, uh, he f s up, he's — 

Maybe you ought to think about John when you talk to the 
President — If, if McCord or Liddy or Hunt or any of these 
seven, you know, uh, testify under oath specifically, you 
know, to their knowledge, you know, they have a basis for 
saying so that Mitchell or any of these guys knew about it; 


- 7 - 


( 415 ) 



17.5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28, 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 

EHRLICHMAN: Urn hm. 

KLEINDIENST: then we a, we have a very serious problem. You know, 

possible perjury, possibility of going back to the grand 
jury, they have a grand jury determine whether any one of 
them should be indicted. When you talk about Mitchell you 
know, uh, and myself, you know, that really creates, you 
know, the highest [chuckles] form of, you know, conflict 
of interest. 

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. 


KLEINDIENST: You might say, and we might want to give some thought to 

having — in such an event, having a special prosecutor. 

EHRLICHMAN: What is the procedure for that? 


KLEINDIENST: Well, I don't know. I, I think that the President could 

appoint somebody as a special prosecutor to direct the 
FBI to cooperate with him, giving them an opportunity to 
hire some attorneys, you know, on his staff and let him, 
uh, just have complete authority to have his own investi- 
gation and if there's evidence that comes out that there 
were acts of criminal behavior have them presented to a 
grand jury, you know, and then proceed with it. 


EHRLICHMAN: Could, could you have somebody brief out how that's done? 


- 8 - 


( 416 ) 




17,5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28 M 19 7 3 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


Uh — 

Just so we know? 

Okay. 

And, uh, uh, uh, the question would be whether the President 
or Sirica or you or, or, you know, who actually does it? 

Yes, well, it wouldn't be the judge. The judge has no, 
no jurisdiction in the area. 

All right. 

I think it would be the President. 

All right. 

He would do it. 

Okay. 

But I, I, it has its own problems that by doing that you 
in effect say publicly well okay the Department of Justice 
and the Attorney General, the U. S. Attorney, and the FBI, 
you know — 

All corrupt. 

all corrupt. 


- 9 - 

( 417 ) 



17,5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28* 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN : 
KLEINDIENST: 


EHRLICHMAN: 


Yeah. 

I f ve now found that out 
Yeah. 

and I T ve got to get myself a new — 

Right. Well, of course we f ve resisted that 
I know it. 

right straight through. 

[Unintelligible] But I, but I think that we have to do 
it in the event that it appears that Mitchell himself is 
going to be involved 

I get it. 

in any further litigation because all the men who are doing 
this who have worked for him — been appointed, you know, 
uh, and I think that if it came down to him that that’s 
what I would seriously start thinking about, recommending 
such an [unintelligible]. 

Also this business of the grant of immunity to witnesses 
before the grand jury, uh, is that peculiarly in the 
province of the Court? 


- 10 - 


( 418 ) 




17,5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28, 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


No, that T s the Department of Justice * 

That is? 

In almost every criminal case of any consequence when we 
convict somebody the next thing we do is haul them back 
in before a grand jury [unintelligible] to find out what 
they know. 

Uh huh. 

Uh, you have to do it in this case — you 1 re always 
going to do it in this case, notwithstanding Sirica. 

Yeah. 

Part of the limitation imposed upon us John is that he 
is the only one who can cut it in all this. 

Right. 

JUnintelligible] Progress. 

Right. 

Under conditions [unintelligible] . But [clears throat] 
you have two really distinct situations here. You have 
the Watergate inquiry by Senator Ervin, that’s the political 

Yeah. 

- 11 - 


( 419 ) 


17,5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28, 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


[Unintelligible] And then you have the obligation imposed 
upon us to investigate criminal conduct. 

Yeah. 

And, and they are two separate distinct operations. They’re 
getting all fuzzed up. That’s the problem. 

What uh, uh, what progress are they making right now, have 
you had a reading on it? 

Well, the last time I talked with, with Henry uh, uh, 

Monday [clears throat] because of Sirica’s sentencing pro- 
cedures it got a little boxed up. Sirica has really loused 
this thing up. Uh, so, uh, I, I don’t know. I’m going to 
talk to Petersen this morning and [unintelligible] if there 
is anything [unintelligible] Petersen, I’ll call you back. 

Okay, great. 

Good enough. 

that’s all I had on my list. 

Thanks , John . 

Now, uh, he said that, uh, there was a possibility he’d 
like to see you in San Clemente Saturday morning 


- 12 - 


( 420 ) 




17.5 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 28. 1973 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 

- y ■■■ ■ — ■ 1 i . .i 1 " 1 — —— 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 


KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 

EHRLICHMAN: 

KLEINDIENST: 


Saturday morning — 

first thing. So you might just keep that in the back 
of your mind. Don't rearrange any of your schedules 
or anything 

Right . 

but I f ll let you know if that materializes. 

Okay. 

We'd send a chopper up to L. A. for you. 

Right . 

Okay. 

Right. 

Thank you. 

Bye. 


- 13 - 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-28 


( 421 ) 



17.6 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT, AUGUST 15 , 1973, 9 PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS 991, 993 


PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 

The time has come to turn Watergate over to the courts, where the 
questions of guilt or innocence belong. The time has come for the rest of us 
to get on with the urgent business of our Nation. 

Last November, the American people were given the clearest choice 
of this century. Your votes were a mandate, which I accepted, to complete 
the initiatives we began in my first term and to fulfill the promises I made 
for my second term. 

This Administration was elected to control inflation— to reduce the 
power and size of Government — to cut the cost of Government so that you 
can cut the cost of living — to preserve and defend those fundamental 
values that have made America great — to keep the Nation’s military 
strength second to none— to achieve peace with honor in Southeast Asia, 
and to bring home our prisoners of war — to build a new prosperity, with- 
out inflation and without war — to create a structure of peace in the world 
that would endure long after we are gone. 

These are great goals, they are worthy of a great people, and I would 
not be true to your trust if I let myself be turned aside from achieving those 
goals. 

If you share my belief in these goals — if you want the mandate you 
gave this Administration to be carried out — then I ask for your help to 
ensure that those who would exploit Watergate in order to keep us from 
doing what we were elected to do will not succeed. 

I ask tonight for your understanding, so that as a Nation we can learn 
the lessons of Watergate and gain from that experience. 

I ask for your help in reaffirming our dedication to the principles of 
decency, honor, and respect for the institutions that have sustained our 
progress through these past two centuries. 

And I ask for your support in getting on once again with meeting 
your problems, improving your life, building your future. 

With your help, with God’s help, we will achieve those great goals 
for America. 

p Thank you and good evening. 

note: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his Oval Office at the White House. His 
address was broadcast live on radio and television. 


The Watergate Investigation 

Statement by the President . August 15 , 1973 

On May 17 the Senate Select Committee began its 
hearings on Watergate. Five days later, on May 22, I 
Issued a detailed statement discussing my relationship 
to the matter. I stated categorically that I had no prior 
knowledge of the Watergate operation and that I neither 
knew of nor took part in any subsequent efforts to cover 
it up. I also stated that I would not invoke executive 
privilege as to testimony by present and former mem- 
bers of my White House Staff with respect to possible 
criminal acts then under investigation. 

1 hirty-five witnesses have testified so far. The record 
is more than 7,500 pages and some 2 million words long. 
I he allegations are many, the facts are complicated, and 


the evidence is not only extensive but very much in con- 
flict. It would be neither fair nor appropriate for me 
to assess the evidence or comment on specific witnesses 
or their credibility. That is the function of the Senate 
Committee and the courts. What I intend to do here Is 
to cover the principal issues relating to my own conduct 
which have been raised since my statement of May 22, 
and thereby to place the testimony on those issues in per- 
spective. 

I said on May 22 that I had no prior knowledge of 
the Watergate operation. In all the testimony, there is 
not the slightest evidence to the contrary. Not a single 
witness has testified that I had any knowledge of the 
planning for the Watergate break-in. 

It is also true, as I said on May 22, that I took no part 
in, and was not aware of, any subsequent efforts to 


Volume 9 — Number 33 


( 422 ) 


17.6 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT; AUGUST 1S } 1972 , 9 PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS 991^ 992___ 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 99 3 


write a complete report on all that he knew of the entire 
Watergate matter. On March 28, I had Mr. Ehrlichman 
call the Attorney General to find out if he had additional 
information about Watergate generally or White House 
involvement. The Attorney General was told that I 
wanted to hear directly from him, and not through any 
staff people, if he had any information on White House 
involvement or if information of that kind should come 
to him. The Attorney General indicated to Mr. Ehrlich- 
^^nan that he had no such information. When I learned 
on March 30 that Mr. Dean had been unable to com- 
plete his report, I instructed Mr. Ehrlichman to con- 
duct an independent inquiry and bring all the facts to 
me. On April 14, Mr. Ehrlichman gave me his findings, 
and I directed that he report them to the Attorney Gen- 
eral immediately. On April 15, Attorney General Klein- 
dienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen told me 
of new information that had been received by the 
prosecutors. 

By that time the fragmentary information I had been 
given on March 2 1 had been supplemented in important 
ways, particularly by Mr. Ehrlichman’s report to me on 
April 14, by the information Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. 
Petersen gave me on April 15, and by independent in- 
quiries I had been making on my own. At that point, I 
realized that I would not be able personally to find out 
all of the facts and make them public, and I concluded 
that the matter was best handled by the Justice Depart- 
ment and the grand jury. On April 1 7, I announced that 
new inquiries were underway, as a result of what I had 
learned on March 2 1 and in my own investigation since 
that time. I instructed all Government employees to co- 
operate with the judicial process as it moved ahead on 
this matter and expressed my personal view that no im- 
munity should be given to any individual who had held 
a position of major importance in this Administration. 

My consistent position from the beginning has been 
to get out the facts about Watergate, not to cover them 
up. 

On May 22 I said that at no time did I authorize any 
offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defend- 
ants, nor did I know of any such offer. I reaffirm that 
statement. Indeed, I made my view clear to Mr. Ehr- 
lichman in July 1972, that under no circumstances could 
executive clemency be considered for those who partici- 
pated in the Watergate break-in. I maintained that 
position throughout. 

On May 22 T said that “it was not until the time of 
my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at 
the office of Mr. Ells berg’s psychiatrist, and I specifically 
authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge 
Byrne. After a very careful review, T have determined 
that this statement of mine is not precisely accurate. It 
was on March 17 that I first learned of the break-in at 
the office of Dr. fielding, and that was 4 davs before the 
beginning of my own investigation on March 21. T was 


told then that nothing by way of evidence had been ob- 
tained in the break-in. On April 18 I learned that the 
Justice Department had interrogated or was going to 
interrogate Mr. Hunt about this break-in. I was gravely 
concerned that other activities of the Special Investiga- 
tions Unit might be disclosed, because I knew this could 
seriously injure the national security. Consequently, I 
directed Mr. Petersen to stick to the Watergate investiga- 
tion and stay out of national security matters. On April 
25 Attorney General Kleindienst came to me and urged 
that the fact of the break-in should be disclosed to the 
court, despite the fact that, since no evidence had been 
obtained, the law did not clearly require it. I concurred 
and authorized him to report the break-in to Judge 
Byrne. 

In view of the incident of Dr. Fielding’s office, let me 
emphasize two things. 

First, it was and is important that many of the matters 
worked on by the Special Investigations Unit not be pub- 
licly disclosed because disclosure would unquestionably 
damage the national security. This is why I have exer- 
cised executive privilege on some of these matters in con- 
nection with the testimony of Mr. Ehrlichman and others. 
The Senate Committee has learned through its investiga- 
tion the general facts of some of these security matters 
and has to date wisely declined to make them public or 
to contest in these respects my claim of executive privilege. 

Second, I at no time authorized the use of illegal means 
by the Special Investigations Unit, and I was not aware 
of the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office until March 17. 
1973. 

Many persons will ask why, when the facts are as I have 
stated them, I do not make public the tape recordings 
of my meetings and conversations with members of the 
White House Staff during this period. 

I am aware that such terms as “separation of powers” 
and “executive privilege” are lawyers* terms, and that 
those doctrines have been called “abstruse” and “eso- 
teric.” Let me state the commonsense of the matter. 
Every day a President of the United States is required 
to make difficult decisions on grave issues. It is absolutely 
essential, if the President is to be able to do his job as 
the country expects, that he be able to talk openly and 
candidly' with his advisers about issues and individuals 
and that they be able to talk in the same fashion with 
him. Indeed, on occasion, they must be able to “blow off 
steam” about important public figures. This kind of 
frank discussion is only possible when those who take 
part in it can feel assured that what they say is in the 
strictest confidence. 

The Presidency is not the only office that requires 
confidentiality if it is to function effectively. A Member 
of Congress must be able to talk in confidence with his 
assistants. Judges must he able to confer in confidence 
with their (aw clerks and with each other. Throughout 
our entire history the need for this kind of confidentiality 


Volume 9 — Number 33 



17.7 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE , AUGUST 22, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1016, 1019_ 

fSiSIOENflAl DOCUMcNI’V SICilAaD MIXON, 197.1 


action 

Announcement of Intention L o Nominate 
Harry J. Hogan To Be Associate Director for 
Policy arid Program Development. 

August 3 1 , 1973 

The President today announced his intention to nomi- 
nate Harry j. Hogan, of Bethesda, Md., to be Associate 
Director of ACTION for Policy and Program Develop- 
ment. He will succeed Charles \V. Ervin, who resigned ef- 
fective September 4, 1973. 

Since 1972, Mr. Hogan has been director of govern- 
ment relations for Catholic University, in Washington, 
D.C. From 1971 to 1972, he was engaged in the private 
practice of law, served as a consultant on educational and 
environmental matters, and was professor of law at Dela- 
ware Law School, in Wilmington, Del. From 1969 to 
1971, he was counsel of the House Special Subcommittee 
on Education. 


I fv was bnin on May 2. 1914, in Newark, N.J. Mr 
Hogan v/«Li graduated mag rut turn laude from Princeton 
UniveiMty, received his LL.15. from Columbia Law 
School, and received his Ph. D. in American Hbtorv from 
George Washington University. He served in the U.S 
Navy during World War II, attaining the rank of 
commander. 

From 1947 to 1952, Mr. Hogan was on the legal star; 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. From 
1952 to 1951, he was engaged in the private practice of 
law in The Duties, Oreg., where he was twice elected Dis- 
trict Attorney (1956 and 1960). From 1961 to 1963, Mr. 
Hogan served as general counsel of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, in Portland, Oreg.; as Associate Solicitor 
for Water and Power of the Department of the Interior, 
and as Legislative Counsel of the Department of the 
Interior, 

Mr. Hogan is married and has three daughters. The 
Hogans reside in Bethesda, Md. 

note: The announcement was released in San Clemente, Calif. 


THE PRESIDENT’S NEWS CONFERENCE OF 
AUGUST 22 , 1973 

Held at the Western While House 

Secretary of State 

The President. Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement before 
going to your questions. 

It is with the deep sense of not only official regret, but personal 
regret, that I announce the resignation of Secretary of State William 
Rogers, effective September 3. A letter, which will be released to the 
press after this conference, will indicate my appraisal of his work as 
Secretary of State. 1 

I will simply say at this time that he wanted to leave at the con- 
clusion of the first 4 years. He agreed to stay on because we had some 
enormously important problems coming up, including the negotiations 
which resulted in the end of the war in Vietnam, the Soviet summit, the 
European Security Conference, as well as in other areas — Latin America 
and in Asia — where the Secretary of State, as you know, has been quite 
busy over these past 8 months. 

As he returns to private life, we will not only miss him, in terms of 
his official service, but I shali particularly mi>s him becau.se of his having 
been, through the years, a very close personal friend and adviser. 

That personal friendship and advice, however, f hope still to have 
rhe benefit of, and I know that 1 wi 1. 

! For an rp han;;<; of letters Iv-tuvori tin* Resident and Secrviaty of State- Rogers, 
s*-r p:it;K MM «»[ this ivau\ 

Volume 9 — Number 34 


( 424 ) 



17.7 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, AUGUST 22, 1973 , 

9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1016, 1019 

SIOENMAl DOCUMENTS StCHA'-lO NiXON, 19/3 101? 


i if . PuKSUHN r. i don't believe, k would sabdy 
t hr public mind, and it should nut. 'flu* s amid point is 
that a.> Mr. Wright, who argued the < axe, l understand 
very well, before Judge Sirica this morning, has indicated, 
to have die tapes listened to— he indicated this also in 
his brief — cither by a prosecutor or by a judge or in 
Cdvnra, or in any way, would violate the principle of con- 
fidentiality, and l believe he is correct. That is why we 
are standing firm on the proposition that we will not agree 
to the Senate committee’s desire to have, for example, its 
chief investigator listen to the tapes, or the Special Prose- 
cutor’s desire to hear the tapes, and also why we will op- 
pose, as Mr. Wright did in his argument this morning, 
any compromise of the principle of confidentiality. 

Let me explain very carefully that the principle of 
confidentiality either exists or it does not exist. Once it 
is compromised, once It is known that a conversation that 
is held with the President can be subject to a subpoena by 
a Senate committee, by a grand jury, by a prosecutor, and 
be listened to by anyone, the principle of confidentiality 
is thereby irreparably damaged. Incidentally, let me say 
that now that tapes are no longer being made, I suppose 
it could be argued that, what difference does it make now, 
now that these tapes are also in the past. What is involved 
here is not only the tapes; what is involved, as you ladies 
and gentlemen well know, is the request on the part of 
the Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor, as well, 
that we turn over Presidential papers, in other words, the 
records of conversations with the President made by his 
associates. Those papers, and the tapes as well, cannot be 
turned over without breaching the principle of confiden- 
tiality. It was President Truman that made that argument 
very effectively in his letter to a Senate committee, or his 
response to a Congressional committee, a House com- 
mittee it was, in 1953, when they asked him to tum over 
his papers. So whether it is a paper or whether it is a tape, 
what we have to bear in mind is that for a President to 
conduct the affairs of this office and conduct them effec- 
tively, he must be able to do so with the principle of con- 
fidentiality intact. Otherwise, the individuals who come 
to talk to him, whether it is his advisers, or whether it is 
a visitor in the domestic field, or whether it is someone in 
a foreign field, will always be speaking in a eunuch-like 
way, rather than laying it on the line as it has to be laid 
on the line if you are going to have the creative kind of 
discussion that we have often had, and it has been respon- 
sible for some of our successes in the foreign policy period, 
parnm iarly in the past few years. 

O. Mr. President, could sou tell us who sou personalis 
talked to in directing that investigations be made both in 
June of ’72, shortly after the Watergate incident, and Ia>t' 
March 21, when you got new evidence and ordered a 
more intensive ins cs i igalia n ? 

l»: i . Pkksio:- . vr . Certainly. In June, I. of cmirm. 
faHe-d in Mr. Mai Gregor fi:>t of all, who was the new 
* hair mail of the connni? ter. Me told me I hat he would 
loiidij; i a thorough ii v « 1 i ( don .is far a> Ins entire com 


miitee stiiw g.va? concerned. \x>p.» ready that iuvt'sdgadoa 
was very effective except for Mr. Magrucier. who stayed 
on. But Mr. MacC Jregor does not have to assume respon- 
sibility for that. I say not responsibility for it because ba- 
sically what happened there was that he believed Mr. 
Mag ruder, and many other, have believed him, too. He 
proved, however, to be wrong. 

In the White House, the investigation's responsibility 
was given to Mr. Ehrlichman at the highest level, and in 
turn he delegated them to Mr. Dean, the White House 
Counsel, something of which I was aware, and of which 
I approved. 

Mr. Dean, as White House Counsel, therefore sat In 
on the FBI interrogations of the members of the White 
House Staff because what I wanted to know was whether 
any member of the White House Staff was in any way in- 
volved. If he was involved, he would be fired. And when 
we met on September 13, and again throughout our dis- 
cussions in the month of March, Mr. Dean insisted that 
there was not — and I use his words—' “a scintilla of evi- 
dence” indicating that anyone on the White House Staff 
was involved in the planning of the Watergate break-in. 

Now, in terms of after March 21, Mr. Dean first was 
given the responsibility tc write his own report, but I did 
not rest it there. I also had a contact made with the Attor- 
ney General himself, Attorney* General Kleindienst, told 
him — it was on the 27th of March— to report to me di- 
rectly anything that he found in this particula r area, and I 
gave the responsibility to Mr. Ehrlichman on the 29th of 
March to continue the investigation that Mr. Dean was 
unable to conclude, having spent a week at Camp David 
and unable to finish the report. 

Mr. Ehrlichman questioned a number of people in that 
period at my direction, including Mr. Mitchell, and I 
should also point out that as far as my own activities were 
concerned, I was not leaving it just to them. I met at great 
length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean 
and Mr. Mitchell on the 22d. I discussed the whole matter 
with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had had 
throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth 
out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt, and it was 
there that. Mr. Mitchell suggested that all the individuals 
involved in the White Hdusc appear in an executive ses- 
sion before the Ervin committee. We never got that far, 
but at least that is an indication of the extent of niv own 
investigation. 

O. Mr. President, you have said repeatedly that you 
tried to get all the fact*, and just now you mentioned the 
March 22 meeting. Vet former Attomev General John 
Mitchell <aid that if you had ever asked him at anv time 
about the Watergate matter, he would have told von the 
whole story, chapter and verse. Was Mr. Mitchell not 
speaking the truth when he said that before the 
« •■mmittee? 

Th r Pk r siur nt. Now. Mr. l.isagoi. I a:n r.o: going to 
question Mr. Miuheli s ver.iciix. and 1 wifi ^nlv that 
throughout l hurl e<»nf!>h‘i?i c in Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Miteh- 


V — 34 


( 425 ) 




18. On August 22, 1973 the President publicly stated that on the 
29th of March he directed Ehrlichman to continue the investigation that 
Dean was unable to conclude. 


Page 


18.1 President Nixon news conference, August 22, 1973, 
9 Presidential Documents 1016, 1019 


428 



18.1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE , AUGUST 22, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS '1016, '1019 

PasSlDENTIAl DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 


1016 

ACTION 

Announcement of Intention To Nominate 
Harry ]. Hogan To Be Associate Director for 
Policy and Program Development. 

August 21 ,1973 

The President today announced his intention to nomi- 
nate Harry J. Hogan, of Bethesda, Md., to be Associate 
Director of ACTION for Policy and Program Develop- 
ment. He will succeed Charles W. Ervin, who resigned ef- 
fective September 4, 1973. 

Since 1972, Mr. Hogan has been director of govern- 
ment relations for Catholic University, in Washington, 
D.C. From 1971 to 1972, he was engaged in the private 
practice of law, served as a consultant on educational and 
environmental matters, and was professor of law at Dela- 
ware Law School, in Wilmington, Del. From 1969 to 
1971, lie was counsel of the House Special Subcommittee 
on Education. 


Ifc was born on May 2, 1914, in Newark, N.J. M r 
Hogan was graduated magna cum laude from Princeton 
University, received his LL.B. from Columbia Law 
School, and received his Ph. D. in American Historv from 
George Washington University. He served in the U.S. 
Navy during World War II, attaining the rank of 
commander. 

From 1947 to 1952, Mr. Hogan was on the legal staff 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. From 
1952 to 1961, he was engaged in the private practice of 
law in The Dalles, Oreg., where he was twice elected Dis- 
trict Attorney (1956 and 1960). From 1961 to 1968, Mr. 
Hogan served as general counsel of the Bonneville Power 
Administration, in Portland, Oreg.; as Associate Solicitor 
for Water and Power of the Department of the Interior, 
and as Legislative Counsel of the Department of the 
Interior. 

Mr. Hogan is married and has three daughters. The 
Hogans reside in Bethesda, Md. 

note: The announcement was released in San Clemente, Calif. 


THE PRESIDENT’S NEWS CONFERENCE OF 
AUGUST 22, 1973 

Held at the Western White House 

Secretary of State 

© 

The President. Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement before 
going to your questions. 

It is with the deep sense of not only official regret, but personal 
regret, that I announce the resignation of Secretary of State William 
Rogers, effective September 3. A letter, which will be released to the 
press after this conference, will indicate my appraisal of his work as 
Secretary of State. 1 

I will simply say at this time that he wanted to leave at the con- 
clusion of the first 4 years. He agreed to stay on because we had some 
enormously important problems coming up, including the negotiations 
which resulted in the end of the war in Vietnam, the Soviet summit, the 
European Security Conference, as well as in other areas — Latin America 
and in Asia — where the Secretary of State, as you know, has been quite 
busy over these past 8 months. 

As he returns to private life, we will not only miss him, in terms of 
his official service, but I shall particularly miss him because of his having 
been, through the years, a very close personal friend and adviser. 

That personal friendship and advice, however, I hope still to have 
the benefit of, and I know that I will. 


1 For an exchange of letters between the President and Secretary of State Rogers, 
see page 1025 of this issue. 

Volume 9— Number 34 


( 428 ) 


18.1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE j AUGUST- 2 2^ 1973 3 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1016 3 1019 ' 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 1QI9 


r l he President. I don't believe, fhsi, k would satisfy 
the public mind, and it should not. The second point is 
that as Mr. Wright, who argued the case, I understand 
very well, before Judge Sirica this morning, has indicated, 
to have the tapes listened to — he Indicated this also in 
his brief — cither by a prosecutor or by a judge or in 
camera, or in any way, would violate the principle of con- 
fidentiality, and I believe he is correct. That is why we 
are standing firm on the proposition that we will not agree 
to the Senate committee's desire to have, for example, its 
chief investigator listen to the tapes, or the Special Prose- 
cutor's desire to hear the tapes, and also why we will op- 
pose, as Mr. Wright did in his argument this morning, 
any compromise of the principle of confidentiality. 

Let me explain very carefully that the principle of 
confidentiality either exists or it does not exist. Once it 
is compromised, once it is known that a conversation that 
is held with the President can be subject to a subpoena by 
a Senate committee, by a grand jury, by a prosecutor, and 
be listened to by anyone, the principle of confidentiality 
is thereby irreparably damaged. Incidentally, let me say 
that now that tapes are no longer being made, I suppose 
it could be argued that, what difference does it make now, 
now that these tapes are also in the past. What is involved 
here is not only the tapes; what is involved, as you ladies 
and gentlemen well know, is the request on the part of 
the Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor, as well, 
that we turn over Presidential papers, in other words, the 
records of conversations with the President made by his 
associates. Those papers, and the tapes as well, cannot be 
turned over without breaching the principle of confiden- 
tiality. It was President Truman that made that argument 
very effectively in his letter to a Senate committee, or his 
response to a Congressional committee, a House com- 
mittee it was, in 1953, when they asked him to turn over 
his papers. So whether it is a paper or whether it is a tape, 
what we have to bear in mind is that for a President to 
conduct the affairs of this office and conduct them effec- 
tively, he must be able to do so with the principle of con- 
fidentiality intact. Otherwise, the individuals who come 
to talk to him, whether it is his advisers, or whether it is 
a visitor in the domestic field, or whether it is someone in 
a foreign field, will always be speaking in a cunuch-like 
way, rather than laying it on the line as it has to be laid 
on the line if you are going to have the creative kind of 
discussion that we have often had, and it has been respon- 
sible for some of our successes in the foreign policy period, 
particularly in the past few years. 

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us who you personally 
talked to in directing that investigations be made both in 
June of '72, shortly after the Watergate incident, and last 
March 21, when you got new evidence and ordered a 
more intensive investigation? 

I ff k President. Certainly. In June, l, of course, 
talked to Mr. MacGregor first of all, who was the new 
( haimian of the committee. He told me that hr would 
conduct a thorough investigation as far as his entire com- 


mittee staff, was concerned. Apparently that investigation 
was very effective except for Mr. Magruder, who stayed 
on. But Mr. MacGregor docs not have to assume respon- 
sibility for that. I say not responsibility for it because ba- 
sically what happened there was that he believed Mr. 
Magruder, ancl many others have believed him, too. He 
proved, however, to be wrong. 

In the White House, the investigation's responsibility 
was given to Mr. Ehrlichman at the highest level, and in 
turn he delegated them to Mr. Dean, the White House 
Counsel, something of which I was aware, and of which 
I approved. 

Mr. Dean, as White House Counsel, therefore sat in 
on the FBI interrogations of the members of the White 
House Staff because what I wanted to know was whether 
any member of the White House Staff was in any way in- 
volved. If he was involved, he would be fired. And when 
we met on September 15, and again throughout our dis- 
cussions in the month of March, Mr. Dean insisted that 
there was not — and I use his words — “a scintilla of evi- 
dence" indicating that anyone on the White House Staff 
was involved in the planning of the Watergate break-in. 

Now, in terms of after March 21, Mr. Dean first was 
given the responsibility tc write his own report, but I did 
not rest it there. I also had a contact made with the Attor- 
ney General himself., Attorney General Kleindienst, told 
him — it was on the 27th of March — to report to me di- 
rectly anything that he found in this particular area, and I 
gave the responsibility to Mr. Ehrlichman on the 29th of 
March to continue the investigation that Mr. Dean was 
unable to conclude, having spent a week at Camp David 
and unable to finish the report. — 

Mr. Ehrlichman questioned a number of people in that 
period at my direction, including Mr. Mitchell, and I 
should also point out that as far as my own activities were 
concerned, I was not leaving it just to them. I met at great 
length with Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr, Haldeman, Mr. Dean 
and Mr. Mitchell on the 22d. I discussed the whole matter 
with them. I kept pressing for the view that I had had 
throughout, that we must get this story out, get the truth 
out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt, and it wa s 
there that Mr. Mitchell suggested that all the individuals 
involved in the White House appear in an executive ses- 
sion before the Ervin committee. We never got that far, 
but at least that is an indication of the extent of my own 
investigation. 

Q. Mr. President, you have said repeatedly that you 
tried to get all the facts, and just now you mentioned the 
March 22 meeting. Yet former Attorney General John 
Mitchell said that if you had ever asked him at any time 
about the Watergate ‘matter, he would have told you the 
whole story, chapter and verse. Was Mr. Mitchell not 
speaking the truth when he said that before the 
v onunittee? 

The President. Now. Mr. Lisagor, I am not going to 
question Mr. Mitchell’s veracity, and I will only say that 
throughout 1 had confidence in Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitch- 


Volurre 9 — Number 34 


( 429 ) 




19. On March 29, 1973 a report of James McCord's testimony at an 
executive session in the Senate Select Committee on March 28, 1973 
appeared in the national press. The report said, among other things, 
that McCord testified that he had been told that John Mitchell, Charles 
Colson, John Dean and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the Water- 
gate bugging operation. 


Page 

19.1 Washington Post , March 29, 1973, Al, A18 432 

19.2 James McCord testimony, SSC Executive Session, 

March 28, 1973, 10-17, 31-32 434 


( 431 ) 



19,1 WASHINGTON POST a MARCH 29, 1973 , Al, A18 



Gy Boo Wo utl ward ami Carl Bernstein 

VV,*s.*i;r.<ion Po.i: ii :» it Wr'. r rrs 


James \V. McCord Jr. testified under oath yesterday that 
he was told by his principal superim* in the Watergate con- 
spiracy-tail t sormej* Attorney General John N. Mitchell had 
personally jo proved plans to bug the Democrats' head- 
quarters, according ro Senate sources. 

McCord tcstiiied that his coconspirator and former 
White House aide. G. Gordon Li tidy, told him that Mitchell 
had approved the plans and budget for rfte bulging white 
Mitchell was still serving us artorney general m February, 
1972, the sources said. 

According :o the sources, McCord indicated that he 
knew or additional illegal wiretaps hur would not discuss 
them with the Senate Watergate committee unless he is 
granted immunity from further prosecution. 

McCord also said that lie had been told by Lidciy and 
former White House cun.su cant :L Howard Hunt Jr., an- 
other conspirator, rhat presidential counsel John '.V. Dean 
III and former White House assistant .fen Stuart M a cru- 
der had advance knowledge of the hugging operation, ac- 
cording to the sources. 

In addition, the sources reported. McCord testified that 
he received “second-hand information'' that Charles >V. 
Colson, then .special counsel :o Preside nr Mixon. xuew roo 
that i he Democrats* Watergate headquarters were to be 
placed under Illegal Electronic nir.^dlonve. 

Cnison has denied any advance knowledge or the hug- 
gitig. 

-McCord’s testimony was delivered in n 4 l ~-hour. closed- 
door meeting of the Senate s select committee investigat- 
ing r he Watergate bugging nnd related acts of political 
espionage and sabotage. It came as Hu nr was appearing 
before a grand jury at the same lime. {Derails .m Page 
ATI). 

McCord is scheduled to appear again before the >>nn r e 
committee next Wednesday. inestimably when Hie n*m- 
mittee will voie whether to grant hi rn imimsnity Iron* fur- 
ther prosecution. 



JOHN N MITCHELL CHARLES W. COLSON 

. . . named by McCord ... denies knowledge 


One Senate source said rh3t McCord* s testimony about 
the alleged involvement of the Iiigh presidential aides was 
hearsay because his knowledge came from Llduv and Hunt. 

Another nr the sources said that McCord was very posi- 
tive about the information he received from Llddy about 
M itched. “There v.-as complete communication between 
.McCord and LMdy about the subject.*' r he source said. 

That source, however, cautioned Chat McCord’s in: onna- 
iiou was not sufficient to prove illegal involvement of oth- 
ers in Hie celebrated conspiracy. 

The sources said that McCord, l he farmer security co- 
ordinator of the Committee for the ?,e-eleorion of the 
President, provided leads in bis testimony that could pro- 
vide additional uuomiaitoa about alleged Involvement of 
llui.se presidential antes. 

WATERGATE. A IS, Col. I 


( 432 ) 



19_A WASHINGTON POST , MARCH 29, 1973 , 42 , 433 


V/ATERGATE. From A1 ; are being leaked out of a from- Mitchell previously has de- S. Muskie (D-Maine). the ini-; 



inv 

and Madruder 


described by Shim way said the ajl^a-. the ac!ia? chairman of y*«e* : s*g. Edwa'rd it. "kennedy* an 


McCord — as ‘'active,” in the: tions have all been nubliciy 


- clay’s meeting, said that Me- alleged attempt to discredit 



ot V 

DeVan L. Shumway 
press spokesman 

the President. also denied last, circumstances under wh i ch t un ° ieCtfUetueu s ^ ir ‘» an ^ m- mac c\ An. e^aon, inves ua- 
night, as he has in the past! they were made." jtelUger.ee gawenag opera-; boas « lews to tee news me- 

that any of the officials named; Asked by a reporter if by lIunb eonduc.ed against .adi-. dia tnat. according to T.rae 
by McCord had any advance: circumstances 

knowledge of the Watergate; fact that McCord is facing a _ 

bugging. j p r i so n sentence, ShLLmway; cracic * >arty * 

‘Well. I think that again! said: “Yes. that would 
that these are allegations that; of the circumstances 

I gars developments began last) 
j Friday when McCord. Hunt 
i and the five other Watergate 
conspirators were scheduled 


reporter if by> UU£1S vuuum-.cu ^ *•***-! 

he meant thei cal P° uticai movements, the i Magazine, incLuded tapping re- 
nrd is facin^ a’ r * ews rnct ^ , * a a-nd iaQ Demo* ; pu rears* telephones; and infil- 
a ShiLrnway- cracic ?arty * jtration ot radical student 

lid be one; Included are disruptive ac-j group 3 . and the Vietnam ^et~j 
es.” i tivicies aimed at Sen. Edmund ! erans Against Fne Aar, ^ l 

’ I The latest round of Water*? 


to be sentenced by Chief U.S. 
District Judge John .T. Sirica. 

In open court, Sirica read a 
letter he had received from 
McCord who said he knew of 
“political pressure,’’ * ; perjury” 
and the involvement of others 
in the Watergate. 

That afternoon and again on 
Saturday afternoon. McCord 
mst voluntarily in secret ses- 
sions with Samuel Dash, the 
chief counsel of the Senate’s 
Watergate investigating com- 
mittee. Dash then announced 
on Sunday at an unusual press 
conference that McCord had 
‘‘named names” of others who 
allegedly had advance knowl- 
edge of the bugging of the 
Democrats’ Watergate head 
quarters, but Dash refused to 
disclose the names. 

On Monday, The Los Ange- 
les Times first reported, anil 
<r f her Senate sources later 
confirmed, that McCord had 
named presidential counsel 
Dean and former White House 


'aide Magruder as having ad-j 
| vance knowledge of the bug-1 
Sing. 

McCord then asked that he; 
be allowed to testify under i 
j oath to the seven members of | 
j the Senate Watergate commit- j 
j tee, and yesterday’s session! 
| was arranged. i 

j Magruder again denied to, 
{The Washington Post last night’ 
i that he had any advance intor- 
imation about the. Watergate; 
| bugging. Asked about reports’ 
■from some of his friends that 
! Magruder might be made a : 
•‘sacrificial lamb,” in the Water-' 
gate case. Magruder answered;: 

“You mean by the White* 
House? I have absolutely no 
! reason to suspect that. I’m noti 
j worried.” j 

j The four persons named bvj 
‘ McCord were all high-ranking? 

■ presidential advisers or assist-; 

■ ants during the first tour} 

years of the Nixon adminiotra-j 
tion. j 

Mitchell was the principal! 


architect of Mr. Xixon's suoi 
cessful I9d3 campaign stra-l 
tegy and resigned as attorney * 
general to serve as the Pres 
dent’s campaign manager in: 
the 1972 election. He then re- 
signed as campaign nuinjger 
two weeks after the Watergate 
bugging, citing Uis wife’s de- 
mands that he leave politics 
as the reason. * 

Dean, the director of all ; 
White House legal matters, re- 
ports directly to President. Nix- 
on and H. R. ilaldeman, the 
White House chief of staff. He 
is the only one of those 
named by McCord who still 
holds a White House or cab-' 
inet position- « 

It was Dean who recom- 
mended to .Magruder that- 
Liddy be hired as general 
counsel of the Committee for- 
the Re-Elect .on of the Pres*.-, 
?lent, according to .Magruder V 
testimony at the Watergate, 
trial. 1 


Magruder, a former key.av!‘j 
sistant to Haideman, left* the:! 
White House to become the-t 
interim manager of President * 
Nixon’s re-election campaign 
until Miccheii took over a'? 
campaign manager. Magruder • 
then was Mitchell's principal 
deputy, After serving as diree- - 
tor of Mr. Nixon's Inaugural 
Committee, Magruder was 
named to a sub-cabinet post in * 
the Commerce Department -by 
the President. 

Colson, who recently left the* 
White House to enter private 
law practice. was special coun- 
sel to the President, resorting ' 
directly to Mr. Nixon and to 
llalciefnan. Colson reeoro- 
m ended that another os the r 
men subsequently convicted In 
the Watergate eonsMrncv. 
Hunt, be hir-rt is a WhiE*r-i 
ft ou s e consul; ant. Hunt 
worked under Colson for at 
least part of his White House 
tenure. 


( 433 ) 



29. 2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY* MARCH 28* 1973 * SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION* 
10-17. 31-32 

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record and now if there is no objection by the Committee, 

I will instruct the Staff to supply a copy of the transcript 
to Mr, McCord and Mr. Fensterwald for correction purposes only, 
to be returned to the Staff without further disclosure to any 
person. 

Is there objection? 

Hearing none, it is so ordered. 

Now, Mr. McCord, is there a second memorandum? 

Mr. McCord. Yes, sir, there is. 

Senator Baker. Would you proceed to read it? 

Mr. McCord. Yes, sir. 

r l will state simply by ray [sic] of introduction to the 
memorandum, itself, that it was prepared in writing by me 
for the purpose of essentially being as accurate as I knew 
how in presenting the information that might be of assistance 
to your Committee, knowing that perhaps under the stresses 
of a question and answer, cross-examination session, I might 
not be so accurate. I felt it would be to my best interest, 
as well as to to [sic] yours, to try to set it down in writing and 
to get it as precise and as specific as I could. I would hope 
to be able to do so in the future on other information -that 
you might want and, in turn, to submit them to you for ques- 
tioning and cross-examination, as you feel appropriate of me. 

The memorandum was dated March 26, 1973, with the 
subject of: John Dean, the Third, which was one of the two 


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19, 2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY , MARCH 28, 1972, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 
10-17, 11-12 

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individuals mentioned in the earlier memoranda, which has 

been entered into the record. I will state that by way of 

amplification on the wording in the memorandum itself, that 

all of this information which I will read to you at this 

point, came from conversations with the Defendant, Mr. Gordon 

Liddy, unless otherwise stated within the memoranda, and there 

is a one-page memoranda [sic] with some possible leads for 

exploration by the Committee if it cares to do so, or feels 

it appropriate. 

The material then that I will read comes from conversa- 
tions with Gordon Liddy himself. I will state further by way 
of explanation that Mr. Liddy and I worked as full-time staff 
members at the Committee to Re-Elect the President, from 
approximately January 1, 1972, on through June of 1972. At 
the time that we both came into the staff full-time, I had 
been previously connected with it part-time. The offices 
then were on the second floor and the fourth floor of the 
committee facilities at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue. We had just 
moved up to the fourth floor of the Main — the Committee 
had the main staff offices under Jeb Magruder, then Acting 
Director of the Committee, in January 1972. My association 
with Mr. Liddy at this point in time, he came aboard approx- 
imately some time in December 1972, because there was a 
small staff — 

Mr. Fensterwald. [one word unreadable] 


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19. 2 JAMES MaCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 1973, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

10-17. 31-32 

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Mr. McCord. 1 71 , correction, because the Staff at 
that point was fairly small. I think at the time we were on 
the second floor, prior to December, it was somewhere between 
25 and perhaps 40 people, and in January that staff began to 
increase. And I am -giving [sic] an estimate on it. I would say 
probably something between 50 and 60 people. Because there 
was a fairly small number of people within the confines of 
the offices, I would see them daily. We would have a fair 
number of conversations each day, personally, and we were 
constantly running into each other in the offices. I say that 
simply by way of laying some type of foundation for my as- 
sociation with him at that point. My association at that 
point was strictly official. I had no social association with 
him at the time that this memorandum is written. 

Now, to quote from the memorandum itself, the memorandum 
reads : 

’’Subject: John Dean, III." 

The memorandum states: 

’’From Liddy" and by that I mean to infer or indicate 
that what I had to say below was, as I have stated to you, 
some conversation with him. 

’’From Liddy." I had better read the memorandum. 

"John Dean, Jeb Magruder, Gordon Liddy and John 
Mitchell, in February 1972, met in Mr. Mitchell’s Office 
at the Department of Justice and held the first formal dis- 

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19. 2 JAMES MoCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 1973, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

10^17^ 31 32 13 

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cussion of bugging and other related operations,. This infor- 
mation — 

Mr. Dash. I did not hear the last sentence* bugging 
the what? 

Mr. McCord. “Bugging and other related operations. 

This information came to me from several discussions before 
and after the meeting and came from Gordon Liddy. John 
Mitchell was then Attorney General, and was Attorney General 
until March 1, 1972, as I understood it." And by that I mean, 
as I recall it. 

"Mr. Liddy had planned for the meeting very carefully 
and had drafted out in longhand budget figures for various 
items of expense and had discussed them and certain details 
of the overall operation." By that I mean the "bugging opera- 
tions and related operations, and by that I mean photography 
operations and possibly other matters. 

Back to the memorandum: 

,f With Jeb Magrude, [sic] so Mr. Liddy told me. Magruder 
reportedly set up the meeting with Mitchell. Liddy was, at 
. that time, in an office on the fourth floor at 1701 Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue, Northwest, near Magruder 1 s Office. Subsequent 
to seeing the longhand draft, Liddy had a typed report on 
the subject on his desk during one of the discussions, these 
discussions, and my impression was that he was planning to 
send it or to take it by hand to someone in the White House. 

House . 

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35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-29 


( 437 ) 



19.2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 1973, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

10-17 ^ 31-32 

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I do not know to whom he took it. 

’’The meeting was set up for one particular day, but 
was cancelled and re-set for a day or so later. It was an 
afternoon meeting, as I recall, and my impression was , from 
what Liddy told me that it lasted an hour or more. He said 
that the — “ I will come back to this. M He said that the 
discussion had covered the pros and cons of various bugging 
type operations. 

Senator Gurney. Covered the what? 

Mr. McCord. “Covered the pros and cbns of the various 
bugging type operations. “ I will explain this subsequently. 

“No decisions were made at the meeting about proceeding 
with the operation but the impression Liddy had, seamed to be 
that the operation would be approved. 

“A few days later Dean told Liddy that a way would have 
to be worked out to undertake the operation without directly 
involving the Attorney General so that he would have deniabil- 
ity about it at a future date. Dean told Liddy at this time 
that the funding for the operation would subsequently come to 
him through other than regular Committee for the Re-Election 
of the President (C.R.P.) funding mechanism, so there would 
be no record of it. This was not further explained to me. 

“About 30 days after the February meeting, in the 
Attorney General* s office, Liddy told me that the operation 
1 had been approved* and that the funding for it would come 


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14 


( 438 ) 



19,2 JAMES MoCOED TESTIMONY , MARCH 28, 197 3, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

10-17. 31-32 2 1 

. 15 

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through shortly. My impression was that this word of the 

approval came from Ben, [sic] although this was not specifically 

stated by Liddy. Dean was Liddy's legal counterpart at the 

White House. Liddy was, at this time, (February 1972) Legal 

Counsel for the Committee to Re-Elect the President/' 

Under the heading of leads: 

"One of Liddy's secretaries, in February 1972, was Sylvia 
Panarites, I would believe that she may have typed some of 
the drafts referred to above and possibly other correspondence 
in connection with the meeting with the Attorney General > and 
possibly for Dean from Liddy in connection thereto." 

Page 2 of the memorandum. Item 2: 

"Liddy in preparing for the February meeting, had prepared 
some professionally done charts, roughly 4 feet by 4 feet* 

(This is only an estimate that may vary.) For which he said — 
for which he paid, correction, approximately $7 to have done. 

impression was that they were commercially done and, there- 
fore, a check with the Washington area firms for February 
may develop a record and documentation for the contents of 
these charts. 

"Liddy said that Dean told me after the February meeting 
to destroy the charts but Liddy said that he had paid so much 
for them that he did not plan to do so. The charts were brought 
In late one afternoon and left In his office on the fourth 
floor wrapped in brown paper, plain brown wrapping paper. 

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( 439 ) 



19,2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 19? 3, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 
10-17 3 31-32 

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He asked me to lock his office overnight and I arranged to 

have it done or did so, personally. I do not recall. 

"When the first meeting with the Attorney General was 
cancelled, Liddy asked that the charts be again stored under 
lock and key overnight, the following night or nights, which 
was done in his office. I never saw the charts but Sylvia 
Panarites nay have. She asked for a spare key for his office 
on the grounds that she had to come in early and do some work, 
and my impressions were that she was curious about the charts. 
Liddy had previously authorized her to have a key when needed, 
and it is my recollection that they issued one for permanent 
use at that time. I would estimate that six or more charts 
were contained within the wrapping paper. 

"Item 3. Liddy's secretary, after we moved to the second 
floor in about March 1972, was Sally Harmony. She typed 
memoranda for him from the Monitoring Logs and may be able 
to furnish further details about Dean's familiarity with the 
Watergate operation. She would have other details of interest. 

"Item 4. My best recoll-ction [sic] of the February meeting 
at the Attorney General's Office was that it was during the 
last half of the month, some time from the 15th on. Perhaps 
the Justice Department, or Attorney General's logs, or the 
Attorney General's Secretary's appointment book would reflect 
the date. 

"Item 5. Jeb Magruder had an administrative assistant 


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( 440 ) 


. 16 



19,2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY , MARCH 28, 1973 , SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 

10-17, 31-32 

1 17 

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named Robert Reisner, who kept Magruder’s appointment book. 

Reisner may have entered the date of appointment in Magruder's 

appointment book as well as in similar records of his own. 

Whether Reisner is knowledgeable of the operation, I do not 

know." 

And my initials follow that, JWMC, and then the words 
"for interview, simply as recap, Sylvia Panarites, Sally 
Harmony, the Secretary to John Mitchell and Robert Reisner. 

Now, 1 realize that this is a completion of the memorandum. 

I realize that this is fairly concise and that there are a 
number of questions. 

1 think I should state at this point, that my job at 
that time was that of Chief of Security of the Committee for 
the Re-Election of the President. I had custody of the keys 
that are referred to in this memoranda, [sic] From the nature of the 
material that you have read, it is obvious that Liddy and I 
had had- considerable discussions about this matter and I will 
be glad to answer your questions to the best I can from this 
point. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. McCord. 

Now, before we proceed further, I would like to suggest 
to the Members of the Committee that while each of us, I am 
sure, have questions, that we want to ask on our own, it seems 
to me the most logical and manageable handling of the interview 
[unreadable] proceed is to ask Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson, who have had 


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(Ml) 



19,2 JAMES MgCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 197Z, SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 
10-17, Z1-Z2 

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you have mentioned? 

Mr, Dash. I will make that a little tigheter, fsicl Mr. McCord, 
involved at the same level of operation as a Mr. Magruder 
or Mt.[sic] Mitchell or Mr. Dean? 

Mr. McCord. You are speaking of the senior level, 
essentially? 

Mr. Dash. Yes . 

Mr. McCord. Well, I cannot speak with conclusion. I 
will state only impressions, if you want it, and that may be 
very inaccurate for you, so I leave it up to you. 

Mr. Dash. If you have impressions upon which you have a 
basis, upon which you state those impressions. 

Mr. McCord. I will state for you then what I know on 
the subject. 

There were numerous conversations between approximately 
March 1972, and the date of our arrest, either by myself with 
Mr. Llddy or the three of us, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy and myself, 
sometimes in Mr. Hunt's offices across the street in the Robert 

r F. Bennett Associates Offices. On a couple of occasions, 

one specifically some time in May 1972, as best I recall, Mr. 

Hunt had a - — had drawn up a written step-by-step description 
of how the Watergate operation, the bugging operation and the 
photography operation might proceed at the Democratic 
National Committee Headquarters; And in connection thereto, 
he left me with the impression that this copy was going to be 


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32 


19.2 JAMES McCORD TESTIMONY, MARCH 28, 1973 , SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION, 
v lOmlTj 31-32 

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Charles Colson for whom Mr. Hunt had said previously, in 

previous discussions, that he had done work. 

Mr. Dash. Now, has this left you with the impression, 
then? 

Mr. McCord. I am trying to level in on it, if I may. 

Mr. Dash. All right, I am sorry. 

Mr. McCord. . His previous discussions in this regard had 
been generally along this line, that he had, that he worked 
for Mr. Colson at the White House; that their association 
and working relationship in some way continued beyond March 
1972. And, in discussing plans for the Watergate, he entered — 
in which Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt and I were sitting down and 
talking jointly without being specific, he would interject the 
name of Mr. Colson, but in the sense of indicating or inferring 
that he, was going to discuss some part of the plan with Mr . 
Colson, yes, with Mr. Colson. I cannot give you the exact 
^^"'■TJTTTTHIItg except to state that he said something to the effect 
that, well, I will be seeing Mr. Colson and it was unclear to 
me what relationship Mr. Colson had with the Watergate opera- 
tion, if any. I did not pursue the questioning at that point 
to find out because I — but, I was unclear as to exactly 
what Mr. Hunt's relationship was with him and since we were 
both not working within the Committee itself at that particular 
time, I had no reason to pursue it. I assume that if he 
interjected the name, that the man had some official, or some 

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(443) 




20 . 


On August 15, 1973 the President stated that when he learned on 
March 30, 1973 that Dean had been unable to complete his report he 
instructed Ehrlichman to conduct an independent inquiry and to bring 
all the facts to him. On March 30 the President met with John Ehrlichman 
and Ronald Ziegler from 12:02 to 12:18 p.m. According to the White House 
edited transcript of this meeting, the only subject discussed was a draft 
statement to be issued by Ziegler at a press briefing. Ehrlichman has 
testified that at the noon meeting the President directed him to conduct 
an inquiry into the Watergate matter. Ehrlichman has testified that 
the President said he was satisfied John Dean was in this Watergate 
activity so deeply that he simply could not any longer have anything to 
do with it; that the President needed to know about executive privilege 
and the attorney-client privilege; that the President needed someone 
to set strategy with regard to testifying at the Committee and the grand 
jury and other places; and that the President needed the truth about the 
Watergate matter. 


Page 


20.1 President Nixon statement, August 15, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 991, 993 447 

20.2 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Ehrlichman, March 30, 1973 (received 

from White House) 449 

20.3 John Ehrlichman log, March 30, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 451 

20.4 White House edited transcript of meeting 

among the President, John Ehrlichman and Ronald 
Ziegler, March 30, 1973, 12:02 to 12:18 p.m.......... 452 


( 445 ) 


20.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2747-50 464 

20.6 John Ehrlichman deposition. Democratic National 

Committee v. McCord , May 22, 1973, 64, 155-56 468 


( 446 ) 



20.1 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT 3 AUGUST 15 3 1973 s . 

9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS _J9J u 993_ 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 991 

The time has come to turn Watergate over to the courts, where the 
questions of guilt or innocence belong. The time has come for the rest of us 
to get on with the urgent business of our Nation. 

Last November, the American people were given the clearest choice 
of this century. Your votes were a mandate, which I accepted, to complete 
the initiatives we began in my first term and to fulfill the promises I made 
for my second term. 

This Administration was elected to control inflation — to reduce the 
power and size of Government — to cut the cost of Government so that you 
can cut the cost of living — to preserve and defend those fundamental 
values that have made America great — to keep the Nation’s military 
strength second to none — to achieve peace with honor in Southeast Asia, 
and to bring home our prisoners of war — to build a new prosperity, with- 
out inflation and without war — to create a structure of peace in the world 
that would endure long after we are gone. 

These are great goals, they are worthy of a great people, and I would 
not be true to your trust if I let myself be turned aside from achieving those 
goals. 

If you share my belief in these goals — if you want the mandate you 
gave this Administration to be carried out — then I ask for your help to 
ensure that those who would exploit Watergate in order to keep us from 
doing what we were elected to do will not succeed. 

I ask tonight for your understanding, so that as a Nation we can learn 
the lessons of Watergate and gain from that experience. 

I ask for your help in reaffirming our dedication to the principles of 
decency, honor, and respect for the institutions that have sustained our 
progress through these past two centuries. 

And I ask for your support in getting on once again with meeting 
your problems, improving your life, building your future. 

With your help, with God’s help, we will achieve those great goals 
for America. 

Thank you and good evening. 

note: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his Oval Office at the White House. His 
address was broadcast live on radio and television. 


The Watergate Investigation 

Statement by the President. August 15, 1973 

On May 17 the Senate Select Committee began its 
hearings on Watergate. Five days later, on May 22, I 
issued a detailed statement discussing my relationship 
to the matter. I stated categorically that I had no prior 
knowledge of the Watergate operation and that I neither 
knew of nor took part in any subsequent efforts to cover 
it up. I also stated that I would not invoke executive 
privilege as to testimony by present and former mem- 
bers of my White House Staff with respect to possible 
criminal acts then under investigation. 

Thirty-five witnesses have testified so far. The record 
is more than 7,500 pages and some 2 million words long. 

I he allegations many, the facts are complicated, and 


the evidence is not only extensive but very much in con- 
flict. It would be neither fair nor appropriate for me 
to assess the evidence or comment on specific witnesses 
or their credibility. That is the function of the Senate 
Committee and the courts. What I intend to do here is 
to cover the principal issues relating to my own conduct 
which have been raised since my statement of May 22, 
and thereby to place the testimony on those issues in per- 
spective. 

I said on May 22 that I had no prior knowledge of 
the Watergate operation. In all the testimony, there is 
not the slightest evidence to the contrary. Not a single 
witness has testified that I had any knowledge of the 
planning for the Watergate break-in. 

It is also true, as I said on May 22, that I took no part 
in, and was not aware of, any subsequent efforts to 


Volume 9— ~Number 33 


( 447 ) 



20.1 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT > AUGUST 15 j 197 3 j 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS % 991 3 993 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 993 


write a complete report on all that he knew of the entire 
Watergate matter. On March 28, I had Mr. Ehrlichman 
call the Attorney General to find out if he had additional 
information about Watergate generally or White House 
involvement. The Attorney General was told that I 
wanted to hear directly from him, and not through any 
staff people, if he had any information on White House 
involvement or if information of that kind should come 
j tcJum. The Attorney General indicated to Mr. Ehrlich- 
man that he had no such information. When I learned 
on March 30 that Mr. Dean had been unable to com- 
plete his report, I instructed Mr. Ehrlichman to con- 
duct an independent inquiry and bring all the facts to 
me. On April 14, Mr. Ehrlichman gave me his findings, 
and I directed that he report them to the Attorney Gen- 
eral immediately. On April 15, Attorney General Klein- 
dienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen told me 
of new information that had been received by the 
prosecutors. 

By that time the fragmentary information I had been 
given on March 21 had been supplemented in important 
ways, particularly by Mr. Ehrlichman’s report to me on 
April 14, by the information Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. 
Petersen gave me on April 15, and by independent in- 
quiries I had been making on my own. At that point, I 
realized that I would not be able personally to find out 
all of the facts and make them public, and I concluded 
that the matter was best handled by the Justice Depart- 
ment and the grand jury. On April 1 7, I announced that 
new inquiries were underway, as a result of what I had 
learned on March 21 and in my own investigation since 
that time. I instructed all Government employees to co- 
operate with the judicial process as it moved ahead on 
this matter and expressed my personal view that no im- 
munity should be given to any individual who had held 
a position of major importance in this Administration. 

My consistent position from the beginning has been 
to get out the facts about Watergate, not to cover them 
up. 

On May 22 I said that at no time did I authorize any 
offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defend- 
ants, nor did I know of any such offer. I reaffirm that 
statement. Indeed, I made my view- clear to Mr. Ehr- 
lichman in July 1972, that under no circumstances could 
executive clemency be considered for those who partici- 
pated in the Watergate break-in. I maintained that 
position throughout. 

On May 22 I said that “it was not until the time of 
my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at 
the office of Mr. Ells berg’s psychiatrist, and I specifically 
authorized the furnishing of this information to Judge 
Byrne.” After a very careful review, I have determined 
that this statement of mine is not precisely accurate. It 
was on March 17 that I first learned of the break-in at 
the office of Dr. Fielding, and that was 4 days before the 
beginning of my own investigation on March 21.1 was 


told then that nothing by way of evidence had been ob- 
tained in the break-in. On April 18 I learned that the 
Justice Department had interrogated or was going to 
interrogate Mr, Hunt about this break-in. I was gravely 
concerned that other activities of the Special Investiga- 
tions Unit might be disclosed, because I knew this could 
seriously injure the national security. Consequently, I 
directed Mr. Petersen to stick to the Watergate investiga- 
tion and stay out of national security matters. On April 
25 Attorney General Kleindienst came to me and urged 
that the fact of the break-in should be disclosed to the 
court, despite the fact that, since no evidence had been 
obtained, the law did not clearly require it. I concurred 
and authorized him to report the break-in to Judge 
Byrne. 

In view of the incident of Dr. Fielding’s office, let me 
emphasize two things. 

First, it was and is important that many of the matters 
worked on by the Special Investigations Unit not be pub- 
licly disclosed because disclosure would unquestionably 
damage the national security. This is why I have exer- 
cised executive privilege on some of these matters in con- 
nection with the testimony of Mr. Ehrlichman and others. 
The Senate Committee has learned through its investiga- 
tion the general facts of some of these security matters 
and has to date wisely declined to make them public or 
to contest in these respects my claim of executive privilege. 

Second, I at no time authorized the use of illegal means 
by the Special Investigations Unit, and I was not aware 
of the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office until March 17, 
1973. 

Many persons will ask why, when the facts are as I have 
stated them, I do not make public the tape recordings 
of my meetings and conversations with members of the 
White House Staff during this period. 

I am aware that such terms as “separation of powers” 
and “executive privilege” are lawyers’ terms, and that 
those doctrines have been called “abstruse” and “eso- 
teric.” Let me state the commonsense of the matter. 
Every day a President of the United States is required 
to make difficult decisions on grave issues. It is absolutely 
essentia], if the President is to be able to do his job as 
the country expects, that he be able to talk openly and 
candidly with his advisers about issues and individuals 
and that they be able to talk in the same fashion with 
him. Indeed, on occasion, they must be able to “blow r off 
steam” about important public figures. This kind of 
frank discussion is only possible when those who take 
part in it can feel assured that what they say is in the 
strictest confidence. 

The Presidency is not the only office that requires 
confidentiality if it is to function effectively. A Member 
of Congress must be able to talk in confidence with his 
assistants. Judges must be able to confer in confidence 
with their law clerks and with each other. Throughout 
our entire history the need for this kind of confidentiality 


Volume 9 — Number 33 



20.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN EHRLICHMAN , 
MARCH 30 3 1973 

•John D. Ehrlichman - 43 - ' 

March 23, 1973 

AM 11:34 11:41 President received long distance call from 

Mr. Ehrlichman 

11:46 12:05PM President received long distance call from 

Mr. Ehrlichman 



March 27, 1973 

11:07 11:08 President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 

AM 11:10 1:30PM President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(Mr. Ziegler 11:30-11:40)^ 

(Mr. Haldeman 11:35-1:30) 

(Mr. BuH 11:45-11:46) 


PM 6:03 6:05 


President placed local call to Ehrlichman 


March 28, 1973 
PM 7:55 7:56 


March 29, 1973 
PM 5:35 6:24 

PM 2:45 4:20 

6:25 6:26 

March 30, 1973 
AM 9:07 10:18 


PM 


President placed local call to Ehrlichman 

^01535 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 2:46-4:45) 

(Mr. Ziegler 3:01-3:30) 

(Marjorie P. Acker 4:05-4:06) 

President placed local call to Ehrlichman 


President met with Messrs. Ehrlichman, 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, George P. Shultz to 
discuss domestic issues &c Sec. Shultz*s 
trip to Western Europe Sc U. S.S.R. 

President met with Messrs. Ehrlichman and 
Ziegler 


12:02 


12:18 



20.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN EHRLICHMAN, 



MARCH 30 , 

1973 


John D. 

Ehrllchm 


-44- 

March 3 
PM 

0. 1973 (Cont'd) 
3:03 3:10 

President and Ehrlichman went to Andrews 
by helicopter 


3:18 

5:17 

President and Ehrlichman went fm Andrews to 
El Toro, California, - Spirit of *76 


4:20 

5:17(P3T) President met with Ehrlichman inflight 


5:33 

5:47 

Manifest - El Toro to San Clemente 

March 31, 1973 



AM 

9:45 

10:30 

9:49 

12:26PM 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(San Clemente) 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 10:35-12:30) 

PM 

12:40 

12:55 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 


7:30 

10:30 

President and Ehrlichman went to John 
Ford Dinner, Beverly Kilton Hotel, 

Los Angeles, California 
cr«vfc 

April 1, 

1973 



AM 

9:24 

9:32 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 

PM 

3:05 

3:16 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 


3:19 

3:21 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 


4:36 

4:48 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 

April 2, 

1973 



PM 

2:18 

4:53 

President met with Mr, Ehrlichman 
(Air. Haldeman 2:15-4:53) 


6:55 


President placed local calL to Mr. Ehrlichman 


7:48 

7:50 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 


\ \ n I 


( 450 ) 



20, Z JOHN EHRLICHMAN LOG , MARCH 30, 1973 


y 


FRIDAY, 

MARCH 30, 197 3 

7 S: 15 

_ERH_pffice 

9:00 

President. Shultz, Son n 

- 12:1 kii&d^ z m?&A ohoto for Nafci< 

“■IZroCT 

h rea r 1 elding 

12:45 

Bill Timmons 

1:15 

Len Garment 

3:00 

Depart South Lawn 

3:20 

Depart Andrews a*30 

5:20 

Arrive El Toro 


Helicopter to Palomar 

Stay 

LaCosta 

SATURDAY, MARCH 31, 1973 

8:30 

AG Kleindienst, . HRH 

10:30-12;: 

30 President 

12:45 

President 

7:00 

John Ford Dinner 

' MONDAY 

, APRIL 2, 1973 


in 


'ores One) 


Los Ansjele3 


10:30 President Thieu arrival ceremony 

11:30 Lunch with Mother Ehrlichman, Mr. and Mrs. Janxs3 Dick 

Nancy Martinson - 

2:30-4:30 President, KRH 


y TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1973 


12:00 Lunch - President, President Thieu 

2:00 Thieu farewell 

2:15-4:00 President 


V 


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1973 


Paul Pres Ley 
Cliff Miller 
president 
V ern Ols en 
Lunch with Zi< 
P re si dent 



( 451 ) 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 30 , 1973 MEETING 

' ■ 330 

Appendix 11. Meeting: The President, Ehrlichman and Ziegler, 

Oval Office, March 30, 1973. (12:02 - 12:18 p.m. ) 

Someone left the room after having a picture taken 

E We have, I think, a useful statement that has been 

cleared by Dean and Mitchell and is directed with 
the cover-up charge - 

P Do you want me to read it? 

Z I think you probably better. 

P I can read it (unintelligible) discuss and so forth. 

Or do you want to read it? 

Z No, well it's not a statement, Mr. President, it's 

some talking points for me. 

P Yeah - O.K. 

E The brackets at the top go to the end. 

P Could we say — could we add one thing here? 

Say this for the last. Every — I've called for 
an investigation on the White House staff — is 
that? And — every — every. This is a statement 
of the President? 

Z No - no — I would make it. 

P Yeah - yeah — the President called for — fine. 

Every member of the White House staff who has been 
mentioned (unintelligible) mentioned as a — has 
submitted a sworn affidavit to me denying any 
knowledge of. 


( 452 ) 



£ 

P 


Z, 

V 

E 


P 


P 


E 


P 

Z 

E 


20. 4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MABCH 30, 1973 MEETING 

- 2 - JtfJ 

any prior knowledge. 

any knowledge of or participation in. Could we 
say this? 

No — I wouldn't. 

Why? Not true? Too defensive? 

Well, number one — it's defensive -- it's self- 
serving. Number two — then that establishes the 
existence of a piece of paper that becomes a focal 
point for a subpoena and all that kind of thing, 
(unintelligible Jsomething. 

(long pause) 

Members of the White House staff would welcome an 
opportunity — Are we going too far and urging the 
Grand Jury to do it? 

Well — that's — we were farther over and we've 
come back to welcome. I don't know. Maybe that's 
still too strong. 

We should tell the President about the framework 
which will be giving this. There's a leak out of 
the Committee — 

Oh. 

for the Re-Election of the President and the 
suggestion that you have waived the - the restriction 
on — on Dean being 

The Dean thing. See, we cleared it with Mitchell, 
we cleared it with Magruder and with Dean's lawyer. 


( 453 ) 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT^ OF MARCH ZO a 1973 MEETING 

oJU 

- 3 - 


E And Dean thinks it was Magruder that leaked it. 

P Members of the White House staff. Well, (pause) 

I don’t know whether you can say "would welcome 
the opportunity". Why don't you say, members of 
the White House staff will, will appear before the 
Grand Jury in person at any time the Jury feels 
it's relevant and furnish any information regarding 
that individual's alleged knowledge. You see what 
I mean? I don’t think you say would welcome. Will 
appear — will appear before the Grand Jury if the 
Jury feels it is relevant. Furnish any information 
of an individual's alleged knowledge, (pause) Have 
you got it in hand? 

Z Well, except for that it is only for me, as a 

talking piece. 

P Yeah. .Have you had it? If the Grand Jury feels 

c 

it's relevant, members of the White House staff, 
by direction of the President, will — will appear 
before the Grand Jury. I think that's a little better 
than the idea that members of the White House staff 
would welcome. Don't you think so John? 

Z By direction of the President 

E Right. 

P By direction of the President will appear before 

the Grand Jury and furnish any information regarding 
that individual's alleged. I like that a little 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE ED ITED TRANSCRIPT^ OF MARCH 30, 1972 MEET ING 
- 4 - 

better. 

OK. 

(pause) 

I would say it is not the objective of the White 
House however to draw a curtain down over this 
matter, to cover up this matter, cover up this matter, 
and to withhold any information. 

(long pause) 

Why don’t we say that we admit there are, of 
course, other informal ways that could be used. We 
are ready — we are ready to — say — we are ready 

i 

to discuss those procedures with the Committee. No, 
and we are ready to "cooperate with the Committee 
to work out the procedure — to work out : ' a proper 
procedure — be proper to work out a proper pro- 
cedure. How’s -that, John? Is that all right? 

E That’s all right. You want to say, we continue to 

be ready? 

P No — just say, we are ready — let’s — that’s a 

little. 

E All right. 

P We are ready — we are ready to work out — to 

work out — that’s right. Let them see that we 
are backing down a bit. 

E All right. 




( 455 ) • 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 30, 1973 MEETING 


- 5 - 


TO) 

£» 


P 

Z 

P 

z 

E 

P 

E 


Z 

P 

E 

P 

E 

P 

E 

P 

E 

P 

Z 


Ready to work. 

And then who should we get to say this? 

We get. 

Well, John? 

Well, now, you’ve given Kleindienst the franchise. 
Yep. 

You — we ' ve got to get word to him which we 
were going to do Saturday. That we were going 
to shift courses. 

Let’s say. 

We are ready — we are ready — we'll say the — 
let's leave it with the Timmons' office. 

Well why say it? 

Yeah - just say it = well with members — the 
appropriate members of the staff. 

Why not say this? This is going to be done 
without publicity. 

Yeah. 

And. 

No — it’s going to be done informally without 
publicity — by whatever. 

Period. 

This will be done informally. 

We can do it but we just have one problem to dwell 
on. If you give the name, like, if you say. 


( 456 ) 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED^ TRANSCRIPT^ 0F_ MARCH S0_, 1973 MEETING^ 
- 6 - 

333 

Yeah. 

well Timmons' office would be. 

That's right. Then they go after him. 

Prepared to do that. Then — no - then you do 
solidify your point, you see. 

Yeah, but the problem is that there's always — 
there's already a lot of complaint on the Committee, 
and particularly with Baker, that there's too many 
people running this show. 

That's right. • 

And if we introduce Timmons or we introduce some- 
body else. 

Yeah, don't give them a name. The - the, why 
don't you just say the President will name a— 
no. 

You could go this far. 

Yeah. 

You could say we've been in touch with the Committee. 
Yeah. Yes. 

Have you? 

And — yeah — I've talked to Baker. 

We have been — we have been in communication with 
members of the — no -- well , then you see — 
you've only been in touch with one member. 

When we’re dealing with. 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 30, 1973 MEETING 



Well, why don't you say communications have been 
opened and will proceed. 

Communications have been opened with members of 
the Committee. What members? That's — I'm not 
going to discuss that. I can't go into that. 
Communications have been opened with the Committee — 
why don't you say with the Committee — Committee — 
communications are handled with the Committee to — 
for the purpose of working out a proper, informal 
procedure. 

And that, has taken place? 

Yeah — I talked to Baker yesterday. 

That's right. Well, we've had lots of talks with 
him. He talked to Baker at length, Ervin's gone. 

Is that all right, John? 

If I could say, John is - has. 

You see, we* got an Attorney General problem. 

We got — we got Kleindienst. 

Let's not force this. 

All right. 

If you want to, you can say, well I may have 
something more to say about this later. 

That's fine. Damn well. Just say, I'm not 
going to discuss it because these are informal 


( 458 ) 



2CL4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 30, 1973 MEETING 

- 8 - 

negotiations at this point — informal discussions 
are taking place at this point. 

Right. 

As soon as something is formalized we will let you 
know. 

Good. 

That's really true and say if something is worked 
out we will let you know. The, some informal 
discussions have already taken place* That's 
right — some informal discussions. I'm not going 
to go into the. 

All right — I've got it. 

How's that? 

(pause) 

Oh, it'll be a little long 
(pause) 

Within the framework of our judicial system; You 
might say of our system. Don't you think so? 

Read the phrase. 

Yeah. It is our position today and in the past 
that if these charges are to be tested it should 
be done within the legitimate framework of our 
judicial system. Don't you think so? 

That takes it out of the Congress, then. 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH SO, 1973 MEETING 


338 

- 9 - 

But the legislative. 

Yeah — well then — just say system. And you 
don't — and then you're not using the last — 
the bracketed thing at all? 

The bracket at the top goes at the end where he 
says. 

Not going to apply it specifically. But he's 
referring to the bracket at the end. 

No - no-we're not going to use that. 

You ' re not going to use that? 

No — it's got a lot of problems associated with it. 
Yeah — because you’re taking the Committee on. 

Yeah — well we worked with a lot of different 
variations of that and just decided really it was 
better to leave it out. 

Give the Committee — And give the Committee back 
into the start there by saying. 

I question. (pause) I don't know. Well, anyway, 
it's all right. Do you think it helps some? 

I think it does. And I think. Ron's going to get 
some questions — Ron's going to get up there — 
well Ron, you're not going to apply this to 
specific instances. What are you trying to say to 
us? And he again could come back and say, what I 
am saying to you is that the mistake that people 



20.4 WHITE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 30 j 1973 MEETING 


are making — there's a mistaken impression that 
the White House is trying to cover up in this 
matter — is just a mistake. 

Listen — I'd almost start this thing — I just 
want to lay to rest what I think is a — what is 
a - I'm not making any charges of how it happened. 

I want to lay to rest a massive misapprehension 
that has been created in the press, created in the 
country with regard to the White House position 
on the Watergate matter. The aftermath. That is, 
because of — because of our — and that is — 
we are attempting, the position is to withhold 
information and to cover up — this is totally true 
you could say this is totally untrue. I think I'd 
start fight out that - massive misapprehension and 
so forth and so on. 

Cover up and withhold information. 

Cover up withhold information. 

And then bang into it. 

Mm huh. 

Part of the case is built on the fact that fellows 
love this room, and your press of course - is no 
place, to work this out. 

Yeah - yeah. That's it exactly. 


( 461 ) 



20. 4 WHITE_ HOUSE_ EDITED TRANSCRIPT^ 0F_ MARCH 2 0 , 1973 MEETING_ 

-ii- 33d 


E 

P 

E 

P 


£, 


•P 

T 


And our refusal to — our refusal to try this case 
in the newspapers. 

Yeah 

Has led to. 

Yeah - Yeah - now — I ' d say our — now — a part 
of that, I must say, due to the fact — our refusal 
to try the case in the newspapers — to try this 
matter in the newspapers — and the position of 
maintaining the constitutional — the President’s 
necessity of maintaining the constitutional separa- 
tion of powers. But as the President, I'd say, as 
the President made crystal clear in his press 
conference on August 2, the purpose of his insistence 
on the separation of powers is not to cover up. 

There will be total and complete cooperation with 
the agencies of government to get at the facts. 

And the facts can be obtained and still maintain 
the principle of separation of powers — and all 
the facts can be obtained. Something like that. 
That's in there I think pretty good. 

(dishes or walking around) 

You don't want to make a sworn statement, huh? 

I would just as soon not — I think we are better 
off not, oh, doing up a stream. Look at the - 
The only position that I am concerned about is 
this. I wonder if you could take whatever Ron says 


( 462 ) 



20.4 WHI TE HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT^ OF MARCH 30, 1973 MEETING 

no , 

\J K/ 

' - 12 - 

and — 

We're going to hypo it — we're going to get it 
around. 

Get it to the Congress. 

Right. 

Get it to George Bush. 

Right. I'm going to see the guys that are going 
to do that and I'll do it now. 

All right, fine. If you could work on that 
between now and three o'clock I think it would 
be very helpful. 

I shall. 

•Fine — you work on it and I'll take off. 


( 463 ) 



20.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 , 1973 , 7 SSC 2747-50 


2747 

other words, he was not going to move against anybody until he had 
this down and could see what this fellow really had and then would go 
forward. 

Senator Gur ney. Well now, around about this time or somewhat 
later, and there are so many meetings here that I have really forgotten 
which occurred When, so perhaps I am going to have to rely on you for 
that, but did the President lift the phone up at any time and say, “John 
I want you to come over to the office here and talk about Watergate, 
what you know about it.” 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, not until way late in the game. He lifted 
up the phone one day and called me down and said, “I am satisfied 
that John Dean is in this so deeply that he simply cannot any longer 
have anything to do with it.” 

Senator Gurney. That is when he transferred the assignment to 
you? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. What date was that? 

Mr. Ehrijchman. March 30. 

Senator Gurney. And tell us again precisely what transpired in 
that phone conversation beyond what you have already. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, that was a meeting in the President’s office 
on March 30, and it was, as I recall, quite brief. We had had, we were 
getting ready to leave that same day, as a matter of fact, for Cali- 
fornia, and he called me down, I am looking for the time to help me, 
to recall the time of departure here. Yes, we leave at 3 o’clock in 
the afternoon, we had had a long meeting that morning with Secre- 
tary Shultz and Mr. Sonnenfeld about the economy, and that ran 
from 9 a.m. to about, I don’t know, what, 10 a.m. or 11 a.m., something 
of that kind, a long session, as I recall. He called me down for just 
about 10 minutes at noontime, and said what I have just told you, 
and I said, “Well, what is it you expect me to do basically” and he 
said, “I want you to step into what Dean has been doing hefe. I need 
to know about executive privilege, I need to know about attorney- 
client privilege, I need to have somebody set this strategy with regard 
to testifying at the committee and the grand jury and these other 
places and I need to know where the truth lies in this thing.” And 
the only tipoff that ‘I had had to that was a request from him on the 
27th, I believe it was, yes, on the 27th. 

Senator Gurney, Is that the meeting between 11 a.m. and 1 pm. 
with the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe — yes, yes indeed. That was for the pur- 
pose of dictating to me a list of questions that he wanted put to the 
Attorney General, and I believe that telephone call to the Attorney 
General which actually was not completed until the next day because 
he was traveling, is in your file, phone call with Kleindienst on the 
28th, and T then went down a handwritten list of questions that the 
President had put to me about the progress of the case, about the 
involvement of John Mitchell, possible^ any possible evidence that 
Kleindienst might have, any possible evidence of anybody else being 
involved at the Committee To Re-Elect, any evidence of any White 
House staff being involved and the President told me to tell the Attor- 
ney General that if he had any such evidence or if he developed any 


( 464 ) 



20,5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973 . 7 SSC 2747-50 


2748 

such evidence,, that he was then to transmit it directly to the President, 
not through’ me, not through anybody else at the White House but 
direct to the President, and in that message I did, as you see in the 
t ra uscript. that I did t ransm i t to the A tto mey Gen era 1 . 

Senator Gurnet. Do we have those questions that he 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir, you do not. They are a part of my notes 
of the meeting of the 27th which are in the President’s file. 

Senator Gurney. How many questions were there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, there are about 10 or 12 topics, I think, 
written out on a piece of paper. ' 

Senator Gurney. Would you give us to the best of your recollection 
what the topics were and what the questions were? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I think I can do that best, Senator, by looking at 
that telephone conversation and — because I think that that transcript 
is quite faithful to the list. I just went down the list in talking with 
the Attorney General. I don’t seem to have that in my 

Senator Gurney. The telephone. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The telephone call with Mr. Kleindienst on the 
2Sth. 

Senator Gurney. I wonder if the committee would hand this to the 
witness, Mr. Ehrlichman. That apparently is it. If we have another 
copy I wish I could have it, too, but I think it is better you have it at 
the moment. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. We have a copy here ; I may have stuck it back in 
the file. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Gurney. J have a copy here now. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign that the appropriate exhibit 
number. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 99.*] 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Actually the first sentence, as 'I recall, is only 
partly on this transcript and it said, “There are a number of things 
the President wanted me to cover with you,” and only the latter half 
of that sentence is in the transcript. 

Senator Gurney. If we could, Mr. Ehrlichman, this is very impor- 
taut, but if you could summarize these as briefly as you can it will help 
out the committee because I think my own time is running out here* 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You will see in the fourth paragraph I said, 
“No. 1, he wanted me to ask you these two things that I did yesterday 
about the grand jury and about Baker,” meaning Senator Baker, and 
then we go into an inquiry about some statements that Senator Weicker 
had made to the press which the President had asked Pat Gray to check 
into. Then, and the President wanted a report on whether Senator 
Weicker had any evidence or not to support these assertions. 

Senator Gurney. I think perhaps you had better explain a little 
more about Senator Baker who is not here so we can know that there 
is no 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the President had designated John Dean as 
the White Mouse contact on Watergate, or the White House leadman 
on Watergate, as I say in February. He had also designated the Attor- 
ney General as the administration contact to the committee, and had 

•See p. 2944. 


( 465 ) 



20.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 197Z, 7 SSC 2747-50 

2749 

asked the Attorney General to be in touch with Senator Baker with 
regard to committee rules and technical matters of that kind. 

Senator Gurney. This was just a liaison matter t 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. So he can find out what was going on, what the 
committee planned to do, that sort of thing l 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. So he was asking for a report 
from the Attorney General on that. 

By the way, it comes back to me that in the meeting that Dean and 
Mitchell and Haldeman and I had in the Presidents oflice on the 22d 
that the President had picked up the phone and called the Attorney 
General and had given Inm some questions to ask Senator Baker about 
committee timing and that kind of thing so that he would be advised 
of the facts, and he had not yet had the report back from the Attorney 
* General on that. 

Then this first page is about Senator Weicker’s statements, which 
was one of the items on the list. 

Then at the bottom of page 2 I said, “The President said for me to 
say this to you that the best information he has had and has, is that 
neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson nor I nor anybody in the com- 
mittee has had any prior knowledge of this burglary. He said that he 
is counting on you to provide him with any information to the contrary 
if it ever turns up. And you just contact him direct. Now as far as the 
Committee To Re-Elect is concerned he said that serious questions 
somebody raised with regard to Mitchell and he would likewise want 
you to communicate with him any evidence or inferences from evidence 
on that subject.” 

Senator Gurney. I think we had better stop there. 

The chairman points out to me that we have a vote on the Senate 
floor. 

Senator Ervin. We will stand in recess. 

* [Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney will resume the questioning of the 
witness. 

Senator Gurney. I think we were there at the bottom of page 2, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir; I saw during recess that I had skipped 
over the Attorney General’s remarks in the middle of page 2 where in 
response to my general inquiry, a previous inquiry also, he said he has 
been emphasizing publicly that “The President wanted the matter in- 
vestigated, to let the chips fall where they may, but second, if anybody 
has any information we not only want it, we expect to get it, so we can 
investigate it and if these indict other people and that anybody who 
withheld information would be obstructing justice.” The Attorney 
General was saying this to the press and he was getting this out in 
every way that he knew how. 

Now, then at the top of page 3 the significance of the McCord letter 
which was drafted by Mr. McCord and handed to Judge Sirica and 
which Judge Sirica read publicly was discussed and evaluated by the 
Attorney General. 

Then, we return to the question about whether or not Mr. Mitchell 
was involved, and that led to a statement by the Attorney General that 


( 466 ) 



20.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 3 1973 3 7 SSC 2747-50 


2750 

if Mr. Mitchell were to be involved, and he says here that he has no 
evidence at this time that he is, but if he were, that we should give some 
thought in such an event to having a special prosecutor, the Attorney 
General would feel he would have to recuse himself. Then I asked 
him what the President’s position would be in the event of such a 
thing and at the bottom of page 3 and middle of page 4 he advises such 
a procedure. Then we discussed, and again this is an item on my list, 
the matter of immunity; who determines whether immunity will be 
granted mechanically, and he said the Department of Justice deter- 
mined that insofar as the grand jury was concerned but so far as the 
Senate committee is concerned that it made that determination in 
conjunction, I don’t think he said in conjunction with the court, but 
that these were two separate procedures. 

Then another item on my list was the status of the court action which 
I have referred to previously in testimony here, in answer to a question 
by Senator Weicker, and then finally I was asked to tell him that there 
was a possibility that the President wanted to see him in San Clemente 
the following Saturday. The Attorney General at that time was in 
Arizona, was planning to be in Los Angeles, and in point of fact that 
meeting did take place in San Clemente subsequent to this phone call. 

Senator Gurney. Did the President tell you at the time he gave these 
questions to you why he was asking you to inquire of the Attorney Gen- 
eral rather than Mr. Dean, did that come up ? 

Mr. Ehrlichaian. No, sir, it did not come up and I did not ask. 

Senator Gurney. But in retrospect you think: he was perhaps having 
doubts whether he was getting a frill story or not ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Yes, up until then Mr, Dean had been the contact 
with the Attorney 'General in matters of this kind. 

Senator Gurney. Then on what date did the President give this full 
assignment to you to run Watergate down for him ? 

... Mr. Ehrlichman. Two days later. 

Senator Gurney. I think I had better stop there, Mr. Chairman, 
because I have taken enough time. 

Senator Ervin. Well, Senator, I would not want to cut you off. This 
is a very serious investigation we are making and you could proceed 
until noon if you have further questions and then we can recess for the 
lunch hour. 

Senator Gurney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me then complete, if we can, the assignment you had from the 
President to now, be the sort of chief Watergate investigator in the 
White House. 

Would you tell the committee about that, what you found and what 
you reported to the President ? 

Mr. Eiirlichmax. I have tried to disclaim the designation “investi- 
gator,” Senator, because I don’t consider what I did to be an investiga- 
tion, to a conclusive result. 

Senator Gurney. You certainly can define your role. I didn’t mean 
to imply something you were not doing. 

Mr. Ehreiciiman. I had to get up to speed on this. I was not follow- 
ing the law on the matter and so the first thing that I did in another 
conversation with the Attorney General was to arrange to have some- 
one in the Department of Justice prepare for me a thorough brief of 


( 467 ) 



20,6 JOHN EHRLICHMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22 / 1973, PNC V , McCOBD, 64, 155-56 

64 

have reasoned back, but those came subsequent to March, of 
course . 

Q Mr. Ehrlichman, when did you get the assignment 

\i ’ 

from the President to conduct an investigation into the "Watergate 
Affair”? 

A The 30th of March of this year. 

"" In your conversations with various persons did you 
make notes? 

A In some cases I did and in some cases I either 
couldn't or didn't. 

Q Were all of these conversations on a one-to-one 
basis? 

A No, Mr. Magruder's conversation was held with his 
two attorneys present. 

The conversations I had with Mr. Dean, as I recall, were 
not always alone. I think in at least one case Mr. Haldeman 
was present. Some of the conversations were on the telephone 
and one or two people would be in the room perhaps at the time 
I was making a phone call because it came in at a particular 
time when they were there. 

And many of them were one on one. 

Q In the telephone conversations where persons were 
in your office, were they on a loud speaker type telephone or - 


( 468 ) 



20.6 JOHN EHRLICHMAN DEPOSITION, MAY 22 3 1973, PNC v. McCORD, 64, 155-56 

155 


A I believe he did* At least, he talked to him. It 
was within 24 hours after that that the President relieved him. 

Q That would have been the end of March? 

A Yes. The President called me in on the 30th and 
said, "My suspicions are crystalized and I want you to get into 
this." 

Q And make your investigation? 

A And make the investigation. 

Q Did the President indicate to you what his suspicions 

were? 

A Well, he said that it was evident to him at that point 
that Dean was in the thing up to his eyebrows. The President, 
incidentally, had had a number of conversations with Dean start- 
ing, I think, the last week in February and running through the 
time that he sent him to Camp David. 

Q Were these personal or telephone conversations? 

A They were personal conversations. 

Q Was anyone else present? 

A I don't know. 

Q Were you ever present? 

A No, I never was. But it was evident from what the 
President said to me on the 30th that through those conversa- 
tions he had a growing awareness of Dean's personal involvement 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-31 


( 469 ) 




20, 6 JOHN EHRLICHMAN DEPOSITION , MY 22. 1973, PNC V, McCORD , 64, 155-56 

156 

in this and that his sending him to Camp David apparently was a 
device to smoke him out and see what he would set down on paper, 
and that when he ' came back and said that he couldn't write any- 
| thing down, that did it. 

Q Did you ever ask Dean why he didn't write something 
down at this time? (I am not going to your investigation.) 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether Mr. Haldeman ever asked him? 

A I imagine he did but I don't know. 

Q Do you know whether the President asked him specific- 
ally why he did not write something down? 

A I don't know. The answer is I don't know. 

Q Other than yourself and Mr. Haldeman and the Presi- 
dent, of course, is there anyone else at the White House who 
would have talked to Dean after his return from Camp David 
relative to the Watergate matter, of course? 

A I don’t know. Mr. Fielding, perhaps. I don't know. 

Q At that time Mr. Dean was still Mr. Fielding's 

superior, however, was he not? 

A Yes. 

Q Then the President then gave you the assignment of 
getting out the facts on Watergate. After that did you have 
further conversations with Mr. Dean? 


( 470 ) 



21. On March 30, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. Ehrlichman met with Fielding, 
Dean's assistant. Ehrlichman has testified that he had directed Fielding , 
to deliver Dean's personnel records to Ehrlichman and to brief Ehrlich- 
man about allegations that Dean had been dismissed by a law firm because 
of unethical conduct. At 3:00 p.m. on March 30, 1973 Ehrlichman and 
the President flew to San Clemente, where Haldeman joined them on April 
1, 1973. They remained in San Clemente until April 8, 1973. While 
they were at San Clemente, Ehrlichman had a long distance telephone 
conversation with Dean in which they discussed the allegations that 
Dean had been involved in unethical conduct. 


Page 


21.1 John Ehrlichman log , March 30 and April 8, 

1973 (received from SSC) 472 

21.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2753 474 

21.3 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903 475 


( 471 ) 



21.1 JOHN EHRLICHMM LOGj, MARCH 30, APRIL 8, 1973 


FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1973 


y 


S:iJ 

9:00 


_KRJEi_office 


Presi dent. Shultz, Sonnenfaldt 


12- { ohoto for Nation's Business cover story) 
' U2nl0 ■TTr esid ent- 
^^^CT^ — x"rea r leJtding 

12;45 Bill Timmons 


1:15 
P“3:00 


3:20 

5:20 



Leu Garment 
Depart South Lawn 

Depart Andrews 4;30 _ Pre3i< isnt (Air Force One) 
Arrive El Toro 
Helicopter to Palomar 
LaCosta 



y- SATURDAY, MARCH 31, 1973 

8:30 AG Klein dienst,. HRH 

10:3 0-12:30 Presiden t 

12:45 Preside nt 

7 ; 00 ’ John Ford Dinner - Dos Angeles 


y- MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1973 


10:30 

11:30 

2:30-4:30 


President Thieu arrival ceremony 

Lunch with Mother Ehrlichman, Mr. and Mrs. James Dick, 
Nancy Martinson 
President, HRH 


y TUESDAY. APRIL 3, 1973 


12:00 

2:00 

2:15-4:00 


Lunch - President, President Thieu 

Thieu farewell 

President 


V 


WEDNESDAY. APRIL 4, 1973 

8:30 Paul Presley 

9:00 Cliff Miller 

1 0 :3Q---12cJ3^ l presid ent 
12;55 Vern Olsen 

1:10 Lunch with Ziegler 

3:00 President 


( 472 ) 



ai.l JOHN_ EHELICHMAN LOG, MARCH 30, APRIL 8, 1973 




r 

j 


8-10:30 

Paul 0. 5 Brian 

i i :00 1 fpp Q 

" -Tq 

^ r d » n c 

3:00 

__JPr evident 

4:00. 

Judge Matthew Byrne 

FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1973 ■' 

10:30 

11:00 : 

Bebe E.ebozo 
President 

11:30 

Kerb Kalmbach (parking lot of Bank of America, 

1:00 

1:15-1:45 

San Clemente) 

Ted Ashley (Warner Brothers) 
President ^ 

1:4 %:00 

7:00 

R^aum^ijmch with Ashley 

Baseball game with the President - Anaheim 

SUNDAY, 

APRIL 8, 1973 

8:30 
9:00 
.4:30 
5-7 

Helicopter from Palomar 

Depart El Toro 0 AA _ . , . , . „ ' 

. . . _ 2:00 - President (Air Fore 

Arrive Andrews 

HRH, John Dean 

MONDAY, 

APRIL 9, 1973 

10:30 

12:30 

2-2:45.; 

Secretary Shultz* office - Stein, Ash, Flanigan 
Lunch with A't? - at Justice 
. * President 

6:30 

Blair House - Senators Ervin, Baker 

TUESDAY 

, APRIL 10, 1973 


8:30 

Bipartisan Leadership 

10:15 

Leu Garment, Ziegler 

11:15 

Ziegler, HRH 

12:45-2 

president 

2:20 

Mr. Luce (Con Ed), Ma: 
• and Light) 

3:00 

HRH 

3:15 

Joined by Dean 

d7oo“~ 

Len Garment 


One) 


po^er 


(47a) 



21.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 27 3 1973 , 7 SSC 2753 

2753 

and that he just did not think it was a good idea for the President’s 
lawyer to be going out and testifying; in other words, it was an at- 
torney-client privilege kind of position that he was contending for. It 
did not satisfy me. 

Senator Gurnet. Mitchell now talking about Dean should not 
testify? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That is correct. This thing continued to be a 
nagging question, and so we called John Dean, as we were headed 
back, I talked to Haldeman further about this. Dean was not talking 
to me, all through this period of time, I had not had phone call one 
from him, which was very unusual because I used to hear from him 
from time to time on various subjects, including Watergate, but I was 
completely not on his telephone list and Bob Haldeman was hearing 
from him all the time. So we talked about what Bob Haldeman 

Senator Gurnet. Did he know that you were performing the role 
for the President? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so. 

Senator Gurnet. All right. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so. I did not tell him but I believe he 
^ well knew it. 

I As a matter of fact, just before we departed for California this 

question arose of Mr. Dean being fired by his law firm for unethical 
I conduct and I sent for his personnel package in order to check it. The 
personnel package arrived in Fred Fielding’s arms with scotch tajje 
around it a number of times, and he said, “What do you want this 
for?” And I said, “Well, there is a story” — and that refreshed my 
recollection, I did have one phone call from John Dean and that was 
on that subject. He did call me at San Clemente about that and he said, 
“I understand you wanted to get my personnel package,” and I said 
“Yes, there is this story about your having been accused of this un- 
ethical conduct,” and he then told me the long story which he re- 
counted to this committee, that he eventually was able to get the 
attorney who made the charges to retract the charges, which satisfied 

L me, but I think through Fielding and through my conversation with 
Fielding on that occasion, Mr. Dean must have known that I was ac- 
tively in this. 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In any event, on the way back we called and 
asked John Dean to meet us in my office when we returned to Wash- 
ington that night, and he did so. 

Senator GuRNEr. What date? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, April 8, 9. 

Senator Gurnet. April 8 between 5 and 7 p.m.? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right ; that was a Saturday or Sunday— that was 
a Sunday night, and we had a 2-hour meeting, Bob Haldeman, John 
Dean, and I, to try and understand what this hangup was between 
Mitchell and Dean. We still did not have a feel for it. Then, for the 
first time, Mr. Dean talked to us about the four meetings or the three 
meetings back in January and February and explained some of the 
nuances of the coverup story with regard to Mr. Magruder and the 
meeting which he, Dean, Magruder, and Mitchell had had in Mr. 
Mitchell’s law office at a time when they were gathered with the 
attorneys in the case to discuss grand jury testimony where the three 


( 474 ) 



2U2_ H-.B, HALDEMM TESTIMONY . JULY 30, 1973 , 7_ SSC 2903 

2903 

APRIL 

r From April 1 to 7, I was in San Clemente with the President. 

TPespite Mr. Dean’s statement that during that period he, under advice 
of counsel, endeavored to avoid any contact with Haldeman, Ehrlicli- 
man, or Mitchell — we talked on the phone daily. The main problem lie 
seemed to have during that period was the continuing one with 
Mitchell regarding the discrepancy on the number of meetings. 

It is my understanding that Dean hired a lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, about 
March 30. He had indicated earlier that he might do this so he — and, 
through him, the President — could consult an attorney familiar with 
criminal law on the implications of some of the concerns Dean was 
developing. He told me that his lawyer had told him he should not 
write anyt hing down about the Watergate case and, if he had written 
anything down, he should not show it to anyone and he should not talk 
to Mitchell or Magruder. He did not mention to me that his lawyer 
had told him not to talk to me or Ehrlichman and he did, in fact, con- 
tinue to talk — to me, at least. 

He told me his lawyers had met privately with the U.S. attorneys 
on April 4. He told me again on April 7 that his lawyers had met with 
the U.S. attorneys on April 6, This despite the fact that in his testi- 
mony he has said that his lawyers were meeting with the prosecutors 
but this was unknown to Haldeman or Ehrlichman. 

'He further said that the U.S. attorneys had told his lawyers — and 
he believed that this was the straight information because this was an 
eyebalLto-eyeball meeting — that the U.S. attorneys were only inter- 
ested in the pre-June 17 facts. They had no concern with post- June 17. 
They only wanted Dean as a witness. They did not consider him a 
target of their investigation. They did not consider Haldeman as a 
target and probably would not even call him as a witness. Liddy had 
told them everything but his lawyers didn’t know it; and Liddy com- 
pletely cleared the White House ; that is, in telling them everything, 
Liddy had confirmed that nobody in the White House had had any 
involvement. 

We returned to Washington on April 8. During that week Ehrlich- 
man continued his investigation — and on Saturday the 14th reported 
his conclusions to the President in the form of a verbal statement of 
7 Is thee y of the case based on all of the information he had acquired — 
still, of necessity, mostly by hearsay. 

There were several meetings with Dean that week and I recall a 
continuing concern on Dean’s part regarding the discrepancy with 
Mitchell and the planning meetings. I don’t recall any major changes 
in Dean’s view of the facts from what he had reported on the phone 
earlier. 

By the end of the week both Dean and Ehrlichman had come to the 
view that Mitchell had approved the Watergate plan and there was 
some discussion that, if that were the fact, and if Mitchell decided 
to step forward and say so, it would be a major step in clearing up the 
Watergate mystery. This was not discussed in any context of asking 
Mitchell to do this as a scapegoat or to divert attention from others— 
but as a major step in bringing out the truth. 

Over the weekend, both Magruder and Dean met with the U.S. 
attorneys in private sessions and gave their full accounts of the Water- 


( 475 ) 




22. On March 30, 1973 Ronald Ziegler stated in a press briefing 
that no one in the White House had any involvement in the Watergate 
matter. Ziegler also announced that the President reiterated his 
instructions that any member of the White House staff would appear 
before the grand jury if called to answer questions regarding that 
individual's alleged knowledge or possible involvement in the Water- 
gate matter. 


Page 

22.1 Transcript of White House press briefing, 

March 30, 1973, No. 1704, 708 (received from 
Watergate Grand Jury) . 478 

22.2 Ronald Ziegler press briefing, March 30, 1973, 

White House edited transcripts. Appendix 12 479 

22.3 Ronald Ziegler testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 

February 12, 1974, 71-72 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 480 


( 477 ) 


~ TBAI ' ,SCRI ^ °JL 1MT7E HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING, MARCH 30, 1973 

DV 


I d.C\. i > 
, 6 . 


^ / '7 ^ f - t ' > 


I would like to remind all of you here and call to 
your attention that it has been our position in the oast and i 
remains the White House position that the public media and 
the White House briefing room are not the places to try and 
conduct an analysis of these charges or to make judgments 
regarding individuals in response to what are unsubstantiated 
and uncorroborated charges. 


Ig.2_ 


I made that .point to you yesterday and several days 
ago, and I state it to you today in anticipation of some of 
vour - questions in relation to reports that have run this morning. 

As we said and I will repeat again today, this country 
has provided, in its wisdom, a number of forums for this 
kind of inquiry and it is in those duly constituted forums 
v/hich we have always, felt this matter should be pursued. 


With that in mind, I would like to take this opportunity 
to focus attention on the fact that we have stated the position 
of the White House to be one of cooperation in the Watergate 
matter. We have stated that geing back to June. But I would 
also like to lay to rest a misapprehension that has been created 
with regard to the White House position on the Watergate matter, 
the misapprehension which has resulted from the fact that ve 
do maintain a position that the public media and the White 
House briefing room is not the place to conduct an analysis 
of these charges or to make a judgment regaling individuals 
in response to the unsubstantiated charges , but also the 
position which ve have stated regarding the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 

The purpose of this policy is the opposite of covering 
up information. It is the policy which has been set with 
the objective to get the true facts, in an orderly way. 

I think you know that subsequent to the Watergate 
incident — ~ and I am going to take a moment here to remind 
you of this — ■ allegations were made in the press regarding 
members of the White House staff. The President, as you 
recall, called for an investigation of members of the White 
House staff regarding the Watergate matter, and as we have 
said before, no one in the VJhite House had any involvement 
or prior knowledge of that event, and I repeat that statement 
again today. 

I would also like to make* several further points 
this morning: Something that has been overlooked is that 

from the very outset of these developments, the President 
instructed all members of the VJhite House staff, present 
and former, to cooperate fully with those investigating the 
Watergate natter. And, in fact, every member of the V7hite 
House staff who has been asked to supply information regarding 
this matter has done so, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
to the Grand Jury, and to the courts. This has taken place, - 
of course, over the past months. 

But I would like to bring into focus the present also. 
There are two processes now under v/ay which are examining the 
Watergate matter. One is the Grand Jury. The other is the 
Senate committee, the Ervin Committee, which is proceeding 
with its initial work. 


KGIuZ 

DV 


( 478 ) 




With regard to the Grand Jury, the President reiterates his instructions 
that any member of the White House staff who is called by the Grand 
Jury will appear before the Grand Jury to answer questions regarding 
that individual* s alleged knowledge or possible involvement in the 
Watergate matter. 

This is a re- statement of a policy which has been in effect. If the 
Grand Jury calls any member of the White House staff, that person, 
by direction of the President, will appear to testify regarding that 
individual* s alleged knowledge of possible involvement in the 
Watergate matter. 

* * * 


( 479 ) 



22.3 RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 12, 1974 , WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
71-72 ___ r- 


71 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 
21 
22 

23 

24 

25 


A I don’t remember when. 1 think it was when it 
either broke in the news or there was testimony that related 
to it. I don’t remember specifically. 

Q Now, you made a statement on the 30th of March that 
no one in the White House had any involvement in 'Watergate? 

A (Nodding.) 

Q So you think that you learned about Mr. Strachan 
following that? . 

A Yes, I'm sure I did. I think it was April. The 
30th of March statement related to the fact that the president 
wanted everyone to go to the Grand Jury. 

Q Did the President tell you to make that statement 
In March? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q He told you to make a statement that no one in the 
White House was involved? 

A £he statement that I made in March related to the 
fact ~ and I made this just before we left for California — 
related to the fact that the President wanted everyone to go 
to the Grand Jury, and we were also, during that period, 
asserting how we would prevent testimony before the Senate 
Watergate Committee. 

Yes, at that time, I made the statement that no one 
in the White House was involved In the Watergate break-in. 

Q No. 


L) v 


( 480 ) 



72 


22.3 


RONALD ZIEGLER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 12, 
71-72 


1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 
21 
22 

23 

24 

25 


A Or Watergate matter. 

Q Yes. 

A That was obviously an ad lib on my part. 

Q So the President told you nothing which encouraged 

you to make that statement? 

A No. I was doing that on the frame of reference in 
my mind that the purpose of the March 30th statement -- 
Q Aside from that, Mr. Ziegler. 

A Let toe make the point. The purpose of the March 

. 

30th statement was the fact that the President was encouraging 
and so stated — it was a big news story — that he wanted 
everyone in the White House and in the Administration to 
appear before the Grand Jury and we would do so before the 
Senate Watergate Committee. 

During that whole period of time, he made reference 

to that* 

Q So the President didn't tell you what he had learned 
on March 21st prior to your making the March 30th statement? 

A No, he didn't. 

Q In substance? 

A No. 

Q This was a brand new policy that the President was 
announcing about appearing before the Grand Jury? 

A Well, it was a restatement of policy and also it 
related to — 





(481) 




23. On March 30, 1973 John Dean, after consultation with his 
attorney, Thomas Hogan, retained Charles Shaffer, an attorney in the 
criminal law field. That day Dean met with Hogan and Shaffer and dis- 
cussed the break-in at the DNC headquarters and the events that followed. 
Haldeman has testified that Dean had indicated earlier that he might 
retain a private attorney so that Dean — and, through him, the President 
— could consult an attorney familiar with criminal law on the impli- 
cations of some of Dean T s concerns. On the afternoon of April 2, 1973 
Dean’s lawyers began a series of meetings with the Watergate prosecutors. 


Page 

23.1 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1009 484 

23.2 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903 485 


( 483 ) 




23.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973 3 3 SSC 1009 

1009 

I had been in continuous contact since March 25 'with my attorney, 
Tom Hogan, regarding whom lie felt was the best available man in 
the criminal law field that I might discuss this entire matter with. 
We had talked on several occasions about Charles Shaffer, whom I 
had met several years ago and regarded highly as a criminal lawyer. 

On March 28 and 29, however, I made several other calls to friends 
to ask them for suggested names of knowledgeable criminal lawyers, 
but decided on March 30 that I would retain Mr. Shaffer if he were 
available. Mr. Hogan informed me that he was and we arranged to 
meet with him. 

•The President, along with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, were going 
to be in California for a week or more in connection with the Presi- 
dent's meeting with President Thieu of South Vietnam and I felt that 
this would give me an opportunity to decide how best I could come 
forward and end this matter. I had decided that I was going to inform 
the prosecutors of what the case was all about but before I did so 
I felt that I should consult with counsel to determine the scope of 
my own problems. 

On March 30, shortly after lunch, I met with Mr. Hogan and Mr. 
Shaffer. I spent 5 hours telling them everything that I could remember 
and telling them that I was unwilling to continue in the covenip. 
Mr. Shaffer advised me to avoid further conversations regarding this 
subject and said that he would like to talk with me again on Monday 
morning prior to his seeing the prosecutors. 

Accordingly, we met again on Monday morning, April 2, and dis- 
cussed the matter for several hours more. That afternoon, my attorneys 
went to the Government prosecutors and told them that I was willing 
come forward with everything I knew about the case. 

From the outset I was confronted with the problems of executive 
privilege, attorney-client privilege, and national security. Thus, it 
was agreed until these problems were resolved that I would exclude 
matters involving the President from these conversations. I was also 
uncertain of many of the dates and details of the facts that I had 
general knowledge of so I began reconstructing a chronology of events. 
As each session progressed, I was able to provide more information, 
more leads, and more explanations of the interrelationships within 
the White House and the relationships of persons who were involved. 

During the period of April 2 until April 15, the meetings I had 
with the prosecutors were initially focusing on the activities which 
had led un to the June 17 break-in at the Democratic National Com- 
mittee and all the knowledge I had regarding the events before June 
17, but as our discussions evolved and I began telling them more and 
more of the covcrup, their interest began to focus more and more in 
that area. 

As I began explaining what I knew, it was evident that the prose- 
cutors had no conception of how extensive the covenip was so I tried 
to provide them with all the details that I could remember. Also, as 
the conversations regarding the covenip began to get into more and 
more specifics, we moved into areas that came closer and closer to the 
President, but prior to April 15 I did not discuss any of the areas of 
Presidential involvement. 


( 484 ) 



23.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 30, 1972, 7 §30 2903 

2903 

APRIL 

From April I to 7, I was in San Clemente with the President. 
Despite Mr. Dean’s statement that during that period he, under advice 
of counsel, endeavored to avoid any contact with Haldeman, Lhrlich- 
man, or Mitchell — we talked on the phone daily. The main problem he 
seemed to have during that period was the continuing one with 
Mitchell regarding the discrepancy on the number of meetings. 

r " It is my understanding that Dean hi red. a lawyer, Mr. bhaffer, about 
March 30. He had indicated earlier that lie might do this so he— and, 
through him, the Presidentr— could consult an attorney familiar with 
criminal law on the implications of some of the concerns Dean was 
| de veloping. He told me that his lawyer had told him he should not 
write anything down about the Watergate case and, if he had written 
anything down, he should not show it to anyone and he should not talk 
to Mitchell or Magruder. He did not mention to me that his lawyer 
had told him not to talk to me or Ehrlichman and he did, in fact, con- 
tinue to talk — to me, at least. 

He told me his lawyers had met privately with the U.S. attorneys 
on April 4. He told me again on April 7 that his lawyers had met with 
the U.S. attorneys on April 6. This despite the fact that in his testi- 
mony he has said that his lawyers were meeting with the prosecutors 
but this was unknown to Hal deman or Ehrlichman. 

He further said that the U.S. attorneys had told his lawyers — and 
he believed that this was the straight information because this was an 
eyeball-to-eyeball meeting — that the U.S. attorneys were only inter- 
ested in the pre-June 17 facts. They had no concern with post-June 17. 
They only wanted Dean as a witness. They did not consider him a 
target of their investigation. They did not consider Haldeman as a 
target and probably would not even call him as a witness. Liddy had 
told them everything but his lawyers didn’t know it ; and Liddy com- 
pletely cleared the White House; that is, in telling them everything, 
Liddy had confirmed that nobody in the White House had had any 
involvement. 

We returned to Washington on April 8. During that week Ehrlich- 
man continued his investigation — and on Saturday the 14th reported 
his conclusions to the President in the form of a verbal statement of 
his theory of the case based on all of the information he had acquired — * 
still, of necessity, mostly by hearsay. 

There were several meetings with Dean that week and I recall a 
continuing concern on Dean’s part regarding the discrepancy with 
Mitchell and the planning meetings. I don’t recall any major changes 
in Dean’s view of the facts from what he had reported on the phone 
earlier. 

By the end of the week both Dean and Ehrlichman had come to the 
view that Mitchell had approved the Watergate plan and there was 
some discussion that, if that were the fact, and if Mitchell decided 
to step forward and say so, it would be a major step in clearing up the 
Watergate mystery. This was not discussed in any context of asking 
Mitchell to do this as a scapegoat or to divert attention from other's — 
but as a major step in bringing out the truth. 

Over the weekend, both Magruder and Dean met with the^U.S. 
attorneys in private sessions and gave their full accounts of the Water- 


( 485 ) 




24. On March 30, 1973 newspaper reports stated that Robert Relsner, 
former Administrative Assistant to Jeb Magruder at CRP, was to be sub- 
poenaed by the staff of the SSC. Magruder has testified that he realized 
that his story about his 1972 meetings with Mitchell, Dean and Liddy 
would not hold up. Magruder realized, among other things, that 
the SSC had begun an Investigation and Relsner, who knew about the 
meetings and who had previously been missed by the prosecutors, would 
be gotten to. On March 31, 1973 Magruder, who previously had been 
represented by the attorneys for CRP, retained James Blerbower as his 
personal attorney. 


Page 

24.1 Washington Post, March 30, 1973, Al, A6 488 

24.2 Robert Relsner testimony, 2 SSC 489, 508-10. 490 

24.3 Jeb Magruder testimony, 2 SSC 805-06, 808 494 


( 487 ) 



24.1 WASHINGTON POST, MARCH SO. 1973 , Al, A6 



m 1 

i sfc 



■iJ 


9 


n* 


I 




•X 


Gain Immunity Seen! 


By Bob Wood war*! 
and Carl Bernstein 
Wa-giinsion Post Writer* 
Watergate conspirator James 
W. McCord Jr. repeatedly in- 
voked the Fifth Amendment 
during his initial appearance 
before a Senate investigating, 
committee Wednesday, refus- 
ing to discuss whether a 
broad range of potentially ille- 
gal activities had been under- 
taken on behalf of President 
Nixon’s re-election. 

According to Senate sources, 
McCord cited his privilege 
against self-incrimination in 
answer to more than 20 ques- 
tions, each asking whether lie 
had personal knowledge of 
additional wiretapping or oth- 4 
er arts of political espionage * 
and sabotage in Mr. Nixon’s; 
're-election campaign. 

The sources said members! 
of the Senate's select Water-; 
gate committee regarded Mc- 
Cord’s invocation of the Fifth 1 
Amendment not as an uncoop- 
erative gesture/ but rather as* 
au op-*n suggestion that they 
grant him immunity from fur- 
ther prosecution. 

They predicted that McCord, 
the former security coordina- 
tor of the Committee for the 
K e-elect ion of the President, 
who was convicted in the 
Wat ergate conspiracy case, i 


AH 

&.v ■? . 


! M- 


.... J 

m 


■i W+r. [ . fii 

% A U 1 . 1 

^ :A : ’ 



JAM KS W. McCORD 
. . . questioned in Senate 


would not hesitate to answer | 
the questions posed Wednes-jj 
day if he were granted im- 
munity. 

“lie seemed to be saying to 
the committee that he. has a 
wide knowledge in a w’de va-t 
riety or areas involving crim- 
inal activity curing the Pres- 
ident’s campaign.’* said one 
source; adding: ‘ He gave - the 
impression that he would be : 
delighted to speak about it- if 1 
the committee gives him im-.j 

munity.” 

Among the questions McCord 


reportedly refused to answe 
were those dealing with Rob- 
ert C. Mardian, the former chief 
of the Justice Department’s in-, 
torn a l security division — thq 
division responsible for man- 
aging legal wiretaps tor the 
federal’ government. 

Mardian, later the political 
coordinator of Mr. Nixon’s; 
campaign, headed an internal) 
investigation of the Watergaret 
bugging for the President’s red 
election committee and. accord-1 
ing to investigative sources, 
supervised a “houspcipaning”’ 
that included the destruction of; 
numerous documents after the! 
June 17 arrests in the Water- 
gate. 

McCord. Senate sources said, 
acknowledged meeting with 
Mardian but invoked the Fifth 
Amendment when asked to dis- 
cuss the subject of such meet- 
ings. 

Senate sources reported tha 
the Watergate investigating 
committee yesterday subpoen- 
aed three former employees of 
the Nixon re-election commit- 
tee in an attempt to corrobo-j 
rare .McCord's testimony about; 
the alleged involvement of 
high presidential a kies in the* 
Watergate bugging. . 

The three were identified x 
as Sally Harmony and Sylvia i 
Panarlies, both former seine-! 

See WATERGATE, Ad, Col. 1 ! 


( 488 ) 



24.1 WASHINGTON POST , MARCH 20 , 1973, Al, A6 


L 


WATERGATE, From Al 

Lorres to one of McCord’s co-j 
conspirators, former White : 
House aide G. Gordon Liddy. 
and Robert Reisner, who- 
served as administrative as- 
sistant to the deputy director 
of the- Nixon re-election cam- 
paign. former Presidential as-, 
sistant Jeb Stuart Alagruder.; 

-During his testimony 5 
Wednesday, McCord said un-i 
der oath that he was told by 
Liddy, his principal superior in 
ihe Watergate conspiracy that 
former 'Attorney General John 
X. .Mitchell had personally ap- 
proved plans to bug the Demo- 
crats headquarters. | 

McCord testified Wednesday! 
that Liddy told him that the= 
budget and plans for the Wa-. 
lergate operation were ap- 
proved during a February,! 
1972, meeting in Mitchell's of-j 
lice that also was attended by; 
Mngrurier and White House! 
Counsel John W. Dean III. j 

According to reliable re-j 
ports of McCord’s testimony,; 
the former Nixon security! 
chief said Liddy also told him 1 
that lie brought six or more! 
Large cardboard charts to thei 
meeting to explain his pro-! 
posal to bug the Watergate. ! 

McCord. Senate sources said.j 
testified that he thought Miss; 
Pnnarites might have know-; 
ledge of the charts. Reisner,: 
according to the sources, was; 
subpoenaed to determine if hei 
knew any details about the al- ! 
leged meeting and whether; 
Ala grader attended it. i 

According to reliable re-; 
ports of his testimony. Me- 1 
Cord told the Senate commit- j 
tee that he believes Aliss Har- 
mony might have typed final; 
reports of wire-tapped con*; 
versa t ions from the Water- 
gate surveillance. One of the 
unresolved mysteries of the< 
Watergate case has been the 
question of to whom those re- : 
ports eventually were distri-; 
buted. 

Miss Harmony also was ex-' 
peeted to be asked if she « 
knew anything about a Febru-; 
ary meeting in Mitchell's of-! 
fice. i 


In other developments yes- ; 
terday: | 

9 The Los Angeles Times j 
reported that McCord's ac- j 
count of the meeting in : 
Alitchell’s office was -partly 
corroborated” by Alagruder s 
testimony before the Water-- 
gate grand jury last summer. 

In the testimony, The Times 
reported, Alagruder confirmed 
that he attended the session 
v'ith Mitchell, Liddy and 
Dean. However, Alagruder told j 
the grand jury that no plans . 
for the Watergate bugging : 
were discussed at the meeting, j 
according to The Times ac-,' 
count. 

* A growing number of Re- 
publican senators and party 
leaders voiced concern about 
the Watergate, with some call-! 
ing on President Xixon to ap-j 
point a special prosecutor to= 
investigate the matter. 

■ t 

• Sen. Lowell P. Weicker 

(R-Conn.), a member of the 
Senate Watergate committee, 
said that the Watergate bug- 
ging was not an isolated in- 
cident of spying directed byi 
the White House. If the Senate;- 
committee intends to get to; 
the bottom of the matter,j- 
Weicker said, it will be nee-;- 
essary to focus the probe on;; 
persons other than Li.ddy and!; 
on espionage incidents other!* 
than* the Watergate. jj 

• Former White House con-i; 
sultant E. Howard Hunt Jr.i: 
testified for a third day be-i; 
fore a federal grand jury that;! 
has reopened its probe of theji 
case. Hunt reportedly wasij 
asked- about McCord’s allegat- 
ions and other ties Hunt mayjj 
have had to the broader cam-; 
paign of political spying. !, 

* Reliable Senate sources! 
said AIcCord’s testimony also!' 
focused briefly on White!' 
House chief of staff H. R.i 
Haldeman. but denied reports; 
published in some newspapers! 
today that the testimony in; 
any way implicated Haldeman ; ' 
in the bugging. 

The sources said AlcCord; 
testified that he once sent 
Haldeman a memorandum- 
dealing with routine security' 


( 489 ) 



24.2 ROBERT BEIMM TESTIMONY , JUNE 5, 1973, 2 SSC_ 489 _ , 508-10 

489 


Mr. Reisner. I do. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, Terry Lenzner, assistant chief counsel, 
will ask the first few questions of the witness. 

Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Reisner, will you spell your name and address 
please? 

TESTIMOOT OF ROBERT A. REISNER 


Mr. Reisner. My name is Robert Reisner, middle initial A. F., 
my address is 2727 29th St. NW., Washington. 

Mr. Lenzner. Will you spell your last name? 

Mr. Reisner. R-e-i-s-n-e-r. 

Mr. Lenzner. And you are appearing here today without counsel; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Reisner. That is correct. 

Mr. Lenzner. Do you have any short opening statement you .would 
like to make? 

Mr. Reisner. No, I do not. As you know, Mr. Lenzner, Mr. 
Chairman, I have met with your staff on a number of occasions in an 
effort to try to be cooperative as I can be and I am appearing here 
in the same spirit and I will be glad to answer your questions. 

Senator Ervin. I would like to say on behalf of the committee the 
staff assures me that you have been most cooperative. 

Mr. Reisner. Thank you. 

[ Mr. Lenzner. Mr. Reisner, were you employed by the Committee 
I To Re-Elect the President in November of 1971? 

1 Mr. Reisner. I was: : 

Mr. Lenzner. And what was your position with the committee? 

Mr. Reisner. I was administrative assistant to Mr. Jeb Magruder. 

Mr. Lenzner. And how long did you hold that position? 

Mr. Reisner. I worked for Mr. Magruder from November 1971 
I until July 1972. In July, I then went to work for Mr. Clark Mac- 
V ftr egor as his executive assistant. 

Mr. Lenzner. When did you leave the Committee To Re-Elect? 

Mr. Reisner. On November 8, following the election. 

Mr. Lenzner. Can you briefly describe your duties as Mr. Magru- 
der’s administrative assistant? 

Mr. Reisner. My duties were pretty conventional — that of ad- 
ministrative assistant. There were three kinds of duties. Basically I 
was responsible for the people, for coordinating among the people that 
he saw, in other words, his schedule. I was responsible for coordinating 
the paper flow that came in and out of his office and, therefore, the 
decisions, just keeping track of the decisions that accompanied that 
paper flow. And finally, I was responsible for sort of followup role, 
just keeping tabs on things that he wanted to have done and that he 
had asked various senior staff members to do for him. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, in those duties did you maintain a diary of 
Mr. Magruder's schedule? 

Mr. Reisner. No, I did not personally maintain a diary. I was 
responsible for his calendar and I had a secretary who also worked 
directly for Mr. Magruder named Vicki Chern, and her role was to 
keep a calendar and keep his own calendar up to date and that would 
be the accurate record of his schedule. 

Mr. Lenzner. Now, did there come a time when you were intro- 
duced to Gordon Liddy? 


( 490 ) 



24.2 ROBERT REISNER TESTIMONY 3 JUNE 5 S 1973 3 2 SSC 489 , 508-10 

508 



Senator Ervin. Just generally speaking. 

Mr. Reisner. Generally speaking, shredding that document, I 
remembered for the first time when I read that Mr. Gray had shredded 
a document and I simply realized that there was a similarity there. 

Senator Ervin. When were you subpenaed to go before the grand 
jury? 

Mr. Reisner. On April 8. It was at a subsequent meeting with 
Mr. Silbert that I described that document to him. It was in a previous 
appearance before the grand jury that I described virtually all that I 
have described here today. 

Senator Ervin. Did you talk to Mr. Silbert before you talked to 
this committee staff? 


Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Were you subpenaed before the grand jury before 
you talked to the staff of this committee? 

Mr. Reisner. To be precise, on March 30 , your staff subpenaed 
me, which was the first time I had heard from an investigatory body. 
I met with two of your investigators on that Friday. The subpena was 
canceled. I believe, Mr. Chairman, you were out of town and returned 
and the nature of the proceeding changed. 

Subsequently, I was subpenaed by the grand jury and appeared 
there. 

Senator Ervin. Now, did you receive a phone call or any communi- 
cation from Mr. Magruder after you were subpenaed to go before the 
grand jury or before our committee? 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir; on that Friday, which was, I believe, 
March 30. Actually, it was in the newspaper before I knew what was 
going to happen. I read in the newspaper that morning that I was 
to be subpenaed. 

Senator Ervin. What did Mr. Magruder ask you to do? 

Mr. Reisner. He asked me to get together with him. He called 
me at home and asked me to get together with him that morning. He 
asked me whether he could take me to work. I indicated that I didn't 
think that was appropriate, because I presumed that the reason I 
was being subpenaed before this committee was to discuss Mr. 
Magruder; therefore, I didn’t think it was appropriate for us to meet. 

He then called me again that morning to urge a meeting. I suggested 
there should be a third person there. We set a meeting. Then I chose 
not to attend the meeting. I wanted to be firm about not meeting 
with him. 

Senator Ervin. Did he say anything to you in either of those 
conversations about meeting with a Paul O’Brien? 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir; the nature of that was this, as I understand 
it. I indicated to him that if we were going to meet, there should be a 
third person there. 

He said, well, we will have to find someone. How about if we find 
either Paul O’Brien or Ken Parkinson, who were counsel to the 
committee? 

I said that that would be acceptable, but subsequently called Mr. 
O’Brien at 11 o’clock that morning and said that I didn’t think it 
was appropriate to get together with the man about whom I was 
going to be asked to testify. Mr. O’Brien agreed with that and said 
that he understood completely and there was no problem. 


( 491 ) 



24.2 ROBERT REISNER TESTIMONY, JUNE 5, 1973 , 2 SSC 489, 508-10 

509 

Senator Ervin. Did Mr. O'Brien give you advice about or make an 
offer of help to you? 

Mr. Reisner. Mr. O'Brien? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Reisner. Well, yes, sir, he was counsel to the committee, and 
I think he said, “I will be glad to help you, Bob," but, he said, “I 
think you will have to realize that if you have independent counsel 
or someone who is independent who can give you advice, that may 
be your best situation. After all, I have to represent the committee 
as well." 

Senator Ervin. What was Magruder's reaction when you told 
him that 

Mr. Reisner. I didn't want to come to the meeting? 

Senator Ervin [continuing]. That you didn't want to meet him. 

Mr. Reisner. He called Mr. O'Brien's office expecting me to be 
there and found out I wasn't going to attend. His response was ex- 
tremely agitated. He felt he wanted to know what I thought I was 
doing. 

He also indicated to me that — I had said to Mr. O'Brien I didn't 
think there was very much I could provide that would be helpful to 
this committee and Mr. O'Brien had apparently — we just discussed 
briefly the nature of the evidence I could provide and Mr. Magruder — 
one of the pieces of evidence, of course, was the easel. We mentioned 
that and I think Mr. Magruder stated that he didn't — he said there 
was no easel. He said, I don't see how you can remember that. 

Senator Ervin. Now, he called you at your home, didn't he, and 
talked about that? 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. That was the third telephone call he made to you 
that day? 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. I would like you to explain the conversation. What 
did you tell him outside of the easel and what did he tell you? 

Mr. Reisner. What did he tell me? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Reisner. He also indicated to me — well, the nature of the 
conversation was one in which he was saying to me, you know, what 
are you doing? There was no easel. 

Then he said, I can't understand this. He said, you know, are you not 
going to be cooperative? Are you not going — everyone else has been 
cooperative, or something to that effect. 

Now, in fairness to Mr. Magruder here, because I think it is border- 
ing on a very serious point that I have discussed with your staff, there 
was a fourth phone call on that day. He, I think, knew that he didn't 
wish to — that I didn't want to meet with him. He called my home and 
had my wife call me and ask me to call him that evening. 

Now, in that evening phone call, the entire nature of the phone 
call was different. I think he said that he was upset, that he was sorry 
if he was overly anxious. He said he just wanted me to realize that 
there were some extremely serious matters concerned here and that I 
should treat them in that way. 

I said I intended to treat them in that way. 


( 492 ) 



24.2 ROBERT REISNER TESTIMONY t JU NE 5 , 1973, 2 SSC 489 , 508 1 0_ 


Senator Ervin. Did he tell you at that time that you should be 
careful about what you said because people's lives and futures were at 
stake? . 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, he did. That was in that second phone call, 
and that was by way of explaining to me why he was so concerned. 

Senator Ervin. Just for my edification, I wish you would explain 
about the easel story, because I don't quite understand. 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. I think the nature of the easel story is 
just that Mr. Liddy came to me indicating that he was going to 
have a meeting with Mr. Mitchell and that he wished to have some 
sort of a prop to use, on which to use visual aids. I indicated to him 
I would try to look for such a prop. 

I had, I think, one of the secretaries call Mr. Mitchell's office and 
see whether there was such a prop. I don't think there was. 

Senator Ervin. In other words, Mr. Liddy told you he was going 
to meet with Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. 

L Senator Ervin. And he asked you if you could get him an easel 
on which he could display charts for Mr. Mitchell's-— — 

Mr. Reisner. He did not say to display charts, but I presumed that 
is what it was. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. If there is 
no objection by you and the committee, I would like to yield now to 
Senator Weicker to examine the witness. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Reisner, I would like to go back to the evening of June 17, 
because as I understand your testimony, and if I also understand 
testimony that has been given before this committee, there seems to 
be some discrepancy as to what occurred. 

Now, just let me try to go over the sequence of events that trans- 
pired with the phone call to Mr. Magruder the evening of the 17 th 
from Mr. Magruder's office. 

Was Mr. Odle on the phone when you spoke to Mr. Magruder? 
Mr. Reisner. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. During the entire time? 

Mr, Reisner. It is my belief that he was on the phone during the 
entire time. As I remember the phone call, he initiated it. 

Senator Weicker. Now, may I stop you? Mr. Odle initiated the 
phone call? 

Mr. Reisner. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Why would he have initiated it? 

Mr. Reisner. He, 1 think, came into the room and said, what is 
the — are you doing here? 

I said, Jeb called me and asked me to come down here, 
hie then said something to the effect — well, he said — I said that the 
reason I was down there was to remove some sensitive things from the 
file and that that is what Jeb wanted me to do. 

He said, do you know exactly what he wants? 

I said, no, not really. 

He said, I think we ought to tell him about the news, or something 
to that effect. So he called Mr. Magruder. 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-32 


( 493 ) 



24. 3 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY a JUNE 14, 197 Z, 2 SSC 805-06, 808 

805 


r 


had a direct relationship to the President at all. In fact, the use of 
his name was very common in many cases where it was inappropriate; 
in other words, where he had not had any dealings in the matter. 
So I knew that this did not necessarily mean it came from the Presi- 
dent or anyone else other than Mr. Dean or Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Dash. But you did not know to the contrary. 

Mr. Magruder. No; I did not know to the contrary. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know or have any knowledge of any plans to 
pay attorney’s fees or salaries to defendants or support for the families 
of the defendants? 

Mr. Magruder. I was aware that they were being taken care of 
because, of course, one of the questions I had if I was going to — par- 
ticularly before the second grand jury appearance where I had to 
decide to go up and tell this coverup story — that I wanted assurances 
that the other seven defendants, the seven defendants would hold and 
I was assured they were being taken care of. That was the extent of 
my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware of any concern about any one of the 
defendants during this period of time? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, at varying times there was concern over par- 
ticularly Mr. McCord. I think Mr, Hunt to some extent at various 
times and also I think Mr. Sturgis who I did not know. They were 
three who wei-e brought up most frequently. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware of any plans to propose a CIA defense 
for the defendants? 

Mr. Magruder. Again, in these series of meetings that we had from 
the period, from the break-in to September, that defense was dis- 
cussed in general terms at meetings I attended but I could not be 
specific about it. 

Mr. Dash. Now, you testified at the first Watergate trial? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, sir. 

Mr Dash. And at that trial did you tell this same false story that 
you testified before the grand jury and told the FBI ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. By the time of the trial in January all seemed, Mr. 
Magruder, to have worked well according to the plan that you had 
worked out with Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr LaRue and Mr. Mardian. 
At what time, to your recollection, if it did occur did the plan begin to 
crumble ? 

Mr. Magruder. Well, I think that as soon as we realized that the 
grand jury was going to reconvene, much more so than Mr McCord’s 
statement because I knew Mr. McCord’s statements would be hearsay, 
but as soon as I knew the grand jury was going to reconvene I knew 
that things would be difficult to hold. I knew I could not go through 
the same process, now that the election was now' over and the reason for 
the cove nap from my standpoint was now' no longer valid. But also I 
knew that Mr. Reisner, the one — from my standpoint, the only mistake 
the prosecutor's made was in going through the organization they 
missed Mr. Reisner, and if they had caught Mr. Reisner earlier, I think 
this story would not have been made but I knew* they would get to 
Mr. Reisner now* because it had been obvious he had been my assistant 
at that time and so as sooii as I knew that and as soon as I knew* Mr. 

A 


( 494 ) 



24.2 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY, JUNE 14 , 1972, 2 SSC 805-06, 808 

806 

Dean began to indicate some reluctance to discuss those meetings in 
the same terms that I had discussed them at the grand jury, I knew the 

L story would not hold up under a second investigation by your com- 
mittee, which, of course, had begun to hold hearings and also the grand 
jury. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Haldeman m January 
1973? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Dash. Could you briefly tell us what the nature of that meeting 
was and what was discussed ? 

Mr. Magruder. The meeting was for two purposes. I was the director 
of the inaugural at that time and was to discuss future employment 
regarding myself and also at that time there was a problem regarding 
Mr. Porter’s employment and I had made certain assurances, Mr. 
Mitchell had, about his employment and I wanted to be sure Mr. Hal- 
deman was aware of that. Ana then, third, and I realize now that these 
were probably taped conversations. I had some conversations with Mr. 

Dean in his office where he indicated a certain lack of memory to 
events, and I became rather concerned. He indicated at one point that, 
wasn’t that surprising how this plan was ever put into operation, and 
I said, “Well, John, surely you remember the meetings we attended” 
and he didn’t seem to remember those meetings, and I said to myself 
something is going to happen here if that continues. I think as it turned 
out these conversations were taped, so I thought I had better see Mr. 
Haldeman and tell him what had actually happened. I thought prob- 
ably that this was becoming scapegoat time and maybe I was going to 
be the scapegoat, and so I went to Mr. Haldeman and I said I just want 
you to know that this whole Watergate situation and the other activ- 
ities was a concerted effort by a number of people, and so I went 
through a literal monologue on what had occurred. That was my first 
discussion with Mr. Haldeman where I laid out the true facts. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what day or date approximately in Jan- 
uary that occurred ? 

Mr. Magruder. It would have been before the inaugural because we 
were still working on the inaugural but I would have to look in my 
diary as to what date specifically. 

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you met with Mr. Mitchell 
sometime after the trial ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes. Well, the McCord letter basically activated 
great concern in the sense 

Mr. Dash. That letter, I think the record will show, was March 23. 

Mr. Magruder. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. That was read out by Judge Sirica in the courtroom on 
the sentences on March 23. 

Mr. Magruder. That is correct, and that, of course, accelerated the 
process of concern on, I think, all of the participant parties. I. on Mon- 
day, the 25th, went to see the two lawyers for the committee. As you 
are aware at this time I did not have my own counsel so I was depend- 
ing on counsel basically from our committee, and I went over my prob- 

L lems with them, which I think were more acute at that time than the 
other participants and they agreed that I had a serious problem and 
suggested that I see, retain my own counsel. I think they then trans- 
mitted that concern of mine to Mr. Mitchell because on Tuesday he 


( 495 ) 



24. 3 JEB MAGRUDER TESTIMONY > JUNE 14, 1973, 2 SSC 805-06, 808 

808 

Mr. Dash. And Mr. Hal deman knew that then, did he not ? 

Mr. Magruder. I cannot recall in my meeting with him in January 
whether — yes, I am sure I did discuss those meetings, yes. 

Mr. Dash. So the attempt to get together and agree on that meet- 
ing was an attempt to get together and agree on at least from your 
point of view, would be the full story? 

Mr. Magruder. That is correct, Mr. Haldeman recommended that 
Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell and I meet, which we did that afternoon. 

Mr. Dash. What was the result of that meeting? 

Mr. Magruder. I realize that Mr. Dean had different opinions then 
as to what he would do probably, and so then my — I thought that 
probably it was more appropriate that even on that Monday that I 
get separate counsel so that I could get advice independent of the 
individuals who had participated with me in these activities. 

Mr. Dash. In other words, you really could not agree at the meet- 
ing with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Magruder. Well, it was cooperative. 

Mr. Dash. What was Mr. Dean’s position? 

Mr. Magruder. He would not indicate a position. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Did there come a time when you did get 
independent counsel? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, Mr. Parkinson, who was counsel of the com- 
mittee, recommended Mr. Bierbower and on that Saturday I went 
to meet him, he was out of the country, and I met him and we agreed, 
be agreed to be my counsel that Saturday evening. 

Mr. Dash. Did there come a time when you decided that you should 
go to the U.S. attorney’s office ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. When did you go to the U.S. attorney’s office? 

Mr. Magruder. We agreed, they discussed the things with the U.S. 
attorney, I think on April 12 and I saw them informally on April 13 
and saw them formally on April 14 on Saturday, April 14. 

Mr. Dash. At that time did you tell everything to the assistant U.S. 
attorneys? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, I cooperated. 

Mr. Dash. Who did you meet with ? 

Mr. Magruder. Mr. Silbert, Mr. Glanzer, and Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Dash. Did you tell them everything you are now telling this 
committee? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have a meeting afterward with Mr. Ehrlichman ? 

Mr. Magruder. Yes, Mr. Ehrlichman called while I was with the 
U.S. attorneys and asked me would I come over and talk to him about 
the case. We talked to the U.S. attorneys and they agreed as a courtesy 
that w r e should and Mr. Bierbower and the other attorney with Mr. 
Bierbower and I went to sec Mr. Ehrlichman that afternoon. 

Mr. Dash. Then, according to that meeting that you had with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, what happened? 

Mr. Magruder. We told him in rather capsule form basically what I 
told you this morning. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Now, I have just two final questions. I want to go back to the time 
when vou came back from California to Washington, putting you back 


( 496 ) 




25. On April 2, 1973 Ronald Ziegler issued a public statement 
criticizing the Senate Select Committee as being plagued by irresponsible 
leaks of tidal wave proportions. Ziegler stated that the White House 
intended to cooperate with the Committee but called on Senator Ervin to 
get his own disorganized house in order so that the investigation could 
go forward in a proper atmosphere of traditional fairness and due process. 


Page 

25.1 Washington Post , April 3, 1973, Al, A4 498 


( 497 ) 




25.1 WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 3. 1973. A1 , A4 


Ervin Insists 


Aides Testify 
Under Oath 

By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein 

Washington Post Staff Writers 

Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.) yesterday rejected a White 
House suggestion that presidential aides appear inform- 
ally before the Watergate investigating committee, ob- 
serving that they are not “royalty or nobility” who can- 
be excused from testifying under oath and in public. - 
Ervin, who heads the seven-member investigating 

committee, said he would ac-' — 

cept nothing less than the , 1T . . _ .. 

.. . . . ’‘I . would encourage the 

sworn testimony of presiden- chairman,” ZiegleF said, “to 

tial aides in public sessions get his own disorganized 

and added: “Divine right went house in order so that the in- 

out with the American Revolu- vestigation can go forward in 

tion and doesn’t 'belong to | a proper atmosphere of tradi- 
Whi te House aides.” | tional fairness and due proc- 

In San Clemente, Calif., R pss ” ^ 

presidential Press Secretary Ervin also repeated his 

Ronald L. :Ziegler responded threat to have White House 

with, sharp White House criti- aides arrested and cited for 

cism of the Ervin committee, contempt by the Senate if 

citing what he called they refuse to respond to a 

“irresponsible leaks in tidal subpoena. He gave no indica- 

wave proportions’" from the tion when subpoenas for the 

committee’s closed-door : ses- aides might be issued, 

sion last week. Ervin presently has the 

backing of at least five of the 
other six members of the 
Watergate committee to force | 
ia showdown with the White! 
! House on executive privilege.! 


I The clash apparently left 
jthe Ervin committee and the 
■ White House more than ever 
! at an impasse over the Presi- 
| dent’s claim that executive 
privilege allows him to keep 
his aides from testifying be- 
fore Congress. The President 
4iss- said he would welcome a 
court test to determine 
whether his aides could be 
forced to testify. 

In other developments j 
yesterday: j 

• Former White House aide 
G. Gordon Liddy, described by 
prosecutors as the “boss” of 
the Watergate bugging, re- 
fused to answer “all substan- 
tive questions” put to him in a 
2 Mi -hour appearance before a 
federal grand jury, according 
to Liddy*s attorney, Peter 
Maroulis. Liddy was convicted 
at the Watergate trial and 
could face a contempt of court 

See WATERGATE, A4, Cot t . 


( 498 ) 



15. -Z WASHINGTON POST. APRIL 3. 1973. Al, A4 
A 4 Tuesday, April 3, 1973 THF WASHINGTON" POST ' '• _ .. 



WATERGATE, From Al 

citation unless he cooperates 
with the grand jury. 

• Another convicted Water- 1 
gate conspirator, James W. 
McCord Jr., was ordered to 
give a sworn deposition today 
to attorneys for the Presi- 
dent's re-election committee in 
pending civil suits stemming 
from the Watergate bugging. 
(McCord ha$ voluntarily testi- 
fied before the Senate com- 
mittee, and is scheduled to ap- 
pear before the Hill panel 
again Wednesday.) 

President- Nixon was em- 
phatic last month in .stating 
that he would not allow pres- 
ent or former aides to testify 
in a formal session of a con- 
gressional committee. Without 
elaborating, Ziegler said last 
Friday that some informal tes- 
timony might be permitted be- 
fore the Ervin Committee. 

In holding firm to his posi- 
tion that public, sworn testi- 
mony is required, Ervin said 
that Mr. Nixon's assertion is 
“shooting the so-called execu- 
tive privilege doctrine way out 
past the stratosphere . . . and 
a terrible disservice to the 
high office of the presidency." 


“That is not executive privi- 
lege, that is executive poppy- 
cock," Ervin said. He said ex- 
ecutive privilege does not ap- 
ply to illegal or unethical be- 
havior, such as the Watergate i 
bugging. | 

Ervin, a 76-year-old former 
state supreme court judge 
added, said in answer to a 
question at a morning press 
conference, ‘The President is 
conducting himself in such a 
way as to reasonably engender 
in the minds of people ’the be- 
lief he is afraid of the truth.” 

... At one point Ervin criticized 
the President's legal judg- 
ment. “I am going to suggest 
that Duke Law School give 
him a refresher course,” Ervin 
said. President Nixon gradu- 
ated" from Duke law school, 
which is in Ervin's home state 
of North Carolina. (During a 
March 15 press conference, 
the President called Ervin a 
“great constitutional lawyer.'') 

Ervin continued: “If all the 
allegations (about Watergate 
and other political espionage) 
are true, we have to consider 
this was an assault on the in- 
tegrity of the process by 


which the President of the 
United States is chosen. 

“Every, person — be he Re-j 
publican or Democrat or Mug- r 
wump — should cooperate with; 
the committee to- try to deter- 
mine the truth of these allega- 
tions.” 

Ziegler's reference to “leaks j 
of tidal wave proportions''] 
from the Ervin committee was I 
an apparent reference to wide-! 
spread news reports of 4 Vi\ 
hours of sworn,, closed-door 
testimony by convicted Water- 
gate conspirator McCord last 
week. 

According to Senate 
sources, McCord testified that 
he had been told that some of 
the President's top White 
House and campaign aides had 
advance knowledge of the bug- 
gmgymeration. 

' Ziegler also said yesterday: 
“We’ve always said that we 
stand ready to cooperate and 
to work out a procedure with 
the (Watergate) committee 
which we do not feel infringes 
on the doctrine of separation 
of powers ... and it is time to 
bring this entire procedure 
back into the framework of or- 
derliness, fairness and respect 
for the rights of individuals, 
and ho press conference state- 
ment, no TV appearance com- 
ment, and no use of overstated 
•hetoric is going tc do this.” 

OrT'^jT Sunday television 
show, Sen. Lowell P. Weicker 
(R-Conn.), a member of Water- 
gate committee, charged that 
White House chief of staff H. 
R. (Bob) Haldeman probably 


( 499 ) 



25.1 WASHINGTON POST 3 APRIL 3. 1972, A1 3 A4 


had knowledge of an overall 
espionage operation run by 
the Presidents re-election 
committee. 

Weicker said that it Is 
“absolutely necessary that Mr. 
Haideman testify before the 
select committee" to explain 
his role. 

Weicker also said that nine 
Republican and Democratic 
critics of the Nixon adminis- 
tration on Capitol Hill had 
i their offices placed under sur* 
veil lance last year by "the Pres* 
ident's re-election commute 

One of those critics. Rep. 
Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.), yes- 
terday called the alleged sur- 
veillance “shocking* inane, 
and one of the foulest acts of 
man." 


In what she described as “a 
rare display of bipartisan con- 
gressional activity." Mrs. 
Chisholm said that she was 
lending a member of her staff 
to Sen. Weicker to assist him 
in his investigation of the 
Watergate espionage. 

In U.S District Court yes- 
terday, Judge Charles TL Ri- 
chey ordered McCord to ap- 
pear fbr a deposition hearing 
today before lawyers for ^ his 
former employer, the Commit-: 
tee for the Re-election of the! 
President. Last week, the com- j 
mittee subpoenaed McCord, j 
its former security coordina- j 
tor, as a witness in a civil suits ' 
arising from the June . 17 bug- 
ging of Democratic headquar- 
ters. . ' . 

Kenneth W. Parkinson, at- 
torney for the committee, said 


that the news - reports of Mc- 
Cord's testimony"' had been 
“highly damaging” and cited 
them as a primary ^factor -in 
the committee's desire to 
question McCord. *'’**- 

“It's all coming out," said 
Parkinson. I think it's coming 
from the Senate, from sena- 
tors and may be coming from 
McCord's ‘ counsel, Mr. 
(Bernard) Fensterward*. The m- 
formation is getting out It's 
time we should have an oppor- 
tunity to find out what is on 
McCord's mind; what is moti- 
vating him to make these 
kinds of outrageous state 


ments involving innocent per- 
sons.” . . V V 

> When Nicholas McConnell, 
an associate of Parkinson, 
sought to introduce 29 pages 
of newspaper articles as evi- 
dence to * support the point, 
Judge Richey v interrupted: 
“What do leaks have • to do 
with whether a deposition 
ought to be taken tomorrow’'* 
Discovering the sources of 
news reports, McConnell re- 
sponded, “would be otie of the 
points we'd be interested -in." 
At that moment, Parkinson, 
who last month subpoenaed 10 
reporters and news executives 


to appear for questioning and 
produce their notes inv the 
same civil suit, rushed to the 
courtroom lectern and told 
Richey: “We’re, not interested 
in running down sources.” Mc- 
Connell later told a reporter 
he had made “a misstatement” 
about his intentions. - * * 
Although McCord was or- 
dered to appear for question- 
ing at 10 a.m., his attorneys 
told Judge Rickey that he 
would refuse to answer ques- 
tions on Fifth-Amendment 
grounds until the government j 
grants him immunity from 
further prosecution. i 


( 500 ) 




26. On April 4, 1973 Dean told Haldeman that his lawyers had met 
privately with the prosecutors. 


Page 


26.1 H. R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2903 


502 



26.1 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY , JULY Z0> 1973, 7 SSC 2903 

2903 

APRIL 

From April 1 to 7, I was in San Clemente with the President. 
Despite Mr. Dean’s statement that during that period he, under advice 
of counsel, endeavored to avoid any contact with Haldeman, Ehrlich- 
man, or Mitchell — we talked on the phone daily. The main problem he 
seemed to have during that period was the continuing one with 
Mitchell regarding the discrepancy on the number of meetings. 

It is my understanding that Dean hired a lawyer, Mr. Shaffer, about 
March 30. He had indicated earlier that he might do this so he — and, 
through him, the President — could consult an attorney familiar with 
criminal law on the implications of some of the concerns Dean was 
developing. He told me that his lawyer had told him he should not 
write anything down about the Watergate case and, if he had written 
anything down, he should not show it to anyone and he should not talk 
to Mitchell or Magruder. He did not mention to me that his lawyer 
had told him not to talk to me or Ehrlichman and he did, in fact, con- 
tinue to talk — to me, at least. 

He told me his lawyers had met privately with the U.S. attorneys 
on April 4. He told me again on April 7 that his lawyers had met with 
Hie U.S. attorneys on April 6. This despite the fact that in his testi- 
mony he has said that his lawyers were meeting with the prosecutors 
but this was unknown to Haldeman or Ehrlichman. 

He further said that the U.S. attorneys had told his lawyers — and 
he believed that this was the straight information because this was an 
eyeballrto-eyeball meeting — that the U.S. attorneys were only inter- 
ested m the pre-June 17 facts. They had no concern with post- June 17. 
They only wanted Dean as a witness. They did not consider him a 
target of their investigation. They did not consider Haldeman as a 
target and probably would not even call him as a witness. Liddy had 
told them everything but his lawyers didn’t know it; and Liddy com- 
pletely cleared the White House ; that is, in telling them everything, 
Liddy had confirmed that nobody in the White House had had any 
involvement. 

We returned to Washington on April 8. During that week Ehrlich- 
man continued his investigation — and on Saturday the 14th reported 
his conclusions to the President in the form of a verbal statement of 
his theory of the case based on all of the inf ormation he had acquired — 
still, of necessity, mostly by hearsay. 

There were several meetings with Dean that week and I recall a 
continuing concern on Dean’s part regarding the discrepancy with 
Mitchell and the planning meetings. I don’t recall any major changes 
in Dean’s view of the facts from what he had reported on the phone 
earlier. 

By the end of the week both Dean and Ehrlichman had come to the 
view that Mitchell had approved the Watergate plan and there was 
some discussion that, if that were the fact, and if Mitchell decided 
to step forward and say so, it would be a major step in clearing up the 
Watergate mystery. This was not discussed in any context of asking 
Mitchell to do this as a scapegoat or to divert attention from others — 
but as a major stop in bringing oat the truth. 

Over the weekend, both Magruder and Dean met with the U.S. 
attorneys in private sessions and gave their full accounts of the Water- 


( 502 ) 



27. On April 5, 1973 L. Patrick Gray called the President and 
requested that his nomination as permanent Director of the FBI be with- 
drawn. According to Gray, the President told him that this was a 
bitter thing to have happened to Gray and there would be a place for 
Gray in the Nixon administration. The President informed Gray that 
he wanted him to serve as Acting FBI Director until a successor was 
confirmed. In a public statement issued by the President on April 5, 
1973 announcing the withdrawal of Gray's name, the President praised 
Gray and stated that his compliance with Dean's completely proper 
and necessary request for FBI reports exposed Gray to totally unfair 
innuendo and suspicion. 


Page 


27.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, 9 SSC 3545-46 504 

27.2 President Nixon statement, April 5, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 335 506 


( 503 ) 


27.1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY. AUGUST 6 3 1973, 9 SSC 3545-46 

3545 

year I had in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of any tendency 
toward a national police force, I saw just the opposite. 

Senator Baker. Well, Mr. Gray, I think that is very helpful and 
I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss that both in the 
public forum and private conversations as legislators in the future, but 
I think your suggestions are well taken and I think they will in fact 
be taken into account. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Now, Mr. Gray, this is the end so far as my 
questioning is concerned, but there is one loose end I think I want to 
pursue. 

This morning I read to you the President’s statement of April 30 
wherein he says : 

As a result on March 21 I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinat- 
ing intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those con- 
ducting the investigations to get all of the facts and to report them directly 
to me right here in this office. 

I asked you whether or not you had received such an order from 
the President at that time and you indicated “No.” 

Mr. Gray. That is correct, Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Now, just so if any responses come in the future 
from various and sundry parties that we put them in the proper con- 
text, it could be interpreted the reason why you received no such order 
was a lack of confidence in you. It could be interpreted that way. I am 
not saying that is the case but it could be interpreted that way. 

Do you have any knowledge that there was a lack of confidence, a 
lack of faith in you at this time, March 21, on the part of the President 
of the United States ? 

Mr. Gray. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I received a call from the 
President on March 23 wherein, among other things, he told me there 
^^^jyould always be a place for me in the Nixon administration. 

Senator Weicker. Now, I would like to get to the one lost end here. 

You had another conversation with the President of the United States, 
as I understand it, on April 5. Could you recount to this committee 
the nature of that phone conversation ? 

In order that we might shorten up here, as I understand it, on April 

4, it was suggested to you, and you may want to make further comment, 
you withdrew your nomination on that day or the next day. On April 

5, it was indicated to you by the Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst, 
that you would be allowed to withdraw your name and that the White 
House was expecting a call. So with that background, if you w r ant to 
add to that background, please do. 

Mr. Gray. I called the President that evening after I had met with 
the assistant directors of the FBI at 5 p.m., to tell them I was going 
to request the President to withdraw my n6mination. And I called the 
President and I told him that it was obvious that I did not have the 
votes and that the nomination would not come out of the committee 
and I thought that the best thing that I could do would be to request 
him to withdraw my nomination and he told me that this was a. and 
these are not his exact words, I know that, but the thought is here, 
that this was a bitter thing to have happened to me, there will be an- 


( 504 ) 




27.1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY* AUGUST 6, 1973 , 9 SSC 3545-46 

3546 

other time to tight our enemies, and lie again said, ; T am quite positive 
there will be a place for you in the Nixon administration,” and I be- 
lieve that I read to him my letter requesting that my nomination be 

U withdrawn in which I said to him that 1 would be perfectly willing 
to serve should it be his desire until my successor would be named and 
confirmed and the President said to me, "I will want you to do just 
that. 5 ’ And I did ; I remained there until April 26, April 27, actually. 

Senator Weicker. So that at least insofar as up to April 5 was con- 
cerned you had firsthand knowledge expressed, firsthand knowledge 
of the President’s confidence in you insofar as the President himself 
expressed it to you % 

Mr. Gray. \es, sir; because I am quite certain 1 read to him that 
paragraph in my letter where 1 said X would remain “should you desire 
until a successor is nominated and confirmed.” 

' Senator Weicker. Now, lastly, Mr. Gray, as far as I am concerned, 
this trail started with a phone call to me from you on April 17 in the 
morning around 9 o’clock, where you indicated that the lid was going 
to blow off — and starting at that moment in time through our meetings 
on the 25th, 26th, and subsequent days, slowly but surely you told a 
complete story to me, to the committee staff, and to the committee and 
I believe here to this committee today. 

And probably nobody has more right to wonder why the story was 
so slow in coming, and in some instances was incorrect, than i have 
because you told it to me first. But I think at least I would like to go 
on record in saying that at each point along the way more truth came 
from you, earlier, even though it might not have been the whole truth, 
more truth came out earlier than from any other person that I en- 
countered in this town, I think a good example of that, because I do 
want to try to relate something in the peoples’ mind that happened 
right here before this committee. We all talk about the July 6 phone 
conversation with the President. I remember hearing that at 7 :30 in 
the morning on the morning of May 10. General W alters, of course, 
gave it in testimony before, I believe, the Armed Services Committee 
on May 18. The first we learned from the President was on May 22. 1 
just use that as a simple example to the many matters that you and I 
discussed. 

So certainly, I for one, am deeply appreciative of what must have 
been a very difficult role and nobody is exonerating anybody else, and 
you have admitted to this committee yourself as to the burdens that 
you have to bear. But at least, as an end to my particular question- 
ing, I notice that a minute ago you commented maybe the agents were 
overawed by those they had to go ahead and interview* Of course, 

I suppose my question to you, Pat, is; were you overawed by the men, 
the institution of Government that you worked for ? 

Mr. Gray. I do not know that I was overawed but I certainly had a 
very — well, the only way to classif y it — deep and abiding respect built 
up over the years for the Office of the Presidency and knowing and 
feeling in my own mind that no matter who comes into that Office he 
always rises to the burdens of that Office and that the individuals in 
it, in my judgment and in my book, have always been above and beyond 
reproach and perhaps with that in mind, Senator Weicker, you could 
say yes, that I was overawed, but I believed and I trusted and I think 
I had every reason to believe and to trust and at no time did I ever 


( 505 ) 



27.2 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT, APRIL 5, 1973 , 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 335 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 


From April to September 1970, Mr. Bomar was a part- 
ner in the Encino, Calif., real estate consulting firm of 
Armur Associates. He was vice president of the Larwin 
Group, Inc., a real estate development and financial firm 
in Beverly Hills, Calif., from 1967 to 1970. From 1961 
to 1967, he was with the Security Pacific National Bank 
in Los Angeles, Calif., where he was assistant vice presi- 
dent and commercial and real estate lending officer. 

He was bom in Sherman, Tex., on July 16, 1937. Mr. 
Bomar attended Glendale College and received his B.S. 
from California State University at Northridge in 1960 
and his M.B.A. from the University of California at Los 
Angeles in 1961. 

Mr. Bomar is married and has two children. The 
Bomars reside in Potomac, Md. 

note: The announcement was released at San Clemente, Calif. 

Boards of Visitors to the 
Service Academies 

Announcement of Appointment of Six Members 
of the Boards of Visitors. April 5, 1973 

The President today announced the appointment of 
six persons to be members of the Boards of Visitors to the 
Service Academies, for terms expiring December 30, 1975. 

Board of Visitors to the US. Air Force Academy 

Brig. Gen. Robert F. McDermott (USAF, Ret.), of San Antonio, 
Tex., president, United Services Automobile Association, and 
permanent dean of faculty, U.S. Air Force Academy. He suc- 
ceeds Kenneth Dahlberg, whose term has expired. 

Churchill T. Williams, of Oelwein, Iowa, president, Oelwein 
State Bank. He succeeds James Reynolds, whose term has 
expired. 

Board of Visitors to the US. Naval Academy 

Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak. (USMC, Ret.), of San Diego, Calif., 
vice president, Copley News Service. He succeeds H. Ross Perot, 
whose term has expired. 

Adm. Harry D. Felt (USN, Ret.), of Honolulu, Hawaii, business 
consultant. He succeeds John McMullen, whose term has 
expired. 

Board of Visitors to the US. Military Academy 

Gen. Leif J. Sverdrup (USA, Ret.), of St. Louis, Mo., senior part- 
ner, Sverdrup & Parcel, and president, Sverdrup & Parcel Over- 
seas, Inc. General Sverdrup is being reappointed. 

Maj. Gen. Georce Olmsted (USAR, Ret.), of Arlington, Va., 
chairman and president, International Bank of Washington. He 
succeeds Louis Vincenti, whose term has expired. 

The purpose of the boards is to inquire into the morale 
and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical 
equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and any 
other matters relating to the Academies which they choose 
to consider. All three boards consist of six members serving 
terms of 3 years. 

note: The announcement was released at San Clemente, Calif. 


335 

Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 

Statement by the President on His Intention To 
Withdraw the Nomination of L. Patrick Gray 111, 

Mr. Gray's Request. April 5, 1973 

Pat Gray is an able, honest, and dedicated American. 

Because I asked my counsel, John Dean, to conduct 
a thorough investigation of alleged involvement in the 
Watergate episode, Director Gray was asked to make FBI 
reports available to Mr. Dean. His compliance with this 
completely proper and necessary request exposed Mr. 
Gray to totally unfair innuendo and suspicion, and 
thereby seriously tarnished his fine record as Acting Direc- 
tor and promising future at the Bureau. 

In view of the action of the Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee today, it is obvious that Mr. Gray’s nomination will 
not be confirmed by the Senate. Mr. Gray has asked that 
I withdraw his nomination. In fairness to Mr, Gray, and 
out of my overriding concern for the effective conduct 
of the vitally important business of the FBI, I have re- 
gretfully agreed to withdraw Mr. Gray’s nomination. 

I have asked Mr. Gray to remain Acting Director until 
a new nominee is confirmed. 

, note: The statement was released at San Clemente, Calif. 


Digest of Other 
White House Announcements 

Following is a listing of items of general interest which 
were announced to the press during the period covered 
by this issue but which are not carried elsewhere in the 
issue. Appointments requiring Senate approval are not 
included since they appear in the list of nominations 
submitted to the Senate, below. 

March 31 

The President and Mrs. Nixon attended the wedding of 
Cheri Fisher and Richard Ryan in Van Nuys> Calif. 
Mr Ryan is Mrs. Nixon’s nephew. 

The President today accepted with regret the resigna- 
tion of Vice Adm. John M. Lee as Assistant Director of 
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, effective April 1, 1973. 

April 2 

The President and Mrs. Nixon hosted a dinner at their 
residence in San Clemente for South Vietnamese Presi- 
dent Nguyen Van Thieu and Mrs. Thieu. 


Voluma 9 — Number 14 


( 506 ) 



28. On April 5, 1973 John Ehrlichraan met in San Clemente, California 
with Paul O'Brien. According to Ehrlichraan, O'Brien had asked to meet 
with H. R. Haldeman to transmit some information to the President. 
According to Ehrlichman's testimony and notes, O'Brien told him that 
he had obtained information from Jeb Magruder and others concerning, 

among other things, Magruder 's and Mitchell's involvement in meetings 

/ 

in which the Liddy Plan for electronic surveillance with a budget of 
$100,000 to $250,000 was outlined; Magruder's testimony concerning the 
number of meetings among John Mitchell, Gordon Liddy, John Dean and 
Magruder; Magruder's claim that Charles Colson called him urging that 
the program go forward; Magruder's claim that Gordon Strachan came to 
him and said the President wants this project to go on; payments that 
had been made to the defendants and their attorneys; and possible 
offers or commitments regarding executive clemency to Liddy, Howard 
Hunt and James McCord. O'Brien told Ehrlichman that neither Magruder 
nor Mitchell were inevitably hung and that Dean was the key problem. 
Ehrlichman's notes also state "must close ranks," "JNM will tough it 
out," "H must bring Jeb up short" and, written below "Jeb," "shut up" 
and "stop seeing people." After this meeting Ehrlichman met with the 
President. Ehrlichman has testified that he reported to the President 
after he had talked to O'Brien. 


( 507 ) 



Page 


28.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 5, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 509 

28.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2729-36, 2751 510 

28.3 John Ehrlichman notes of April 5, 1973 meeting 
with Paul O'Brien, SSC Exhibit No. 98, 7 SSC 

2922-31 519 

28. A Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Ehrlichman, April 5, 1973 (received from 
White House) 529 


( 508 ) 



28,1 JOHN EHELICHMAN LOG, APRIL 5, 1973 


y 


j 


THURSDAY 

, APRIL 5, 1973 

18-10:30 

Paul O'Brien 

1 1 :00 1 iTstC 

a oh 

3:00 

sident 

4:00 

Judge Matthew Byrne 

FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1973 

10:30 

Bebe Rebozo 

lliOOL ' 

President 

11:30 

Herb Kalmbach (parking lot , of Bank of America 


San Clemente) 

1:00 

Ted Ashley (Warner Brothers) 

1:15-1:45 

President 

1:4 %:00 

Linch with Ashley 

7:00 

Baseball game with the President - -Anaheim 

SUNDAY, APRIL 8, 1973 

8:30 

Helicopter from Palomar 

9:00 

4:30 

Depart El Toro 2:00 - President (Air Fores 

Arrive Andrews 

5 - 7 c__ 

HRH, John Dean 

MONDAY, 

APRIL 9, 1973 

10:30 

Secretary Shultz* office - Stein, Ash, Flanigan 

12:30 

Lunch with A't/ - at Justice 

2-2:45^ 

President 

6:30 

Blair House - Senators Ervin, Bales r 

/ TUESDAY, 

APRIL 10, 1973 

8:30 

Bipartisan Leadership 

10:15 

Len Garment, Ziegler 

11:15 

Ziegler, HRH 

12:45-2 

President 

2:20 

Mr. Luce (Con Ed), Marshall McDonald (Florida 
and Light) 

3:00 

HRH. 

3:15 

Joined by Dean 

57oo~ 

Lsn Garment 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-33 


( 509 ) 



23.2- JOm_EHRLICMM TESTIMONY^ JULY 27 . 3973.7 ggC IZMlM* 2751 

FRIDAY, JTTLY 27, 1973 

U.S. Senate, 

Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington, D.C* 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, aJj^I0,:05 a.m., in 
room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
(chairman), presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel ; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; 

David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
, chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; 
Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel ; Donald G. Sanders, deputy 
minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and 
Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, 
research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert 
Baca, office of Senator Montoya ; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator 
Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; John Walz, 
publications clerk. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye, will you resume your examination 
of the witness. 

Senator Inotjte. Thank you very much. 

r * Mr. Ehrlichman, when we recessed yesterday we were discussing 
your interviews as part of the inquiry made in behalf of the President, 
and in response to one of my questions you indicated that you had dis* 
cussed or talked with Mr. O’Brien, Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Dean, Mr, 
Mitchell, and again with Mr. Strachan, and you have indicated that 
you had maintained interview notes. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN EHRLICHMAN— Resumed 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Of some of those, Senator, and I neglected to 
say I also talked to Mr Krogh because of something that came up in 
the course of these interviews that I wanted to inquire about, so he 
would be an additional individual that I talked to. 

Senator Inotjte. We have no notes on Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Dean, Mr. 
Mitchell, and Mr. Strachan. Is there anv reason for this? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. You should have. There are notes for Strachan 
and Dean. There are no notes for mv talk with either — for my talk 
with Mr. Kalmbach. We did turn over to the committee staff the 
transcript of mv interview with Mr. Mitchell which is a very, very 
poor one. It is not very helpful. It is very sketchy. 

( 2729 ) 


( 510 ) 


28.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 27, 1973 t 7 SSC 2729-36, 2751 

2730 

Senator Inottye. Mr. Dash, do we have the copies of the Kalmbach, 

Dean, Mitchell, and Strachan — — 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There are no Kalmbach notes, Senator. There are 
Dean and Strachan notes. The notes that I have here are O’Brien. 

Dean, Colson, Magruder, and Strachan. 

Mr. Dash. Senator Inouye, whatever you have, is what we received. 

In other words, that was intact, delivered to us in that form, and we 
have no other notes. 

Senator Ervin. Let the reporter assign it the appropriate exhibit 
number. * 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 98.*] 

Senator Inotjye. Then we have here, Mr. Ehrlichman, one Strachan 
and you had two Strachan meetings. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There are only notes for one. 

Senator Inottye. We have a Reisner meeting. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. I think that is actually the — that is the Dean 
meeting, J. D. is up in the corner of it. That is the Dean meeting on 
April 13 at 3 p.m. 

Senator Inottye. Then, we have an O’Brien meeting. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Inottye. And Colson and Shapiro- 

Mr. Ehrlichman, Right. 

Senator Inottye. And Magruder. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Correct. That is it. 

Senator Inottye. We have no Mitchell. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; you have the transcription of two tapes, 

Mitchell and Magruder, that are both very, very hard to read, hard to 
understand because the tapes are hard to understand. You also have 
the tapes themselves, and they are for whatever they are worth. I do 
not think you can make much from them. 

Senator Inottye. I received these notes early this morning, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, and I must confess that I find it very difficult to under- 
stand your hieroglyphics here. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sure, right. 

Senator Inottye. So, if I may ask you, whenever the initial “H” 
appears, is that for Mr. Hal deman ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Not necessarily. You would have to take it in the 
context. Senator, that could also be Hunt in some cases here, although 
I used the double “H” for Hunt on occasion. 

Senator Inottye. JNM is John Mitchell ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inottye. And JSM is Magruder ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

S enator Inottye. L or LD or LID is Liddy ? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Well, LID is certainly Liddy, and I do not re- 
call — yes, I have used L also for Liddy in the Magruder notes. 

Senator Inottye. And K or EK for Krogh ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I believe so, yes. 

Senator Inottye. And CC for Colson? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes. 

Senator Txoute. Now, there is a Greek svmbol, the symbol pi, who 
is that? 

*Sf»e p. 2915. 


( 511 ) 




28. 2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY. JULY 27, 1973 , 7 SSC 2729-26, 2751 

2731 

Mr. Ehruchman. That is the President. 

Senator IxotnrE. That is the President of the United States? 

Daughter,] 

ir we may, may we begin with your meeting with Mr. O’Brien? 

Mr. Ehbuchman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Inottye. At San Clemente. 

Mr. Ehklichman. Right. 

Senator Inotjte. Please tell us what transpired. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. All right, sir. The circumstances of this meet- 
ing were that Mr. O’Brien indicated that he had some information 
that he felt the President should have. He called and asked for an 
appointment with Mr. Haldeman. In view of the fact that 4 or 5 
days previously the President had asked me to get into this, he was 
referred to me. We met in my office at San Clemente, and he began 
to tell me about what he believed would be Mr. Magnider’s testimony— 
oh. in the upper right comer you will see that he told me that the pur- 
pose of his being on the coast was to see Herb Kalmbach in connection 
with some of the civil litigation which Mr. O’Brien was handling for 
the Committee To Re-Elect. 

Senator Inotjye. And this happened on April 5 ? 

Mr. Ehrhchman. April 5 at 10 in the morning; yes, sir. 

* He said that there had been four meetings which led up to the 
Watergate break-in, and you will see the meetings were referred to 
by numbers with circles around them. We start with No. 1, which is 
actually the fourth one that he described to me, which was a meeting 
between Liddy, Dean, and Mitchell in the Attorney General’s office 
in November. He said that Mr. Mitchell 

Senator iNorrrE. N ovember of what year, sir ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That would have been 1971. That was a meeting 
which Mr Mitchell apparently did not recall, which was held for the 
purpose of Mr. Dean introducing Liddv to Mitchell. 

The second meeting appears in the date notebooks of various parties, 
and that was a meeting between Dean, Liddy, and Magruder for the 
® purpose of introducing Liddy to Magruder, and that was held on 
January 27, 1972. 

There was a subsequent meeting on February i involving Dean, 

Liddv. Magruder, and Mitchell. He said that the third meeting was 
“canceled,” that is to say, the parties agreed that it would be described 
as a meeting that had been canceled, and then he refers later on to 
the construction of that story or that version. 

He said that John Dean, and bear this in mind now — is hearsay 
twice removed, this is Magruder telling O’Brien, telling me, he saii 
that Magruder said that Dean kept Haldeman advised by memo of all 
of these meetings. Actually, there were four meetings, and then he 
starts through again. The first meeting in November which I have 
described, he said there was actually a third meeting which was not 
any of these that I have heretofore described, where a $1 million budget 
was proposed by Liddv. Everyone at the meeting agreed that that 
budget would not be adopted. 

Senator In'Ottte. Did he sav for what reason ? 

Mr. Ehrmchmax. T didn't ask him. T don't believe at that point. 

Senator Inoctt:. Was it because of the price tag alone ? 


( 512 ) 


28.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 3 1973, 7 SSC 2729-26* 2751 

2732 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don’t know, Senator, from this conversation. 

He didn’t say. 

He said that between meetings No. 3 and No. L Mr. Colson phoned 
twice to J eb Magruder. 

Now, in parentheses I have only according to Jeb, which indicated 
what Mr. O’Brien told me that this was, the only person he had ever 
heard this from was Magruder urging that this program go forward. 

Now I have the notation “Not price,” and I don’t know what that 
refers to. That does not jog my recollection at alL 

He said that Liddv had a commitment from Krogh, that Hunt had 
a commitment from Colson, and these commitments, I took it, related 
to Executive clemency. That was the context an which that comment 
was made. 

Senator Inottye. Liddy had a commitment from Krogh ? 

jjlr. Ehruchman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ijvottye. That he could receive Executive clemency? 

Mr. Ehruchman. That was what Mr O’Brien said that Mr. 

Magruder had told him. 

Senator Inottye. And Mr. Hunt said that he had a commitment 
from Mr. Chuck Colson? 

Mr. Ehruchman. No; I am not saying that Hunt said that. Bear 
in mind this is Magruder speaking tp O’Brien now. Because of this 
assertion, I did contact Krogh later on to determine when he had had 
contacts with Liddy and to try to either verify this or set it aside. 

Parenthetically, circumstances indicated that he had had no contact 
either direct or indirect with Liddy and so the— -it was not borne out 
by anything that I could find collaterally in the time in which I 
worked. 

• He said that. He said at the fourth meeting Dean arrived late, 

Magruder, Dean, Liddy, and Mitchell attended the meeting. There 
was an intelligence budget of $200, 000-^250, 000. Dean said to Liddy 
that he, Dean, would have nothing further to do with this. I asked 
him about charts and he said the charts did exist, and the reason I 
asked him, of course, is that there was something in the press at this 
time about the existence of a set of charts. He said that the code name 
“Gemstone” was used, that that term was not translated into what 
it really stood for at this meeting. The party, he said, apparently 
didn’t know, or that is what Magruder told him. I said, “Was bugging 
involved?” and he said, “Yes, bugging was one of the methods in- 
volved.” It also involved counteractivities at the convention. 

Then — — 

Senator Inottye. Do you know what the $1 million budget involved ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He didn’t tell me. This characterization at the 
bottom of the first page referred, so far as I can recall, to the $200,000-- 
$250,000 budget. 

He told me that there was a second intelligence operation at the 
Committee To Re-Elect which was not involved in this series of four 
meetings. This involved a cab driver who volunteered at the Muskie 
headquarters. He had been recruited by a friend of Ken Rietz who 
was a former FBI man in Tennessee, and he went into the Muskie 
headquarters and volunteered and became Senator Muskie’s chauffeur 
and a friend of the family, and went to Muskie’s house for dinner, and 
soon began carrying all of the Senator’s mail back and forth. 


( 513 ) 




28^2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY^ JULY 27j_ 1973, 7_ SSC 2729-36, 2751. 

2733 

Senator Inottte. And he photographed all the mail? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes; he photographed all of the mail. 

Senator IxotjYe. Who is this friend of Ken Rietz? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. The FBI man? I don’t know. I don’t have his 
name but apparently your staff should because when the Senate staff 
was looking for someone for this committee staff, he was approached, 
and so it shouldn’t be too hard to find out who that was. He declined 
the employment apparently. [Laughter.] 

One of the pieces of mail apparently was printed in Evans and 
Novak and so everybody in the Muskie organization was ques- 
tioned about it except the chauffeur, and the chauffeur was a volun- 
teer. he was paid nothing. Eventually he was transferred from Rietz ’ 
to Howard Hunt for purposes of management and reporting. 

Then I have a notation that Rietz became worried at some point 
about cash funds, and I believe that refers back to this business of the 
transfer. In other words, Rietz didn’t like what he saw about cash in 
the organization and he wanted out and at that point he discontinued 
any connection with this kind of activity and Howard Hunt took it 
over. 

I have a note Magruder was pushing, and I think what that refers 
to is a statement that Magruder was pushing generally for intelligence 
information. 

He told me that Magruder told him that there had been an entry 
into the Democratic headquarters in May and that a bug had been 
planted, that he was satisfied that neither Dean nor Mitchell had 
knowledge of either the May or June break-in but that Mr. Magruder 
did. v 

Then he mentioned that he had been caught — no, I think this is 
Mr. O’Brien speaking for himself. He was advising caution with 
regard to John Dean’s objectivity, in the advice he might be giving 
* the President in this matter. 

Senator Ixottye. Who is Hofgren? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Hofgren is Daniel Hofgren and that name relates 
to the note that I will come to farther down on the page. 

Mr. O’Brien said that Magruder reaches Strachan, Haldeman, Col- 
son, and the President in his story. I said, “How does Magruder reach 
the President?” 

And he said in this circumstance, Magruder fired Gordon Liddy. he 
will say, Gordon Liddy went to Gordon Strachan and Gordon 
Strachan came to Magruder and said. “Move him back,” that is, this is 
Strachan talking to Magruder saying, “Move Liddy back. The Presi- 
dent wants this project to go on.” 

I said, “Is there any other way that this reaches the President ?” 

And he said, “Not that I know of.” 

Now, he said, “According to Mr Hofgren, Mr. Magruder s wife was 
indicating to three friends apparently that there was a possibility that 
Mr. Magruder would be indicted and' that he was planning to leave the 
Government.” 

And that is the reference to Hofgren at the top of the page. 

Now, Mr. O’Brien said that neither Magruder nor Mitchell in his. 

O’Brien’s opinion, were inevitably hung intliis case by the evidence as 
he understood it at that point. He said, “Frankly, John Dean is the kev 
problem.” 


( 514 ) 



28.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 3 1973 3 7 SSC 2729-36, 2751 

2734 

Mr. O’Brien was concerned about the post- Watergate situation and 
about the handling of money and then he began telling me about this 
money situation which concerned him. He told me about Mr. Rivers, 

Mr. Kalmbach’s man who delivered $25,000 in cash to Attorney 
Bittman by leaving it in a phone booth, and I said, “What became of 
the money ?” 

And he said, “I believe it was deposited to their firm account.” He 
said, “There has been obstruction of justice,” in his opinion. I asked 
him to define what he meant by that. He said that a^defendant in a 
criminal case is also a witness, and the purpose of giving money to 
such a defendant becomes very important. It is OK if one gives them 
attorneys fees and defense funds or possibly even subsistence but not 
consideration to not talk, in other words, the quid pro quo of silence. 

Then he said, “Money flowed to Howard Hunt, in turn to Howard 
Hunt’s wife, and then in turn, $19,000 to Mr. McCord, which in turn 
went to McCord’s attorney.” 

And this was an example that he was citing to me. 

He said, Tuesday of this week, meaning the week of the 5th, that 
McCord was going to present a letter to the court which implicated 
Attorney Parkinson. He quoted McCord as saying this letter is a lie 
but I am going to get these bastards. He felt that haying said that to 
the attorneys in the case that that comment was privileged but ap- 
parently McCord got cold feet. He stood up to deliver the letter against 
Parkinson in court but then he sat down without doing so. ^ 

Then he characterizes Mr. McCord, Mr. O’Brien does, in the adjec- 
tives that you see there in the exhibit. 

He said later and I don’t know what later — I know what later 
refers to, I was interrupted in this meeting, and went out, I believe, 
to take a phone call and came back. He said that Mrs. Hunt had writ- 
ten a memo which named Bittman and Parkinson as involved in the 
money business. That there is a memo from Parkinson to Dean to 
LaRue. The memo went to LaRue because LaRue was responsible for 
obtaining the funds for this purpose. 

Just before Howard Hunt was sentenced, which would have been in 
March, as I recall, although it doesn’t say so here., Bittman phoned 
O’Brien who, in turn passed a message to Dean, Mitchell, and LaRue 
that Hunt was making a demand for $70,000. 

Then he said in his opinion the attorney-client privilege will not 
cover meetings he was in or any conspiracy that he was in, and that 
refers to John Dean, and then he mentioned to me that Dean’s attor- 
ney is Mr, Hogan. That Dean is represented and that he is actively 
counseling with an attorney. 

He said that two blocks of money were delivered bv Mr. Mitchell, 

I take it, not personally but by the campaign to Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Ixotjte. How many dollars ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I don’t know and I don’t think he knew. I believe 
I asked him. 

Senator Inotjte. Was this in cash ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I don’t know that either. He just said that he — 
because I was pressing him for any White House involvement and 
all through these interviews, Senator, that was the key question all 
the way through. 


( 515 ) 



28.2 JOHN EHELICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 , 1973, 7 SSC 2729-36* 2751 

2735 

He said the night of the Watergate break-in, Sloan and Stans took 
cash home amounting to about $81,000 which they returned the next 
day. This was given to LaRue on advice of Mardian and this money 
was used for subsistence for the defendants. He said Mr. LaRue has 
$100,000 now, $81,000 of which he has held since that time, since, for 
the past 11 months. 

Sloan said to O’Brien that $1 million to $2 million in cash had 
come in. Stans reported that it was about $1,700,000, which included 
$275,000 that had gone to Kalmbach and $350,000 sum which had gone 
to the White House. He said, Mr. O’Brien said, that one sheet of 
paper exists with an accounting of this $1,700,000 on it, and three 
people know where that accounting is. 

Senator Inoute. Who are the three people ? 

Mr. Ehrijchaiax. I will come to that later on in the accounts. I 
think I had better take this seriatim, if you don’t mind, to explain 
the hieroglyphics as we go along. 

He saia as far as his reputation was concerned that Mr. Stans was 
“done” but that he, O’Brien, did not foresee that Mr. Stans would be 
indicted. He is not guilty of any perjury, he had been very foxy in the 
statements which he had made, that if he could spend a week with 
Mr. Kalmbach and could get their accounts straightened out, he didn’t 
foresee that there would be any liability in Mr. Stans. 

Then we talked about the civil suits. There were two. The Demo- 
cratic suit and the Common Cause suit. He felt if the Committee To 
Re-Elect would only file with the Congress an accounting of all con- 
tributions that the Common Cause lawsuit could be mooted. It would 
take somewhere between 2 weeks and 6 months to get those accounts 
in shape and he didn’t know just how long it would take. He said that 
Mr. Stans was extremely opposed to domg this because this would 
break faith with the contributors who had contributed anonymously. 

He said if we didn’t do this, he said, “I am satisfied we are going to 
lose the case.” 

In the Democratic National Committee suit, settlement negotiations 
were underway because Larry O’Brien was now on the payroll of 
Dwayne Andreas. Mr. Andreas held his future— Mr. O’Brien as long 
as the countersuits existed couldn’t get credit, couldn’t buy a house, 

Robert Strauss wants to settle the case, Mr. Mitchell met with Strauss 
the previous day. The number that was being kicked around was a 
$500,000 settlement and he said there are $5 million available in the 
Committee To Re-Elect treasury to make that settlement. 

Howard Hunt was a prime — Howard Hunt was a prime contact for 
Segretti according to Mr. O’Brien and I don’t know what his source 
for this information is. I think we have gone out of the Magruder part 
of the source business now. That Hunt supplied a Florida printer to 
three key Segretti men, one a man named Norton in Los Angeles and 
one from Tampa and another from Florida whose names he didn’t 
know. These three men performed dirty tricks. 

Senator Ixoutr. What were the dirty tricks ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, the only one I have a note of is generator 
of Canuck letter and presumably he meant by that that either Segretti 
or one of these three people were the generator of that letter. What his 


( 516 ) 



28.2 JOHN EHELICHMM TESTIMONY, JULY 27 , 1973, 7 SSC 27 29-Z6, 2751 

2736 

source is for that I do not know. I asked him about Dwight Chapin’s 
involvement in this. He said, “Well, Chapin will take a bath,” by which 
he meant his reputation of his good repute will be affected. He said 
someone is working newsmen for more favorable stories, and his 
source of information on that was a reporter named Lasky who told 
him that this was going on. 

He said that Chapin had had a lot of Segretti contact. He said 
Segretti had an immediate worry which was that he had received these 
payments of cash as you see here in the exhibit totaling $40,000, by 
April 15 he was going to have to pay his income tax, he needed guid- 
ance from somebody as to how to show that money as income or not, 
and he lacked money to pay his taxes. 

He said he has the problem of how one describes his business, and 
how to deduct a business expense under those circumstances. 

He said that 'Mr. Segretti had kept a very complete diary in which 
he had cataloged all of his expenses. 

He then told me about Mr. Fensterwald, who was an attorney repre- 
senting McCord. He said that Mr. Alch wanted out as McCord’s 
attorney. McCord had done some things which Alch did not approve 
of such as phoning the Embassies of Chile and Israel with the thought 
they were tapped so he could be dismissed from the Government’s 
*■ actions against him. McCord also had sent an unsigned letter to Jack 
Caulfield which Mr. O’Brien described as sick, which related to the 
CIA and Mr. Helms and so forth. 

He said that Caulfield had taken the letter to Mr. Dean. Caulfield 

L had seen McCord three times. I asked him whether Caulfield had made 
any offers to McCord. He said he didn’t know. He thought perhaps 
he had offered clemency but he thought also this would be susceptible 
proof because McCord very well may have tapped it. 

Senator Ervin. I hate to interrupt the proceedings but there is a 
vote on in the Senate and members of the committee have to go 
perform their senatorial duties. 

Recess.] 

Senator Baker [presiding]. The chairman has been temporarily 
detained and he asked me to recommence the hearings and to permit 
Senator Inouye to continue with his examination. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired but I 
wanted the committee to know that my line of questioning was a very 
simple one. I just wanted the committee to be aware of the symbols 
in your notes and to better understand the interview notes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator, on that, there is a kind of a personal 
shorthand that runs through there of a few Greek letters which I will 
be gl ad to give a Rosetta stone to the staff, if they need it. 

Senator Inouye. Will you provide us with your transcript of the 
meeting with Mr. Mitchell also? 

Mr. Ehruchman. I have done so, I believe. 

Mr. Dash. Again, what I have given to you, Senator Inouye, is 
everything that we have received, and we have no- 
Mr. Ehrlichkan. Did you give him the cassette and the transcript 
of the- cassette, counsel? 

Mr. Dash. We have the tape — that is right. We have the tape of 
the Mitchell meeting but I am talking about the notes. 


( 517 ) 



28.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY* JULY 27 3 1973 3 7 SSC 2729-36, 2751 

2751 

the laws of attorney-client privilege, executive privilege, obstruction 
of justice and all of these subject that we seemed to be encountering in 
this. 

Senator Gurney. Who was that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. A man named Axel Kleiboomer. 

Senator Gurney. Perhaps you can try to spell it. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. K-l-e-i-b-o-o-m-e-r, a first-rate young man, a 
good lawyer, who did the, just the briefing, and he moved to me by 
courier at San Clemente a great deal of very useful legal reading 
and I spent the first 2 or 3 days out there in trying to assimilate some 
'of this background of law. 

Senator Gurney. What dates are these? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. This would have been the 2d, 3d, 4th of April, 
along in that period. 

Now, the Attorney General had been at San Clemente on March 31, 
and I had had a brief meeting with him at that time and that he had 
had a private meeting with the President that day. And then he left. 

Finally Mr, O’Brien’s arrival at San Clemente — — 

Senator Gurney. Did you and the Attorney General discuss Water- 
gate at all? 

Mr, Ehrlichman. Yes, the fact that I had this assignment. 

Senator Gurney. But nothing of substance about facts? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. But not facts as such. He indicated in this con- 
versation on the 28th, just 2 days before or 3 days before, that we 
had everything he had, in effect, that is the substance of his responses 
here, and that continued to be the case in the brief conversation that 
I had with him ‘before he saw the President. I told him that I was 
trying to get on top of this and I would need some help, some briefing 
help, and he said fie would find the best guy he could and he did, and 
so we got into it. 

Mr. Kleiboomer sent me two big notebooks of brief, and as I say 
^^that was sort of heavy going, and I just sat and read it. 
r With Mr. O’Brien’s arrival, however, that was my first interview, 
and it brought me a whole new picture of this whole matter. A lot of 
information in what Mr, O’Brien gave me that I had never heard 
before. 

■Senator Gurney, You have recounted most of that to the com- 
mittee, have you not? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; 'I am not quite through. 

Senator Gurney. All right, 

Mr. Ehrlichman. There is quite a bit of business in those notes 
about money, about the involvements of people who had various funds 
of money and carried money around and who got money and how 
Biddy got money and this kind of thing which was all a brandnew 
subject to me at that point. I reported in quite sketchy detail to the 
President after I had talked to Mr. O’Brien, and he urged me at that 
poin t 

Senator Gurney. Will you tell us very briefly what he told you about 
this money and other things ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. O’Brien? 

Senator Gurney. Yes. 


( 518 ) 



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( 528 ) 



28. 4 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN EHRLICHMAN 3 APRIL S 3 1973. 

’J.ohn D. Ehrlichman 
April 3, 1973 
PM 12:35 1 ;32 

2:10 3:25 

5:37 5:47 

April 4, 1973 

AM 10:35* 12:38PM President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(Haldeman 9:08- 11:20 & 12:05 - 12:40} 

PM 6:07 6:09 President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 

•April 5, 1973 

AM 11:45 2:00PM President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(Haldeman 11:45-3:00} 

PM 3:00 3:30 President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

(Ziegler 3:15-3:25} 

101536 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

Motored from San Clemente to Anaheim 

Stadium to California Angels Dug out 7:50PM 

Motored from Anaheim Stadium to San Clemente 

April 8, 1973 

AM 9:29 4:35 PM El Toro to Andrews AFB 

10:40 12:20PM President met with Ehrlichman in flight 


April 6, 

1973 


AM 

10:57 

11:22 

PM 

1:25 

1:50 


7:06 

7:50 


10:29 

11:09 



Luncheon hosted by President and Mrs. 

Thieu at La Casa Pacifica - San Clemente 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Ziegler 2:11-2:14) 

President placed local call to Mr. Ehrlichman 



29. On April 6 , 1973 Ehrlichraan met with Kalmbach in the Bank of 
America parking lot in San Clemente, California. Ehrlichman ' s notes 
dictated after the meeting reflect a discussion of Kalmbach 's activities 
in raising and disbursing money for the Watergate defendants. Kalmbach 
told Ehrlichman that he had retained the services of an attorney, Paul 
O'Connor. 


Page 

29.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 6 , 1973 (received 

from SSC) 532 

29.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2752, 2768, 2773... 533 

29.3 John Ehrlichman notes of April 6 , 1973 meeting 
with Herbert Kalmbach, SSC Exhibit No. 100, 7 SSC 

2947 536 


( 531 ) 




• 29.1 JOHN EHRLJCHMAN L OG , APRIL g. 1973_ 

y THURSDAY. APRIL 5, 1973 


OR 


8-10:30 

li:00 lll3O; 
3:00 __ 

4 : 00 . 


Paul 0 ! 3rien 


'“r^rsiae nc 


JPrei ildent 


Judge Matthew Byrne 
y FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1975 J 


c 


10:30 

11:00 

1 1:30 


Bebe Rebozo 
Presider 1 


1:00 

1:15- 1:45 

1 : 4% : 00 _ 

7:00 


Herb Kalmbach {parking lot of Bank of America. 
San Clemente) 

Ted Ashley (Warner Brothers) 

President . - -• 


■^r^'S Td e jj* nc h Ashley 




Bas eball game with the President --Anahe im 
SUNDAY. APRIL 8. 1973 


8:30 

9:00 

4:30 

5-7 


Helicopter from Palomar 

Depart El Toro _ ' ' . ~ 

Arrive Andrews 2j0 ° - Pre sident (Air Force One) 

HRH, John Dean 


J 


MONDAY. APRIL 9, 1973 


10:30 
12:30 
2-2 :45_ 
6:30 


Secretary Shultz* office - Stein, Ash, Flanigan 

Lunch with AT^ - at Justice 

Pr esident 

Blair House - Senators Ervin, Baker 


TUESDAY. APRIL 10, 1973 


8:30 

10:15 

11:15 

12 : 45-2 

2:20 

3:00 

3:15 

SToo 


Bipartisan Leadership 
Ler. Garment, Ziegler 
Zi egler, HRH 
President 


Mr. Luce (Con Ed), Marshall McDonald (Florida Po'~j- 
and Light) 

HRH 

Joined 07 Dean 


( 532 ) 



29.2 JOHN EHHLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 , 1973, 7 SSC 2752, 2768, 
2773 


2752 


Mr, Ehrlichman. Yes. He told me about a fund of money that 
existed at the Committee To Re-Elect, of which he knew, and he had 
a piece of paper that had a lot of information on it, this was Bart 
Porter’s account, as he called it. It was in cash from Sloan to Porter, 
about $50,000 of it was pre-April I money, $37,000 of it went to Gordon 
Liddy, and then he has a whole lot of payments out, most of which I 
believe Mr. Porter has testified to here. 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Well r let’s not go over those that we already know. 

Mr. Ehhjchkan. Right. 

Senator Gurney. But give us new information. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He told me about some campaign violations, cam- 
paign funding violations, which he said the General Accounting Office 
knew of which involved, oh, nothing over about $10,000 but a lot of 
different items. He told me about Liddy getting some money for 
Cuban demonstrators in Washington, D.C., you had testimony on that, 
I guess, and so then I got into the question of who ran the Committee 
To Re-Elect at various times, particularly during the planning period 
- here. He said that Magruder said he was running the committee, but 
he was seeing Mr. Mitchell twice a day during this period of time and 
he felt it was safe to say that Mitchell was running the committee 
even when he was Attorney General. 

Now, that is the balance of the interview with O’Brien, but that 
gave me a lot of perspective on this thing that I had never had before. 

Senator Gurney. Did he give you any information on the planning 
of the break-in ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes ; and I testified with Senator Inouye about 
that, those four meetings and that whole business. 

Senator Gurney. Fine. 

C Mr. Ehrlichman. I had only one other substantive interview while 
we were at San Clemente in the remaining 3 or 4 days and that was 
with Mr. Kalmbach, but I became aware through Mr. Haldeman, who 
was reporting to me, conflicting conversations that he was having with 
Mitchell and Dean on this whole subject of should Dean go to the 
grand jury or should Dean go to the prosecutor, and we began trying 
to understand what lay behind this. Well, I had the background of 
Mr. O’Brien’s interview, and we zeroed in on the fact that it had to 
do with these four meetings or three meetings or whatever there were, 
and whether or not Mr. Mitchell might have some exposure for perjury 
on account of having testified that the meetings were canceled or not. 
Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. And so I had Bob Haldeman trying to get a 
straight answer out of Mr. Mitchell and he said he could not, so I called 
Dick Moore and asked him if he would talk to John Mitchell because 
I knew they had a close relationship. 

Senator Gurney. And that was the reason for Moore’s trip to New 
York? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No; it was not. It was subsequent to that trip 
to New York. I believe this was a telephone call which Mr. Moore 
said he made to John Mitchell, and Mr. Moore, I believe, also talked 
to Mr. Mitchell’s attorney, although I am not positive of that. But 
in any event, Mr. Moore reported back that Mr. Mitchell was con- 
fident that he had not in any way violated any perjury statute, 


( 533 ) 



29.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY , JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2752, 2768, 

2773 


2768 


r 

L 


Mr. Ehrlichman. "What he told me in the second interview I had 
with him I felt was correct and the truth and that he was trying very 
hard to tell me every thing he knew. I had a favorable impression of 
what he told me, that is, of the — of his attempt to tell the truth. 

Senator Montoya. The point I am trying to make is, did you reach 
any conclusion from the interviews with respect to him as to whether 
or not he was involved either in the pre-June 17 complicity or after? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I see. He told me that he had received from the 
Committee To Ke-Elect notice that they had an intelligence capability. 
He — and I confronted him with what Mr. Magruder had alleged which 
was that Mr. Magruder had sent over to him a budget which included 
specific reference to bugging and he said no he would have remembered 
if anything like that had come over. He was sure he had never seen 
anything like that. He said that he did receive from Mr. Magruder 
some material designated Sedan Chair, and it looked to him like syn- 
opses of wiretap information. Of course, we have learned since that 
Sedan Chair was not a wiretap but that was the only thing he said he 
received. He said he got no Gemstone material at all. 

Senator Montoya. Mr. Ehrlichman, I am just interested in what 
you concluded as a result of the interviews with respect to these in- 
dividuals. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right. My conclusion with regard to Mr. 
Strachan was that he was a messenger, that he was not an active plan- 
ner or executor of any plan but simply a conveyor back and forth. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now what conclusion did you reach 
with respect to Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. My conclusion after talking with Mr. Kalmbach, 
as you will see in this memorandum that we have now given the staff, 
I take it, perhaps it is best if I simply read you a short portion of that 
as my then contemporaneous conclusion. That will probably be the best 
evidence. E>o you have that, counsel ? 

Mr. Wilson. I gave them the only copy I had. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Do you want to read it? 

Senator Montoya. Let me, I am running out of time now. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right, very shortly, Senator 

Senator Montoya. I merely wanted to get an indication as to what 
kind of an inquiry you had conducted with respect to each individual. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. All right. My inquiry with him was as to his 
money-raising efforts and whether or not he knew, either directly or 
whether he knew circumstances surrounding his efforts which might 
have put him on notice that he was engaged in an effort to buy the 
silence of defendants and I was satisfied that he did not know. 

Senator Montoya. All right, what inquiry did you make about Mr. 
Kalmbach? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I interviewed Mr. Kalmbach. 

Senator Montoya. Just briefly, what inquiry did you — you inter- 
viewed him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

•Senator Montoya. All right. And you taped his conversation? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. I made this memorandum afterward 
which I have given to the staff. 

Senator Montoya. All right. 


( 584 :) 




29.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973 , 7 SSC 2752, 2768, 


2773 

of making findings of fact as to the testimony of specific witnesses. 
But passing that fox' the moment, it seems to me that whether there 
are conflicts in the evidence is not neax*ly as impoxtant as to whether or 
not conflicts in the evidence are supported, one side or the other, by cor- 
roborating independent evidence on material points, and I hope that 
you will find it possible, and the other members of the committee will 
find it possible, to examine the various extrinsic pieces of evidence such 
as the letter from the CIA to the FBI and thiixgs of that kixxd, to 
determine which of conflicting testimony is entitled to the greater 
weight. - 

Senator Montoya. I am sure that we will do that. I personally will, 
I can assure you, Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. I will weigh the weight of the testimony, and I 
will also give consideration to any documentary evidence that you pre- 
sent here and certainly I think all the members will. 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Good, thank you. 

Senator Ervin. I think one of the prime functions of this committee, 
outside of making recommendations for legislation, is to find the facts 
and what the facts are — whether the testimony is from witnesses or 
from documents. Senator Weicker. 

r Mr. Wilson. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, may the notes of the meet- 
ing of April 6 which I passed to the Chair be included in the record at 
this point? 

L Senator Ervin. Yes; the reporter will mark it as an exhibit and 
admit it as such. < 

[The document referred to was max'ked exhibit No. 100.*] 

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, sir. Excuse me Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Chairman, I think a bell has just rung for a 
vote and this might be the proper time to recess. 

Senator Ervin. We will recess and hurry back as fast as we can. 
[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. Senator Weicker, you may examine the witness. 
Senator Weicker. Mr. Ehrlichman, I am going to refer to your 
opening statement before the committee and specifically on page 11 of 
that opening statement, and in the bottom of paragraph you state: 

The counsel has always had political duties. The President is the Nation’s 
Chief Executive but he is also by longstanding tradition his political party’s 
leader. Any President has a political role to play whether he is going to run 
for re-election or not. But if he is a candidate then he is both an executive and 
a practicing politician. Every such politician wants information, and the Presi- 
dent, in bis politician role, is no different from the others. He needs and wants 
information about issues, supporters, opponents, and every other political sub- 
ject known to man. For the year 1969 to 1970 when I left the post of counsel, 
I attempted to gather purely political information for the President as I was 
expected to do, out of real concern for reciprocity, attempted to use only con- 
ventional nongovernmental sources of information ; as one might hire political 
aides in a political campaign. Tony Ulasewicz was hired to do this chore of in- 
formation-gathering. He was paid from existing Nixon political money by check 
under an api>ropriate employer’s tax number. Among other assignments he ex- 
ecuted potential opposition for vulnerability. So far as I am aware, in my tenure 
as counsel, Mr. Ulasewicz conducted his assignments legally and properly in all 
respects. 

•See p. 294-7. 


( 535 ) 



29.3 JOHNEHRLICHMAN NOTES, APRIL 6 , 1973, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 100, 

2947 

Exhibit No. 100 

Notes of a meeting with Herb Kalmbach, April 6, 1973, 
in San Clemente, California approximately Noon 


Kalmbach wan very concerned about the effect of his testimony 
with regard to raising money for the Watergate defendants upon 
Kalmbach* s reputation and family. 

It is his recollection that John Dean telephoned him to ask him to 
do so upon the representation that both Bob Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman had OKayed his doing so. 

Kalmbach assumed that he would not be asked to do anything 
illegal or improper , he had no occasion to check the law nor to 
inquire into the disposition of the funds, he arranged for a "Mr. Rivers" 
to carry the money from California to Washington and to deliver it 
according to John Dean's instructions. 

Kalmbach does not know to this day how the money was used. He 
was not willing to disclose to me who he raised the money from but 
my impression is that he raised it from two individuals who paid 
him cash and desired passionately to remain anonymous. 

Kalmbach has the impression that the money was to be used for - 
compassionate purposes, that is, the support of the families of 
the imprisoned defendants, and that the money was being furnished 
to them by way of a moral obligation for the well-being of the 
families. He understands.. that some of the money was to be used 
for attorneys' fees for the men either directly or indirectly. Kalmbach 
has retained the services of an attorney named Paul O'Connor of 
Phoenix, a long-time friend, and he asked that I see Mr. O'Connor 
on his first visit to Washington as a courtesy, I agreed to do so. 


* * * 


( 536 ) 



30. On April 8, 1973 Dean started to meet with the prosecutors. 
While meeting with the prosecutors. Dean received a call from Air Force 
One from Haldeman's assistant Lawrence Hlgby , who asked Dean to be in 
Ehrllchman' s office that afternoon for a meeting. Ehrllchman and 
Haldeman met with Dean from 5:00 until 7:00 p.m. There was a discus- 
sion of the possibility of a grand jury appearance by Dean. Ehrlich- 
man has testified that they discussed, among other things, what this 
"hang up" was between Mitchell and Dean and Dean's feeling that 
Mitchell did not want Dean to talk to the prosecutors or appear before 
the grand jury. Ehrllchman has also testified that the President 
decided on the flight that he wanted Dean to go to the grand jury, and 
that Ehrllchman and Haldeman conveyed that to Dean at the meeting. 


Page 


30.1 <John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1010-11 538 

30.2 John Ehrllchman log, April 8, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 540 

30.3 John Ehrllchman testimony, 7 SSC 2753^54 541 


( 537 ) 




30.1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25 3 1973 3 3 SSC 1010-11 

1010 

Events Leading up to the President’s Statement of April IT 




During the time I was having conferences with the Government 
prosecutors, I was avoiding conversations with Mitchell, Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman as much as I could. However, on several occasions ] 
did talk with Ehrlichman while he was in California. At one point 
he called me and asked if I had completed my report that I had beer 
working oil at Camp David. I told him it wa 3 still incomplete. 
said that I should send him whatever I had completed. I told him 
that a section dealing with Segretti’s activities, which had been pre- 
pared by Dick Moore, but which I had not reviewed myself, was com- 
plete as far as I was concerned and I would send it on to him. He said 
I should send it to California immediately on the DX machine. He 
said that Haldeman was interested in getting these facts out now 
because the timing might be good. I sent the report that had been 
written by Mr. Moore, a copy of which I have submitted to the 
committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 3 4-44 .*] 

Mr. Dean. L also had a conversation with ^Mitchell about Paul* 
O’Brien going out to visit with Haldeman in California. Mitchell told 
me that lie wanted O’Brien to go out and visit with Haldeman and that 
he had worked out the meeting. I felt like telling iMitchell that I 
thought that when I learned the meeting had been switched from 
Haldeman to Ehrlichman, that O’Brien was being set up, that Ehrlich- 
man would probe him on everything he knew about Mitchell, Dean, 
and anyone else involved. I did not know if this in fact occurred, but 
knowing that Ehrlichman and Haldeman were very busy protecting 
their flanks, I would have to believe that it did occur. I have never 
talked with O’Brien about .what did occur during his meeting with 
Ehrlichman. 

Ehrlichman also asked me if I knew when I would be called before 
the grand jury. I told him I did not, but that my lawyers were dis- 
cussing the matter with the prosecutors. I did not tell him that I had 
already met with the prosecutors but he told me that he wanted to 
know when I was going to be called because he wanted to talk with 
me before I appeared. 

I believe that the President returned from California on Sunday, 
April 8. I was scheduled to meet with the prosecutors that afternoon. 
My attorneys had been discussing my testimony with the prosecutors 
and they had worked out an arrangement whereby I could give the 
prosecutors my knowledge directly and what I told them would not 
later be used against me if they should prosecute me. I felt that I 
should tell Haldeman that I was going to meet with the prosecutors 
personally so I called him in California on the morning of April S 
before they departed for Washington. I made the call from Mr. Shaf- 
fer’s office and when I told him this he said that I should not meet 
with the prosecutors because, as he said, i: Once the toothpaste is out 
of the tube, ifs going to be very hard to get it back in.” After this 
comment, I did not tell Haldeman whether T would or would not meet 
with them and in fact the meeting went forward. During the meeting 
and while the President was flying east, I received a call from Air 


•See p. 1204. 


( 538 ) 



30. 1 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY . JUNE 25, 1972^ 3 SSC1010-11 

ion 

Force One from Higby, who asked me to be in Wisdom’s (Ehrlich- 
man’s code name) office at a certain time for a meeting. I believe the 
meeting was set for 4 or 5 o’clock. 

I departed from the meeting with the prosecutors to go into the 
White House. I went to Ehrlichman’s office. There I found Ehrlich- 
man and Haldeman who had just arrived from Andrews Air Force 
Base and we chatted for a brief moment about their trip. I raised the 
fact that I had read in the paper that morning that Colson had taken 
a lie detector test. I said that I hope everyone is willing to take such 
a lie detector test because it will probably be necessary now that Colson 
has taken a test. They asked me if I had met yet with the prosecutors 
or knew when I would be called before the grand jury. I avoided a 
direct answer to the question by saying that my lawyers were still 
having discussions with the prosecutors about my appearance before 
the grand jury. I was then asked some questions about testimonial 

L areas but I gave them evasive answers. Even these evasive answers, 
which raised matters which related to them, brought forth responses 
that they did not remember it quite as I did. 

During the week of April 9 to April 14, 1 had several conversations 
with Ehrlichman and Haldeman but I tried to avoid them as much 
as possible. I recall some discussions however regarding getting 
Mitchell to step forward. The theory that had ‘been discussed before 
they went to California was becoming the policy— “If Mitchell takes 
the rap the public will have a high level person and be satisfied and 
the matter will finally end.” I felt during each encounter I had with 
them that I w^as very much a problem for them but they did not want~ 
me to know that they felt so. However, after having been involved 
with them for months on end in this matter, it was very easy for me 
to recognize a changed attitude, and on occasion they were almost 
patronizing in dealing with me. 

On Monday, April 9, Mitchell called me and told me he was coming 
to Washington and wanted to meet with me. I informed Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman of Mitchell’s request and they both wanted me to meet 
with hirQ. I also discussed this with counsel and there was some discus- 
sion with the Government about the meeting. The prosecutors were 
interested in my taping the conversation but I told them I thought it 
was most unfair to do, to Mitchell, and that I would not go in and set 
him up. 

After discussing this further with my attorney, and rejecting the 
suggestion that I record the conversation, I agreed to meet with 
Mitchell but I had been instructed by counsel to prepare a memoran- 
dum of the meeting as soon as the meeting was over. I agreed to do 
this and I have submitted a copy of that memorandum to the 
committee. 

fThe document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-45.*] 

Mr. Dean. The sum and substance of the meeting was that if and 
when I were called to testify I would testify fully and honestly. Mit- 
chell said that he understood and did not suggest that I do otherwise. 
He did, however, believe that mv testimony would be verv harmful to 
the President and said that he felt that I should not testify if at all 
possible. I reported my meeting with Mitchell to Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman later. 


•See p. 130S. 


( 539 ) 



30. 2 JOHN EBELICHMAN LOG, APRIL g. 1973 



y < 


THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1973 


8-10:30 

ll:00 n ^ 

3:00 

4:00 


Paul 0 ! 3rien 

Preside at 
_P-r esident 

4.1- 


Judge Matthew Byrne 
,X FRIDAY. APRIL 6, 1973 


10:30 

11:00 

1 1:30 


Bebe Rebozo 
President 


1:00 

1:15- 1:45 

1:4 %:00 _ 
7:00 


Herb Kalmbach (parking lot of Bank of America. 
San Clemente) 

Ted Ashley (Warner Brothers) 

President 


j£*rWtrete ncil with Ashley 




Baseball game with the President —Anaheim 
SUNDAY, APRIL 8. 1973 


8:30 

9:00 

4:30 

5-7 


Helicopter from Palomar 
Depart El Toro — 

Arrive Andrews 2 ^2P ~ ,. Pr 5g ldeafc (Air F orce One) 

HRH, John Dean 


J 


MONDAY, APRIL 9. 1973 


10:30 

12:30 

2-2:45^ 

6:30 


Secretary Shultz 1 office - Stein, Ash, Flanigan 
Lunch with AT^ - at Justice 
.President 

Blair House - Senators Ervin, Baker 


/ TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1973 


8:30 

Bipartisan Leadership 

10:15 

Len Garment, Ziegler 

11:15 

Ziegler, HRH 

12:45-2 

President 

2:20 

Mr. Luce (Con Ed), Marshall McDonald 
and Light) 

3:00 

HRH 

3:15 

Joined by Dean 

57oo“ 

Lan Garment 


( 540 ) 



30. 3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY. JULY 27 , 1973, 7 SSC 2753-54 

2753 

and that he just did not think it was a good idea for the President’s 
lawyer to be going out and testifying; in other words, it was an at- 
torney-client privilege kind of position that he was contending for. It 
did not satisfy me. 

Senator Gurnet. Mitchell now talking about Dean should not 
testify? 

Mr. Ehruchman. That is correct. This thing continued to be a 
nagging question, and so we called John Dean, as we were headed 
back, I talked to Haldeman further about this. Dean was not talking 
to me, all through this period of time, I had not had phone call one 
from him, which was very unusual because I used to hear from him 
from time to time on various subjects, including Watergate, but I was 
completely not on his telephone list and Bob Haldeman was hearing 
from him all the time. So we talked about what Bob Haldeman- 

Senator Gurnet. Did he know that you were performing the role 
for the President ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. I believe so. 

Senator Gurnet. All right. 

Mr. Ehruchman. I believe so. I did not tell him but I believe he 
well knew it. 

As a matter of fact, just before we departed for California this 
question arose of Mr. Dean being fired by his law firm for unethical 
conduct and I sent for his personnel package in order to check it. The 
personnel package arrived in Fred Fielding’s arms with scotch tape 
around it a number of times, and he said, “What do you want this 
for?” And I said, “Well, there is a story” — and that refreshed my 
recollection, I did have one phone call from John Dean and that was 
on that subject. He did call me at San Clemente about that and he said, 

“I understand you wanted to get my personnel package,” and I said 
“Yes, there is this story about your having been accused of this un- 
ethical conduct,” and he then told me the long story which he re- 
* counted to this committee, that he eventually was able to get the 
attorney who made the charges to retract the charges, which satisfied 
me, but I think through Fielding and through my conversation with 
Fielding on that occasion, Mr. Dean must have known that I was ac- 
tively in this. 

Senator Gurnet. I see. 

Mr. Ehruchman. In any event, on the way back we called and 
asked John Dean to meet us in my office when we returned to Wash- 
ington that night, and he did so. 

Senator Gurnet. What date ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Well, April 8, 9. 

Senator Gurnet. April 8 between 5 and 7 p.m.? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Right ; that was a Saturday or Sunday — that was 
a Sunday night, and we had a 2-hour meeting, Bob Haldeman, John 
Dean, and I, to try and understand what this hangup was between 
Mitchell and Dean. We still did not have a feel for it. Then, for the 
first time, Mr. Dean talked to us about the four meetings or the three 
meetings back in January and Feb ni ary and explained some of the 
nuances of the coverup story with regard to Mr. Magruder and the 
meeting which he, Dean, Magruder, and Mitchell had had in Mr. 
Mitchell’s law office at a time wiien they were gathered with the 
attorneys in the case to discuss grand jury testimony where the three 


35-904 O - 74 - pt. 1-35 


( 541 ) 


30.3 JOHN EHELICHMAN TESTIMONY 3 JULY 27, 1973 3 7 SSC 2753-54 

2754 

of them had retired to Mr. Mitchell’s partners’ office away from the 
attorneys and had discussed how to reconcile their respective recol- 
lection of the events of the early 1972 period. So that was the first 
time that I had from Mr. Dean directly this subject matter. 

Senator Gurney. Did he talk to you at that time about his orchestra- 
tion of the per j ury of Magruder ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He did, but he did it in very delicate terms. He 
did not in any way admit to me flatly that he had, in fact orchestrated 
it to perjury. He indicated that he had had u part in the preparation 
of the testimony, that there were, well, I have forgotten now, it was 
a very careful explanation which did not really implicate Mr. Dean 
in suborning to perjury by any means, but he indicated that he was 
well familiar with the problems between Magruder and Mitchell, 
on the one hand. He felt that Mr. Mitchell had problems which were 
causing Mr. Mitchell to say that Mr. Dean should not go and talk to 
the prosecutor or the grand jury and so this was very thoroughly dis- 
cussed and hashed over during that meeting. 

Senator Gurney. These problems between Dean and Magruder, 
specifically, did they involve who was responsible for the break-in, in 
giving the green light to it ; is that what you mean ? 

* Mr. Ehruchman. I gathered not. I think they involved disputes 

in their recollection as to what took place at these Liddy meetings, 
so-called, back in the early part of 1972. 

Senator Gurney. I see. 

Did he go in at that meeting to any detail about his own involve- 
ment from June on — Dean, I am talking about — co verup ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No ; not in evidentiary terms at alL We talked 
about the President’s desire. The President on the flight back, as I 
recall, we had a meeting on the flight back of about, nearly 2 hours 
about this and the President decided he wanted Mr. Dean to go to 
the grand jury, so we conveyed that to Mr. Dean at that time. 

Senator Gurney. What was his reaction to that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. He was still very much interested in the question 
of immunity. He had some information, as I recall, about how the 
prosecutors felt about the White House, and so he imparted that to us, 
that he did not feel that anybody in the White House was a target of 
the prosecutors, that they were after some people who had obstructed 
justice, like Mardian and LaRue and people at the committee, but that 

L he, Dean, felt that something like an estoppel or functional immunity 
or something could be worked out with the prosecutors if he went to 
testify and he seemed generally in agreement with the idea that he go 
and testify. 

Senator Gurney. Was there any discussion at that meeting about 
your role in Watergate or Hal deman’s role in Watergate? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That did not come until this meeting of April 13. 
Senator Gurney. Well, could we go into that one? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. On the 13th, after 2 :30 or 3 o’clock in the afternoon 
I had a conversation with Dean which was apparently as a result of 
further contacts which he had had with the prosecutor He told me 
. that Liddy had talked with the prosecutors off the record very com- 
pletely and that they might get him to talk on the record. That his 


( 542 ) 



31. On April 8 , 1973, from 7:33 to 7:37 p.m., the President and 
John Ehrlichman spoke by telephone. The President has produced an 
edited transcript of that conversation. A summary has been prepared 
of that transcript. 


Page 


31.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Ehrlichman, April 8 , 1973 (received 

from White House) 544 

31.2 House Judiciary Committee staff summary of White 
House edited transcript of conversation between 
the President and John Ehrlichman, April 8 , 1973, 

7 : j 3 7 : 37 p *m« 343 


( 543 ) 



31.1 

MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN EHRLICHMAN. APRIL 8 . 1973 

’John D. 

Ehrlichman 


April 8, 

1973 (Cont'd) 

i 

PM 

4:40 

4:48 

\ 4 : 

Andrews AFB to White House 

— 

7:33 

7:37 

President received call from Mr. Ehrlichman 

April 9, 

1973 



PM 

2:14 

2:45 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 2:05-2:45) 

(Mr. Garment 2:40-3:00) 


7:55 

8:07 

President placed call to Mr. Ehrlichman 


8:21 

8:23 

President received call from Mr. Ehrlichman 


April 10, 1973 


AM 

8:37 

10:19 

President had meeting in Cabinet Room/ 
Bipartisan Cong. Leadership 

PM 

12:48 

2:00 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 


5:59 

6:09 

President placed call to Mr. Ehrlichman 

April 11, 

1973 


X01538 

AM 

11:05 

11:50 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 

PM 

12:34 

1:20 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 


2:20 

2:59 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 1:40-2:59) 

(Mr. Ziegler 2:15-2:59) 


3:18 

4:32 

President met with Mr. Ehrlichman 
(Mr. Haldeman 3:18-4:49) 

(Mr. Ziegler 3:18-4:20) 


7:14 

7:26 

President placed long distance call to 
Mr. Ehrlichman 


7:38 

7:43 

President placed long distance call to 
Mr . Ehrlichman 



( 544 ) 




31.2 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF SUMMARY OF WHITE 

HOUSE EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF APRIL 8, 1973 CONVERSATION^ 


Summary of White House Edited Transcript, 

April 8, 1973, From 7:33 to 7:37 p.m. 

Ehrlichman reported to the President that Dean would appear 
before the grand jury and his testimony would harm Magruder, but not 
Mitchell. The President said that Mitchell should decide whether to 
tell Dean to say nothing or lie. The President said, "Well, John is 
not going to lie." The President expressed his opinion that if Dean 
incriminated Magruder, Mitchell should be concerned that Magruder would 
incriminate Mitchell and not Haldeman. The President also said the 
grand jury would be concerned with who gave final approval. The President 
concluded by telling Ehrlichman that Magruder had better plead the 5th 
Amendment and we don 1 t want Mitchell popping off. 


( 545 ) 





32. On April 11, 1973 Attorney General Kleindienst had a conversation 
with Assistant Attorney General Petersen. Kleindienst told Petersen 
that Ehrlichman had just called to tell Kleindienst that he did not feel 
that any White House aides should be granted immunity. 


Page 

32.1 Henry Petersen testimony, 9 SSC 3629 548 


( 547 ) 




32.1 HENRY PETERSEN TESTIMONY, AUGUST 7, 1973 , 9 SSC 3629 


effect has admitted it. Should I request his resignation?” And I said, 
“My goodness, no. Now, here is the first man who has come in to co- 
operate with us and certainly we don’t want to give the impression 
that he is being subjected to reprisal because of his cooperation. So 
please don’t ask for his resignation at this point.” And the President 
agreed to hold off until I — until he heard from me further on that 
issue. That carried on until about the 26th or 27th of October and in 
a statement on the telephone I reached the conclusion after discussions 
with Silbert that we had reached an impasse in our negotiations with 
Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Dash. You don’t mean October. You mean April. 

Mr. Petersen. Right, Mr. Dash. April, excuse me. 

We had reached an impasse in our discussions with Mr. Dean and 
that I could no longer justify the President’s not asking for his 
resignation, and 

r "~ Mr. Dash. Prior to that time, do you recall having a discussion with 
the President concerning immunity that might be afforded witnesses? 
Mr. Petersen. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Could you tell us briefly about that ? 

Mr Petersen. Well, I think that started — that started the preceding 
Wednesday. Mr. Ehrlichman had called Mr. Kleindienst and Klein- 
dienst called me up there and said he just had a call from John Ehr- 
lichman and Ehrlichman wants to say he didn’t think any White 
House aides ought to be immunized and it didn’t make much of an 
impression on me and I just made a witticism and said, “Well, tell 
Ehrlichman he can’t count on it,” and I didn’t think anything more 

about it. Of couise. when I learned at the end of the week 

Mr. Dash. And at this time Mr. Dean was in these conversations, in 

L cooperation with the prosecutor. 

Mr. Petersen. That is right. At the end of the week when I learned 
j^ean was cooperating it made more sense. The President took it up. 
' The President — we went on with this for about 2 or 3 days. We had a 
difference in viewpoints, of course. The President's concern — I hope 
I accurately reflect him but it seemed to me the President's concern 
was that from a public relations point of view, certainly he wanted to 
leave the impression that he as President was not causing persons who 
were in the upper echelons of his administration to be immunized and 
freed from liability. He wanted to make certain that in that respect no 
one got the impression that they were getting favored treatment. 

Well, you know, I understood that to be a consideration but I also 
understood that if it were in the interests of the prosecution, that it 
might be necessary to immunize some high echelon person. 

Mr. Dash. Did von explain that to the President ? 

Mr. Petersen. I did indeed. 

Mr. Dash. And did you get an understanding of who would make 
the ultimate decision on immunity ? 

Mr. Petersen. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. And who would be given that ultimate decision? 

Mr. Petersen. Mo. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did that point in time 

Mr. Petersen. At that point in time. 


( 548 ) 




33. On or about April 12, 1973 Ehrlichman met with Haldeman's 
assistant Gordon Strachan. Ehrlichman has testified that Strachan said 
that he had just returned from the grand jury and that upon leaving the 
grand jury room he had realized that the testimony he had given was 
mistaken with respect to the amount of money he had delivered to Fred 
LaRue. Ehrlichman has testified that he advised Strachan to get an 
attorney and, subject to the attorney's advice, to tell the prosecutor 
that he had made a mistake in his testimony. 


Page 

33.1 John Ehrlichman log, April 12, 1973 (received 


from SSC) 550 

33.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2767 551 


( 549 ) 




33. 1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN LOG, APRIL 12. 1972 


/ V/EDNZIiDAY, APRIL t 1973 

9:00 

Garment 

9:13 

Dick Moore’s office - Garment Jim. O'Connor 

11:00-1 1:45 

Pres LderG 

12:30-1 :30 

President 

1:30 

Roger Barth, Dee Henkel (tarr simplification, slide she 

2:10 

Roger Barth. 

2:15-4:00 . 

President 

5:30 

Blair House (Senators Ervin and Baker) 

7:00 ; 

Buffet at Italian Embassy - 1 60 1 Fuller - Black tie 

9:00 

Film at Kennedy. Center - Brother Sun, Sister Moor 

/ THURSDi*. 

t, APRIL 12, 1973 

\S " 

9:15 

* T3rc»_c5?dftnt 

10:30 

Ziegler 

11:00 

. HRH office 

11:45 

HRH 


HRHT Strachan 

^^30 

President 

3:30 

Alan Greenspan 

5:00 

Garment’s office 

5:30 

State Dining Room - Congressinal reception 

6:15 

. Ziegler f s office - Dick Moors et al 


y FRIDAY,, APRIL. 13, 1973 


9:10 

President 

11:30 

Charles Colson 

1:00 

President 

.2.: 30 

Dean 

3:00 

Ziegler 

3:10 

President 

5:00 

Colson, David Shaoiro 

7:30 

Dinner at La Fonda 

S;30 

’’Godspell” - Motion Picture Assn. 

/ SATURDAY 

APRIL 14. 1973 

3:45-11:30 

President 

i 1:50 

HRH office 

rSTTi 

1-iR Dean 

vts 

JrlRH put 

l :20_7„ 

Dean out 

7*30 

Ziegler 

1 ; 10 : i 0 Job n Minch.ii.L- 

2:33-3:45 

Pros i d e r t , 1 i y [ 

4:00 

J o b \ L a r : : c a r , J i •/: \ ;1 h p , J j rr. • 3 L ; r n » r 

'Vcfrf 

President ~~ 


( 550 ) 



33.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY. JULY 27 3 1973 . 7 SSC 2767 


2767 


Senator Montoya. Well, what particular assignment did he have 
during the compaign ? I understood that he was going from Mr. Halde- 
man’s office to the CRP and back and forth. Did you know of this 
assignment ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Have you since found out about this assignment? 

Mr Ehrlichman. In the course of these hearings I have learned a 
great deal more than I ever learned when I was in the White House. 

Senator Montoya. You mean you did not find out while you were at 
the White House about Mr, Strachan’s assignment? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I knew almost nothing about the scope of Mr. 
Strachan’s assignment while he was in the White House until late, you 
know, in the March-April period, when I got into it and I began in- 
terviewing people and he was one of the people I interviewed. 

Senator Montoya. What did you find out about him? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. At that time ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr Ehrlichman. That he was the liaison man between Mr. Hal de- 
man and the Committee To Re-Elect for the purpose of keeping both 
ends of his liaison informed of the acts and desires of the other. 

Senator Montoya. Did you know him ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Did you know him to be a very reliable young 
man ? 

Mr Ehrlichman. Well, I did not know him well enough to form an 
opinion as to his reliability. 

Senator Montoya. If he conveyed anything to the CRP or brought 
anything to Mr. Haldeman from the CRP, would you say that he was 
carrying out his assignment properly ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I could not speculate as to that, sir. 

Senator Montoya. Why can’t you f 

*Mr. Ehrlichman. Well, I just do not have that kind of knowledge. 
Now, so far as reliability is concerned, something occurs to me that 
perhaps you ought to know. My first interview with Mr. Strachan was 
on the occasion of his having just returned from the grand jury, and 
he came in rather shaken and told me that he did not know what to do, 
and he was looking for somebody to give him some advice. He said that 
he had just come back from testifying to the grand jury that he had 
delivered $350,000 to Mr. LaRue, and he said : 

As soon as I left there I knew that was wrong. I had not delivered $350,000 to 
Mr. LaRue, I had delivered some lesser sum because I remember that they took 
some money out or I took some money out. 

I have forgotten how he put it, but some money had been taken out 
for advertising. “What should I do?” And I said, “Well, do you have 
an attorney,” and he said, “No, I do not,” and I said : 


JL 

I thii 
’1 


That is the first thing I think you ought to do, is get some advice. The second 
thing, it seems to me, that you ought to do. subject to your attorney’s advice, is 
to go and tell the prosecutor you think you have made a mistake in your testimony. 

But that is probably the only real gage I have of Mr. Strachan’s* 
timonial reliability. 

Senator 'Montoya. Then, what did you find out about — -what con- 


clusion did you reach with respect to Mr. Strachan as a result of the 
interviews that you had ? 


o 


( 551 )